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PREF ACE 
This book, which is about dramatic change and transformation in a 
turbulent era of Polish history, was researched and written against the back­
drop of an equally profound and revolutionary turn of events in contem­
porary Poland. Although the first conceptual seeds were planted in 1980 
during work on an earlier book, I could not begin the present undertaking 
until that project's completion in 1984. In Poland, the first "self-limiting" 
revolution of Solidarity had come and gone, while many of the repressive 
features of martial law, imposed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski at the end 
of 1981, remained in place. Three periods of research in Poland followed: 
in 1985-1986, at the height of the so-called normalization; in 1988, on the 
eve of the Polish "Round Table" negotiations; and in 1991, during the 
Republic of Poland's first truly free parliamentary elections since the in­
terwar era. The crisis and then collapse of communism in Poland influ­
enced, at the very least, the circumstances of my research, if not my 
thinking about it. While I have tried to remain cognizant of the dangers 
"presentism" poses to historical analyses, I have found the social science 
methodologies that have informed the best scholarship of more recent 
events, as well as contemporary debates about such critical issues as the 
meaning and nature of "civil society," not without value in pondering the 
causes and significance of an earlier, and admittedly different, revolution. 
The revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century in Russian 
Poland-or, more accurately, in the Kingdom of Poland that the Congress 
of Vienna had created in 18ls-have not been well illuminated by histo­
rians. The Polish upheavals of 1904 to 1907, although characterized by an 
undeniable specificity, have been eclipsed by their concurrence with rev­
olution throughout the vast Russian Empire. Until recently, Western stu-
lX 
x PREFACE 
dents of late imperial Russian history, when dealing with the Revolution 
of 1905, have focused almost exclusively on the central Russian provinces, 
and more particularly on Moscow and St. Petersburg. If the peripheral 
"borderlands," including Russia's Polish provinces, were discussed at all, 
it was usually in reference to developments at the center. This is not to 
say that such crucial events as "Bloody Sunday" and the proclamation of 
the October Manifesto were without influence in Russian Poland, only that 
these events occurred within an economic, social, cultural, and political 
context that in many ways was vastly different from what prevailed in the 
empire's Russian heartland. Hence, the revolution in the Kingdom of Po­
land, more often than not, took its own route, with a point of departure in 
the final months of 1904, several weeks before Bloody Sunday. By certain 
criteria often applied to the study of revolutions-for example, social 
mobilization and organization, the incidence of political terror and coun­
terterror, and the formation of alternative governing structures-develop­
ments in the "peripheral," Polish provinces were, if anything, more 
"revolutionary" than elsewhere in the empire, including the two Russian 
capitals. The paucity of Western-language literature on the Revolution of 
1905 in Poland thus provided one important justification for my work. 
At the same time, Polish historiography, in its nationalist, romantic, and 
Marxist variants, at home or in emigration, had excessively politicized this 
initial chapter of twentieth-century Polish history. Consequently, the up­
heavals of 1 904 to 1 907 were conventionally rendered as struggles between 
and among political personalities, ideologies, tactics, and parties. Such par­
tisan historical writing, which reached its apogee in the Polish People's 
Republic, culminated in the "definitive" second edition of Stanislaw Kal­
abhlski and Feliks Tych's Czwarte powstanie czy pierwsza rewolucja: Lata 
1905-1907 na ziemiach polskich (Fourth uprising or first revolution: The 
years 1905-1907 on Polish lands), published in 1976. Despite the promise 
implied in Kalabinski and Tych' s title that their study would address the 
transitional social and political significance of the revolution, Czwarte 
powstanie remained preoccupied with issues of political "treachery" and 
ideological (i.e., Marxist-Leninist) "correctness." Aside from the occa­
sional inclusion of a statistical table, the social history of the revolution in 
Russian Poland remained in relative obscurity. Movements among urban 
workers, middle school and university students, agrarian laborers and small 
peasant proprietors, Catholic clergy and religious communities, and pro­
fessional groups, as before, were readily assigned to the influence of one 
or more of the competing political agents and thus denied any tangible 
significance in their own right. The same tendentiousness also applied to 
the numerous "local histories" of the revolution written in the 1960s and 
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197os, although in hindsight the best works in this genre, by Halina Kie­
purska (on Warsaw) and Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki (on LodZ), were be­
ginning to break away from the traditional mode. 
My purpose became twofold as work proceeded: to examine the revo­
lutionary upheavals in the Kingdom of Poland in their own light, "eman­
cipated" as it were from dubi�us Russian revolutionary "parentage," and 
to study far more carefully the Polish revolution's social actors, much 
neglected in the political preoccupations of Polish historians. By the time 
I embarked on the lengthy journey that, I hoped, would lead me to an ideal 
intersection of social and political history, a new generation of Polish 
historical writing relieved me of the overly ambitious task of rewriting the 
entire history of the revolution from the bottom up. In the late 1970S and 
especially in the 1980s, important studies, informed by the methodologies 
of modem social historical research well established in the West, began to 
appear in Poland; and if they did not focus on the revolution per se, they 
nevertheless helped define many of its principal issues within a larger social 
historical context. These works, by Anna Zarnowska and Wladyslaw Lech 
Karwacki on labor history and workers' culture, Elzbieta Kaczyllska and 
Jan Molenda on urban and rural crowd behavior, Maria Nietyksza on urban 
demography, Krzysztof Groniowski on agrarian labor, Andrzej Chwalba, 
Maria Kowalska, and Tadeusz Krawczak on popular religious conscious­
ness, Jozef Ryszard Szaflik and Jolanta Niklewska on volunteer firemen 
and private middle schools, and Jerzy Jedlicki on the origins of modem 
Polish political culture, marked a radical historiographic breakthrough. 
Even the era's political parties were subjected to new and objective social 
analysis, especially in the work of Pawel Samus on socialist party organiza­
tion in LodZ and that of Tadeusz Wolsza on the nationalist movement in the 
countryside. Meanwhile, historians working on similar and related topics in 
Western languages lagged far behind the Polish historians until after 1980 
and the publication of studies by Richard Lewis on agrarian revolutionary 
movements and Stephen Corrsin on tum-of-the-century Warsaw. 
Significant gaps in the literature remained, however, and a good deal of 
original research was still necessary to fill them. As a glance at the notes 
will attest, this book does not lack for primary archival materials retrieved 
from central, provincial, local, and diocesan repositories. A legitimate ques­
tion may be raised about the dependability of these materials, especially 
those of an administrative, police, military, and judicial nature. I hope I 
have been able both to distance myself from the attitudes and biases of 
those who composed and left written comments on these documents and, 
even better, to submit those attitudes to critical examination where appro­
priate. 
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Perhaps of greater significance are my points of emphasis in this study, 
as indicated in the chapter titles. My decision to devote three lengthy chap­
ters to largely Polish popular movements-among urban and industrial 
workers, the postemancipation peasantry, and students in higher and sec­
ondary educational institutions, respectively-is easily justifiable. These 
movements "made" the revolution in Russian Poland and, to a certain 
extent, helped to "unmake" it as well. The apparatus of imperial Russian 
state authority, although hardly the monolithic and monstrous Leviathan of 
contemporary and later caricature, was another obvious and principal actor 
in the revolutionary drama which required my considerable attention. The 
role of the Roman Catholic Church in Russian Poland, as the most im­
portant social and political actor among the Polish elite, demanded close 
analysis. So, too, did the main political parties of the era, although in this 
context I consider their importance less in terms of traditional political 
history and more for their role as vehicles in creating a modem political 
culture. 
This is not to deny the significance of other "supporting" social and 
political actors who remained far from passive during these fateful years. 
Among the elite, this would include the landowning nobility and the en­
trepreneurial bourgeoisie and, among the popular classes, the small masters 
and journeymen in the artisanal trades. An even stronger case may be made 
for including separate chapters on the intelligentsia, which in Poland as 
elsewhere in central and eastern Europe acted as something of a social 
substitute for a Western-style middle class, and on the Kingdom's non­
Polish minorities, which together constituted over one-quarter of the pop­
ulation. Given the constraints of a single volume, however, I found myself 
compelled to limit my discussion of these groups and incorporate my anal­
ysis of their roles into relevant parts of the text, while conceding that they 
deserve more detailed treatment than I have been able to afford them. 
Finally, in striving for a comprehensive and integrated account of Po­
land's revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century, my greatest 
hope is that this work will expand the horizons of a discussion hitherto 
confined by constraints of language, geography, and politics. For this very 
reason, I have adopted a straightforward narrative style to present my re­
search, one that sacrifices theoretical abstraction and mounds of statistical 
data for readability. This work quite easily could have taken on a quanti­
tative bent (especially in the chapters on workers and peasants) that might 
have served the needs of a narrow and specialized audience but would 
have interfered with a clear articulation of the fundamental social and po­
litical issues of the revolution in Russian Poland. I have thus confined my 
quantifications to the outer parameters of the subject matter at hand, while 
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referring the reader to the relevant specialized literature wherever possible. 
In other words, this contemporary historian, though ever mindful of the 
influence of modem social science on reconstructions of the past, never­
theless freely admits a first loyalty to a tradition of historical writing more 
appropriately associated with the humanities. 
Acknowledgment sections usually end with expressions of gratitude to 
the members of one's family for their indulgence and support. I owe my 
family more than that. The strains of travel, physical separation, and the 
sheer absorption of time that a project of this nature demands are not easily 
borne and often take a greater toll on those closest to an author than on 
the author himself. I have burdened my wife, Vicki, with untimely depar­
tures, all of my chapter drafts, and too much of the responsibility for child 
care. Before departing on my first research trip to Poland for this project, 
I escorted my daughter Anna to her third-grade class. Soon, too soon, I 
will be seeing her off to college. Her brother Charles, ten months old when 
this project began, has experienced too many of the adventures of Little 
League baseball, and much else as well, in the absence of his father. Lind­
say, who came into my life midway through this project, has joined her 
siblings in learning that the true meaning of "research" is departure. I 
have not spared Katherine, my youngest, either, whether in the months 
before her birth or in the two years since. Still, despite all the birthdays, 
band concerts, school plays, and other events that have gone on without 
me, there has been no . grumbling, even now as we begin to discuss plans 
for the "next project." The only way I can begin to acknowledge such 
support is to dedicate this book to my family. 
West Virginia University has also provided ongoing support to this pro­
ject, but of a quite different nature. In fact, were it not for a generous 
subvention from the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences, this book might 
have been partitioned into so many articles. I have Dean Gerald E. Lang 
to thank for the subvention, as well as for his readiness to agree to lengthy 
leaves to research and write this book. The West Virginia Faculty Senate 
provided two summer research grants, and the Office of International Pro­
grams a third. The latter unit helped fund the reproduction of photographs 
and illustrations housed in the Muzeum Niepodleglosci (Museum of In­
dependence) in Warsaw, which were selected for this book with the help 
and permission of its director, Dr. Andrzej Stawarz. Two chairs in the 
Department of History, Robert Maxon and Ronald Lewis, had sufficient 
faith in my research to add their support to my many supplications within 
and without and have allowed me to pursue my agenda by limiting the 
duties and obligations that can easily overwhelm a faculty member. Finally, 
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Allison Hanham and her skillful manipulation of a computer technology 
that I cannot begin to comprehend, assisted me in drafting an intelligible 
map to familiarize the nonspecialist with an unfamiliar place. 
A good deal of the major funding for this project, especially for the 
extended stays in Poland, has come from the International Research and 
Exchanges Board, with funds provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foun­
dation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the U.S.  Depart­
ment of State. The Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American 
Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council also 
provided generous support in the form of a postdoctoral research grant, as 
did the National Endowment for the Humanities in funding my participa­
tion in a summer seminar at Brandeis University on religion in imperial 
Russia. An earlier version of Chapter 7, which was published as "The 
Revolution of 1905-1907 and the Crisis of Polish Catholicism" (Slavic 
Review 47, no. 4 [1988]), is reprinted here, with modifications, by permis­
sion of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies .  
While none of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed 
in this book, all have certainly helped provide an opportunity for such 
expression, for which I am most grateful. 
Before this book made its way to the anonymous readers for Cornell 
University Press, whose advice helped shape the final version, various parts 
of the manuscript benefited from the reading and comment of friends, stu­
dents, and colleagues.  Rosemarie Zagarri, Ron Lewis, Greg Monahan, and 
George L. Simpson assisted me in keeping this study within frames of 
reference accessible to interested nonspecialists. Graduate students at West 
Virginia University, especially Charles Steele, Wolf Heidenmann, and Jean 
M. Crumrine, when asked to critique the manuscript, were boldly unsparing 
in pointing out its faults to their professor. The most valuable assistance 
came from my colleagues in the field, however, some at my direct request, 
some as coparticipants or commentators on professional panels that served 
as forums to float more than one trial balloon. Walter Pintner, Norman 
Naimark, Anna Cienciala, John J. Kulczycki, Neal Pease, Gregory Freeze, 
Richard Lewis, E. Anthony Swift, Padraic Kenney, Stephen Corrsin, Mi­
chael Jakobson, and William Chase have all had a hand in this, whether 
they realize it or not, and I thank them for their help. 
lowe a special debt of gratitude to my colleagues in Poland, beginning 
with Janusz Zarnowski, who invited me into both his home and his seminar 
in modem Polish social history at the Institute of History at the Polish 
Academy of Sciences. At the latter, I had an opportunity to discuss a 
multitude of issues with Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, Jan Molenda, Elzbieta 
Kaczyitska, Walentyna Najdus, and Ludwik Hass, not to mention invited 
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guests such as Jerzy Jedlicki and Daniel Olszewski . Two students in that 
seminar, Tadeusz Wolsza and Wlodzimierz M�drzecki, have since earned 
their doctorates and are leaving their own mark on the field, in many ways 
surpassing their older colleagues and former mentors (I include myself in 
that category). It was through Professor Zarnowski that I became involved 
in another seminar at Warsaw University, directed by his wife, Anna Zar­
nowska, which also included labor historians Andrzej Szwarc and Jaroslaw 
Paskudski. Working in the company of these people can only be described 
as exhilarating, and the hospitality shown me during each research visit 
went beyond the norms of mere collegiality. I am grateful for their intel­
lectual stimulation and, even more so, for their warmth and acts of kind­
ness, which helped get me through more than one long and lonely Warsaw 
winter night. 
ROBERT E. BLOBAUM 
Morgantown, West Virginia 

A NOTE ON DATES , NAMES , 
AND SOURCES 
Historians of imperial Russia are well acquainted with the problems of 
dating before the Soviet regime ' s  adoption of the Gregorian, or New Style, 
calendar, but in the case of the Kingdom of Poland, the matter is even 
more complex. Exclusive use of the Julian, or Old Style, calendar in Poland 
was confined mainly to internal correspondence and documents among 
state agencies. Proclamations to the population and other public documents 
usually were dated according to both calendars, although on occasion only 
the New Style date, thirteen days past the Old Style date, appeared. As for 
the population at large, with its historic ties to the Latin culture of the 
West, its reliance on the New Style calendar was practically uniform. I 
have therefore followed social rather than administrative usages, and all 
dates are rendered in the New Style throughout the narrative. In source 
citations, however, particularly where an official document was dated ac­
cording to the Old Style, I maintain the original while providing the New 
Style version in parentheses. 
These same official documents, composed in the Russian language, also 
posed a dilemma in deciphering Polish surnames and place names.  I spent 
many hours attempting to locate on past and present maps the exact spell­
ing of the Polish name of this or that small village, whose only rendition 
in the sources was in Russian. Because time and historical atlases are 
frequently unkind to smaller communities, I was not always successful : I 
was forced into more than one educated guess. A similar problem cropped 
up when the only reference to a particular individual-for example, in a 
police protocol-was in Russian. For the most part, the names were easily 
rendered back into Polish and the Latin alphabet, thanks to common Slavic 
consonant clusters, but undoubtedly my retransliterations are not error-free. 
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Jewish names, often poorly transliterated by the Russian authorities, posed 
an especially difficult chore in this regard, for which I beg the reader' s  
indulgence. 
Finally, the archival collections cited in this book have changed over 
time, usually though the accretion of new documents. Entire sygnatury 
(portfolios of documents known to my colleagues in Russian history as 
" fonds" )  have been recataloged and renumbered, sometimes more than 
once, as have the individual documents contained therein. Consequently, 
most source citations made by researchers in the late 1 960s are no longer 
valid today; and with another archival reorganization currently in progress 
as entire collections are being relocated, those made today may not be 
valid tomorrow. Therefore, I have identified the vast majority of these 
documents more completely than would usually be the case, both as a 
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C H A P  T E R O N E  
RUS S IA N  STATE, 
POLIS H SOCIETY 
The origins of the Revolution of 1 905 in Russian Poland can be traced 
back to developments in the final phase of an earlier but far different 
upheaval, the January Insurrection of 1 863- 1 864. As tsarist Russia sup­
pressed this last of a series of challenges by the Polish nobility, or szlachta, 
to its hegemony in central Poland, it set in motion forces that were to 
reshape Polish society and redefine Polish politics for decades to come. 
The January Insurrection was therefore an authentic historical watershed, 
the culminating point of the turbulent romantic era of Polish history 
and the point of departure for a new period, the contours of which would 
not be clearly visible until some forty years later. 
The insurrection that erupted in January 1 863 resulted from frustration 
and disappointment with the limited concessions offered the Kingdom of 
Poland by Alexander II shortly after he succeeded to the Russian and Polish 
thrones in 1 855 .  Since the suppression of the November Insurrection of 
1 830--- 1 83 1 ,  the Kingdom had suffered the " iron rule" of Nicholas I and 
his viceroy in Warsaw, Gen. Ivan F. Paskevich. The Kingdom' s  autono­
mous status within the Russian Empire, supposedly guaranteed by agree­
ments reached at the Congress of Vienna in 1 8 1 5 ,  had been reduced to a 
legal fiction. In effect, the country was ruled by military decree for almost 
a quarter of a century. Then came the disastrous defeats of the Crimean 
War, also inherited by Alexander from his father, which convinced the 
new tsar that limited reforms were necessary in Poland to avoid a pro­
spective uprising. Consequently, Alexander issued an amnesty for Poles 
exiled to Siberia in 1 83 1 ,  reopened institutions of higher learning, and 
restored the right of assembly to permit participation of the Polish elite in 
the .statewide debate on planned reforms, especially peasant emancipation. 
I 
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Unfortunately, Alexander' s  relaxations, designed to secure greater sta­
bility and loyalty to the throne in the Kingdom, had the opposite effect. 
Legally recognized organizations with moderate yet undisguisedly political 
aims, such as the Agricultural Society and the Warsaw City Delegation, 
emerged, emboldening radicals to form conspiratorial circles and organize 
patriotic street demonstrations. To contain the growing political unrest and 
restore discipline, the tsar in 1 86 1  turned to the aristocrat Aleksander Wie­
lopolski, an arrogant and determined " realist" who believed he could man­
age the crisis by continuing to hold out the carrot of reform while 
selectively applying the stick of repression. As head of the country' s  civil 
administration, Wielopolski imposed martial law, forced the disbanding of 
the Agricultural Society and the City Delegation, and undertook a series 
of preventive arrests. Finally, on January 1 4, 1 863, Wielopolski announced 
the draft of thirty thousand young men into the military service in an effort 
to force the opposition out into the open. 
Instead, that opposition retreated to the underground, where it formed 
an insurrectionary government and launched a guerrilla war that harassed 
the Russian army for sixteen months. As the insurrection quickly spilled 
over to Lithuania and Byelorussia, the eastern borderlands of the prepar­
tition Polish Commonwealth, both sides sought to win the support of the 
peasantry by offering more favorable terms of emancipation. In this single 
most important social issue of the insurrection, the tsar had the last word. 
Aided by a massive bureaucracy that could implement his escalating prom­
ises to the peasants, Alexander outbid an insurrectionary government 
forced to operate in the shadows and whose authority was limited to ter­
ritory that it never held for more than a few days at a time. With the 
emancipation decrees of March 2, 1 864, the autocracy effectively took the 
wind out of the sails of the insurrection and left it without a popular base 
of support. The denouement came five weeks later, with the capture of 
Romuald Traugutt, the last "dictator" of the insurrectionary government. 
Organized Polish resistance came to an end. l 
Russian Reaction to the January Insurrection 
Abrupt changes in Russian policy toward the Kingdom followed the 
suppression of the insurrection. The modest relaxations and limited reforms 
I. From the vast literature on the January Insurrection, see R. F. Leslie, Reform and Insur­
rection in Russian Poland (London, 1 963); Stefan Kieniewicz, Powstanie stycZ)'Iiowe (War­
saw, 1972); and Franciszka Romotowska, RZIJd narodowy Polski w latach 1863-1864 
(Warsaw, 1978). 
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of the pre-January period now gave way to harsh retaliation for Polish 
"ingratitude." Especially targeted for retribution were the gentry and the 
Catholic clergy, perceived by the Russian authorities as the leading social 
forces behind the rebellion. More than six hundred persons of predomi­
nantly gentry origin were sent to the gallows. Tens of thousands were 
exiled to Siberia, where a significant proportion served out hard-labor 
terms. Some ten thousand others escaped similar punishment by fleeing 
the country.2 Economic deprivation went hand in hand with political re­
venge. The government confiscated 1,660 estates in the Kingdom and 1,794 
estates in Lithuania from the Polish gentry. Another eight hundred estates, 
belonging to property owners considered politically unreliable, were forc­
ibly sold at auction. Moreover, to maintain post-insurrectionary Russian 
armies of occupation, contributions totaling thirty-four million rubles were 
levied on those gentry who remained on the land. One historian estimates 
that 250,000 lives were affected by the various measures of repression.3 
Together they dealt a devastating blow to the traditional Polish elite. 
The Roman Catholic Church was simply terrorized into submission. 
Some members of the hierarchy were kidnapped and held hostage in the 
depths of Russia; others were forcibly removed from their ecclesiastical 
offices. By 1870, not one Polish bishop in the entire Kingdom remained 
in his diocese, and, for several years thereafter, the episcopate ceased to 
function. In the meantime, hundreds of lower clergy joined their gentry 
countrymen in tsarist prisons, Siberian exile, and forced emigration. The 
autocracy also found a pretext to end its limited toleration of the Uniate 
(or Greek Catholic) Church in the Kingdom's eastern provinces. For cen­
turies, the Uniate faithful had been considered by the autocracy as religious 
renegades from the officially recognized Orthodox Church and were largely 
persecuted out of existence in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. In 1839, Nich­
olas I severed all contact between the Uniate Church and the Vatican as a 
first step toward introducing that persecution into the "autonomous" King­
dom. Now, in 1875, the Uniates who remained in the Chehn and Podlasie 
regions of the Kingdom were disenfranchised, and hundreds of thousands 
were "reconverted" to Orthodoxy by coercive means. Any hopes for po­
litical or moral assistance from Rome were dashed in 1882 when a modus 
vivendi was reached between the Russian government and the Vatican. 
Abandoned by Leo XIII to the mercies of the Russian caesar and fearing 
2. Jerzy Borejsza, "Rewolucjonista polski : Szkic do portretu," in Polska XIX wieku: Pan­
stwo-spoleczenstwo-kultura, ed. Stefan Kieniewicz (Warsaw, 1982), p. 298. 
3 .  Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, vol. 1 ( 1 864-19 14), 
2d ed. (London, 1 963), pp. 16-17. 
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further deprivations, the Polish church went into a decades-long hiberna­
tion.4 
Meanwhile, the legal fiction of the Kingdom's autonomous status was 
dropped. As an immediate consequence of the failed insurrection, 
thousands of Poles were purged from the civil administration and replaced 
by Russians. All separate administrative institutions that had survived the 
reign of Nicholas I were then quickly eliminated. With the death of Count 
Berg in 1874, the office of viceroy was discontinued and replaced with 
that of the Warsaw governor-general, which was invested with broad civil 
and military authority over the administration of the Kingdom's ten gub­
ernii, or provinces.s Shortly thereafter, "Vistulaland" supplanted the 
"Kingdom of Poland" in Russian bureaucratic parlance as the country's 
official designation. 
Until 19 14, Russian Poland was ruled under a system of exceptional, 
emergency legislation, beginning with the declaration of martial law by 
Wielopolski in 186 1. Emergency rule allowed the autocracy to deny the 
Kingdom the advantages of recent Russian legal reforms, such as elected 
justices of the peace and trial by jury for criminal cases, as well as such 
reforms of local government as the establishment of elected city councils 
and zemstvo assemblies in the countryside. At the same time, the Warsaw 
governor-general was empowered to issue binding decrees affecting state 
security and to levy a variety of administrative penalties if those decrees 
were violated. The Warsaw governor-general could also arbitrarily transfer 
the trial of civilians to military courts and order deportations to Siberia 
without the verdict of any court. Separate Polish scientific, cultural, eco­
nomic, and philanthropic organizations could not be formed without his 
express permission, which in tum had to be confirmed by St. Petersburg. 
Moreover, the political press was absolutely prohibited (with the exception 
of government-sponsored newspapers), and nonpolitical publications were 
forced to submit to strict preventive censorship.6 
In the gubernii, governors served as the highest administrative authority 
4. For more on the post-January repressions as they affected the Roman Catholic Church, 
see Ryszard Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy chrzescijariskie w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1905-1918 
(Lublin, 1 978), pp. 29-4 1 .  
5 .  Russian-style gubernii had already been introduced into the Kingdom under Nicholas I 
and were named after provincial administrative centers, in this case, Kalisz, Piotrk6w, War­
saw, LornZa, Plock, Radom, Kielce, Siedlce, Lublin, and Suwalki. 
6. For a general discussion of Russian repressive measures after the January Insurrection, 
see Piotr Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 (Seattle, 1 974), pp. 1 93-
196; Marian Kukiel, Dzieje Polski porozbiorowej, 1795-1921, 3d ed. (Paris, 1983), pp. 424-
427,450-452; and Henryk Wereszycki, Historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1918, 2d ed. (Paris, 
1 979), pp. 57-70. 
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and together with their executive organs supervised the work of provincial­
level departments. The provinces, in tum, were divided into Russian-style 
uezdy, or counties, headed by nachaL'niki (chiefs) appointed by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, but subordinate to the governors . Despite pro­
visions in the emancipation decrees for self-governing institutions in Polish 
villages and communes, the county nachal 'niki regularly intervened and 
exercised a decisive influence in their affairs. Magistrates, headed by ap­
pointed mayors, governed the cities under the supervision of the provincial 
governors. 
A massive and overlapping police bureaucracy ran parallel with the civil­
military apparatus. Beginning in 1 866, offices of the gendarmes were or­
ganized at the provincial and county levels, subordinate to the central office 
of the Warsaw Regional Gendarmes, which, in tum, was headed by the 
special deputy to the Warsaw governor-general for pol ice affairs . The 
unique institution of the Land Guard was also introduced into the Kingdom 
at this time, charged primarily with preserving law and order in the Polish 
countryside. The Land Guards were headed by captains who, from their 
headquarters in the county seats, supervised units in various precincts. In 
provincial capitals, the chief of police also doubled as head of the county 
Land Guard. Police forces in major urban areas such as Warsaw and LadZ 
were entrusted to superintendents of police, whose powers rivaled those of 
the provincial governors. Beyond the regular police, some two hundred 
agents of the reorganized secret police, the notorious Okhrana, functioned 
as the "eyes and ears" of the autocracy in the Kingdom, alert to any sign 
of independent activity, whether political or nonpolitical .? If this were not 
enough to keep the Kingdom subdued, 240,000 soldiers occupied the coun­
try. 
The retributive measures of Alexander I I ' s  reign, though they eliminated 
separate Polish institutions and completely incorporated the Kingdom into 
the empire, did not yet imply the systematic russification of the population. 
That became official state policy only during the reign of his successor, 
Alexander III ( 1 88 1 - 1 894) . With the appointment of Iosif Gurko as War­
saw governor-general in 1 883,  the Kingdom was subjected to a dozen years 
of intense "denationalization" by which the Russian bureaucracy strove 
to divest the Poles of their national character. Through a series of arbitrary 
decrees, the Polish language was eliminated from all levels of administra­
tion and the courts; even the " self-governing" institutions in the villages 
7 .  On the establishment of the Okhrana after the assassination of Alexander II in 1 88 1  and 
its activities in Russian Poland, see Elibieta Kaczynska and Dariusz Drewniak, Ochrana: 
Carska policja polityczna (Warsaw, 1 993). 
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and communes were not spared. At the same time, Poles were completely 
purged from the upper and middle administrative ranks. Henceforth, they 
would be permitted to serve only in the lower levels of the postal and 
railroad bureaucracies. Moreover, all legally registered associations, in­
cluding the Roman Catholic Church, were now required to conduct internal 
correspondence in the Russian language, making it easier for the police to 
keep tabs on them. Of course, all business with the state authorities had to 
be transacted in Russian. Polish street and building signs came down and 
were replaced by Russian-language equivalents. The names of towns were 
also changed; for example, Pulawy in Lublin Province became Novo­
Aleksandria. In short, when the nightmare of Gurko's tenure as Warsaw 
governor-general came to an end in 1894, the only places where Polish 
remained a public language were a few state-owned theaters in Warsaw.s 
The russifiers took principal aim, however, at the Kingdom's separate 
educational institutions. Already in 1867 a tsarist edict liquidated all traces 
of autonomy in the educational system as Russians took over the admin­
istration of the schools. Two years later, the Warsaw Main School, a Polish 
institution of higher learning earlier conceded by Alexander II, was trans­
formed into an imperial Russian university and its faculty purged. Fluency 
in Russian became necessary for admission, a criterion that openly dis­
criminated against Polish applicant�. Also beginning in 1869, public sec­
ondary schools were required to use Russian as the language of instruction 
for all subjects with the exception of religion. Polish could be studied as 
an elective "foreign language" in gymnasia that had received permission 
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but only up to the sixth form. Even 
then, Russian was employed as the language of instruction. To implement 
these policies, teachers were recruited from Russia with the aid of sub­
stantial bonuses and other incentives. According to official expectations, 
once a sufficient number of Russians were hired, the employment of Polish 
teachers in the state-run secondary schools would be terminated.9 
The task of consolidating and extending the russified school system fell 
to Aleksandr Apukhtin, curator of the Warsaw School District during the 
Gurko era. Before Apukhtin' s appointment, public elementary schools were 
considerably less affected by the "denationalization" measures. Compul­
sory study of Russian had been introduced, as had textbooks that eliminated 
references to "Poland." Otherwise, the authorities concentrated on the 
teachers seminaries where Russian replaced Polish as the language of in-
8. Wandycz, Lands of Partitioned Poland, p. 267. 
9. Edmund Staszynski, Polityka oswiatowa caratu w Kr6lestwie Polskim od powstania sty­
czniowego do I wojny swiatowej (Warsaw, 1 968), pp. 3-19 .  
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struction. Under Apukhtin, however, Russian became the instructional lan­
guage for all subjects in the elementary schools with the exception of 
Polish grammar and religious studies. New teachers were hired, moreover, 
according to political rather than pedagogic criteria. The same criteria de­
termined advancement and bonuses. Heads of provincial and city school 
directorates, for example, had at their disposal discretionary funds that they 
used to reward the most loyal agents of russification.1O 
Apukhtin also sought to fill in the few cracks of Polishness that remained 
in the system of public secondary education. He began his tenure with 
another purge, this time of Russian teachers suspected of harboring sym­
pathies for the Poles. And though he was unable to root out Polish language 
and religious studies from the gymnasia, he did succeed in organizing 
Orthodox chapels and choirs in the secondary schools. Apukhtin also 
planted political informers in the schools to "maintain student discipline." 
To increase police supervision of the students' extracurricular activities, he 
introduced both mandatory uniforms and on-campus residency require­
ments. 
Apukhtin's final "achievement" was to bring the education of Catholic 
clergy into the orbit of the russified state system. By the I880s the training 
of clergy in the seminaries came to include compulsory study of Russian 
and the use of Russian for the instruction of history. 11 In the private schools 
(largely confined to the secondary level), russification never advanced as 
far as in the state schools. Nevertheless, their curricula were made subject 
to the approval of the state authorities. In addition, access to Russian in­
stitutions of higher learning for graduates of private secondary schools 
required passing examinations identical to those necessary for matriculation 
at the state-run boys' gymnasia. A similar curriculum was therefore 
adopted in the private schools, with Russian as the primary language of 
instruction. Private secondary schools for girls possessed more latitude to 
use the native language, but only because their graduates-like their coun­
terparts in the state-run girls' gymnasia-were denied access to higher 
education. 12 
The Gurko-Apukhtin era in the Kingdom, especially when coupled with 
simultaneous efforts at germanization in Prussian Poland, constitutes one 
10 .  Eugenia Podgorska, Szkolnictwo elementame w Lodzi w latach 1808-1914 (L0dZ, 1 966), 
pp. 67-91 .  
II. Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy, pp. 38-40. 
1 2 .  StaszyIlski, Polityka oSwiatowa, pp. 1 87-193 .  For more on women' s  educational op­
portunities in Russian Poland before 1 905, see Adam Winiarz, "Ksztalcenie i wychowanie 
dziewcz�t w Ksi�stwie Warszawskim i Krolestwie Polskim, 1 807-1 905," in Kobieta i edu­
kacja, ed. Anna Zarnowska and Andrzej Szwarc, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Warsaw, 1 992), pp. 1 7-22 .  
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of the bleaker periods of Polish history. To a much greater extent than its 
German counterpart, however, the ubiquitous machinery of Russian gov­
ernment in the Kingdom possessed significant defects that, although they 
did not make life any more tolerable, did permit the Poles considerable 
room to maneuver. Particularly at the lower levels of the Russian bureauc­
racy, corruption was rife and officials could easily be bribed to bend the 
rules. This was particularly the case among the poorly paid and under­
staffed police forces in both urban and rural areas. The Russian authorities 
were also notoriously capricious. Although their permission was required 
for almost everything, frequently the decision of one official could be ig­
nored by turning with the same request to another of the same rank. Higher­
ranking bureaucrats cornmonly overturned decisions of subordinates, a 
practice that encouraged appeals. Finally, with the passing of Gurko and 
Apukhtin from the scene in the mid- I 890s, the perspectives of the central 
government in St. Petersburg and those of the provincial government in 
the Kingdom began to diverge significantly. In other words, Russian gov­
ernment in the Kingdom was hardly monolithic. 
The Russian bureaucracy was also insufficiently financed to fulfill the 
tasks imposed on it. Despite the russification of the country's educational 
system, for example, there were too few schools and pedagogic personnel 
at all levels to carry out the official policy of mass "denationalization." 
The autocracy simply lacked the resources to achieve such an end. The 
public elementary school system was woefully underfunded and failed to 
keep pace with population growth. By the turn of the century, only 18 
percent of the Kingdom's school-aged children received primary education. 
The state-run secondary schools were better funded, but their small number 
(fifty-four in the entire Kingdom in 1904), high tuition, and difficult en­
trance examinations effectively confined enrollment to the· children of a 
narrow elite. In 1900, only a fraction of a percent of the total population 
had attended a state secondary school.13 Neither the few legally registered 
private schools nor an underground network of "secret schools" could 
hope to fill such a huge gap left by the state. Hence, the end result of 
Russian educational policies was not increased literacy in Russian among 
the general population but high rates of general illiteracy (69.5 percent of 
the total population, according to the census of 1897).14 
1 3. Staszyilski, Polityka oiwiatowa, pp. 88,  95-96. 
1 4. Estimation of literacy in Russian Poland, however, is extremely problematic. The literacy 
rates based on the 1 897 census, and repeated in much of the literature, should be revised 
upward, in that they include children under the age of ten, a significant cohort of the pop­
ulation. The census also discounted literacy in Yiddish and Hebrew, which disqualified a 
significant proportion of Jews. Finally, admitting literacy in Polish may have been considered 
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In short, when the Gurko-Apukhtin era came to a close, the Russian 
bureaucracy had failed to transform the population of the Kingdom into 
docile, loyal subjects of the tsar. Rather, the Kingdom was undergoverned, 
especially at the local level, where state authority came into direct contact 
with society. This undergovernance hindered the effective implementation 
of policy and promoted among the general population an impression of 
contradiction and ineptitude. At the same time, the very pretensions of 
tsarist government in the Kingdom, too underfinanced and inadequately 
staffed to inspire fear and respect, nevertheless managed to create a sizable 
gulf between the Russian governing class and the society over which it 
ruled, a gulf that could not be bridged by the minor relaxations and tiny 
concessions offered in subsequent years. How large that gulf actually was, 
however, became apparent a decade later, during the Revolution of 1905. 
The Impact of Agrarian Reform 
The emancipation of the peasantry in Russian Poland, although in its 
final version at significant variance with the autocracy's original intentions, 
was the single most important reform carried out by the imperial bureauc­
racy in the post-January period. Forced by the insurrection into a bidding 
war for peasant support-not only in the Kingdom but also in adjacent 
Lithuanian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian provinces-the autocracy began 
making good on its promises even before the insurgents had been com­
pletely suppressed. The tsar and his advisers believed that quick imple­
mentation of the favorable terms offered the peasants would win them over 
permanently to their Russian benefactors. At the same time, the Russian 
authorities were determined to punish the Polish gentry for its leading role 
in the revolt, and a generous emancipation settlement would seriously un­
dermine the economic base of the country's traditional elite. Motivated by 
immediate political calculations and a general desire for revenge, the eman­
cipation nevertheless had unforeseen social, economic, and political con­
sequences that created a quite different set of problems for Russian rule in 
the Kingdom. 
The decrees of March 2, 1864, immediately liquidated all peasant obli-
by many respondents to be synonymous with admitting involvement in an illegal activity. 
For a discussion of literacy in Russian Poland, see Egon Vielrose, " Szacunek analfabetyzmu 
w zaborze rosyjskim," Przeszlosc Demograjiczna Polski 9 ( 1 976): 3-1 6. I also thank Ste­
phen D. Corrsin for sharing with me his unpublished manuscript "Levels of Literacy among 
Poles and Jews in Late Nineteenth-Century Warsaw." 
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gations to the manor. In contrast to the rest of the Russian Empire, there 
was no transitional phase of ' ' temporary obligation." Further, the peasants 
in the "western provinces" and the "Vistulaland" received as freeholds 
the lands they used, together with holdings "illegally" enclosed by the 
nobility since 1846. As fully recognized landowners, they were also 
granted individual titles to their property free of charge as a gift of the 
tsar. The Russian muzhik, again by contrast, made redemption payments 
stretched out over forty-nine years while being denied individual property 
rights. Instead, title to "peasant land" in Russia after the emancipation 
was held collectively by peasant communes. Polish peasant proprietors paid 
a hefty land tax, double that prevailing for Russian peasants, but not ex­
ceeding two-thirds of the former rent or ransom. Financially, too, they 
came out ahead of their Russian counterparts. 
The landless peasantry in the Kingdom, on the other hand, derived little 
benefit from the emancipation other than their immediate personal freedom. 
The majority remained without land while a minority, not exceeding 
140,000 peasants, were granted small plots averaging about three morgs 
(four acres), too little to sustain their new proprietors over the long term.1 5  
The expectation that the national domains would be divided among the 
landless went largely unrealized. Only 27 percent of the crown lands, for 
example, passed into peasant hands, while 60 percent was granted in entail 
to Russian dignitaries.16 The great latifundia of the titled aristocracy, the 
most logical source of land for the landless, were left relatively untouched 
as a reward for that group's continued loyalty to the tsar during the insur­
rection. Actual peasant landholding therefore increased only marginally 
(between 5 and 8 percent) after the emancipation, and at least 220,000 
peasants remained propertylessP 
In the end, the emancipation left 56.5 percent of the Kingdom's arable 
land in the hands of the Polish nobility, even after the confiscation of 
considerable gentry property. I S  The great latifundia, as already mentioned, 
were little affected. The Russian officials who staffed the local liquidation 
committees and carried out the reform rewarded the political loyalty of the 
owners of large estates by making favorable determinations concerning the 
value of lost labor and rents for the purpose of subsequent compensation. 
The great landowners, moreover, possessed the necessary capital to adjust 
1 5 .  Stefan Kieniewicz, The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry (Chicago, 1 969), p. 1 77. 
16. Wandycz, Lands of Partitioned Poland, pp. 1 97-1 98.  
1 7 · Kieniewicz, Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry, p. 1 77; see also Krzysztof Gron­
iowski, Kwestia agrama w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1871-1914 (Warsaw, 1 966), pp. 106-107.  
1 8. Jozef Buszko, Historia Polski, 1864-1918 (Warsaw, 1 979), p. 14 .  
1 2  R EW O L U C I A  
to the new postemancipation conditions. Not only could they afford to bribe 
corrupt officials and defend themselves against peasant claims in lengthy 
court litigation, but they could also switch more easily from compulsory 
to hired labor and were able to invest in mechanical sowers, reapers, and 
threshers as those became available. The subsequent increase in productiv­
ity on the latifundia more than offset the impact of higher land taxes. Not 
surprisingly, the latifundia owners continued to stand in the forefront of 
economic life in the Polish countryside. 
The smaller gentry estates ,  however, particularly those that had relied 
on serf labor, were devastated by the emancipation settlement. The same 
Russian bureaucrats who rewarded latifundia owners for their political loy­
alty during the insurrection punished rank-and-file gentry for their collec­
tive "treason" by making arbitrary undervaluations of gentry losses in 
labor and rents. Subsequent indemnification arrangements therefore left 
most of the gentry in a worse financial situation than before the agrarian 
reforms. In addition, the method of indemnification was carefully calcu­
lated to bring profit to the Russian regime. Compensation took the form 
of negotiable bonds carrying a 4 percent rate of interest and an amortization 
period of forty-two years. The bonds, the value of which quickly depre­
ciated, were financed by the new and relatively high land taxes imposed 
primarily on peasant proprietors. In the end, the authorities would collect 
1 1 0 million rubles through land taxes while paying only 64 million rubles 
in compensation to noble landlords . 19  
As a whole, the gentry lacked sufficient capital to absorb the losses 
incurred, let alone to adapt to new conditions. Many had to accede to 
peasant claims on disputed land or went bankrupt fighting such claims in 
court. Escalating demands by Russian bureaucrats for bribes also took their 
toll. The imposition of high land taxes, the new cost of hiring farm laborers, 
and the inability to compete with the large estates all eventually led to the 
outright sale and parceling of gentry property. 
The resulting exodus of the gentry from the land was a slow, gradual 
process in the first two postemancipation decades. Then, with the collapse 
of local grain prices by 50 to 60 percent in the 1 880s, as cheap American 
and Russian grain became available to European markets, gentry departures 
became a mass phenomenon. By 1 890, noble landholding had declined to 
47 percent of the total tilled area, representing a loss of nearly two million 
acres since the emancipation. During the same period, total peasant land­
owning rose by 8. I percent, although the sale and parceling of gentry land 
19. Wandycz, Lands of Partitioned Poland, pp. 1 97-198.  
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accounted for only a small part of the increase.2o Lacking access to state 
credit institutions until the I 890s, the peasantry gained little immediate 
advantage from the gentry's economic plight. Instead, urban merchants and 
industrialists proved the main purchasers of gentry property. 
A more important source for the increase of peasant landownings in the 
first twenty-five years after the emancipation was the liquidation of tradi­
tional easement rights, or "servitudes, "  for which the peasantry received 
compensation in land. The emancipation decrees of 1 864 specified that 
servitudes would remain in force only temporarily, that is, until the gov­
ernment assessed their value and adopted regulations to fix the means of 
their conversion. This provisional arrangement, affecting private estates 
only, left 65 percent of the peasants with grazing rights, 55 percent with 
fuel rights, 39 percent with timber rights, and 2 1 .5 percent with gathering 
rights.2 1 In state forests and crown lands, by contrast, the servitudes were 
entirely and immediately abolished, but only a small percentage of peasants 
were compensated in the form of land transfers. 
Although the 1 864 decrees anticipated the conversion of all easement 
rights on private estates, the authorities soon recognized that the servitudes 
issue, already a source of contention between village and manor, served 
Russian interests by maintaining a state of friction in the Polish country­
side. Consequently, the authorities did nothing to accelerate a final solution 
to the problem. In 1 872 the government decided that the conversion of 
easement rights would best be left to agreements privately negotiated be­
tween the former lords and the vil lages and subsequently ratified by the 
appropriate state authorities. This solution allowed Russian officials to act 
ostensibly as mediators, although in reality they frequently considered op­
posing claims in accordance with the respective bribes or delayed cases 
that held the potential for substantial personal profit. The process of con­
version was therefore excruciatingly slow, and it exacerbated existing con­
flicts. Between 1 864 and 1 9 1 2 , approximately two-thirds of all peasant 
farms underwent some changes in servitudes, for which they were com­
pensated with land in varying amounts.22 Despite such partial liquidation 
of servitudes, a similar percentage of peasant farms continued to retain 
some form of easement rights up to World War J .23 Even where conversion 
had occurred, the peasants were frequently dissatisfied and ignored the 
20. Groniowski, Kwestia agrama w Kr6lestwie Polskim, pp. 76-77; Kieniewicz, Emanci­
pation of the Polish Peasantry, pp. 22 1 -222 .  
2 1 .  Kieniewicz, Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry, pp.  1 78- 1 79. 
22 .  Groniowski, Kwestia agrarna w Kr6lestwie Polskim, p. 1 42 .  
23 .  Jan Molenda, "Carat i klasy posiadaj{lce w walce z rewolucj{l 1 905- 1 907 r .  na  wsi 
polskiej ,"  Przeglf,!d Historyczny 46, 1 -2 ( 1 955):  1 38 .  
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results, prompting widespread "illegal" trespassing and sporadic outbursts 
of resistance to state intervention.24 Hence, the conflict over servitudes, 
while mobilizing the peasants against the manor, could and did rebound 
against the authorities as well. 
Another part of the agrarian reform which departed even more signifi­
cantly from original intentions related to local government. Before the Jan­
uary Insurrection, administration on the communal level had been entrusted 
to a w6jt (mayor) who served simultaneously as a paid agent of the local 
landlord. With the emancipation decrees, this system was abolished and 
replaced by a two-tiered administration designed to end the nobility's dom­
ination of local affairs. At the lower level of the gromada (community or 
"small commune"), an assembly composed exclusively of peasants elected 
a soltys (elder) who carried out those resolutions of the assembly confirmed 
by the authorities. At the higher level, several gromady constituted a gmina 
("large commune"). In addition to the peasants, the gmina assembly in­
cluded owners of adjoining estates and other nonpeasant settlements. The 
gmina assembly, in turn, elected the wojt, the pisarz (a clerk who saw to 
the day-to-day administration of communal affairs), and two plenipotenti­
aries. At both the gromada and gmina levels, landless peasants and small­
holders possessing less than 1.5 and 3 morgs respectively were excluded 
from participation in the assemblies. 
These institutions of self-government in the Polish countryside, initially 
designed to empower the peasantry at the expense of the manors, were 
gradually transformed into instruments of the ruling bureaucracy. Central­
ization and merger of gminy provided one means to this end. Of the 3,083 
gminy in existence in 1864, only 1,287 remained forty years later.25 The 
contraction of gminy made it easier for centrally appointed county officials 
to interfere in local affairs. By the 1880s the nachal'niki were regularly 
rejecting the results of local elections, suspending elected officials from 
their duties, declaring assembly resolutions invalid, and through the timely 
presence of the county Land Guard at assembly meetings, applying pres­
sure on the peasants to act in a way prescribed by the Russian bureaucracy, 
especially in matters of taxation.26 During the Gurko-Apukhtin era, county 
chiefs also acquired the power to appoint the communal pisarz, turning a 
previously elected official into yet another agent of the bureaucracy in the 
24. On the conflict over servitudes in the late nineteenth century, see Helena Brodowska, 
Ruch chlopski po uwlaszczeniu w Krolestwie Polskim, 1864-1904 (Warsaw, 1 967), pp. 65-
1 09· 
25 .  Jan Borkowski, Chlopi polscy w dobie kapitalizmu (Warsaw, 198 1 ), p. 23 .  
26. Richard D. Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside: Russian Poland, 1 905-1 906," Carl 
Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 506 ( 1986): 3 .  
R U S S I A N  S T A T E , P O L I S H  S O C I E T Y  1 5 
"A Peasant before a State Official ."  Contemporary drawing by Jan Olszewski . 
(Muzeum Niepodleglosci 35864) 
Polish countryside. Most debilitating, however, was the introduction of 
Russian as the official language of local " self-government" as well as the 
language of instruction at village schools funded by the gminy. By the 
1 890s, self-government had come to mean the rural community' s  rubber­
stamping of resolutions drawn up by an alien bureaucracy in a language 
incomprehensible to the villagers . Not surprisingly, peasant participation 
in meetings of communal assemblies declined precipitously, especially 
among members of the postemancipation generationY 
Despite the shortcomings of the agrarian reforms, most Polish peasants 
experienced an immediate improvement in their standard of living in the 
first decade after the emancipation. A continuing rise in grain prices 
throughout the 1 870S contributed to their relative prosperity, while better 
nutrition through increased consumption lowered mortality rates .28 Peasant 
27. Brodowska, Ruch chlopski, pp. I 36-I40. 
28 .  Tadeusz Sobczak, Przelom w konsumpcji spozywczej w Kr6lestwie Polskim w XIX wieku 
(Wroclaw, I 986), p. 254. 
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farmers were not induced by the favorable conditions, however, to intro­
duce more intensive methods of land cultivation. In 1 877, peasant farms 
of less than twenty hectares (approximately fifty acres) accounted for 80 
percent of all peasant property holdings.29 Such small plots discouraged 
the use of mechanical threshers, seeders, and reapers. Moreover, only a 
fraction of the peasant farms used iron ploughs, and iron harrows remained 
practically unknown up to W orId War I. As a result, total grain production 
and average yields increased only marginally. In this regard, the Kingdom 
even lagged behind neighboring Galicja under Austrian rule, considered 
by many to be the most poverty-stricken, "backward" comer of Europe. 
Grain production also failed to keep pace with rapid population growth, 
a process that had begun in the 1 870s. In 1 86o, the Kingdom of Poland 
had an estimated 4.8 million inhabitants. According to official censuses 
taken in 1 897 and 1 9°7, the population increased to 9.2 and l I .5 million 
inhabitants respectively.30 As a result, the output of grain per inhabitant 
actually declined so that by the beginning of the twentieth century the 
Kingdom had become a net importer of grain for the first time in its his­
toryY 
The demographic explosion, in turn, placed enormous pressures on the 
land. Principally through subdivision, the number of peasant holdings in­
creased from 593 ,000 in 1 870 to 7 1 7,000 in 1 899, and the average size of 
peasant holdings declined.32 By 1 907, almost 90 percent of all peasant 
landowners possessed farms of five hectares ( 1 2 .4 acres) or less. At the 
same time, the landless population doubled. In 1 89 1  the Warsaw Statistical 
Committee estimated that there were 827,000 landless peasants (together 
with families), or 1 3 .2  percent of the rural population, compared with 
590,000 in 1 864. By 1 90 1 ,  that number had grown to 1 ,220,333 ,  or 1 8 . 1  
percent o f  all rural inhabitants.33 
The great estates and, to a considerably lesser extent, the larger peasant 
farms could provide employment for only part of the rapidly expanding 
rural proletariat and semiproletariat. Moreover, as a readily available source 
of cheap labor, farm workers received abysmally low wages, which were 
29. Juliusz Lukasiewicz, "Drogi rozwoju rolnictwa na ziemiach polskich," in Polska XIX 
wieku, ed. Kieniewicz, p.  22 .  
30 .  Wlodzimierz Wakar, Rozw6j terytoryalny narodowosci polskiej, vol. 2 (Kielce, 1 9 1 8),  
p.  I I .  
3 1 .  Lukasiewicz, "Drogi," p. 44. 
32 .  Kieniewicz, Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry, p. 1 89.  
33 .  Krzysztof Groniowski, Robotnicy rolni w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1871-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 977), pp. 29, 48. 
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paid both in money and in kind. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the average annual monetary wage of an ordynariusz (a full-time farm 
worker) was twenty-two rubles, supplemented by 1 0.8  bushels of grain. 
Full-time farm workers were also granted a small amount of land (aver­
aging one-third of an acre) in order to grow potatoes, the principal staple 
in their diet, and usually the right to raise a cow, a hog, a few goats, and 
chickens at their employer' s expense. Occasionally, a farm worker also 
received specified amounts of wood and salt as part of his wage. The total 
value of the average annual earnings of a farm worker in money and kind 
has been estimated at 1 57 rubles, which fel l  well below the average annual 
wage of 240 rubles paid in industry.34 Of course not all landless peasants 
could find full-time employment in the countryside, especially when faced 
with the competition of peasant smallholders seeking seasonal, part-time 
employment. 
The already-mentioned collapse of local grain prices in the 1 880s, which 
drove many gentry proprietors from the land, had a less dramatic but stil l  
significant impact on the peasantry and contributed to the general impov­
erishment of the Polish countryside. Peasant farm income declined, and 
the previously impressive growth of peasant consumption slowed consid­
erably. Fortunately, the agricultural depression produced no famines, but 
market conditions discouraged peasant farmers from expanding grain pro­
duction even through traditional , extensive methods. Moreover, the growth 
of the hog population stagnated, and the cattle population actually de­
clined.35 After 1 896, grain prices stabil ized and then began to rise, but it 
would take years for peasant agriculture to recover from the crisis .  
In the meantime, hundreds of thousands had already left the land. Some 
went to Prussia 's  Polish provinces in search of employment, only to be 
expelled by Bismarck in 1 885 .  They returned with the relaxation of im­
migration policies after 1 890, so that by 1 9 1 4, some 400,000 "seasonal" 
farmhands from the Kingdom were employed by German agriculture .36 
Between 1 890 and 1 904, another 1 27,000 emigrated permanently from the 
Kingdom to new homes in the Ruhr industrial region of Germany, Canada, 
Brazil ,  and above all, the United States.3? Most important, however, they 
were lured by the expectation of higher wages and social mobility to the 
34· Ibid. , pp. 69-75· 
35. On the crisis afflicting Polish agriculture in the 1 880s and 1 890s, see Juliusz Lukasie­
wicz, Kryzys agramy na ziemiach polskich w koncu XIX wieku (Warsaw, 1968). 
36. Kieniewicz, Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry. p. 193. According to Kieniewicz, 
these " seasonal" farmhands worked ten to eleven months a year. 
37. Borkowski, Chlopi polscy w dobie kapitalizmu. p. 44. 
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dynamically expanding industrial centers of the Kingdom itself, sparking 
an internal migration of unprecedented proportions which was to change 
the social, economic, cultural, and political complexion of the country. 
Industrialization and Urbanization 
The industrial revolution, as it spread eastward, came to the Kingdom 
of Poland in the second half of the nineteenth century, transforming the 
country-at least temporarily-into the most economically advanced re­
gion of the Russian state. Until the late 1 890s, the total value of industrial 
production in the Kingdom actual ly exceeded that of the rest of the Russian 
Empire .38 Stimulated initially by railroad construction and the expansion 
of the domestic market, and subsequently by sales in a much larger Russian 
market, industrialization of the Kingdom progressed through two distinct 
stages in the relatively short period of fifty years . In many ways, the King­
dom' s  industrial revolution with its accompanying social and demographic 
transformations followed the classic English model;  in others, local con­
ditions and geographic factors imbued these processes with pecul iarly Po­
lish characteristics. 
The starting point of the Kingdom' s  industrial revolution is subject to 
debate. The most recent consensus focuses on the year 1 850, when the 
l ifting of tariff barriers between the Kingdom and the empire eased the 
access of Polish industry to potentially lucrative Russian markets . Of 
course, industrial enterprises existed in the Kingdom already in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, and in mining and metallurgy many were 
owned and operated by the state . In the absence of cheap transportation 
and sufficient local demand, however, a considerable number of these un­
dertakings-and particularly those under state management-proved un­
profitable and were abandoned or allowed to stagnate. Railroad 
construction, which began in the I 850s, soon faci l itated the movement of 
raw materials and finished goods, while the favorable economic conditions 
in agriculture and the demographic increase after the emancipation of the 
peasantry led to a dramatic expansion of the domestic market. The first 
industries to tap that market, food processing and textiles, were also the 
first to be transformed through mechanization and the adoption of the fac­
tory system of industrial organization. By 1 864 almost all the country's  
sugar refineries had converted from wind and water power to  steam, and, 
38. Ireneusz Ihnatowicz, " Przemysl, Handel,  Finanse," in Pol.�ka XIX wieku. ed. Kienie­
wicz, p. 82 .  
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by 1875, the cotton-spinning industry was completely mechanized. Owing 
to state neglect and inadequate investment, mining and metallurgy were 
the last industries to experience technological modernization. The sale of 
concessions in the form of long-term leases to foreign investors, coupled 
with the imposition of protective tariffs on imported coal and pig iron in 
the 1870s, led to the emergence of a modem heavy-industrial base in the 
Kingdom by 1890.39 
In the first phase of the Kingdom's industrial revolution, up to around 
188o, the main catalysts of economic change were the development and 
expansion of local markets, the growth of per capita domestic consumption, 
and native capital accumulation and investment. The Kingdom's incorpo­
ration into the Russian customs system became significant only later; until 
1880, the country's trade with western Europe remained more important 
than its trade with the Russian Empire.40 At that point, the eastward move­
ment of Polish industrial goods began, led by textiles. This reorientation 
of Polish industry from production for domestic consumption to production 
for "export" was spurred by the seemingly limitless possibilities for profits 
in the huge Russian market. Once that market emerged and began to ex­
pand, Polish industry, at least initially, faced little competition in its efforts 
to capture it. Until the 1890s, Russia's semiprotectionist trade policies fa­
vored the more advanced Polish industries as well as infant Russian in­
dustries not yet able to satisfy consumer demand. Simultaneously, the 
agrarian crisis of the 1880s and 1890S dramatically slowed the growth of 
domestic consumption in the Kingdom and prompted a search for new 
sales markets. As a result, the Kingdom's trade with Russia increased elev­
enfold in the period 1880-19 10.41 Driven primarily by "exports " until the 
late 1890s, this trade led to a lasting dependence of certain industries on 
Russian sales. By 1 900, 75 percent of the production of the Kingdom's 
textile industry was sold on "eastern" markets.42 In addition, the Kingdom 
exported large quantities of pig iron, steel, sugar, paper, and agricultural 
machines to Russia in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
Stimulated primarily by sales on Russian markets in the period 1880-
1900, Polish industry experienced a second phase of modernization and 
expansion. Steam turbines, then electric generators continued to transform 
39. Irena Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "Przewrot przemyslowy w wanmkach kapitalistycznej in­
dustrializacji na ziemiach polskich do 1 9 1 8  r. ,"  in Uprzemyslowienie ziem polskich w XIX 
i XX wieku: Studia i materialy, ed. Irena Pietrzak-Pawlowska (Wroclaw, 1 970), pp. 57-103 .  
40. Andrzej Jezierski, Handel zagraniczny Kr6lestwa Polskiego, 1815-1914 (Warsaw, 
1967), p. 1 2 1 .  
4 1 .  Ibid., p .  1 5 1 .  
42. Ireneusz Ihnatowicz, Przemysl 16dzki w latach 1860-1900 (Wroclaw, 1 965), p .  1 24. 
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the energy base. Joint-stock companies dominated by foreign capital grad­
ually replaced individual native ownership of the larger enterprises, and 
this conversion was accompanied by the creation of informal cartels, par­
ticularly in the mining and textile industries. Production became more con­
centrated, although not on the scale that subsequently prevailed in Russia. 
Nevertheless, in the Kingdom's  metallurgical industry, the three largest 
firms employed 63 percent of the labor force and produced 64 percent of 
the country' s  pig iron and 68 percent of the country' s  stee1.43 In the textile 
industry, great firms employing over a thousand workers accounted for 
over half of the total value of production and an equal percentage of the 
labor force.44 At the same time, production processes became more con­
centrated in individual factories, reducing the reliance of the textile indus­
try, for instance, on cottage labor at certain stages in the production cycle. 
Following the classic British model, the textile industry played a dom­
inant role in the Kingdom's industrial revolution. Concentrated in the L6dZ 
region of Piotrk6w Province, with important subcenters in the Warsaw­
Zyrard6w and Cz�stochowa-Sosnowiec regions, the textile industry at the 
tum of the century employed over half ( 1 2 1 ,  48 1 workers) of the entire 
factory labor force and accounted for 44 percent of the total value of 
industrial production.45 Textiles also led Polish industry' s  offensive on Rus­
sian markets and absorbed the largest share of capital investment. The 
prosperity of the textile industry was therefore of crucial importance to the 
country' s  economic health, and in L6dZ and other parts of Piotrk6w Prov­
ince, it affected almost every inhabitant. Extremely vulnerable to changing 
market conditions, the Kingdom' s  textile industry experienced periodic cri­
ses that led to sharp declines in sales, factory closings, and high rates of 
unemployment. Although the general trend was one of dramatic expansion 
(between 1 879 and 1 9 1 3 , the value of textile production increased fivefold, 
and employment fourfold), the first years of the twentieth century were 
characterized by depression and contraction.46 
" Heavy industry," a term that embraces the mining, mineral, metal, and 
metallurgical industries, comprised the second-most-important sector in the 
Kingdom's  industrial economy at the tum of the century. It was also the 
most rapidly expanding one. Of only minimal significance in 1 880, heavy 
43. Waclaw Dlugoborski, "G6mictwo i hutnictwo do 1 9 1 8  r . ," in Uprzemyslowienie. ed. 
Pietrzak-Pawlowska, pp. 1 50--1 5 1 .  
44. Gryzelda Missalowa et aI. ,  "Przemysl wI6kieImiczy," in Uprzemyslowienie. ed. Pie­
trzak-Pawlowska, p. 230. 
45 . Pawel Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne w Lodzi i okrt�gu 16dzkim w latach 1905-1907 (War­
saw, 1 956), pp. I I- I2 .  
46. Missalowa e t  aI., "Przemysl wI6kieImiczy,"  pp. 226-227. 
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industry accounted for 27.9 percent of all industrial enterprises and em­
ployed 32.8 percent of the industrial labor force by 19 1 1.47 The D�browa 
Basin, a geophysical extension of [Prussian] Upper Silesia into the B�dzin 
region of southern Piotrk6w Province, became the principal center of the 
mining and metallurgical industries, beginning with the purchase by French 
capital of four coal mines and the Huta Bankowa steel mill from the Rus­
sian state in the late 1870s. Aided by the further influx of foreign, mainly 
German, capital as well as by Russian protective tariffs, the D�browa Basin 
by 1890 produced over half the country's pig iron and steel and almost all 
its coal and zinC.48 At the same time, Warsaw became a major center of 
the Kingdom's metal industry, employing 18,000 workers (or 43 percent 
of the city's industrial labor force) in the first years of the twentieth cen­
tury.49 Compared to textiles, heavy industry was considerably less vulner­
able to general economic crises, which tended to slow rather than halt its 
further expansion. For most of the period under consideration, the rapid 
growth of heavy industry outstripped the influx of new workers. The coal 
industry, for instance, suffered a perpetual labor shortage.5o 
Food processing, mainly distilling, brewing, milling, and especially, 
sugar beet-refining, was the Kingdom's third-most-important industrial 
sector. The oldest and most traditional of the country's industries, food 
processing was closely tied to the agrarian economy and dominated by 
small factories on manorial estates up to approximately 1870. Many of 
these plants collapsed after the emancipation of the peasantry and the loss 
of servile labor; between 1855 and 1897, the number of distilleries and 
breweries was cut in half, the number of sugar refineries by 20 percent.51 
As the significance of landed capital in the food industry lessened, mer­
chant and bank capital grew in importance, primarily through the formation 
of joint-stock companies. Expansion of the industry occurred largely as a 
result of investments in new technologies and substantial growth in labor 
productivity. Between 1870 and 19 14, sugar and beer production increased 
eightfold, and alcohol production grew fourfold. Over the same period, 
however, employment increased by only 40 percent, from 19.3 to 26.6 
thousand workers.52 Unlike textiles and heavy industry, the food processing 
47. Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "przewr6t," pp. 8 1-82 .  
48 .  Jan Ziemba, Ksztaltowanie si� proletariatu Zagl�bia D�browskiego, 1865-1914 (War­
saw, 1 980), pp. 20-25 .  
49 .  Anna Zarnowska, Robotnicy Warszawy na przelomie XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw, 1 985), 
p. 1 8 . 
50. Ziemba, Ksztaltowanie si� proletariatu D�browskiego, pp. 39-4 1 .  
5 1 .  Stanislaw Wykr{:towicz, "Przemysl spozywczy," in Uprzemyslowienie, ed. Pietrzak­
Pawlowska, pp. 285-286. 
52. Ibid.,  pp. 288-29°. 
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industry was not geographically concentrated. Distilleries, for example, 
were scattered throughout the Polish countryside, whereas breweries tended 
to be located in urban areas. The food processing industry could therefore 
be as important to the economy of Warsaw, where it was the third-most­
important source of industrial employment, as it was to rural Sied1ce Prov­
ince, where the Elzbiet6w sugar beet manufacturing plant was the largest 
industrial enterprise, employing 367 workers in 1 904.53 
In line with patterns elsewhere in Europe, industrialization in the King­
dom was accompanied by urbanization. Between 1 865 and 1 897, the urban 
population increased by 1 3 1 .3 percent compared with a 77.2 percent dem­
ographic increase for the country as a whole. In 1 865, one out of every 
five inhabitants of the Kingdom lived in a city or larger town; in 1 897, 
one out of every four; in 1 9 1 3 , one out of every three. Urbanization was 
particularly pronounced on the west bank of the Vistula River, where 80 
percent of the urban population resided. Piotrk6w Province, for example, 
experienced a 376 percent increase in urban population between 1 865 and 
1 897. By contrast, the proportion of urban inhabitants to total population 
actually declined in Sied1ce Province on the Vistula' s east bank. Never­
theless, by 1 897 , thirty-two cities in the Kingdom had more than ten thou­
sand inhabitants, with Warsaw and L6dZ accounting for half of the 
country' s total urban population. 
The cities and towns were also primarily responsible for the multina­
tional character of Russian Poland. Although the Polish element dominated 
the countryside and constituted almost three-quarters of the total popula­
tion, only 48 .2  percent of the urban population was Polish in 1 897. Nev­
ertheless, as a result of wage migration from the villages, the Polish 
element was primarily responsible for the demographic increase in urban 
areas. This growth occurred primarily at the expense of the Jews, who in 
1 865 accounted for 47 . 1  percent of the urban popUlation. Although steadily 
declining as a percentage of total urban population, Jews still were 38 .6  
percent of  all urban dwellers in  1 897 (compared with a 1 3 .7 percent share 
of the Kingdom' s  total population). Like the Jews, the German and Russian 
elements of the population were primarily urban ones, accounting for 6 
and 4 percent of the urban population, respectively. The former provided 
a significant proportion of the capital and skilled labor required by indus­
trialization, especially in the textile industry, while the latter group was 
made up largely of state officials and their families. The census category 
of "others " in the urban population would have included French, Czechs, 
53.  Zarnowska, Robotnicy Warszawy, p. 20; Urszula Glowacka-Maksymiuk:, Gubemia sied­
lecka w latach rewolucji, 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 985), p. 37. 
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English, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians, although the latter two 
groups were predominantly rural in character, concentrated in the eastern­
most counties of the Kingdom.54 
In 1 904 the population of Warsaw, the Kingdom' s  largest city, stood at 
more than three-quarters of a million inhabitants, having increased more 
than three times in less than forty years. The most dynamic growth rates 
were recorded in the period 1 895-1 900, when the city ' s  population in­
creased by over 1 50,000. Natural increase and migration shared equally in 
stimulating the city 's  demographic growth, although in the most dynamic 
years before the turn of century, the latter accounted for 65 .3 percent of 
the increase in population. According to the census of 1 897, 47.7 percent 
of the city 's  inhabitants were born outside of Warsaw. In the suburbs, 
where most of the city ' s  larger industrial plants and a sizable proportion 
of the working-class population were located, that figure stood at 56. I 
percent. In comparison with L6dZ or the industrial settlements of the B�d­
zin region in the D�browa Basin, migrants to Warsaw came from farther 
afield; nevertheless, the surrounding Warsaw Province provided the main 
source, followed by the adjacent counties of Plock and Siedlce provinces. 
According to official statistics,  44-4 percent of Warsaw' s  population was 
"professionally active" (a term that does not embrace family members 
helping in small artisanal shops, a practice quite common among Warsaw' s  
Jews, who were one-third o f  the population). O f  the city 's  "professionally 
active" inhabitants, 36 percent relied on industry and artisanal trades as 
the main source of income, 19 .3  percent on commerce, 1 2 .8  percent on 
domestic and personal services, 9.9 percent on administration and the free 
professions, 6.6 percent on day labor, 6.5 percent on transportation and 
communications, and 4.7 percent on "unearned income. "55 
The growth of L6dZ, the Kingdom' s  second-largest city and center of 
its textile industry, was even more phenomenal. Little more than a sleepy 
hamlet at the beginning of the nineteenth century, L6dZ counted 33,000 
inhabitants by 1 865 and 3 14,000 by 1 897. In contrast to Warsaw, L6dZ 
had a large German minority ( 1 8  percent of the population in 1 897), which 
played a crucial role in transforming the city into the country' s  most im-
54. For the best overall treatment of the Kingdom's  urbanization, see Maria Nietyksza, 
Rozw6j miast i aglomeracji miejsko-przemyslowych w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1865-1914 (War­
saw, 1 986); see also Ryszard Kolodziejczyk, Miasta, mieszczanstwo, buriuazja w Polsce w 
XIX wieku (Warsaw, 1 979). 
55. Maria Nietyksza, Ludnosc Warszawy na przelomie XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw, 1 97 1 ), pp. 
26-29, 30-34, 4 1-43, 1 38,  149, 1 55 ;  see also Stephen D. Corrsin, Warsaw before the First 
World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of the Russian Empire, 1880-1914 (Boulder, 
1 989), for a discussion of the city's  ethnically mixed character. 
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portant industrial center. The city' s  great textile barons were predominantly 
of German origin, and Germans were strongly represented among factory 
technicians and foremen. Nevertheless, that minority was rapidly losing 
ground to Poles (48 .3  percent), many of whom had recently arrived from 
the countryside, as well as to Jews (3 1 .4 percent), whose numbers had 
increased both naturally and as a result of migration from the empire' s  
western provinces. 56 
L6dZ was a classically proletarian city; in numbers of industrial workers 
it was third in the Russian Empire, behind Moscow and St. Petersburg, on 
the eve of the 1 905 revolution. According to data compiled by the Factory 
Inspectorate, 76,500 workers were employed by 547 factories, the vast 
majority in the textile industry. Another 6,000 cottage workers, classified 
among 23 ,000 independent artisans in official statistics, also derived their 
income from the textile industry. Among the city ' s  textile workers, women 
formed nearly half the labor force, and the employment of minor children 
was commonplace until the late 1 880s. The city was continually over­
whelmed by the onslaught of new migrants from the countryside; well over 
half of the city 's  inhabitants in the 1 890S were first-generation residents, 
and the proportion was considerably higher in the unincorporated industrial 
suburbs of Widzew and Baruty,57 Not surprisingly, the growth of institu­
tions such as schools, hospitals, and libraries did not keep pace with pop­
ulation growth, prompting one scholar to refer to L6dZ as " the most 
[ culturally] backward city in the Russian state. "58 
Urbanization in the B�dzin area of the D�browa Basin, the Kingdom' s  
third major industrial region, was peculiar in that there were no major 
concentrations of population similar to Warsaw or L6dZ. Nevertheless, the 
population of Sosnowiec, the largest city in the region, increased from nine 
thousand in 1 886 to fifty-seven thousand in 1 904.59 Other centers of urban 
population, although still treated as rural communes in official statistics, 
included D�browa, CzeladZ, and Zawiercie, not to mention the county seat 
of B�dzin. The region as a whole experienced a fivefold increase in pop­
ulation between 1 867 and 1 9 1 2 , with the peak period falling in the last 
five years of the nineteenth century. In comparison with Warsaw and L6dZ, 
the Polish element was far more dominant in the D�browa Basin, consti­
tuting over 86.5 percent of the total population.60 Like L6dZ, the D�browa 
56. Kolodziejczyk, Miasta, p. 79; Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne, p. 3 1 .  
57. Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, Zwiqzki zawodowe i stowarszyszenia pracodawcow w Lodzi 
(LodZ, 1 972), pp. 1-19 ;  Ihnatowicz, Przemysl 16dzki, pp. 89-94. 
58 .  Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, LOdf. w latach rewolucji, 1905-1907 (LodZ, 1 975), p.  9. 
59. Kolodziejczyk, Miasta, p. 70. 
60. Nietyksza, Rozwoj miast, p. 304. 
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L6di as viewed from the south. (Muzeum NiepodJeglosci 39028) 
Basin was characterized by the numerical dominance of its working-class 
population (56 .8 percent of total inhabitants in 1 897). Yet there was much 
greater occupational diversity among that population; 27 .3  percent of the 
regional labor force was employed by the mining industry, 1 7 .9 percent 
by the metal and metallurgical industries, lOA percent by the textile in­
dustry. Although the organization of educational, cultural, and health-care 
institutions in the D�browa Basin left much to be desired, the situation 
was much better than in L6dz. In 1 897, 48 percent of the adult population 
of the D�browa Basin could read and write compared with a less than 40 
percent literacy rate in L6dz.6 1 
As impressive as the Kingdom's  industrialization and urbanization were 
statistically, they must be viewed in their proper context. To be sure, the 
total value of industrial production exceeded that of agriculture by the turn 
of the century. Two-thirds of the population nevertheless continued to live 
in the countryside, and agriculture remained the major source of income 
for a majority of the Kingdom' s inhabitants. Within industry itself, modern 
6 1 .  Ziemba, Ksztaltowanie si{? proletariatu DQbrowskiego, pp. 34-36, 47-5 1 ,  1 7 1- 1 72,  1 88-
1 93 ;  Karwacki, ZwiQzki zawodowe, pp. ' 7- 1 8 .  
R E W O L U C J A  
Textile workers from Hielle and Dietrich in Zyrard6w. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 
36365) 
methods and machines existed side by side with antiquated equipment and 
more traditional production processes.  The transportation of coal directly 
from the mines, for instance, was based exclusively on human labor and 
draft animals until World War I. In the textile industry, the abundance of 
cheap labor and the persistence of the cottage system hindered the intro­
duction of technological innovations, which in tum contributed to a period 
of stagnation in the first years of the twentieth century. 
Similarly, urbanization, which proceeded quite dramatically in the coun­
try's  western provinces, had only a minimal impact east of the Vistula. 
Moreover, a substantial portion of the urban population retained social and 
economic ties to the countryside. In cities like L6dZ, adaptation to changing 
conditions was perhaps more difficult for native urban dwellers continually 
overwhelmed by peasant migrants than it was for the migrants themselves .  
In reality, the Kingdom could be considered "advanced" only in the 
context of the tremendous backwardness of the entire Russian Empire; 
compared with western Europe, the Kingdom continued to lag far behind. 
What is more, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Kingdom' s  
industry was losing the privileged place in the very Russian sales markets 
that had stimulated its expansion the previous twenty years . Already in the 
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Working-class dwellings on the outskirts of Warsaw. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 
38008) 
1 890s, during Sergei Witte ' s  tenure as minister of finance, the Kingdom 
was subjected to discriminatory policies in taxation, state investment, and 
rail freight rates in order to protect Russian industries from Polish com­
petition. At the same time, the technological gap between Polish and Rus­
sian industry began to close, depriving the former of its competitive edge 
in the eastern markets. Consequently, exports to Russia of Polish manu­
factured goods, particularly of the textile and metallurgical industries, de­
clined appreciably in the first years of the twentieth century, while imports 
of Russian industrial products increased. By 1 9 1 0, for example, pig iron 
from the Donets Basin had captured 42 . 8  percent of the Kingdom' s  market, 
symbolizing a dramatic shift in the terms of trade.62 
Partial modernization, uneven development, and overreliance on Russian 
markets thus characterized the Kingdom' s  industrial economy just before 
the 1 905 revolution. Not surprisingly, that economy had just entered a state 
of crisis and adjustment to new market conditions created by Russian in­
dustrialization. Economic stagnation rather than expansion was the rule in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the transformational 
processes of the previous fifty years had already made deep imprints on 
Polish society, and the long-term trends were irreversible. For better or 
worse, the Kingdom of Poland had entered the modem industrial age. A 
62. Dlugoborski, "G6rnictwo," p. 1 69 .  
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large but not entirely stabilized class of industrial workers had emerged, 
constituting about 1 0  percent of the country' s  population. Even more than 
the emancipated peasantry, the factory proletariat was destined to become 
the new focal point of Polish political strategies.  
The Changing Nature of Polish Politics 
In the forty years between the collapse of the January Insurrection and 
the first rumblings of the 1 905 revolution, Polish political thought retained 
many of the divisions and much of the diversity that had characterized it 
since the partitions of the eighteenth century. Although some scholars pre­
fer to reduce that diversity to a few easily manageable categories for di­
dactic purposes, actual historical experience reveals many conflicting and 
converging political tendencies.63 More important than categories and la­
bels, however, is the social and economic setting in which political thought 
is formulated. In the Kingdom of Poland at the end of the nineteenth cen­
tury, peasant emancipation and industrialization revolutionized the context 
of Polish politics and created conditions favorable to the formulation and 
adoption of ideologies that anticipated the rise of modern mass movements. 
The collapse of the January Insurrection, followed by the dramatic shift 
in the European balance of power in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War 
and German unification, brought a definite end to the romantic era of Polish 
history. Russian retribution removed the szlachta as the dominant force in 
Polish politics, thereby eliminating the principal social base of the insur­
rectionary tradition. Shortly thereafter, Prussia' s victory over France 
dashed any lingering hope for assistance from the West. The "Polish ques­
tion," once at the center of European diplomacy, now disappeared into 
oblivion. Not surprisingly, demoralization and resignation spread among 
the politically conscious and active strata of Polish society. At home, con­
spiracies were denounced as suicidal, the insurrectionary past condemned. 
Abroad, Wladyslaw Czartoryski closed the " Polish Embassy" at the Hotel 
Lambert in Paris,  the center of efforts for over thirty years to gain diplo­
matic support for the cause of Polish independence.  
Such a political climate gave rise to the philosophy known as " Triple 
63. See particularly Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism versus Realism (Cambridge, 
Mass. ,  1 967). Jerzy Jedlicki ' s  Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebujq: Studia z dziej6w idei i 
wyobraini XIX wieku (Warsaw, 1 988) is the most reliable guide to the complexity and 
diversity of Polish political thought for the entire period of the partitions. More specific to 
the period embraced by my book are Wilhelm Feldman, Dzieje polskiej my§li politycznej, 
1864-1914 (Warsaw, 1 933), and Wereszycki, Historia polityczna Polski. 
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Loyalism. " Too frequently, Triple Loyalism has been characterized as an 
abject political prostration at the feet of the three empires that had parti­
tioned Poland. Actually, it was a rather sophisticated program that consid­
ered loyal behavior toward the partitioning governments as the necessary, 
if evil, condition for the continued cultural existence and material progress 
of Polish lands. Its practitioners, moreover, were not of one mind. For 
ultramontane conservative periodicals like the Krakow-based Czas (Time) 
or Dziennik Poznanski (The Poznan Daily) in Prussian Poland, Triple Loy­
alism meant not only resignation from the "hopeless" cause of Polish 
independence but also entrusting the preservation of the existing social 
order to Europe ' s  conservative monarchies. By contrast the young Krakow 
conservatives who made up the Stanczyk group, though opposed to the 
spirit of Polish irredentism, were nevertheless considerably more accom­
modating to social and economic change.64 
In Russian Poland, right-wing loyalism found a natural representative in 
the figure of Zygmunt Wielopolski, son of the luckless Aleksander Wie­
lopolski, and, as elsewhere on Polish lands, the aristocracy provided its 
principal constituency. By appealing to the goodwill of the tsar, by seeking 
a common ground with Russian conservatives based on Pan-Slavism, and 
by supporting the Russian government' s  struggle against the revolutionary 
movement, Wielopolski hoped to gain equal rights for the tsar' s Polish 
subjects and a more decentralized political structure for the Kingdom. 
Viewed in the light of the tragic aftermath of the January Insurrection and 
its effect on the collective instinct for self-preservation, Wielopolski ' s  mod­
est program offered a "realistic" alternative to total political apathy and 
quietism. After Leo XIII ' s  concordat with the Russian government in 1883, 
Wielopolski ' s  program won the tacit support of the reinstated Polish epis­
copate and became the basis for an informal clerical-conservative alliance. 
Kraj (The Country), a social and literary weekly published in St. Peters­
burg and associated primarily with the figures of Wlodzimierz Spasowicz , 
and Erazm Piltz, represented a somewhat more moderate strain of loyalism. 
Like Wielopolski, Kraj' s political program emphasized conciliation with 
Russia, but more in terms of the Russian intelligentsia than the tsarist gov­
ernment. Indeed Kraj openly criticized that government, particularly its 
policies of russification. Kraj, too, was influenced by Pan-Slavic currents 
and acknowledged the hegemonic role of Russia in the Slavic movement. 
Yet in contrast to Wie1opolski and his adherents, its editors polemicized 
64. For an interesting discussion of the Stanczyk group of Krakow conservatives, see Marcin 
Krol ' s  introduction to Stanczycy: Antologia mysli spolecznej i politycznej konserwatystow 
krakowskich (Warsaw, 1 985), pp. 5-37. 
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with conservative Russian Pan-Slavists who accused the Poles of betraying 
Slavic interests . Finally, Kraj was much more emphatic in its promotion of 
economic and cultural "organic work" as the principal means of assuring 
the continued existence of the Polish nation. As censorship was much less 
severe in St. Petersburg than in Warsaw, Kraj was able to attract and pub­
lish many of the most important Polish authors of the day, including Hen­
ryk Sienkiewicz and Eliza Orzeszkowa, making it for a time the most 
informative and widely read periodical in Russian Poland.65 
The problem with loyalism and conciliation in Russian Poland, whether 
of the clerical-conservative or more progressive variety represented by 
Kraj, was that the concessions and goodwill necessary to their minimal 
political viability were not forthcoming from the Russian side. The Gurko­
Apukhtin era of systematic russification could not but undermine Wielo­
polski ' s  efforts to legitimate Russian rule in Polish eyes, while the majority 
of educated Russians remained distrustful of even the most moderately 
formulated Polish policies, always suspecting them as covers for Polish 
separatism. Unable to demonstrate any concrete pol itical dividends as a 
result of their policies, the loyalists and conciliationists in Russian Poland 
failed to attract more than a narrow upper-class following. As for the rank­
and-file nobil ity, or what was left of it after 1 864, this potential constitu­
ency of conservative politics found it difficult to find common ground with 
a Russian government that had long abrogated its traditional rights and 
privi leges and had purposefully reduced its property. 
Despite these obstacles, loyal ism and concil iation were given one last 
chance with the death of Alexander I I I  in 1 894, his succession by Nicholas I I ,  
and the departure ofGurko and Apukhtin from the Kingdom. Nicholas' s  visit 
to Warsaw in 1 897 and the tsar 's  permission for the unveiling ofa monument 
dedicated to Adam Mickiewicz, the great bard of Polish romanticism, briefly 
raised the hopes of Polish conservatism for substantive changes in Russian 
policy. These hopes were dashed within a year, however, by the disclosure and 
publication of a secret memorial ofthe new Warsaw governor-general, Prince 
Imeretinskii ,  in which Gurko' s  " liberal successor" ridiculed the political im­
potence of the Polish conservatives. More damaging to the loyalist­
conciliationist camp was the continuation and, in some cases, extension of the 
denational ization measures of the preceding era.66 
The decline and gradual disappearance of the Polish szlachta, the tra-
65 . On Kraj. see particularly Zenon Kmiecik, "Kraj " za czas6w redaktorstwa Erazma Pil­
tza (Warsaw, 1 969). 
66. Wandycz, Lands of Partitioned Poland. p. 280. In the first years of the twentieth century, 
for example, the provincial Russian bureaucracy made an unsuccessful effort to eliminate 
Polish as a permitted language for the instruction of rel igion. 
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Triumphal Gate and street decorations on the occasion of the visit of Tsar Nicholas 
II to Warsaw, 1 897. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 224 1 2) 
ditional social base for all political activity, whether conservative or rev­
olutionary, made it increasingly unlikely for that group to play an 
influential, let alone leading, role in any case. Driven from the land by 
Russian policies and adverse economic conditions, many bankrupt noble­
men migrated to the cities in the I 880s. According to the imperial census 
of 1 897, two-thirds of those officially classified as gentry lived in cities, 
where they made up the majority of recruits for a newly emerging urban 
intelligentsia.67 Indeed, this first generation of intelligentsia of noble de­
scent coincided roughly with the first generation of industrial workers of 
peasant background; both came to the cities in search of work. Some dis­
placed gentry found employment in the lower levels of the state adminis­
tration, particularly the postal and rail bureaucracies. Others were able to 
tum to the private sector or to the free professions, and a narrow stratum­
the "creative intelligentsia" -earned a living from cultural pursuits or 
journalism. It was among this intelligentsia, in its first generation career­
minded and apolitical, that the liberal philosophy of Warsaw positivism 
with its emphasis on "organic work" found its principal audience.68 
67. Janina Zurawicka, Inteligencja warszawska w koncu XIX wieku (Warsaw, 1 978), p. 54. 
68. On Warsaw positivism, see Stanislaus Blejwas, Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw 
Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth-Century Poland (New Haven, 1 984). 
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Compared to Triple Loyalism, the positivism of August Comte as it 
applied to Polish conditions was considerably more forward-looking. Hark­
ing back to the traditions of the Polish Enlightenment, Warsaw positivism 
based itself on a firm belief in reason, science, material progress, and ed­
ucation as keys to the nation' s  future. Reformist in outlook, but politically 
passive, Warsaw positivism rejected both political loyalism and insurrec­
tionary irredentism. Instead, positivism called on the "enlightened classes" 
to participate in "organic work" that aimed at quietly transforming a tra­
ditional society into a modem one as the only means of preserving the 
national existence. Arguing that the only field for Polish "conquests " was 
in the advance of civilization, Aleksander Swi�tochowski, Warsaw posi­
tivism' s  leading exponent, wrote, " If a supreme omnipotent force offered 
us a choice between 500,000 soldiers and the same number of knowledge­
able people, we would take the latter. "69 
Superficially apolitical, in practice positivism could not be separated 
from politics. The positivists ' designation of the nascent Polish bourgeoisie 
as the leading class in the nation' s  future, as well as their critique of the 
nobility' s  role in the nation' s  past, invited attacks from traditional conser­
vatives .  The ultramontane clergy, for its part, accused the positivists of 
loosening social bonds as a result of their liberal positions on divorce, the 
emancipation of women, and Jewish assimilation. Positivism' s  espousal of 
materialism, modernism, and secular education also brought on a strong 
clerical reaction.70 
In time, however, the principal challenge to positivism came from the 
left of the political spectrum, particularly from the emerging nationalist 
and socialist movements, which derided Swi�tochowski and the Warsaw 
positivists for their apolitical reformism in the face of belligerent russifi­
cation. Like conservative loyalism, positivism was undermined by the un­
compromising nature of Russian policies, which in the latter case rendered 
meaningful "organic work" next to impossible. The fact that the King­
dom's  emerging entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in the last decades of the nine­
teenth century was largely non-Polish and partially absentee, a varied group 
more interested in maximizing profits than in playing the philanthropic and 
cultural role assigned to it by the positivists, further played into the hands 
of liberalism' s leftist opponents. Finally, the corning of age in the late 
I 880s and early I 890s, of a second, more politically impatient generation 
69. Feldman, Dzieje polskiej mysli politycznej, p. 1 53 .  
70 .  On the political exchange between the Warsaw positivists and their conservative op­
ponents, see Andrzej Jaszczuk, Sp6r pozytywist6w z konserwatystami 0 przysziosc Polski, 
1870-1903 (Warsaw, 1 986). 
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of the intelligentsia devoid of personal memories of the tragedy that ac­
companied the ill-fated January Insurrection, also led to a search for more 
activist solutions. Given these circumstances, the intelligentsia in Russian 
Poland never did become a real substitute for the native, reforming middle 
class of Western tradition, nor would it create a significant political vehicle 
of progressive liberalism like the Constitutional Democratic Party in Rus­
sia. Nevertheless, both the early nationalists and the socialists owed an 
intellectual debt to positivism. The former eventually adopted much of the 
positivists ' economic and social agenda, and positivism' s  materialist phi­
losophy and emphasis on scientific method definitely influenced the latter.7 1 
The emergence of the modern ideologies of nationalism and socialism 
marked a transformation in Polish political thought, if not yet a transfor­
mation of Polish political culture. Before the revolutionary period, the na­
tionalist and socialist movements had not attained the status of true mass 
movements. Effectively confined to the underground by the Russian 
bureaucratic-police system, conspiratorial elites formed primarily from the 
intelligentsia dominated both camps in their prerevolutionary phase. As 
political ideologies, however, nationalism and socialism already enjoyed 
greater popular appeal and a broader social base than either conservative 
loyalism or liberal positivism. What set them apart was their call for active 
opposition to Russian rule and the existing political status quo at a time 
of fluid economic and social change. The ascendancy of nationalism and 
socialism. also coincided with a general reaction among younger intellec­
tuals to the "realism" of the older generation, symbolized by the neo­
romantic Mloda Polska (Young Poland) movement in literature, theater, 
and the arts. 
Of the two popular political currents, nationalism proved far more ideo­
logically, and therefore organizationally, cohesive. The birth of the modern 
Polish nationalist movement is usually associated with three interrelated 
events: the founding of the Warsaw-based populist periodical Glos (The 
Voice) in 1 886, the formation of the Polish League (Liga Polska) by emigre 
Polish democrats in 1 887, and the creation of a radical student organization 
known as "Zet" (a popular acronym for the Union of Polish Youth) in 
the same year. The appearance of Glos, whose most important contributor 
was Jan Ludwik Poplawski, signaled the emergence of a new generation 
unwilling to accept positivist prescriptions for the nation' s  survival. Ap­
pealing to the radical and democratic aspirations of this generation, Glos 
called for mass political action as the only effective form of opposition to 
7I. Blejwas, Realism in Polish Politics, pp. 1 48, 1 62-1 63 .  
3 4 REWOLUCJA 
russification. Meanwhile, emigre Polish democrats led by Col . Zygmunt 
Milkowski (also known by the pseudonym T. T. Jez) and relatively si lent 
since the collapse of the Paris Commune and many of their revolutionary 
hopes, seized the organizational initiative . The publication of Milkowski ' s  
brochure "On Active Defense and the National Treasury" was both an 
antipositivist manifesto and the founding document of the national ist move­
ment. Shortly thereafter, with funds unexpectedly pouring into Milkowski ' s  
"national treasury," the decision was made to form the Polish League 
with the aim of coordinating a renewed struggle for Polish independence. 
Through its energetic emissary and one-time socialist sympathizer Zyg­
munt Balicki, the Polish League then inspired the organization of Zet, a 
clandestine organization of Polish students enrolled in universities both at 
home and abroad. Together with Glos, Zet subsequently recognized the 
leadership of the Polish League in the so-called camp of action. 
In its formative stage, Polish national ism represented a mixture of radical 
populist, democratic, and socialist elements dedicated to the restoration of 
a unified Polish state. Both the Polish League and Zet were organized along 
masonic-like conspiratorial lines that kept the movement lean in terms of 
active members, if  not sympathizers . For example, Zet had only eighty­
five members in Russian Poland a year after its creation. Then in 1 893,  
the nationalist movement entered a new phase in its development as a result 
of an internal coup that wrested leadership from Milkowski and the emi­
gres. Engineered by Roman Dmowski, a former Zet activist, with Balicki ' s  
cooperation, the coup led t o  the transformation o f  the Polish League into 
the National League (Liga Narodowa), which in tum marked the beginning 
of far-reaching organizational and ideological changes .  Dmowski, whose 
name became virtually synonymous with Polish nationalism, quickly 
sought to remove freemasonry's  l iberal and cosmopolitan traditions from 
the movement. While recognizing the need for preserving the conspiratorial 
and el itist nature of the league itself, Dmowski worked to give the rest of 
the movement a more open character as well as a larger "al l-Polish" focus 
(instead of its previous preoccupation with Russian Poland) . This was ac­
complished through the publication of PrzeglfJd Wszechpolski (The All­
Polish Review) as the league' s  leading organ from 1 895 to 1 905, the 
formation of the National Democratic Party as the political arm of the 
movement in 1 897, and, under league sponsorship, the creation of satell ite 
organizations such as the Towarzystwo Oswiaty Narodowej (TON, Society 
for National Education) . 
The ideological changes after Dmowski ' s  coup were even more signif­
icant. As seen from successive programmatic documents-Dmowski ' s  
Nasz patriotyzm (Our patriotism, 1 893); the programs of the National 
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League published in 1 897 and 1 903 in Przegl(!d Wszechpolski; Balicki ' s  
Egoizm narodowej wobec etyki (National egoism and ethics, 1 902); and 
Dmowski' s  Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka (Thoughts of a modern Pole, 
1 903)-the movement abandoned its radical democratic and populist roots 
for an all-embracing integral nationalism. Gradually, less emphasis was 
placed on the restoration and reunification of Poland as immediate goals, 
particularly through an armed insurrection. Instead, more attention was 
paid to the cultivation of national "instincts" through cultural and edu­
cational activities-in other words, through the previously criticized meth­
ods of "organic work. " The idealistic rhetoric of the not-so-distant past 
now gave way to calls for realism and "sobriety. " Similarly, anticlerical 
polemics were replaced by efforts to reach a modus vivendi with the Cath­
olic church as a " national institution. " The movement also became less 
tolerant of its political competitors, especially the socialists, as it sought to 
monopolize expression of the " national interest. " At the same time, it 
became intolerant of other nationalities inhabiting "Polish lands, "  partic­
ularly Jews and Ukrainians. Under Dmowski' s  leadership, the Polish na­
tionalist movement, popularly known as the "Endecja, "  evolved into a 
kind of lower-middle-class populism that characterized other nationalist 
movements of the period, particularly in central Europe.  Yet the Endecja 's  
organizational tentacles reached beyond the lower middle-class into all 
Polish social groups, making it the most formidable political force in the 
Kingdom by the time of the revolution.72 
Polish nationalism's  evolution toward a right-wing orientation was oc­
casioned, at least in part, by the rise of an organized socialist movement. 
Yet from the beginning, Polish socialism was plagued by bitter factional­
ism resulting from fundamental differences of opinion over two issues: the 
movement' s  relationship to the question of an independent Polish state and 
the efficacy of terror as a form of political struggle. The first issue made 
its appearance already in 1 88 I when Boleslaw Limanowski broke with the 
Geneva-based socialist publication R6wnosc (Equality), whose internation­
alist program was inspired by Marxian socialism and the previous shared 
experiences of many early Polish socialists with Russian populists (narod-
72. For critical assessments of the Polish nationalist movement, see Wladyslaw PobOg­
Malinowski, Narodowa Demokracja, 1887-1918: Fakty i dokumenty (Warsaw, 1 933); Jerzy 
Janusz Terej, Idee, mity, realia: Szkice do dziej6w Narodowej Demokracji (Warsaw, 1971) ;  
and Andrzej Micewski, Roman Dmowski (Warsaw, 1 97 1 ) . More partisan to  the movement 
are Stanislaw Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej (London, 1 964), and Tadeusz Bielecki, W 
szkole Dmowskiego: Szkice i wspomnienia (London, 1 968). In English, see Alvin Marcus 
Fountain, Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology, 1895-1907 (Boulder, 1 980), and Adam 
Bromke, The Meaning and Uses of Polish History (Boulder, 1 987), pp. 7 1 -88 .  
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niki) in the imperial Russian universities.  Limanowski, who maintained 
contacts with Polish democratic circles in emigration and later became a 
member of the Polish League, argued that the position of R6wnosc ignored 
the national aspirations of the Polish proletariat through its relegation of 
Polish independence to a mechanical by-product of a distant social revo­
lution. In setting up the rival, but short-lived, Lud Polski (Polish People) 
organization, Limanowski put the resolution of the Polish question at the 
top of the "national socialist" agenda.73 
The internationalist wing of the movement, however, was the first to set 
up a fiL'lctioning organization on Polish soil known simply as " Proletar­
iat," later called the " Great Proletariat" to distinguish it from its succes­
sors. The organization was led by Ludwik Waryilski, whose profound 
belief in the necessity of common action with Russian revolutionary groups 
to overthrow the tsarist government led to an alliance with the People' s  
Will, the terrorist offshoot o f  the narodniki responsible for the assassination 
of Alexander II in 1 88 1 .  Cooperation between the two groups ended in 
mass arrests by the police in 1 886 and the collapse of the Great Proletariat 
after less than five years of existence. In the meantime, however, Waryilski 
and his comrades had managed to spread socialist propaganda and make 
organizational inroads among the movement' s  principal designated audi­
ence, the industrial workers of Warsaw, L6dZ, and Zyrard6w. Downplay­
ing, if not completely negating, the Polish question from ideological 
conviction, the leaders of the Great Proletariat mobilized workers by con­
centrating on their immediate socioeconomic concerns and the organization 
of mutual aid in the event of strikes.74 
After the liquidation of the Great Proletariat, a variety of groups emerged 
to compete for its legacy. The Second Proletariat, created in 1 888 ,  departed 
from the traditions of its namesake in two important respects. Its leadership 
in the Kingdom, headed by Ludwik Kulczycki, relied on terrorist tactics 
as the primary means of political struggle against the Russian autocracy, 
whereas Waryilski and his collaborators had viewed terror only as an an-
73. On Limanowski ' s  long career, see K. J. Cottam, Boleslaw Limanowski, 1835-1935: A 
Study in Socialism and Nationalism (Boulder, 1 978). For a more general discussion of the 
early Polish socialist movement' s  collisions and compromises with nationalism, see Ulrich 
Haustein, Sozialismus und die nationale Frage in Polen (Cologne, 1 969), and the still­
valuable account of Feliks Perl, Dzieje ruchu socjalistycznego w zaborze rosyjskim do pows­
tania PPS ( 1 9 10;  reprint, Warsaw, 1 958). 
74. On the Great Proletariat, Norman Naimark, The History of the "Proletariat":  The Emer­
gence of Marxism in the Kingdom of Poland (Boulder, 1 979), views WaryTIski' s  party in a 
much broader perspective than either Lucjan Blit, The Origins of Polish Socialism: The 
History of the First Polish Socialist Party, 1878-1886 (London, 1 97 1 ), or Leon Baumgarten, 
Dzieje Wielkiego Proletariatu (Warsaw, 1 965). 
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cillary weapon for use against traitors and spies. In addition, the Second 
Proletariat, especially through its Geneva-based theoretical publication 
przedSwit (Pre-Dawn), rej ected Waryilski' s  emphasis on the necessity of 
cooperation with the Russian revolutionary movement. It believed that the 
Kingdom was far riper for revolution than Russia, given its more advanced 
industrialization, its more settled urban proletariat, and its long-standing 
tradition of rebellion against tsarist rule. Indeed, PrzedSwit discounted any 
revolutionary possibilities in Russia whatsoever after the final collapse of 
the remnants of the People ' s  Will organization. The Union of Polish Work­
ers, also organized in 1 888,  was somewhat closer in spirit to the Great 
Proletariat. Rejecting the terrorist tactics of Kulczycki and the " national 
socialism" of PrzedSwit, the Union of Polish Workers concentrated on 
economic agitation and illegal trade union activity. Its avoidance of polit­
ical forms of struggle, however, marked an equally significant departure 
from the traditions of Waryitski ' s  party.75 
The largely unplanned outbreak of a general strike in the L6dZ textile 
industry in 1 892,  accompanied by street rioting and a brief but bloody 
struggle from makeshift barricades with Russian troops, caught the various 
Polish socialist groups by surprise. The suppression of the L6dZ riots and 
mass arrests of socialist activists served as an immediate spur for the li­
quidation of factions and for the temporary unification of the movement. 
In emigration, Limanowski and the editorial board of Przed§wit seized the 
initiative in November to create the Union of Polish Socialists Abroad, 
which was then entrusted with the task of drawing up a program for a 
united organization. A few months later, representatives of the Union of 
Polish Workers and the Second Proletariat, preferring that unification take 
place in the Kingdom, held a conference in Warsaw that called into exis­
tence the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna-PPS). The 
new party, however, was soon decimated by arrests, leaving the formula­
tion of programmatic principles completely in the hands of the emigres. 
The semblance of socialist unity proved short-lived. The publication of 
a party program in Przed§wit in July 1 893, largely the work of Stanislaw 
Mendelson, the organ's  chief editor, reflected the views of the emigres. By 
assigning priority to the creation of an independent Polish democratic re­
public, Przed§wit and the Union of Polish Socialists Abroad reopened old 
75. On the Second Proletariat, see Jerzy Borejsza, "Powstanie II Proletariatu i pocz�tki jego 
dzialainoSci," Z Pola Walki, 2 ( 1 958):  2 1-56, and L. J. Wolkiewicz, "Z dziejow II Prole­
tariatu, 1 881)-1 890," Z Pola Walki, 4 ( 1 975): 81)- 1 1 6. On the Union of Polish Workers, see 
Feliks Tych, ZwifJzek Robotnik6w Polskich, 1889-1892: Anatomia wczesnej organizacji ro­
botniczej (Warsaw, 1 974). 
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wounds. Shortly thereafter, a rival "Zurich group" led by Rosa Luxemburg 
and Leon Jogiches began publishing Sprawa Robotnicza (The Workers ' 
Cause), which condemned the " nationalism" of Przed§wit. At home, dis­
sident elements allied with Sprawa Robotnicza, consisting mainly of former 
members of the Union of Polish Workers, quit the PPS in 1 894 to form 
the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP, after 1 900 called 
the SDKPiL as a result of a merger with a small socialist group from 
Lithuania led by Feliks DzierZytlski). The lines quickly hardened as a result 
of bitter polemical exchanges between Social Democrats and " social pa­
triots,"  leaving the long-desired unity of Polish socialism a shambles. To 
complicate matters even further, Ludwik Kulczycki and his adherents with­
drew from the PPS in 1 900 in protest of the party 's  theoretical rejection 
of terrorism as well as its neglect of social issues. Yet another organization 
was created, the PPS-Proletariat (sometimes called the Third Proletariat), 
which vied with both the PPS and the SDKPiL. When one includes the 
General Jewish Workers Union, popularly known as the Bund, a Marxist 
organization active among the Jewish urban poor in Russia 's  western prov­
inces and itself soon to be- challenged by a Zionist-socialist movement, at 
least four socialist organizations competed for influence in Russian Poland 
at the turn of the century.76 
If the socialists in the Kingdom of Poland were divided, at least they 
were active. This was particularly true of the Bund and the PPS. Already 
by 1 892,  Jewish socialists had established an efficient organization centered 
in Vilna, and its theoretical refinement of and experience with " agitation" 
among Jewish workers influenced both Russian and Polish socialist orga­
nizations as they emerged. Although the Bund's  activity in the Kingdom 
of Poland was somewhat peripheral to its main arena in the empire ' s  west­
ern borderlands, its organizations in Warsaw and L6<lZ were the equal of 
those of any Polish socialist party on the eve of the 1 905 revolution.77 For 
its part, the PPS developed a stable organization and an efficient smuggling 
operation between 1 894 and 1 900, owing in part to the efforts of J6zef 
Pilsudski, a native of Lithuania and editor of the clandestine Robotnik (The 
Worker). By the end of 1 903, the PPS could boast of organized activity 
in Warsaw, L6<lZ, the D�browa Basin, Radom, Lublin, and Kalisz; the 
circulation of party appeals in up to twenty thousand copies; and an annual 
76. For a factually accurate but ideologically biased account of the PPS-SDKPiL split, see 
Jan Kancewicz, Rozlam w polskim ruchu robotniczym na pocz{!tku lat dziewi�cdziesi{!tych 
XIX wieku (Warsaw, I96I) .  
77 .  On the activities and evolution of the early Bund, see Henry J. Tobias, The Jewish Bund 
in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905 (Stanford, I 972). 
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budget of eighteen thousand rubles.78 By contrast, the SDKPiL remained 
largely confined to Warsaw and L6dZ; its appeals were published in usually 
fewer than five thousand copies; and its activity was financed by a meager 
budget of fifteen hundred rubles .79 The organizational apparatus of the PPS­
Proletariat was even weaker than that of the SDKPiL, and it displayed no 
signs of pol itical existence outside of Warsaw. 
Despite disunity within the movement, the socialist parties, considered 
together, posed more than an irritant to the Russian authorities and repre­
sented a serious challenge to the Polish nationalist movement. The former 
considered the socialists, particularly the PPS with its militant striving for 
independence, the chief threat to the political order in the Kingdom. The 
latter, seeing in the socialist movement' s  slogans of class struggle a ne­
gation of its own efforts to achieve social solidarity in pursuit of " national 
goals , "  began courting the traditional elite while simultaneously initiating 
its own organizational activity among Polish workers . Again, the PPS 
posed the principal danger, in part because of the perceived radicalism of 
its social program, but also because of its active disputation of the Ende­
cja 's  self-proclaimed monopoly on patriotism. Dmowski and the Endecja 
countered by pointing to Jewish involvement in the socialist movement as 
evidence of its ' 'al ien " character. The competition for popular support had 
definitely been joined between nationalists and socialists on the one hand, 
and among socialists on the other. In the process, the existence of a re­
pressive, autocratic Russian government was sometimes forgotten, lost 
amid heaps of polemical invective, a tell ing sign of pol itical immaturity 
among an ambitious but divided intell igentsia at the head of the emerging 
popular movements .  
As the twentieth century began, hardly anyone save a handful of radical 
socialists anticipated revolution in the Kingdom of Poland, let alone in the 
Russian Empire. On the surface, all was relatively calm. Agriculture was 
78. On the PPS before the Revolution of 1905, see Jan Kancewicz, Polska Partia Socjal­
istyczna w latach 1892-1896 (Warsaw, 1984); the first chapters of Anna Zamowska, Geneza 
rozlamu w Polskiej Partii So(jalistycznej. 1904-1906 (Warsaw, 1 965); and the biography 
of the young Pilsudski by Wladyslaw Pob6g-Malinowski,  l6zef Pilsudski. 1867-1914 (Lon­
don, 1 964). The first chapters of Wactaw J(!drzejewicz, Pilsudski: A Life for Poland (New 
York, 1 982), are based largely on Pob6g-Malinowski 's  account. 
79. The principal works on the evolution of the SDKPiL are Bronislaw Radlak, Socjalde­
mokracja Kr6lestwa Polskiego i Litwy w latach 1893-1904 (Warsaw, 1 979); Georg W. 
Strobel, Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs, Lenin und die SPD: Der polnische "europiiische "  
Intemationalismus in der russischen Sozialdemokratie (Wiesbaden, 1 974); and Robert Blo­
baum, Feliks Dziertyriski and the SDKPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish Communism 
(Boulder, 1 984). 
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recovering from its prolonged slump, promising the renewed expansion of 
the domestic market for industrial goods. The grievances of the peasantry, 
though considerable, did not threaten agrarian revolt. Strikes were occur­
ring with greater frequency in industrial centers, but workers ' demands 
remained confined to immediate economic issues. The old elite seemed 
content to follow the path of loyalism and conciliation, despite major set­
backs, or simply ignored the state altogether and pursued " organic work. " 
The patriotic and insurrectionary methods of the Polish nobility may have 
been transferred after a generation or two to the urban intelligentsia at the 
head of illegal political movements, but their "parties" still bore more 
resemblance to conspiratorial sects than to modem mass organizations. The 
Russian authorities kept close tabs on the situation in the Kingdom but 
were not overly concerned. 
Yet they should have been. For just below the surface seethed a society 
that had changed greatly since the January Insurrection. The peasants, once 
emancipated with land, became less politically pliable. Instead, as inde­
pendent proprietors, they displayed growing resentment of the Russian bu­
reaucracy' s interference in local rural affairs. They were thus partially 
reconciled to the remnants of the szlachta, whose declining wealth and 
influence nevertheless served to mitigate ancient class divisions in the 
countryside. The industrial workers, though chiefly concerned about wages 
and working conditions, ran up against repressive Russian police measures 
whenever they tried to improve their lot through the "illegal" means of 
collective action. Petty discrimination against the Kingdom' s  industry ex­
acerbated social tensions by increasing unemployment. While the nonna­
tive and absentee captains of Polish industry could only protest such 
measures to the Russian government (or just as likely, to foreign embassies 
and consulates), they also led a group of ethnically Polish entrepreneurs to 
support the national movement with financial contributions, if not direct 
participation. Finally, the vast majority of Poles may have reconciled them­
selves to Russian rule, but they could never accept russification and the 
attempted eradication of their language, religion, history, and culture. Op­
position to russification united all groups in society, from conservative 
clericalists to revolutionary socialists, and led to the creation of informal 
networks of passive resistance and ultimately, to alienation from the ruling 
regime. Thus the situation in the Kingdom was far more delicate than the 
Russian bureaucracy imagined. The Kingdom may not have been pregnant 
with revolution, but general dissatisfaction had drawn increasing numbers 
into active opposition to the regime. When that regime belatedly discov­
ered, in the course of 1 904, how widespread that opposition actually was, 
it came as a something of a shock. 
C H A P  T E R T W O  
T H E  M A K I N G  O F  A 
RE V OLU T I O N , 1 9 0 4  
On Sunday morning, November 1 3 , 1 904, more than a thousand people 
crowded into the parish church of All Saints on Grzybowski Square in 
what was then the solidly working-class Zachodna district of Warsaw, a 
couple of blocks north of aleje  Jerozolimskie (Jerusalem Boulevard). Some 
were there to attend the regularly scheduled Mass, others to participate in 
a political demonstration organized by the Polish Socialist Party against 
the Russo-Japanese War and the mobil ization of reservists for the Far East­
ern front. Days earlier, the Warsaw Workers ' Committee of the PPS had 
issued separate appeals to Polish and Jewish workers as well as to students 
at Warsaw University and the Warsaw Polytechnical Institute, informing 
them of the location, time, and avowed purpose of the planned demon­
stration. The Warsaw protest, the Socialists proclaimed, was to serve as a 
political example for the rest of the country. The PPS appeals also found 
their way, as if by design, into the hands of the Russian authorities. I On 
November 1 2 , police raided two meetings of members of the Jewish section 
of the PPS, arresting twenty who had gathered to discuss preparations for 
the Grzybowski Square demonstration. On the same day, police and Cos­
sack units were placed on alert and given instructions to disperse the crowd 
and arrest "the guilty ." 2  
Neither the unwitting Catholic parishioners, nor the police, nor indeed 
the majority of those who turned up for the demonstration were aware of 
what was in store for them that Sunday. A month earlier, members of the 
I. APW WGZZ 934. 
2 .  AGAD KGGW 2384, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, October 27 (No­
vember 9) and October 30 (November 1 2) ,  1 904. 
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Central Workers Committee o f  the PPS, then under the leadership o f  Jozef 
Pilsudski, had conferred in Krakow and resolved to respond to Russian 
mobilization orders with a "tactic of deeds. " For months Pilsudski had 
sought to create a special paramilitary organization that, he hoped, would 
provoke a general uprising by carrying out a series of armed actions against 
Russian state institutions and personnel. Until October, his plans had met 
with apprehension among his closest collaborators and open opposition 
within the party ' s  Warsaw organization, although workers ' self-defense 
circles had been formed in April to protect PPS demonstrations against the 
"brutality" of the authorities. In Krakow, however, the party leadership 
concluded that the self-defense circles should also engage in l imited 
terrorist-style actions against the most hated representatives of the regime. 
Although the self-defense circles were stil l  far from the paramilitary units 
Pilsudski had in mind, he nevertheless assumed responsibility for the smug­
gling of men, arms, and ammunition into the Kingdom from Krakow, while 
Jozef Kwiatek, a leading member of both the party ' s  Jewish section and 
the Warsaw Workers Committee, took direct charge of operations in the 
country.3 
Before the self-defense circles of "tens" could be properly armed and 
trained in the tactics of what essentially would become urban guerrilla 
warfare, a small PPS demonstration on Leszno Street numbering fewer than 
three hundred participants was dispersed by Cossacks on October 28, leav­
ing some eighty injured. At that point, Kwiatek and the Warsaw leadership 
decided that the next demonstration, designated for November 1 3  on Grzy­
bowski Square, would be "armed. "4 Sixty men were assigned the task of 
"defending" the demonstration in the furious planning that preceded it. 
Thus, at half past twelve on that fateful Sunday, before the crowd began 
to file out of All Saints, a central group of PPS bojowcy (fighters) took 
their places in front of the church and began to intone the revolutionary 
hymn "Warszawianka" while Stefan Okrzeje, destined to become a martyr 
to the cause of "armed struggle" against Russian rule, unfurled a small 
red banner with the slogan "PPS : We don 't want to be soldiers of the 
tsar! ' '5 As some seventy to eighty regular police and mounted Cossacks 
moved to disperse the demonstrators, mainly student sympathizers of the 
3. Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, l6ze! Pilsudski, 1867-1914 (London, 1 964), pp. 288-290; 
Jerzy Pajtlk, Organizaeje bojowe partii politycznych w Kr6lestwie Polskim. 1904-191 1 (War­
saw, 1 985), pp. 44-55 ;  Henryk Piasecki ,  Zydowska organizacja PPS, 1893-1907 (Wroclaw, 
1 978), p.  1 06. 
4. Pobog-Malinowski, l(ize! Pilsudski, p. 29 1 ;  Bronislaw Zukowski ,  " Pami\!tniki bojowca," 
Niepodleglosc 1 (October 1 929): 1 20. 
5 .  Halina Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 974), p.  60. 
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PPS, they were met with a volley of bullets from the revolvers and Brown­
ings carried by the sixty bojowcy. The police and Cossacks returned the 
fire, primarily into the crowd of departing parishioners with whom the 
demonstrators had merged. In the resulting melee, twenty-seven civilians 
were wounded and six killed. Only one policeman lost his l ife in the 
exchange, although five others suffered inj uries. More than six hundred 
persons were arrested, including more than two hundred trapped inside the 
church. Fifty were subsequently deported from Warsaw, thirty-two jailed 
for two to six weeks, and twenty-four imprisoned for more than two years 
before standing trial.  The remainder were released the day after the dem­
onstration, including fifty bojowcy whom police interrogators failed to 
identify.6 
Those involved in the planning of the " armed demonstration " on Grzy­
bowski Square believed that the firing of shots would mobilize the popu­
lation and perhaps even ignite a general revolt. In this they were very much 
mistaken. Public outrage over the incident was directed as much at the PPS 
as at the tsarist government. The demonstration was roundly condemned 
by conservatives led by the archbishop of Warsaw, Wincenty Popiel .  The 
press of the Endecja claimed that the demonstration was inspired by and 
served foreign interests ( " English and perhaps Japanese ") .7 The SDKPiL 
accused its rival of " political adventurism" and of organizing a " street 
tumult" that had led to the deaths of persons " having nothing in common 
with the socialist movement. ' '8 
The incident on Grzybowski Square therefore did not become a Polish 
version of Bloody Sunday, despite the intentions of its leading organizers . 
At the same time, however, it did not occur in a vacuum. The Grzybowski 
Square demonstration was in fact only one of eighty antiwar protests or­
ganized in the Kingdom in 1 904, eighteen of which occurred in WarsawY 
Nor was the movement against the war and mobilization the only expres­
sion of discontent with Russian policies in 1 904. Disturbances in the 
schools,  mounting labor unrest, " il legal " Polish-language resolutions of 
rural communal assemblies, and the steady, if not spectacular, growth of 
opposition parties all bore witness to a growing crisis .  The skirmish on 
Grzybowski Square between police and PPS gunmen may not have 
launched a revolution, but it certainly dramatized the heightening tensions 
6. AGAD KGGW 2384, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, November I I  (24), 
1 904; APW WGZZ 934; Paj�k, Organizacje bojowe. p. 49. 
7 .  Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji. p. 60. 
8 .  AGAD AB. druk 249. 
9. Anna Zarnowska, Robotnicy Warszawy na przelomie XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw, 1 985), p. 
245 · 
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between the Russian governing class and the society over which it ruled. 
Meanwhile, a real explosion, ignited by spontaneous social combustion 
rather than political calculation, was only two months away. 
Opposition to the Russo-Japanese War and Mobilization 
On February 8, 1 904, the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian naval 
base at Port Arthur marked the beginning of a war in the Far East that 
would last nearly eighteen months. Within two weeks of the outbreak of 
hostilities,  on February 2 1 ,  a patriotic demonstration orchestrated by the 
Russian authorities in Warsaw to show support for the war effort was 
disrupted by club-wielding counterdemonstrators organized by the PPS and 
the Jewish Bund. Two days earlier, Polish and Jewish students walked out 
of the Warsaw Polytechnical Institute rather than participate in a pro­
government demonstration. lO  In subsequent weeks, three gmina assemblies 
in Lomza and Warsaw provinces refused to assign 10 percent of commu­
nity funds to aid the cause of Russian arms in the Far East, despite con­
siderable pressure applied by county chiefsY In Radom on March I I ,  five 
Polish "patriots" were j ailed for three months each for disrupting a spec­
tacle at 'the local theater which had been staged to raise contributions for 
the war. 1 2  
From the beginning, the attitude of the population in the Kingdom to­
ward the war in the Far East, according to the head of the country' s  gen­
darmerie, ranged from "indifferent to hostile. " 1 3 The response of the 
clandestine Polish parties to the news of the outbreak of the Russo­
Japanese War was of course predictable. The SDKPiL, in an appeal of its 
main directorate, used the occasion to declare war on the tsarist govern­
ment. 14 The Central Workers Committee of the PPS portrayed the war as 
one of Japanese defense against Russian imperial aggression and declared 
that "a Japanese victory is our victory. " 15 The central committee of the 
National League was more subdued. Its appeal argued that although Rus-
10 .  AGAD KGGW 2308, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, February I I  (24), 
1 904· 
I I .  AGAD KGGW 2307; Herman Rappaport, ed., Narastanie rewolucji w Kr61estwie Pol­
skim w latach 1900--1904 (Warsaw, 1 960), pp. 499-500. 
1 2 .  AGAD KGGW 2255, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 26 (March I I) ,  1 904. 
1 3 .  AGAD KGGW 2308, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 9 (22), 1 904. 
14. T. Daniszewski, ed., SDKPiL w rewolucji 1905 roku: Zbi6r publikacji (Warsaw, 1 955), 
PP· 5-6· 
1 5 .  Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, pp. 488-490. 
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sian losses in the war with Japan were beneficial to Poland, the war in the 
Far East would not change the map of Europe.  Nevertheless, the nation­
alists believed that the best tactic was to use the war to build up " our own 
forces" and not to permit the spil l ing of one drop of Polish blood " for 
someone else ' s  cause . "  16 In the eyes of the authorities, all these groups, 
together with the Bund, were guilty of conducting a widespread propa­
ganda campaign against the Russian government. 
Genuine support for the Russian war effort was confined to a small group 
of conservative loyalists. Archbishop Popiel, anticipating official gratitude 
and concessions for the Roman Catholic Church, sponsored the formation 
of a committee of fourteen prominent clergy and laymen to solicit contri­
butions for sending a " sanitary train "  of medical supplies and personnel 
to the front. Funds came in at a trickle, however, and by mid-Apri l ,  only 
seventy thousand rubles had been col lected. 1 7  The lower clergy, for its part, 
generally refrained from active participation in the hierarchy' s  fund-raising 
initiative and maintained a " passive " attitude toward the war. Priests in 
Siedlce Province, in a rare display of clerical opposition to the authorities, 
refused to read the government' s  wartime proclamations until directly 
forced to do so by the police. IS In Radom Province, even the Polish upper 
classes, the traditional bastion of loyalism, failed to respond to the arch­
bishop ' s  appeal . 1 9  Meanwhile, politically inspired vandals attacked the 
Warsaw homes of several conservatives authorized by the archbishop to 
collect contributions for the sanitary train.20 
To the Russian bureaucracy, the attitudes of the urban lower classes and 
student population toward the war were not only dismaying but the source 
of considerable alarm. The governor of industrialized Piotrkow Province 
reported that the sympathies of the workers " are entirely on the side of 
Japan. "21 In Warsaw, rumors of the fal l  of Port Arthur published in the 
legal daily Kurier Poranny (Morning Courier) on March 14 were enough 
to set off a demonstration against the war involving some four hundred 
workers.22 Students were even more active in their opposition to Russia ' s  
cause i n  the Far East. The example o f  the Warsaw Polytechnical Institute 
in February quickly spread to other institutions of higher and secondary 
1 6. Ibid., pp. 490-492 .  
1 7 .  AGAD A B ,  druk 3 .  
1 8 . AGAD KGGW 2308, Report of the SDPA t o  the WGG, March 1 3  (26), 1 904. 
1 9 ·  AGAD KGGW 2308, Radom Governor to the SDPA, February 29 (March 1 3),  1 904. 
20. AGAD KGGW 2 2 80, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, March 1 8  (3 1 ), 
1 904· 
2 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2308, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, February 28 (March 1 2),  1 904. 
2 2 .  Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, p.  497. 
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education in the Kingdom. In at least four provinces, Polish and Jewish 
students boycotted the "patriotic demonstrations" in support of the Rus­
sian war effort organized by the school authorities, despite threats of ex­
pulsion. In Warsaw, teachers in some city schools received anonymous 
letters warning them against participating in pro-Russian activities.23 
Only the peasantry retained the relative confidence of the authorities in 
the first months of the war. The most optimistic report came from Piotrkow 
Province, where several community assemblies readily assigned 1 0  percent 
of their funds for the government' s  wartime needs.24 In Radom Province 
as well, the peasantry appeared "favorably disposed" to the Russian war 
effort, although "not to the extent among peasants in the empire. "25 The 
Warsaw provincial governor noted that where the Catholic clergy sup­
ported pro-Russian fund-raising activities, the peasantry tended to follow 
suit.26 Elsewhere, however, the local authorities were less sanguine in their 
assessments. The Lomi:a governor could not vouch for the "real mood" 
of the province ' s  overwhelmingly peasant population, especially after two 
gmina assemblies refused to contribute funds for the Russian causeY The 
attitude of the peasantry of Suwalki Province was generally described as 
"unenthusiastic" and, in the northern counties inhabited by Lithuanians, 
" antipathetic .  " 28 The most discouraging news came from Siedlce Province, 
where Polish peasants, following the lead of the Roman Catholic clergy, 
boycotted all "patriotic" activity. Worse, the dissident Uniate peasantry 
of the province ' s  eastern counties were reported to " openly sympathize 
with Japan in the hope that a Russian defeat will give them the possibility 
of openly practicing Catholicism. ' '29 
In subsequent months, conscription and the mobilization of reservists 
strengthened the growing antiwar movement. According to the PPS central 
organ Robotnik (The Worker), conscripts from the Kingdom eventually 
made up 30 percent of the tsarist army on the Far Eastern front.30 Although 
such claims were exaggerated, there can be little doubt that the Kingdom, 
23.  AGAO KGGW 2308, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, February I I  (24), 
1904. 
24. AGAO KGGW 2308, Piotrk6w Governor to the WGG, February 28 (March I 2), 1 904. 
25. AGAO KGGW 2308, Radom Governor to the SOPA, February 29 (March 1 3), 1 904. 
26. AGAO KGGW 2308, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, April 2 ( I S), 1 904. 
27. AGAO KGGW 2308, Lomi:a Governor to the SOPA, March I ( 1 4), 1904. 
28 .  AGAO KGGW 2308, Suwalki Governor to the SOPA, February 27 (March 1 I ), 1 904. 
29. AGAO KGGW 2308, Report of the SOPA to the WGG, March 13 (26), 1 904; see also 
Robert Blobaum, "Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife: The Struggle between Catholics 
and Orthodox Christians in the Chelm Region of Russian Poland, 1 904-1906," Polish Re­
view 35, 2 ( 1 990): 1 1 7 ·  
30 .  Robotnik, no.  58 (January 20,  1905). 
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accounting for . 1 0  percent of the total population of the Russian Empire, 
provided a disproportionate share of recruits for the war. Consequently, in 
comparison with the rest of the empire, resistance to mobilization was far 
more pronounced, assuming a mass character by the end of the year. 
Evasion of military service was particularly widespread among the Jew­
ish population, whose communities traditionally preferred to pay heavy 
fines rather than deliver recruits to the Russian army. In Piotrkow Province, 
Jewish draft evasion reached such proportions that local authorities feared 
it might provoke resentment among Polish recruits and eventually lead to 
"major disorders. "3 1  Similar situations existed in Radom, Siedlce, and 
Kielce provinces, where fighting broke out between local Jews and Polish 
conscripts reporting for duty. Although Jews were frequently victimized 
by Christian hostility in such incidents-as in Ostrowiec in Radom Prov­
ince where more than one hundred Jewish homes were ransacked in a July 
pogrom32-there were also several reported cases of violence perpetrated 
by large Jewish crowds. In the town of Chmielnik in Kielce Province, for 
example, three thousand Jews armed with rocks and clubs attacked a mil­
itary escort taking sixteen reservists into active service .33 
Draft evasion and resistance to mobilization, moreover, was hardly con­
fined to the Jewish population. By October, information reached the War­
saw governor-general that thousands of young men were fleeing the 
country to escape military service and the prospect of being sent to the Far 
East, a situation attributed to "fear of death" as well as to "underground 
propaganda. '  '34 Official records also include several reports of resistance 
among reservists to mobilization at induction points purposefully located 
outside the major cities. When that resistance was actively supported by 
the local population, as in the small town of Kutno in late October, violent 
clashes with Russian police and army units were the usual result.35 Such 
incidents, however, were exceptional . As a rule, the forms and methods of 
popular protest against conscription and mobilization were considerably 
less dramatic, particularly in rural areas. For instance, the wives of peasant 
conscripts in the gmina of Sk�pe in Plock Province, supported by their 
neighbors, informed the local mayor that they would no longer pay taxes, 
citing the loss of income resulting from their husbands ' departure for the 
3 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2382, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, October 30 (November 1 2), 
1904. 
32. AGAD KGGW 243 1 ,  Radom Governor to the Minister of Internal Affairs, July 16 (29), 
1 904· 
33 .  Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, p. 673 .  
34 .  Ibid., p. 637· 
35 .  Ibid. , pp. 649-65 I .  
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front.36 The gmina assembly of Dlugoborz in Lomza Province, by contrast, 
" illegally" resolved to cease its subscription to all government-sponsored 
publications and to use the money instead to aid widows of those killed 
in action in the Far East.37 
Opposition in urban areas was considerably more active, particularly in 
Warsaw, which by early summer had become the focal point of the grow­
ing discontent against the war and Russian military recruitment. This was 
due in large part to the activity of the PPS and its ability to transform 
general sentiment against the war into an organized movement. 38 Of the 
clandestine parties active in the Kingdom, the PPS most clearly recognized 
the possibilities the war created for political mobilization. The party lead­
ership may have been divided on the ultimate goal of that mobilization, 
the Old Guard (Starzy) thinking of preparations for a national armed up­
rising; the Young (Mlodzi), of a socialist revolution. Nevertheless, by plac­
ing itself at the head of the antiwar movement, the PPS quickly acquired 
an "active" image that in a situation of growing crisis was bound to reap 
political dividends. By the end of 1 904, the party had tripled its member­
ship in Warsaw, quadrupled it in LodZ, and developed strong local organ­
izations in Kalisz, Lublin, Radom, and Zagl�bie.39 
The antiwar, antimobilization strategy did not come immediately to the 
divided PPS leadership. At the outset of the war, the Old Guard, led by 
Pilsudski, Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, and B. A. J�drzejowski, pursued an 
"alliance" with the Japanese, who were expected to finance and arm Polish 
legions recruited by the PPS .  The Japanese were at least willing to explore 
the possibilities of a more limited collaboration with the PPS, and thus 
Jodko was able to hold preliminary discussions with Japanese envoys in 
Vienna, Paris, and London. An invitation was then issued to Pilsudski to 
make a visit to Tokyo, where his hosts wished to discuss the PPS ' s  ca­
pabilities for gathering intelligence information on the situation in Russia 
and Siberia. Pilsudski agreed to make the trip, kept secret from party lead­
ers inside the country because of their anticipated opposition, in the hope 
that in exchange for PPS intelligence activity, the Japanese would supply 
arms and ammunition for a PPS-Ied uprising in the Kingdom. He arrived 
in Tokyo in July but failed to persuade his hosts that the PPS possessed 
an "armed force" capable of inflicting enough damage in the Russian rear 
36. AGAD KGGW 2385, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 1 ( 1 4),  1 904. 
37. Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, pp. 709-7 10.  
38 .  Forty-four demonstrations against the war and mobilization, or more than 50 percent of 
the total in 1 904, can be ascribed directly to PPS activity; see Anna Zarnowska, Geneza 
rozlamu w Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej, 1904-1906 (Warsaw, 1 965), pp. 1 8-19 .  
39 .  Ibid., pp .  1 2-14.  
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to force a transfer of troops from the Far Eastern front. Japanese reserva­
tions were undoubtedly influenced by Roman Dmowski, who to Pilsudski ' s 
surprise, made a simultaneous visit to the Japanese capital to dissuade 
Tokyo from supporting insurrectionary activity in the Kingdom, which ac­
cording to Dmowski, could only tum into a needless bloodbath. Dmowski ' s  
argument that the PPS could count on  an organized force of  fewer than a 
hundred men, only some of whom possessed handguns, was compelling 
enough to deter Japanese support.40 
Having played the Japanese card without much effect, the PPS Old 
Guard began to pay more attention to the antiwar demonstrations organized 
in the country by the Young leadership, whose principal base was the 
Warsaw Workers Committee. The ability of the socialist parties to organize 
May Day demonstrations in Warsaw, Radom, Piotrk6w, L6dZ, and Suwalki 
in the face of strong police countermeasures emboldened the Warsaw PPS 
leadership to tum to public demonstrations against the war as a means of 
mobilizing opinion behind the party. The first such demonstrations, in the 
late spring and early summer in Warsaw, were hardly formidable displays 
of antigovernment sentiment. Involving as few as thirty or forty partici­
pants, they were easily dispersed by the police and resulted in numerous 
arrests, prompting a rival Social Democratic leader to refer to the PPS 
activity in this period as "comical. "41 
The PPS demonstrations did, however, begin to gather momentum, stim­
ulated by the unbroken string of Russian military defeats in the Far Eastern 
war and succeeding rounds of mobilization in various parts of the King­
dom. By early July, the demonstrators were arming themselves with rocks, 
clubs, and bottles, and by late July, "fighters" from the PPS self-defense 
circles began to make their appearance at scenes of organized protest.42 
Dispersing the demonstrations without resorting to arms consequently be­
came more difficult. Clashes between protesters and police and the creation 
of victims of " tsarist brutality" among the former were the inevitable and, 
to the PPS leadership, most desirable results. By mid-September the move-
40. For more on the adventures of Pilsudski and Dmowski in Tokyo, see Pob6g-Malinowski, 
J6zej Pilsudski, pp. 249-250, and his Narodowa Demokracja, 1887-1918: Fakty i dokumenty 
(Warsaw, 1 933), pp. 259-268; see also Waclaw J�drzejewicz, Pilsudski: A Life jor Poland 
(New York, 1 982), pp. 34-36; Andrzej Micewski, Roman Dmowski (Warsaw, 1 97 1 ), pp. 
9 1-94; and Alvin Marcus Fountain, Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology, 1895-1907 
(Boulder, 1 980), pp. 1 1 5-1 39. 
4 1 .  CA PZPR, AM 2511 , ZespOl Feliksa DzierZyIiskiego, " Social-Patriotic Demonstra­
tions," July 1 904. 
42. AGAD KGGW 2383, Report of the Warsaw Superintendent of Police on events in the 
week of July 10-17,  1 904. 
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ment had spread from Warsaw to L6dZ, where in one incident, demon­
strators attacked the residence of the superintendent of police.43 
The official announcement of a new round of mobilization of reservists 
on October 22 effectively shifted the antiwar movement into higher gear. 
In the last week of October, relatively large demonstrations involving as 
many as five hundred participants occurred at several locations in Warsaw, 
as well as in L6dZ, Zawiercie, and Cz�stochowa,44 almost all of them ac­
companied by violent clashes between police and demonstrators . By this 
time, the Old Guard had adopted the antiwar movement as its own cause 
and transferred the emigre headquarters of the party from London to 
Krak6w to be closer to the action. The Bund, followed by the SDKPiL, 
abandoned their preoccupation with strikes and began organizing demon­
strations of their own or in cooperation with the Warsaw and L6dZ PPS 
committees. For their part, the Social Democrats no longer found the an­
tiwar movement laughable and now sought to steal some of the credit. The 
party' s  main organ, Czerwony Sztandar (Red Banner), went so far as to 
claim that a Social Democratic demonstration against mobilization on Oc­
tober 30 "was undoubtedly the largest and most successful of all workers' 
demonstrations that Warsaw has seen in recent months. '  '45 
Then came the tragic debacle on Grzybowski Square, the misguided 
attempt of the PPS to ignite a general revolt by provoking a massacre. 
Although the plan misfired, the movement against the war and mobilization 
could no longer be contained. From mid-November to mid-January, anti­
war demonstrations were practically an everyday occurrence. The state 
played its prescribed role by calling up reservists in twenty-eight counties 
in the Kingdom just before Christmas. Warsaw remained the center of the 
movement, followed by L6dZ and Radom, but demonstrations were also 
organized in the smaller cities of Kalisz, Pabianice, and Cz�stochowa and 
in the industrialized gmina of Cmiel6w in Radom Province. Shortly after 
the incident on Grzybowski Square, the PPS reportedly spent several thou­
sand rubles on arms and ammunition for its "fighters"  in L6dZ and Ra­
dom.46 Not surprisingly, violence erupted in both cities during the winter 
holidays, as police and demonstrators clashed.47 Meanwhile, assassination 
attempts were made on policemen, gendarmes, and soldiers in L6dZ, Cz�s-
43. Pawel Korzec, ed., irodla do dziejow rewolucji 1905-1907 w okr�gu 16dzkim. vol. I ,  
pt. 1 (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 345-347· 
44. Ibid., pp. 355-357; Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji. pp. 642-644, 646-649, 655-656. 
45 . Czerwony Sztandar. no. 21 (October 1 904). 
46. AGAD KGGW 2384, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 14 (27), 1 904. 
47 . Korzec, irodla do dziejow rewolucji 1 ( I ) :  373-374; Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji. 
P· 703 · 
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tochowa, and Cmiel6w. In a sign of things to come, bombs exploded in 
L6dZ on January 1 5  during an exchange of fire between armed PPS dem­
onstrators and police.48 To the Russian bureaucracy in the Kingdom, the 
situation had already, by the end of November, become critical enough for 
the Warsaw govenor-general to seek authorization from the Minstry of 
Internal Affairs to proclaim a state of " intensified security" in Warsaw, 
Warsaw County, and all of Piotrk6w Province.49 
The antiwar movement of 1 904 did not lead directly to the Revolution 
of 1 905, but it certainly helped prepare the ground. By bringing people of 
different social backgrounds into the streets, where they frequently came 
face to face with the forces of state repression for the first time, the move­
ment contributed to the creation of an atmosphere charged with confron­
tation. The spilling of blood in these encounters served to inflame passions, 
if not to the extent desired by the movement' s  organizers, then at least to 
the point where they could be employed for political mobilization. More 
than any other form of popular protest or expression of social unrest in 
1 904, the antiwar movement visibly dramatized a situation that was rapidly 
approaching a state of crisis. 
Economic Dislocation and Labor Unrest 
The economic impact of the war on the Kingdom, though less spectac­
ular than the political, was nevertheless of equal consequence and indeed 
nourished the growing sentiment against the Russian government and its 
war in the Far East. Agriculture, to be sure, was not directly affected by 
the war, and farm prices continued their slow recovery from the collapse 
of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The agrarian economy had 
other afflictions in 1 904, namely, drought and a poor harvest. The war, of 
course, affected the family income of conscripted peasants and farm la­
borers, but agriculture in general did not suffer a labor shortage thanks to 
rural overpopulation. The average annual wage of farm laborers actually 
declined, from twenty-two rubles and 10 .8  bushels of rye in 1 900 to twenty 
rubles and nine bushels of rye in 1 904.50 
The Kingdom's industrial economy, however, was thrown into a tailspin 
48. AGAD KGGW 2385, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, January 4 ( 1 7), 1 905 . 
49. Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, pp. 684--688. 
50. Irena Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "Depresja ekonomiczna w Kr6lestwie Polskim i elementy 
kryzysu rewolucyjnego 1904 r. ," Przegl�d Historyczny 46, 1-2 ( 1 955): 14;  see also Krzysz­
tof Groniowski, Robotnicy rolni w Kr61estwie Polskim, [87[-[9[4 (Warsaw, 1977), p. 69. 
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by the war. The outbreak of hostilities in the Far East could not have come 
at a worse time. The Kingdom' s  industry was just beginning to rebound 
from the general European slump of the first years of the twentieth century, 
and the war abruptly interrupted the recovery process. The financial burden 
of the war, resulting in higher taxes, rents, and industrial prices, was suf­
ficient to discourage investment. In Warsaw, private investors withdrew 
thirty million marks from local banks and looked for less risky opportu­
nities outside the country. Foreign banks likewise withdrew their reserves 
from banks in the Kingdom. Suddenly, there was a shortage of capital, and 
credit became more expensive, especially as the state competed for funds 
to finance its military effort. Interest rates increased by only 1 percent in 
state banks but soared by 1 0  percent in private banks. The subsequent 
decline in investment did not, however, affect Polish industry uniformly. 
The war initially stimulated investment in mining, metal, metallurgical, and 
other military-related industries, but t�is expansion came largely at the 
expense of peacetime production. Overall, the total value of industrial pro­
duction in the Kingdom declined already by 30-40 percent by the summer 
of 1 904.5 1 
The textile industry was especially affected by adverse wartime condi­
tions . Not only did investment dry up, but sales took a nosedive. The textile 
industry' s  dependence on Russian and eastern markets now came fully to 
light against the backdrop of the war's  disruption of normal economic 
activity. The mobilization of the empire' s  weak railroad network for mil­
itary purposes created chaos in the transportation system, making it diffi­
cult, if not impossible, for Polish goods to reach traditional eastern clients. 
Consequently, five months into the war, the "export" of textile products 
from L6dZ fell by 20 percent, from Cz�stochowa by 55 percent. Related 
industries, such as haberdashery and shoemaking, suffered from the ripple 
effects and experienced sharp declines in sales ranging from 27 to 35 
percent.52 
Textile industrialists and factory owners responded predictably by saving 
on labor costs . In L6dZ, the larger factories initially sought to keep all 
employees on the payroll, but this could be accomplished only by reduc­
tions in hours and wages. In a survey of 2 1 0  factories and plants employing 
sixty thousand workers in the spring of 1 904, state inspectors discovered 
5 1 .  Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "Depresja ekonomiczna," pp. 6-8 . 
52 .  Ibid., p. 7; see also Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, Czwarte powstanie czy 
pierwsza ..,.ewolucja: Lata 1905-1907 na ziemiach polskich, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1 976), pp. 
1 6-17 · 
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that hours had been reduced on the average by 25 percent and that half 
the labor force had experienced a decline in earnings.53 By the summer, 
the situation in L6dZ had become much worse. In an expanded survey of 
350 factories and plants employing seventy-five thousand workers, 25 per­
cent reported that operations had been reduced to only three days a week.54 
In Piotrk6w Province as a whole, approximately half of the 9 1 0  firms 
sending statistical data to the Factory Inspectorate were operating on a part­
time basis.55 
Meanwhile, unemployment began to be a mass phenomenon. At first, 
unemployment was confined to the smaller factories, artisanal shops, and 
cottage industries dependent on the larger textile firms for their orders. 
Already by March, 479 of 1 ,225 weavers in Pabianice, whose only source 
of orders were the great firms of L6dZ, were completely without work.56 
A similar situation existed in nearby Zdunska W ola in Kalisz Province, 
where only 900 of 2 ,000 weavers had sufficient orders from L6dZ to con­
tinue working on their handlooms.57 By the middle of May, 4,000 were 
fully unemployed in the L6dZ industrial region, which left at least 1 0,000 
persons in affected families without means of sustaining themselves .  By 
contrast, in the mining and metallurgical region of southern Piotrk6w Prov­
ince, the local economy remained relatively unaffected by the war, and 
there were no reported changes in employment patterns, working hours, or 
wages.58 
As the crisis deepened during the summer, unemployment spread from 
the smaller shops and cottages into the large factories. Although the prin­
cipal victims remained the handweavers, who worked at home on their 
own looms, by July, forty-two larger factories in L6dZ had laid off 1 ,280 
workers, and the remainder had their hours drastically reduced.59 In the 
L6dZ region alone, 1 0,000 workers were unemployed by the middle of 
August, leaving 25,000 persons without any source of income. Those who 
remained at their jobs experienced an average decline in earnings of more 
than 30 percent.60 Again, by way of contrast, the condition of workers 
53 .  AGAD KGGW 2382, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, May 7 (20), 1 904. 
54. Ibid. , July 15 (28), 1 904. 
55 .  Korzec, trodla do dziejow rewolucji I ( I ) : 1 54-156. 
56. Ibid. , pp. 76-n 
57. Ibid. , pp. 77-78. 
58 .  AGAD KGGW 2382, Report of the Piottkow Governor to the Department of Police, 
May 7 (20), 1 904. 
59. Korzec, trodla do dziejow rewolucji I ( I ) : 1 09-11 3 .  
60. AGAD KGGW 2382 ,  Piotrkow Governor to  the WGG, August I I (24), 1 904. 
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employed in the mining and metallurgical industries remained " relatively 
satisfactory,"  although even here reductions occurred periodically as a re­
sult of insufficient orders.61 
Before the crisis bottomed out in the late fall, officials estimated that 
more than 75 percent of the workers in Piotrk6w Province were in "a 
difficult material situation" as  a result of  unemployment or  part-time em­
ployment, which had brought about a decline in family incomes averaging 
50 percent.62 Mining and metallurgy, moreover, no longer remained im­
mune. The war's  initial stimulation of the Kingdom' s  heavy industry drew 
a significant number of unemployed workers from other parts of the coun­
try to the D�browa Basin. The area' s traditional labor shortage, particularly 
in mining, quickly gave way to a labor surplus, enabling firms to reduce 
wages .  Once Russian military orders declined in the second half of 1 904, 
heavy industry began to experience its own sales crisis, primarily as a result 
of the transportation bottleneck that limited access to Russian markets. As 
in the textile industry, declining sales led to layoffs and reduced working 
hours. Although the D�browa Basin remained a picture of health in com­
parison with the L6dZ region, unemployment and partial employment nev­
ertheless affected 30 percent of the labor force by the autumn of 1 904.63 
The Kingdom' s  industry, of course, was not confined to Piotrk6w Prov­
ince, nor was the industrial crisis. In Warsaw, unemployment already 
affected 30,000 people, mainly textile workers and their families, by mid­
summer.64 As the crisis spread to Warsaw's  metal industry in the second 
half of 1 904, working hours were cut back, leading to a decline in wages 
averaging 20 percent. At the peak of the crisis, some 1 20,000 inhabitants 
of Warsaw were suffering from the impact of unemployment and reduced 
employment in industry, which affected some 60 percent of the city ' s  in­
dustrial labor force. Official statistics did not embrace the city 's  small 
artisans and craftsmen, most of whom were Jewish. Yet evidence that 
20,000 Warsaw Jews were receiving relief from community philanthropic 
institutions by the summer of 1 904 suggests that many Jewish tradesmen 
had experienced a significant decline in income. Numerous artisans were 
forced to close their shops altogether. In the immediate environs of War­
saw, many of the small breweries, distilleries, and brickyards that provided 
employment to neighboring peasants were also driven out of business.65 
6 1 .  Ibid., July 15 (28), 1 904. 
62. Korzec, Zr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I ( I ) : 142-147. 
63. Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "Depresja ekonomiczna," pp. 24-25 .  
64. AGAD KGGW 2382 ,  Report of  the Warsaw Section of  the Society for the Support of 
Russian Industry and Trade, July 24 (August 6), 1904. 
65. Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "Depresja ekonomiczna,"  pp. 1 6-20. 
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Distribution of flour in Warsaw. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 24639) 
Outside of Piotrk6w and Warsaw provinces, the industrial crisis had 
considerably less impact on local economies . In Radom Province, a thou­
sand workers had been laid off by the summer, but since the majority 
consisted of small peasant landowners, many were able to support them­
selves by returning to traditional agricultural pursuits. Local officials were 
concerned, however, that more serious problems could arise once work in 
the fields came to an end.66 A similar situation existed in Lomia Province, 
where employment in industry was largely a side occupation for peasant 
smallholders and not a principal source of income.67 In Lublin Province, 
unemployment was confined to artisans and unskilled laborers. Although 
workers ' hours were reduced slightly in the small factories of the province, 
the resulting decline in wages was considered " insignificant. ' '68 
Even so, throughout the Kingdom of Poland, unemployment and partial 
66. AGAD KGGW 2382, Radom Governor to the Department of Police, August 26 (Sep­
tember 8), 1 904. 
67. AGAD KGGW 2382, LornZa Governor to the Department of Police, June 26 (July 9), 
1904. 
68. AGAD KGGW 2382, Lublin Governor to the WGG, August 3 1  (September 1 2) and 
November ' 7  (30), 1 904· 
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employment affected close to one-third of all those who derived, or were 
dependent on, income from industry and trade, approximately 350,000 peo­
ple.69 Never before in the history of Polish industry had unemployment 
been so severe as in the autumn of 1 904. To make matters worse, the 
industrial crisis coincided with a sharp rise in prices for basic foodstuffs, 
the major expenditure in working-class budgets.7o In L6dZ the price of 
potatoes doubled by the spring.7!  During the course of 1 904, price increases 
for beef, bacon, butter, milk, eggs, and cabbage ranged from 25 percent to 
1 50 percent. Meanwhile, apartment rents and the price of clothing, also 
important items in workers' budgets, increased on the average by 25 per­
cent. 72 Hence even those workers who were fortunate enough to maintain 
full-time employment during the crisis nevertheless experienced a decline 
in their real earnings. 
For the most part, the state proved incapable of organizing relief for 
those most adversely affected by the crisis. In Lublin Province, where 
unemployment was less widespread and where agricultural pursuits served 
as a safety valve, the state ' s  relief efforts were moderately successful. 
There, the provincial governor established a relief committee consisting of 
government officials and private citizens which created a job information 
and placement office, provided basic goods at low prices with the help of 
private philanthropy, and opened up shelters and soup kitchens for un­
employed workers and artisans,?3 
In Piotrk6w Province, though, the dimensions of the crisis continually 
outran the government' s  efforts to organize relief. In May, Karl Miller, the 
Piotrk6w governor, sought and received permission to transfer sixteen 
thousand rubles from the L6dZ city administration to Christian and Jewish 
philanthropic organizations for distribution among the families of the un­
employed. Despite the subsidy, the funds of these organizations were ex­
hausted within two months.74 Miller then made a series of more 
far-reaching proposals and recommendations, some of which were quite 
radical in the context of prevailing Russian bureaucratic attitudes .  In July, 
69. Kalabinski and Tych, Czwarte powstanie ezy pierwsza rewolueja, pp. 1 6-17 .  
70 .  In  an average Warsaw working-class household of four members, food purchases could 
easily consume halfto two-thirds of a family ' s  income; see Zarnowska, Robotniey Warszawy, 
pp. 1 14-I I 5 · 
7 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2382,  Piotrkow Governor to the Department of Police, May 7 (20), 
1 904. 
72. Pietrzak-Pawlowska, "Depresja ekonomiczna," p. 27. 
73.  AGAD KGGW 2382, Lublin Governor to the WGG, August 31 (September 1 3) and 
November 17 (30), 1 904. 
74. Korzec, ir6dla do dziej6w rewolueji 1 ( I ) :  97�8, I I1}- 1 25.  
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he proposed that the factory and plant owners of Piotrk6w Province carry 
the financial burden of improved and better organized relief efforts. Miller 
also argued for the creation of a permanent unemployment relief fund 
under the auspices of the State Bank to help secure the workers ' existence 
in future times of crisis.75 Unfortunately, Miller's  advice went unheeded, 
and he was subsequently forced to plead for the placement of orders for 
army uniforms with L6dZ industrialists as well as the issuing of passports 
and railroad tickets free-of-charge to the unemployed so that they might 
work abroad. Finally, at the end of September, the Piotrk6w governor' s  
office, recognizing the failure o f  its various efforts to provide relief, re­
quested permission to deport twenty-five hundred "permanently unem­
ployed" workers from L6dZ to their places of birth.76 
The effects of the industrial depression, coupled with inflation and the 
state ' s  inability to organize relief where it counted-in the major urban 
and industrial areas-were bound to generate labor unrest. In part, that 
unrest also resulted from what historian Richard Lewis has termed " a  crisis 
of rising expectations. "77 Workers ' real wages had risen steadily in the 
1 890s, aided by an increasingly offensive-minded strike movement that 
drew up to 1 0  percent of the industrial labor force. Wages then plummeted 
sharply during the European depression of 1 900-1 903 , but recovery in the 
second half of 1 903 and early 1 904 generated hope among the workers 
that a return to normal economic conditions would result in an improve­
ment in their standard of living. Workers ' expectations are reflected in the 
escalating number of strikes (twenty in 1 903 compared with six in 1 902), 
almost all of which resulted in at least some concessions from manage­
menUS The momentum of the strike movement initially carried forward 
into the first months of 1 904. At the end of January, 580 textile workers 
struck at five factories in Tomasz6w Mazowiecki in Piotrk6w Province, 
effectively bringing the local economy to a standstill. Within a week, man­
agement at all five factories agreed to raise piece rates in a compromise 
acceptable to their employees. Throughout the strike, provincial authorities 
reported that the workers remained "calm" and "peaceful, " thus obviating 
a resort to extraordinary police measures.79 
75. AGAD KGGW 2382,  Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, July 15 (28), 1 904. 
76. AGAD KGGW 2382,  Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, August I I  (24) and August 1 2  
(25), 1 904; Korzec, ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I ( I ) :  1 42-147.  
77. Richard D. Lewis, "The Labor Movement in Russian Poland in the Revolution of 1 905-
1 907" (ph.D. diss. ,  University of California, Berkeley, 1 97 1 ), p. 75. 
78 .  Ignacy Orzechowski and Aleksander Kocluuiski, Zarys dziej6w ruchu zawodowego w 
Kr61estwie Polskim. 1905-1918 (Warsaw, 1964), pp. 4 I-5 I .  
79. AGAD KGGW 222 1 ,  Report o f  the SDPA to the WGG, January 2 0  (February 3), 1 904; 
Korzec, irOdla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 ( 1 ) :  303-3 1 2 .  
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The workers ' hopes, as well as their quiet and confident demeanor, were 
shattered by the Russo-Japanese War. The ensuing industrial depression 
quickly becalmed the strike movement. Faced with unemployment and 
reduced wages, workers found themselves with no choice but to give up 
their efforts to improve their living standards. The few strikes that did occur 
during the remainder of 1 904 were by necessity defensive in nature, aimed 
at maintaining wages at their prewar level or preventing their drastic de­
cline. Employers, for their part, could and did threaten to close their fac­
tories and plants if workers resisted the reductions. This proved a most 
effective bargaining tool. 
The one major strike of 1 904 occurred in the Warsaw construction in­
dustry, one of the few oases of economic activity unaffected by the war. 
The seasonal nature of employment in the industry determined the timing 
of the strike; the desire to keep up with inflation, its purpose. Already, at 
the beginning of the construction season in April, bricklayers struck at 
several building sites in Warsaw, but after ten days they had achieved only 
minor wage increases, and these were soon eroded by rising prices.so The 
relatively high demand for skilled construction workers and the need to 
complete already initiated projects prompted a second three-week strike at 
the end of the summer. This time the bricklayers demanded a substantial 
wage increase, from the existing fifteen kopecks per hour, as well as a 
nine-hour working day. Their lesser demands included immediate and di­
rect payment of wages at work sites, the construction of shelters to protect 
workers from the elements, and a two-week advance warning of layoffs.s l  
In contrast to the April strike, the strike of August-September was joined 
by carpenters, painters, and other construction workers-at its peak, thirty­
five hundred workers-halting construction at 1 2 1  building sites.s2 
The nearly general strike in the Warsaw construction industry achieved 
few of its goals, and workers again had to satisfy themselves with minor 
wage concessions . But the Warsaw construction strike was important in 
that it displayed for the first time many of the characteristics that would 
become common to the labor movement in 1 905 . First, socialist parties 
played a principal role in organizing and spreading the strike, a role to 
which they were not particularly accustomed. At the majority of striking 
construction sites, for example, workers ' demands followed those set forth 
in proclamations of the PPS-Proletariat. As the strike continued, workers 
80. AGAD KGGW 2336, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, April 14 (27), 1 904; see also 
Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, p. 62. 
8 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2336, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, August 9 (22), 1 904. 
82. Ibid. ,  August I7 (30), 1 904. 
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looked to both the PPS-Proletariat and the SDKPiL to represent their in­
terests, and four delegates from each party joined the bricklayers' strike 
committee.83 Second, the strike was accompanied by a good deal of vio­
lence. In the April strike, workers who did not join had been threatened 
with beatings. In August and September, that threat was carried out, leading 
to the charge by employers that the strike was the work of a minority who 
terrorized an otherwise peaceful and contented majority.84 Although the 
employers ' claim was surely an exaggeration designed to bring about state 
intervention, rioting did erupt in the Warsaw suburb of Praga on September 
1 0, when rock-throwing strikers attacked those who remained on the j ob, 
inflicting several minor head injuries.85 Finally, the workers took their de­
mands into the streets, holding public meetings and demonstrations num­
bering up to five hundred in Praga, Mokotow, Wola, and Srodmiescie. In 
the first week of the strike, these crowds dispersed peacefully; but as the 
strike continued into September, they began to resist police demands, lead­
ing to the arrest of dozens of construction workers.86 
Workers in the Warsaw construction industry may have been able to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction through a general strike, but most of the 
labor force resorted to other means. From Piotrkow Province, in particular, 
came reports of a turbulent and " ugly" mood spreading among the pro­
letariat. That mood found graphic expression, for instance, in May when 
a crowd of more than five thousand in the LodZ suburb of Chojny at­
tempted to lynch a factory watchman suspected of beating a young boy to 
death. Several Cossacks were injured as they tried to forestall vigilante 
justice.87 In Warsaw on June 1 3 , a fire at a pharmacy on Grzybowska Street 
drew a crowd of several thousand working-class spectators, which in turn 
attracted the police, who were greeted with taunts and then a hail of rocks. 
The crowd dispersed only when confronted with salvos fired by a company 
of Cossacks. Two civilians were killed and six injured in the brawl, which 
also left twenty-two policemen, nine gendarmes, and four Cossacks with 
serious wounds. A similar clash occurred nine days later, when police tried 
to disperse workers who had gathered to watch a fire at a pub on Worona 
83 .  Ibid., August 1 6  (29), 1 904; see also Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, pp. 62-63 . For 
the SDKPiL' s  version of its involvement in the strike, see Czerwony Sztandar, no. 20 (Sep­
tember 1 904). 
84. AGAD KGGW 2336, Warsaw Bricklayers' Guild to the Warsaw Magistrate, September 
7 (20), 1 904· 
85.  Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, pp. 6 1 8-61 9. 
86. AGAD KGGW 2336, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, August 24 (Sep­
tember 6), 1 904. 
87. AGAD KGGW 2346, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, May 1 2  (25), 1 904. 
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" Street Demonstration ."  Contemporary drawing by Witold Wojtkiewicz, 1 905. 
(Muzeum Niepodleglosci 35860) 
Street.88 The growing number and size of these disturbances, which por­
tended "major disorders, "  led four provincial governors to request the 
dispatch of additional troops to reinforce local garrisons. Already back in 
May, the Piotrk6w governor' s shopping list had included two battalions of 
infantry, a company of cavalry, and two companies of Cossacks.89 
Officials in urban areas also reported a rising tide of crime, fights, and 
public drunkenness, which they attributed to the demoralizing effects of a 
sharp decline in workers ' living standards. The crime rate in L6dZ doubled 
in comparison with 1 903, primarily as a result of an increase of thefts and 
robberies related to food.90 By autumn larceny had reached such propor­
tions that several L6dz industrialists appealed directly to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs to take stronger measures to defend the property and se­
curity of "law-abiding citizens. "91  Local authorities, meanwhile, sought to 
identify and remove from factory centers unemployed workers suspected 
88. AGAD KGGW 2383, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, June I ( 14), 1 904, and Warsaw 
Superintendent of Police to the WGG, June 1 3  (26), 1 904. 
89. AGAD KGGW 2346, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, May 12 (25), 1904. 
90. Korzec, Zr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 ( 1 ) :  1 42-147.  
91 .  AGAD KGGW 2382, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, September 25 (October 8) ,  1 904. 
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of criminal activity or deemed guilty of disturbing the peace as a result of 
riotous or drunken behavior.92 
In the eyes of the Russian authorities,  labor unrest in the Kingdom as­
sumed its most dangerous proportions in the autumn, as a result of workers ' 
increasing participation in the political demonstrations organized by the 
socialist parties, especially in the antiwar movement headed by the PPS. 
The May Day demonstrations of 1 904, by the very fact of their occurrence 
in several cities in the face of strong preventive police measures, provided 
the authorities with an initial warning. This achievement, unprecedented in 
the annals of Polish socialism, could not be immediately exploited, how­
ever. The PPS antiwar demonstrations of the late spring and early summer, 
for example, still consisted largely of party activists and student sympa­
thizers. Similarly, of fifty-six persons arrested in a Warsaw funeral dem­
onstration organized by the SDKPiL in May, thirty-four were students or 
former students, and only two could be classified as workers.93 
The antiwar movement nevertheless proved a most effective vehicle for 
directing labor unrest into desired political channels. After the mobilization 
of reservists in October, the dozens of demonstrators turned into hundreds, 
and by December, thousands. Authorities pointed the finger at the growing 
influence of socialist propaganda among the workers; but it did not take 
party newspapers like the PPS ' s  Robotnik or the SDKPiL' s  Czerwony 
Sztandar to convince a textile mill hand that the Russo-Japanese War was 
a direct cause of his current misery. Moreover, the socialists had not 
brought the workers into the streets; they were already there, unemployed 
or working limited hours, angry and at times intoxicated, agitated first by 
the forced abandonment of their expectations and then by the drastic de­
cline in their living standards. They were itching for a fight. While the PPS 
boj owcy, armed with revolvers and Brownings, began turning up at dem­
onstrations, the workers brought their own "cold" weapons-knives, bot­
tles,  rocks, and clubs. The very appearance of such weapons, commonplace 
by the late fall, marked the confluence of social with political protest. For 
the imperial authorities, it was to prove a most dangerous combination. 
The Student Movement 
Students played a prominent role, as already mentioned, in the early 
phases of the antiwar and antigovernment movement of 1 904. Long alien-
92.  AGAD KGGW 2382, WGG to the Minister of Internal Affairs, September 19 (October 
2), 1 904. 
93. AGAD KGGW 2337, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, May 1 ( 1 4), 1 904. 
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ated by the inflexibility and discrimination of the russified system prevail­
ing in institutions of secondary and higher education, many students had 
found refuge in "secret" self-education circles where they discussed pro­
hibited literary, philosophical, and historical topics. Many of the "secret" 
circles dated from the 1 890s-their appearance coinciding with the emer­
gence of the nationalist and socialist movements. From the beginning, the 
new ideologies of what would develop into mass movements were fash­
ionable among students, perhaps because they provided the self-education 
circles with a forum for debate of contemporary issues and a sense of 
political direction. By 1 904, nationalist and socialist student organizations 
were competing and sometimes cooperating with one another in all of the 
country' s  institutions of higher education and in many secondary schools 
as well . As a consequence, students were the most politicized social group 
in Polish society on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Meanwhile, disturbances in the schools had become almost usual in the 
first years of the twentieth century. In Lublin, the self-education circles at 
the boys' gymnasium were sufficiently strong to coordinate successful boy­
cotts of concerts, balls,  literary evenings, and other activities organized by 
the school authorities.  Their activities culminated in "disorders" in the 
spring of 1 902 during the singing of the Russian national anthem.94 Gym­
nasium students in LOrnZa and Plock, also in 1 902 , responded to official 
observances of the fiftieth anniversary of Gogol' s  death by boycotting the 
ceremonies and disrupting classes. In the latter case, the incident led to the 
expulsion of forty students.95 The most widespread action of these years, 
however, occurred in the ethnically mixed eastern counties of Siedlce and 
Lublin provinces, where nationalist youth organized a series of actions in 
1 902 and 1 903 protesting the arbitrary introduction of Russian as the lan­
guage of religious instruction. Despite expulsions and other countermea­
sures, the authorities were forced to restore Polish for the study of religion 
in eight secondary schools.96 
A proliferation of self-education circles followed, accompanied by the 
penetration of nationalist and "progressive" (liberal and socialist) influ­
ences. By 1 904, underground student circles of various political stripes 
existed at almost all institutions of higher and secondary education in War-
. saw, and the Society for Secret Instruction, created in 1 894 by Cecylja  
94. Bogdan Nowroczyilski, ed., Nasza walka 0 szkol� polskI,!, 1901-1917: Opracowania, 
wspomnienia, dokumenty, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1 932), pp. 461-466. 
95 · Ibid. , pp. 405-410, 429. 
96. Ibid., pp. 414-41 7, 42 1-429; see also Urszula Glowacka-Maksymiuk, Gubemia sied­
lecka w latach rewolucji, 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 985), p. 57. 
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Sniegocka, provided illegal Polish language instruction for two thousand 
Warsaw children of elementary school age.97 Conspiratorial organizations 
and underground activity had also become widespread in the provinces but 
varied widely in size and significance. The "secret" library shared by 
nationalist and progressive student groups in the Piotrkow secondary 
schools, for instance, held three thousand volumes.98 By contrast, the "pro­
gressive" self-education circle in the Kielce Boys ' Gymnasium, strongly 
influenced by the PPS, consisted of forty students and possessed a library 
containing only four hundred volumes.99 
The competition of political organizations active among student youth 
intensified greatly during the course of 1 904. As already mentioned, the 
Union of Polish Youth, better known as "Zet, " was closely tied to the 
nationalist movement. In the first years of the twentieth century, Zet suc­
ceeded in creating conspiratorial groups among Polish university students 
and, through a satellite organization called Przyszlosc (The Future), among 
Polish students in the secondary schools as well . The Union of Socialist 
Youth, on the other hand, was created in 1 902 and brought together stu­
dent members and sympathizers of the PPS, SDKPiL, Bund, and PPS­
Proletariat. Whereas nationalist youth groups were ethnically exclusive and 
limited membership to students of Polish nationality, "progressive" and 
socialist groups (which were frequently synonymous) contained both Polish 
and Jewish students. Both nationalist and socialist youth groups cooperated 
in mutual-aid organizations (e.g. ,  at the Warsaw Polytechnical Institute) 
and sent delegates to the Central Circle, which represented all shades of 
opinion among secondary school youth in Warsaw. Student solidarity was 
fragile, however, and competition among political organizations could just 
as easily result in the fragmentation and polarization of student opinion. 
Political rivalry between nationalist and socialist youth groups, for exam­
ple, brought about the breakup of the mutual-aid organization at Warsaw 
University by 1 899. Sharp divisions between nationalist and socialist stu­
dent sympathizers also prevailed in several secondary schools in Warsaw 
and LodZ. 
Nevertheless, student opposition to the Russian educational system be­
came both more organized and more politicized in 1 904, and the level of 
student unrest, as measured in official documents, grew appreciably. The 
Warsaw Polytechnical Institute became the scene of repeated incidents dur-
97. Helena Ceysinger6wna, "Tajne nauczanie w Warszawie, 1 894-1 906," Niepodleglosc 2 
(April-September 1 930) : 95-103 .  
98 .  NowroczyTIski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� polskQ I :  372. 
99· Ibid., p .  397· 
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ing the course of the year, beginning with the already-mentioned walkout 
of Polish and Jewish students eleven days after the outbreak of hostilities 
in the Far East. A few months later, efforts to organize a demonstration at 
the institute on the anniversary of the Polish Constitution of May 3 resulted 
in the arrest of thirty students. loo Students from the institute, as well as 
from Warsaw University, figured prominently among those arrested and 
sentenced for " active participation" in the Grzybowski Square demonstra­
tion of November 1 3 . 10 1  Exactly one month later, forty-nine students were 
arrested for participating in a demonstration that celebrated the recent as­
sassination of Viacheslav Plehve, the Russian minister of Internal Affairs. 
This particular " disorder" resulted in the closing of the institute four days 
before the end of the semester. 102 
The Institute of Agriculture and Forestry in Pulawy was another center 
of unrest in 1 904, this despite its overwhelming proportion of Russian 
students. In fact, many of the young Russians were actively involved in or 
sympathized with the socialist and radical movements, and collaboration 
with like-minded Polish colleagues had been established in 1 899. The 
ground was therefore fertile at the Pulawy Institute for organizational ac­
tivity of an "internationalist" flavor carried out primarily by the SDKPiL. 
In fact, the entire Southern Committee of the SDKPiL consisted of students 
from the Pulawy Institute, and its influence, although co$ed at the time 
within the institute, was nonetheless considerable. The Southern Commit­
tee, moreover, maintained contacts with and supported the activity of the 
Military Revolutionary Organization of the Russian Social Democratic 
Workers Party, which, in tum, was active among the soldiers of the Russian 
garrison at Pulawy.103 Consequently, as early as March 1 904, authorities 
feared a student strike at the institute and blamed the activity of the South­
ern Committee. I04 Although a strike did not occur in the spring as expected, 
unrest at the Pulawy Institute remained high. In the middle of March, six 
students were arrested and subsequently fined for " disturbing the peace. "  
Two months later, windows were broken at the homes o f  the institute' s  
inspector and three o f  its professors . !Os 
A series of incidents at the boys ' gymnasium in Radom, leading to the 
1 00. Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, pp. 525-526. 
1 0 1 .  APW WGZZ 934. 
1 02 .  AGAD KGGW 2384, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, December 2 ( 1 5), 
1 904. 
103.  Robert Biobaum, Feliks Dziert.yriski and the SDKPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish 
Communism (Boulder, 1 984), p. 1 28 .  
1 04. AGAD KGGW 22 1 9, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 20 (March 4), 1 904. 
105.  Ibid. , April 1 3  (26) and May 10 (23), 1 904. 
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expulsion of eighty students during the spring semester of 1 904, well il­
lustrates the tensions prevailing in the secondary schools. On February 4, 
students from the upper forms walked out of the gymnasium after de­
manding the dismissal of a teacher who had " illegally" prohibited the 
reading of the morning prayer in Polish. The gymnasium' S  director, though 
refusing to remove the teacher, promised to look into the matter upon the 
return of the students to classes. l 06 No action, however, was taken against 
the teacher, and on March 6, nineteen students from the fifth form walked 
out of his class. They were followed by dozens of colleagues from the 
sixth, seventh, and eighth forms, all of whom were expelled: 107 Despite the 
expulsions, the students remained defiant. On May 3, about a hundred 
gymnasium students sang the forbidden hymn "Boze cos Polsk�" (God 
preserve Poland) in a Radom church and then marched down the city ' s  
main thoroughfare. l OS The climax occurred on the night of June 1-2,  when 
an explosion from a homemade bomb rocked the quarters of the gymna­
sium's  inspector. Although the police failed to come up with direct evi­
dence, they immediately and justifiably suspected the involvement of 
recently expelled students. 109 
During the course of 1904, walkouts, closings, and mass expulsions of 
students also took place at the E. Swi�ciitski Technical School in Warsaw, 
the Mariampol Boys ' Gymnasium in Suwalki Province, and the Mariampol 
Teachers Seminary. By the end of the year, rumors of a nationwide student 
strike were rife. Zet began making preparations for student meetings at 
Warsaw University and the Polytechnical Institute. At the same time, the 
possibility of a strike in the secondary schools was openly debated at a 
congress of nationalist students in December. In anticipation of a strike, 
student organizations from three secondary schools in Kalisz formed a 
committee to direct the action once it occurred. Similarly, representatives 
of nationalist and "progressive" youth groups in Piotrkow met to discuss 
preparations for a strike despite the lack of instructions from Warsaw. Also 
in December, students at the Sosnowiec Real School were told by a del­
egate to the Central Circle in Warsaw to expect "some sort of action" at 
the beginning of the new year. In the words of a former student of the 
Kielce Boys Gymnasium, "nobody was surprised" once the call for a 
nationwide school strike finally materialized the following JanuaryYo 
106. Ibid., February 23 (March 7) ,  I 904. 
107.  Ibid., March I 2  (25), I 904. 
108 .  AGAD KGGW 2282,  Radom Governor to the WGG, April 30 (May 5), I 904. 
Iog. AGAD KGGW 2 2 I 9, Radom Governor to the WGG, June 4 ( I 7), I 904. 
I 10. Nowroczynski, Nasza walko 0 szkolll pols� I :  1 32-I 33,  274, 376, 383, 39 I ,  398. 
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Stirrings in the Countryside 
Compared with factory centers and academic institutions, the Polish 
countryside remained relatively quiet for most of 1 904. There was no or� 
ganized antiwar movement in the villages, only sporadic and isolated 
incidents of resistance to conscription and wartime taxation. To the peas­
antry, the disruption of sales of the Kingdom' s  industrial goods in Russian 
markets had little meaning, and questions relating to "imperialist expan­
sionism" even less. Overall, the Polish peasantry remained indifferent to 
the war; only a few peasants hoped for a Japanese victory or saw some 
advantage for the "Polish cause" in a Russian defeat. Indeed most peasants 
did not yet recognize the existence of a "Polish cause. "  
Those who did, however, became increasingly active, especially toward 
the end of the year. The awakening of national consciousness among cer­
tain segments of rural peasant society was a long, drawn-out process that 
extended back to the 1 880s and the first postemancipation generation of 
Polish peasants. As mentioned in the first chapter, this generation, unlike 
the previous one, did not perceive the tsar as its benefactor or the land it 
owned as "a gift. " Meanwhile, it increasingly perceived the Russian bu­
reaucracy as an alien and external force usurping statutory rights of local 
self-government. That bureaucracy' s  arbitrary introduction of the Russian 
language into the conduct of communal affairs, its interference in com­
munal elections and meetings, and the pressures it applied to force mem­
bers of communal assemblies to act in a prescribed way-all led to 
declining peasant participation in local political processes clearly manip­
ulated from the outside. 
The principal contact between peasants and the Russian state, however, 
occurred during encounters of the former with the rural police, or Land 
Guard. The Land Guard appeared at the scene of almost every local dis­
pute, whether between peasant neighbors or between entire villages and 
nearby estate owners, and made its presence felt at every meeting of com­
munal assemblies. The Land Guard was a completely alien force. Although 
statistical information on its composition is available only for Lublin Prov­
ince, it serves as a representative example for the entire Kingdom. Of the 
388 men employed in the Lublin Land Guard in 1 904, 359 were classified 
as "Orthodox," that is, Russian, whereas only 5 .5  percent were Roman 
Catholics born inside the Kingdom, and most of these served in the town 
of Lublin rather than in the countryside. I I I  
I I  I .  APL KGL 1 905 :64. 
T H E  M A K I N G  O F  A R E V O L U T I O N ,  1 9 0 4  6 7 
Finally, the system of elementary education in the countryside, which in 
the 1 880s increasingly substituted Russian for Polish as the language of 
instruction, was not only alien to peasant society but also woefully inade­
quate in pedagogic terms. In 1 904, there were 2 ,977 elementary schools 
funded by organs of communual self-government, or one school for every 
3 , 1 05 inhabitants. Or put another way, 32 children for every 1 ,000 inhab­
itants in the Polish countryside were enrolled in an elementary school in 
1 904. By comparison, 42.9 children for every 1 ,000 inhabitants attended 
elementary schools in the rest of European Russia. In Great Britain, Ger­
many, and the United States the ratios stood at 1 60, 1 90, and 230 per 1 ,000 
respectively. Moreover, of the small minority of children receiving primary 
education, 92.5 percent were enrolled in one-class elementary schools and 
completed their " education" after three years of study. At the most, they 
picked up rudimentary reading and writing skills, and these were not in 
their native language. Small wonder then that illiteracy continued to afflict 
three out of every four Polish peasants in the first years of the twentieth 
century. 1 1 2 
Individual peasants and groups of peasants responded to their growing 
sense of alienation from the Russian regime and its local bureaucratic and 
police representatives in various ways. One was to create their own social 
organizations, such as volunteer fire departments, which, with the permis­
sion of the authorities, could serve the interests of village communities 
without undermining those of the Russian state. In many localities, a vol­
unteer fire department was often the only such social organization in ex­
istence. Even the authorities recognized the need for volunteer firemen. 
Until World War I, almost all buildings in the Polish countryside were 
constructed of wood and other flammable materials, and losses from fires 
ran into the millions of rubles each year. Consequently, provincial gover­
nors in consultation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs approved the 
creation of 1 2 8  associations of volunteer firemen . by 1 900. For practical 
reasons, Polish was the language of command in the volunteer organiza­
tions, which also possessed their own biweekly Polish-language publi­
cation. In time, the firemen' s  associations came to play an important 
integrative role in their communities through the promotion of social, ed­
ucational, and cultural activities. Equally important, dedication to public 
service earned the firemen sympathy, respect, and authority in their com-
1 1 2 .  Zenon Kmiecik, Ruch oiwiatowy na wsi: Kr61estwo Polskie, 1905-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 963), pp. 1 1- 12 ;  Edmund StaszyTIski, Polityka oiwiatowa caratu w Kr61estwie Polskim 
(Warsaw, 1 968), pp. 88-89. 
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munities. l 1 3 State officials, for their part, became alarmed at the prolifera­
tion of the firemen' s  associations and increasingly suspicious of their range 
of activities,  which, in the words of the Siedlce governor, translated into 
"agitation" and "a failure to carry out the obligations for which [they] 
were constituted. " 1 14 
Participation in volunteer firemen' s  associations was a legal circumven­
tion of externally imposed Russian institutions in the countryside and per­
mitted the cultivation of Polish language and customs. Another, even more 
important awakener of national consciousness in rural areas was the wide­
spread involvement of peasants in illegal Polish-language reading and writ­
ing courses. In 1 90 1 ,  a special commission created by the Warsaw 
governor-general reported that one-third of the rural population had re­
ceived or was currently receiving secret instruction in the Polish lan­
guage . l l 5  In Siedlce Province in 1 904, there was one underground school 
for every two public elementary schools. 1 16 In Radom Province, where the 
state network was even weaker, the authorities uncovered and suppressed 
more than two hundred secret schools in the years immediately before the 
revolution. I I ?  
Inasmuch as  secret instruction often had a moral-religious flavor, the 
didactic achievements of the underground schools were not particularly 
impressive by modem secular standards. Nevertheless, maintenance of the 
secret schools and the hiring of teachers required forms of collective social 
organization that raised the national consciousness of a substantial section 
of the peasantry. Most secret courses were held in buildings belonging to 
the local Catholic parish or in peasant cottages and were conducted by 
church organists, semiliterate village women, ex-soldiers and reservists, 
and employees of local manors, as well as by fired and retired teachers 
from the state schools. Some clandestine teachers traveled from cottage to 
cottage and from village to village to hold their courses. Covert instruction 
was also aided by the young intelligentsia, particularly students from War­
saw and Pulawy during vacations. An average of slightly more than ten 
pupils, usually a mixed group of boys and girls, attended an underground 
school, where they studied Konrad Proszyllski' s  Polish primer (the so­
called Promyk grammar) or a Polish-language catechism. After 1 900, 
1 1 3 .  On the history of the volunteer firemen' s  associations, see 16zefRyszard Szaflik, Dzieje 
ochotniczych straiy poiamych (Warsaw, 1 985). 
1 14. AGAD KGGW 2472, Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, October 1 4  (27), 1 904. 
1 1 5 .  Helena Brodowska, Ruch chlopski po uwlaszczeniu w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1864-1904 
(Warsaw, 1 967), p. 255. 
1 1 6. Glowacka-Maksymiuk, Gubemia siedlecka w latach rewolucji, pp. 44-47. 
1 1 7 .  Brodowska, Ruch chlopski, pp. 248-25 1 .  
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teaching in the secret schools carried the risk ofa three-hundred-ruble fine 
and three months in j ail. Parents of participating children could also be 
subjected to stiff fines or up to two weeks in j ail. 
The Society for National Education, known by its popular Polish acro­
nym as TON, played an important role in the spread of secret instruction 
in rural areas. Founded in 1 899, TON functioned as a satellite organization 
of the Endecja in the countryside. By 1 904, six thousand peasant members 
participated in two hundred cells of TON, many of which were located in 
the Kingdom' s  northern and eastern provinces ."S  As TON took over and 
enlarged the network of secret schools, it gave the underground educational 
movement in the countryside a far greater sense of organization and po­
litical purpose. 
A logical extension of TON's  underground educational activities in the 
Polish countryside was its agitation for the polonization of the institutions 
of communal self-government. Polak (The Pole), a Krakow-based Endecja  
publication aimed at the peasantry and distributed by the TON cells in  the 
Kingdom, began popularizing the slogan of " gmina action" in the autumn 
of 1 904. Conceived as activity legally conducted and restricted initially to 
demands for Polish language, gmina action eventually embraced about one 
hundred communes by the end of the year. The center of the movement 
was in Plock and Warsaw provinces, where forty-one gmina assemblies 
passed resolutions drafted in Polish instead of Russian, an action justified 
on the basis of the statutes of 1 864 that provided for communal self­
government. 1 19 At several other meetings, moreover, the right of the as­
semblies to use the Polish language in their resolutions was at least 
asserted, if not actually exercised. 
Almost all this activity occurred at the end of 1 904. The uniformity of 
the gmina assembly resolutions points to an organized movement among 
the peasants in which TON and Polak played significant inspirational roles.  
The movement' s  strength, however, was in its indigenous roots. In the 
words of the Lublin governor, agitation for the Polish language was ' 'con­
ducted by persons well known to the local population and enj oying its 
trust" -that is, presumably, by persons like the volunteer firemen. 120 Such 
agitation took a variety of forms, especially earlier in the year. In early 
March, for example, peasants from the gmina of Niemce in Lublin Prov-
1 1 8 .  The history of TON in the years immediately before the revolution is documented by 
Tadeusz Wolsza, "Towarzystwo Oswiaty Narodowej, 1 899-1905,"  Kwartalnik Historycmy 
89, 2 ( 1 987): 7 1-96. 
1 19 .  Polak no. 2 (February 1 905) :  28 .  
1 20. Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, eds. ,  Walki chlop6w Kr6lestwa Polskiego w 
rewolucji 1905-1907. vol. I (Warsaw, 1 958), pp. 1 33-1 34. 
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ince refused to tax themselves for the capital repair of two primary schools 
so long as instruction was in the Russian language. As a result, four local 
" agitators" were placed under "open" police surveillance (a type of house 
arrest) . 1 2 1  In another protest action during the summer, several Russian road 
and directional signs in the communes of Dzierzkowice and Ur�dow, also 
in Lublin Province, were covered with homemade Polish equivalents. 122 At 
the end of the summer, the mayor of the grnina of Lukow in Siedlce 
Province was dismissed from his office and placed under police surveil­
lance after demanding that the minutes and r�solutions of the gmina as­
sembly be written in Polish. 1 23 
The rising tide of peasant protest against the russification of local insti­
tutions that were supposedly created to serve peasant interests was the most 
visible form of unrest in rural areas in 1 904. Once it assumed the character 
of an organized movement, it also began to attract the serious attention of 
the Russian authorities.  Other sources of potential agrarian unrest were 
considerably less alarming by comparison: ongoing disputes over easement 
rights, a rising rural crime rate, the steady deterioration in the living stan­
dards of agrarian laborers, and the mounting pressures of overpopulation. 
Yet these too, along with gmina action, would help define the contours of 
the coming revolution in the Polish countryside. 
At the end of 1 904, leading provincial officials clearly anticipated the 
outbreak of "major disorders" in the Kingdom of Poland and requested 
that the machinery for emergency rule, long in place, be set in motion as 
part of a preemptive strategy. Not only was the expression of political and 
social discontent among different strata of society becoming more bold and 
demonstrative, but it was also becoming more efficiently organized. Signs 
of oppositional activity began to appear as well among such previously 
reticent social and occupational groups as teachers and the Catholic clergy. 
Furthermore, the various underground parties by now were emerging from 
their conspiratorial shells in an effort to direct that unrest into desired 
political channels and, in the process, were reaping dividends in the form 
of increased memberships. 
Even conservatives who had previously urged society to reconcile itself 
to Russian rule could no longer ignore that rule' s  deleterious impact, nor 
the dramatic shift in popular attitudes during the course of 1 904. At the 
end of December, Count Wladyslaw Tyszkiewicz, a longtime "concilia-
1 2 1 .  Rappaport, Narastanie rewolucji, pp. 479-480. 
1 2 2 .  Ibid., pp. 584-585.  
1 23 .  Ibid. , p .  6 1 8 . 
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tionist" and president of the Warsaw branch of the Society for the Support 
of Russian Industry and Trade, delivered a "memorial" signed by twenty­
three prominent members of the Polish elite to the minister of Internal 
Affairs, urging the government to implement immediate reforms to prevent 
a further escalation of the crisis. Citing a litany of sins perpetrated by the 
Russian bureaucracy in the Kingdom, Tyszkiewicz claimed that Russian 
rule had led to widespread uncertainty regarding the future, to a weakening 
of the public and "entrepreneurial" spirit-in short, to "a general demor­
alization of society. " To prevent even greater disasters, Tyszkiewicz called 
for the granting of rights to Poles equal to those shared by other subjects 
of the tsar; the return of the Polish language to the Kingdom' s  schools, 
courts, and administration; the employment of Poles in state and public 
institutions; the realization and strict observance of statutes providing for 
local self-government; the granting of religious freedom to the Uniate pop­
ulation; and the restoration of full rights to the Roman Catholic Church. 1 24 
Whether the adoption of these measures would have been enough to 
avert a revolution is difficult to say; in any event, Tyszkiewicz' s  memorial 
had little impact on St. Petersburg' s  way of thinking. As 1 904 gave way 
to 1 905, the central government remained determined to rule the Kingdom 
according to the familiar methods of repression. Instead of timely conces­
sions and reforms, the tsarist autocracy preferred to rely on police force, 
the emergency powers vested in the Warsaw governor-general, and the 
presence of a large body of troops-time-tested devices that had, after all, 
kept the Kingdom subdued for more than forty years . Within a few weeks 
of the receipt of the Tyszkiewicz memorial, however, events would con­
vince the central government, if not its provincial agents, that the efficacy 
of repressive measures alone had just about run its course .  
1 24. AGAD AB, druk 220. 
C H A P  T E R T H R E E 
T H E E M ER G EN C E  O F  
TH E L A B OR M O V EM EN T 
Beginning with Bloody Sunday, the infamous massacre of working-class 
demonstrators in St. Petersburg on January 22 ,  industrial labor played an 
undeniably significant role in the Revolution of 1 905 in European Russia. 
The outrage after Bloody Sunday, expressed in massive strikes and dem­
onstrations throughout the empire, indeed became the spark that ignited 
Russia ' s  subsequent bourgeois-democratic revolution. In October, Russian 
workers intervened directly in that revolution by means of a statewide 
general strike to force a recalcitrant autocracy to accede to the demands of 
a temporarily united political opposition for democratic freedoms and a 
constitutional restructuring of the old political order. Between January and 
October, however, Russian industrial workers remained relatively quiet, if 
not entirely neutral, in the struggle between the principal combatants, the 
autocracy and its liberal opponents. By the end of the year, and especially 
after the ill-fated Moscow uprising, the Russian proletariat had played out 
its collective historical role, at least as far as this revolution was concerned. 
Although more than mere spectators, Russian workers were largely offstage 
in the revolutionary drama of 1 905 save for two brief but exciting ap­
pearances. 
In the Kingdom of Poland, however, the industrial labor movement 
played a far more central role in the revolution. Without the industrial 
workers, it is hard to conceive of a "Polish revolution" worthy of the 
name. The revolt of the industrial workers in late January and early Feb­
ruary gave other independent social and political movements their cue. 
Unlike their Russian counterparts, industrial workers in Poland refused to 
leave the stage to other actors between January and October. They main­
tained their position, moreover, throughout 1 906 and into the first months 
7 2 
T H E  E M E R G E N C E  O F  T H E  L A B O R  M O V E M E N T  7 3 
of 1 907, until finally removed by a crushing defeat in a dramatic confron­
tation with management in L6dZ known as the " Great Lockout. " In the 
meantime, the labor movement in the Kingdom became politicized and 
organized to a degree unknown elsewhere in the Russian Empire. Simply 
put, the revolution' s  initiation of the era of mass politics and the conse­
quent transformation of Polish political culture would not have occurred 
without the active participation and involvement of the Kingdom' s  working 
class. 
Statistical data clearly illustrate the engagement of the Kingdom' s  pro­
letariat in the revolution, especially when compared with workers in the 
rest of the empire. According to Laura Engelstein' s  study of Moscow work­
ers in 1 905, the great "general" strikes of January and October involved 
only 20 percent of the labor force.) By contrast, 93 .2  percent of the in­
dustrial workers in Russian Poland participated in the strike movement in 
1 905 . In the same year, one-third of all strikes in the Russian Empire 
occurred in the Kingdom of Poland, and the proportion was even greater 
in 1 906 (42 percent of all strikes).2 Piotrk6w Province alone supplied 37.5 
percent of all striking textile workers in the empire in 1 905, and 57.6 
percent in 1 906.3 Similarly, the May Day general strike in Warsaw in 1 905 
accounted for 40 percent of all participants in that strike in the entire 
Russian state.4 
Trade union organization in Russian Poland also far outpaced the rest 
of the empire. At the turn of 1 906-1 907, some 20 percent of the labor 
force in the Kingdom had been organized, compared with only 5 percent 
in Russia. In fact, industrial labor was more organized in Russian Poland 
at this time than in Austria, Belgium, and France.5 A high percentage of 
trade union members were also active in political organizations. In Warsaw 
at the end of 1 906, the trade union movement embraced thirty-two thou­
sand workers; of these twenty thousand belonged to a political party.6 The 
I .  Laura Engelstein, Moscow, 1905: Working-Class Organization and Political Conflict 
(Stanford, 1 982), pp. 64, 1 09. 
2 .  Anna Zarnowska, "Pr6ba analizy ruchu strajkowego w Kr6lestwie Polskim w dobie re­
wolucji 1 905-1 907,"  Przeglqd Historyczny 56, 3 ( 1965):  433. 
3 .  Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, LOdzka organizacja Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej-Lewicy, 
1c;06--1918 (L0dZ, 1 964), p. n 
4. Zarnowska, "Pr6ba analizy," p. 443. 
5. Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, Zwiqzki zawodowe i stowarzyszenia pracodawcow w Lodzi 
(L6dZ, 1 972), pp. 54--60; see also Stanislaw KalabiIiski and Feliks Tych, Czwarte powstanie 
czy pierwsza rewolucja: Lata 1905-1907 na ziemiach polskich, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1 976), p.  
444 · 
6. Anna Zarnowska, Robotnicy Warszawy na przelomie XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw, 1 985), 
pp. 241-244· 
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formation of workers ' cooperatives, the rapid growth of reading rooms and 
libraries, and a general striving to expand educational opportunities­
though more difficult to measure statistically-provide additional evidence 
of a genuine political and cultural awakening among a large section of the 
Kingdom' s  working-class population.? 
Although the politicization and general cultural advance of industrial 
workers must be counted among the positive achievements of this period, 
the revolution also encouraged recourse to violent solutions on the shop 
floor, lack of tolerance for opposing views, polarization of working-class 
opinion, and eventually a disastrous particularism that resulted from the 
workers ' political inexperience and the absence of democratic traditions. 
If the emergence of the labor movement was truly the locomotive of the 
revolution in the Kingdom, its imperfect construction as well as popular 
disillusionment with its would-be political engineers from the intelligentsia 
eventually facilitated the efforts of the imperial bureaucracy to derail the 
entire train. 
The January-February General Strike 
The response of workers in Russian Poland to events in St. Petersburg 
needed no political prompting. The initiative for the subsequent general 
strike, spreading from L6dZ and Warsaw to provincial industrial centers, 
came from the workers themselves.  Both the government and the opposi­
tion political parties in the Kingdom were caught completely off-guard by 
the workers ' action. To be sure, police authorities in Warsaw took preven­
tive measures to defend banks, governmental institutions, and power plants 
in anticipation of "disturbances" after Bloody Sunday, but these measures 
were conceived more with political terrorists than industrial workers in 
mind.8 In the event, they proved totally inadequate. Meanwhile, the 
SDKPiL rejected proposals by the Bund and the PPS immediately after 
Bloody Sunday to form an intraparty strike commission in Warsaw.9 As 
the socialist parties haggled among themselves and prepared independent 
7. On the cultural and educational aspirations of industrial workers, see Wladyslaw Lech 
Karwacki, "Teatr dla robotnikow przed 1 9 1 4  r. ,"  Polska Klasa Robotnicza: Studia Histo­
ryczne 7 ( 1 976): 159-2 1 6, and Jadwiga Krajewska, "Z dziejow oswiaty robotniczej : Bibli­
oteki robotnicze w Krolestwie Polskim w latach 1 870--1 9 14," Polska Klasa Robotnicza: 
Studia Historyczne 3 ( 1 973): 1 80--209. 
8 .  Stanislaw Kalabmski, ed., Carat i klasy posiadajqce w walce z rewolucj(! 1905-1907 w 
Kr61estwie Polskim: Materiary archiwalne (Warsaw, 1 956), pp. 4--6.  
9 .  Halina Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 974), p.  82 .  
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appeals for a protest strike, the workers acted on their own. The parties ' 
role in the initiation of the strike was therefore extremely limited. The very 
news of Bloody Sunday and the Petersburg strike reached the Kingdom' s  
industrial labor force more by way o f  standard press accounts and govern­
ment warnings than as a result of party agitation. 1O 
The general strike, moreover, began not in Warsaw, where the socialist 
discussions and "planning" had occurred, but in L6dZ. At the end of 1 904, 
the city 's  textile industry experienced a slight upturn when a few of the 
larger finns received new state ordersY Within weeks, workers in the af­
fected factories sought to recoup wages lost or reduced earlier in the 
year. On the eve of Bloody Sunday, the SDKPiL organized a strike of four 
hundred workers at the Karol Steinert factory that soon spread to the great 
mills and factories of Ludwik Geyer. By January 26, six thousand workers 
from eight L6dZ factories had walked off the job, demanding an eight-hour 
workday and a minimum hourly wage of fifteen kopecks. 1 2  Within forty­
eight hours . the strike became general, embracing twenty-three thousand 
workers on the twenty-seventh, and all of the city's  factories and shops 
together with one hundred thousand workers and employees by the morn­
ing of the twenty-eighth. 1 3  
From L6dZ, the general strike spread quickly to the city 's  satellite textile 
towns of Zgierz, Pabianice, and Tomasz6w as well as Zdunska Wola in 
Kalisz Province. In the latter case, authorities attributed the strike to the 
influence of events in L6dZ rather than to local causes. 14 Perhaps for this 
reason, the government proclaimed a state of emergency on January 30 
that extended beyond the L6dZ industrial region to all of Piotrk6w Prov­
ince . 1 5  This move did not, however, prevent the general strike during the 
first week of February from embracing Cz�stochowa and the D�browa 
Basin, where it continued well after most workers in L6dZ had returned to ' 
their jobs. 
In Warsaw, the general strike began in the Wola district, where work 
was suspended in many factories and mills on the morning of January 27. 
On that day, a clash on the corner of Chlodna and Wronia streets between 
10 .  APL KGP 1 5 1 5( 1 ), Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Piotrkow Gov­
ernor, January 14 (27), 1 905 . 
I I .  Pawel Korzec, ed., irodla do dziejow rewolucji 1905-1907 w okr?gu 16dzkim, vol. I ,  
pt. I (Warsaw, 1 957), pp. 1 54-1 56. 
12. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  ( I ), Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Piotrkow Gov­
ernor, January 14 (27), 1 905. 
13. AGAD KGGW 2494, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 ), 1 905. 
14 .  Korzec, irodla do dziejow rewolucji 1 ( 1 ) :  5 1 6-5 1 9. 
1 5 .  APL KGP 1 5 1 7, Proclamation of the Piotrkow Governor, January 1 7  (30), 1 905. 
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police and gendannes and a crowd of a thousand workers immediately set 
a more violent tone for the strike in Warsaw.16  As crowds of roaming 
workers spread the strike from factory to factory, " street disorders" and 
rioting frequently followed in their wake. The W ola district not only con­
centrated a large percentage of the city ' s  factory workers but provided 
asylum to many criminal elements as well . Hence the crowds of striking 
workers were accompanied by professional thieves, hooligans, vandals, and 
street urchins, who took advantage of the prevailing confusion to destroy 
street lanterns and to loot private shops and state-owned alcohol stores .  
Already, on the first day of the strike, police made sixty-nine arrests. 1 7  
As the strike spread from W ola to  other industrial districts of  the city 
on January 28, the rioting, looting, and violent confrontations with the 
police also became general. On this,  the most alanning day of the Warsaw 
"disorders," one alcohol store after another was robbed, and dozens of 
shops were ransacked. The crowd, moreover, responded to police inter­
vention with armed opposition as makeshift barricades went up on the 
comer of Wronia and Grzybowska streets. Police made 1 57 arrests in the 
rioting, which left nine dead and thirteen seriously injured. IS On the next 
day, "only" thirty private shops and stores were looted, thanks to the 
reinforcement of police by troops. In the process, however, more than forty 
persons were killed and several dozen more wounded by soldiers firing 
into the crowd.19  After the proclamation of a state of emergency on January 
30, city life began to return to nonnal, although the strike continued with 
full force.  Altogether, sixty-five persons lost their lives and more than 
seven hundred were arrested on a variety of charges.2o 
As the authorities restored order in Warsaw, the strike spread to plants 
and factories throughout Warsaw County. Short-lived strikes were also 
reported in sugar refineries in Blonie, Kutno, Wloclawek, Lowicz, and 
Gostynin counties. Many of these strikes, according to county officials, 
1 6. AGAD KGGW 2488, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, January 14  (27), 
1 905. 
17. Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadaj�ce, pp. 7-8; see also Eli:bieta Kaczyilska, "Tlmn i 
margines spoleczny w wydarzeniach rewolucyjnych: Krolestwo Polskie, 1 904-1907," Dzieje 
Najnowsze I S ,  1-2 ( 1 983): 2 2 1-230. 
18. AGAD KGGW 2488, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, January 29 (Feb­
ruary I I ), 1 905. 
19 .  AGAD KGGW 2488, Chief of the Warsaw Okhrana to the Department of Police, Jan­
uary 1 6  (29), 1 905. On January 30, the Warsaw Strike Committee of the PPS called on 
workers to use all possible means at their disposal to prevent further rioting; AGAD AB, 
druki ulotne 43. 
20. AGAD KGGW 2488, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, January 24 (Feb­
ruary 6), 1 905. 
T H E  E M E R G E N C E  O F  T H E  L A B O R  M O V E M E N T  7 7  
were accompanied by incidents of coercion usually aimed at local Jewish 
shopkeepers and small merchants. In Pruszk6w a crowd of workers forced 
the teacher of the local primary school to dismiss fifty-seven children from 
classesY 
Massive strikes were also reported at the end of January and the first 
week of February in Kalisz and Radom provinces. The general strike in 
Kalisz Province involved approximately ten thousand workers, the vast 
majority of them employed by textile firms in Ozork6w, Kalisz, and Zdun­
ska Wola. These strikes were not accompanied by rioting, so the use of 
troops proved unnecessary. The authorities, however, took no chances, and 
the province was placed under a state of emergency on February 5 .  By 
February 6, half of the workers had returned to their jobs in Kalisz and 
Ozork6w, while negotiations in the smaller factories promised a quick end 
to the strike. The weavers of Zdunska Wola, having synchronized their 
demands with those of the L6dZ textile workers, waited until the sixteenth 
before settling with mabagement.22 
In Radom the strike took in all the city 's  factories and workshops to­
gether with three thousand workers. As in Warsaw, crowds of strikers 
spread the walkout from factory to factory, leading to similarly violent 
confrontations with local authorities attempting to restore order. On Feb­
ruary 2, a crowd succeeded in closing the city 's  electric power station. 
"Disorders" inevitably followed the blackout. On February 3, troops fired 
into a "riotous mob," leaving fourteen dead and fifty wounded.23 Before 
the authorities could proclaim a state of emergency in the province, twenty­
five more were killed on February 4, when troops opened fire on a crowd 
of a thousand workers attempting to close the nearby railroad station of 
SkarZysko.24 Elsewhere in Radom Province, the strike at the Ostrowiec 
Mining Company in the Holy Cross Mountains, the scene of an anti­
Semitic pogrom the previous year, followed a peaceful course and ended 
on February 8 .  
In  Cz�stochowa, the strike began on February 3,  when a crowd of a 
hundred workers armed with clubs and knives broke into the Gantke fac­
tory, forcing the plant to close. By the next day the strike in Cz�stochowa 
was general and began to spread to firms throughout the county. In Rak6w, 
2 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2488, Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, January 20 (February 2) and 
January 26 (February 8), 1 905 . 
22 .  AGAD KGGW 2506, Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, January 27 (February 9) and 
February 1 5  (28), 1 905 . 
23 .  Jan Boniecki, "Rewolucja 1 905-1907 roku w Radomiu," Biuletyn Kwartalny Radom­
skiego Towarzystwa Naukowego I I, supplement ( 1 974) : 22-25 .  
24 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 8, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, January 23 (February 5), 1 905. 
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two thousand employees of the Cz�stochowa Mining Company struck on 
February 6. Nearly five thousand workers participated in the strike in the 
Cz�stochowa region.25 Uncharacteristically, the workers spreading the 
strike resorted to violent threats at only one factory. Bloodshed was also 
avoided when a crowd of six thousand gathered near the Stradom factory 
to formulate strike demands.26 
In the D�browa Basin, events took a considerably more dangerous turn. 
The strike there began on February I among boilermakers at the Fintzer 
and Gamper factory of Sosnowiec. On the same day, a crowd of several 
hundred disrupted work at mines owned by the Saturn Company. By Feb­
ruary 3 the strike had spread to steel mills and coal mines throughout the 
region. Authorities later attributed the expansion to the agitation of students 
from the D�browa School of MinesY Governor Artsimovich of Piotrkow 
took immediate alarm and for good reason. The miners' strike, if not settled 
quickly, could leave many factories in the Kingdom without sufficient coal 
and force them to close . Moreover, sharp conflict between strikers and 
those wishing to work was evident from the beginning, creating a situation 
where a minor incident could provoke a wave of violence. Finally, the 
governor believed that county administrative and police officials were un­
derestimating the situation in the basin, especially the threat that striking 
miners posed to unprotected stores of explosive materials.  When crowds 
of up to twenty thousand appeared in Sosnowiec and D�browa, Artsimo­
vich took all available military reserves from the Cz�estochowa region and 
sent an urgent request to Warsaw for a significant and immediate increase 
in troop strength.28 
In the event, Artsimovich' s efforts failed to prevent the worst tragedy 
of the January-February general strike. On February 9, a large crowd of 
striking workers crashed the gates of the Katarzyna steel mill in Sosnowiec, 
where management had attempted to resume production with the help of 
scab labor. Anticipating trouble, two companies of infantry were stationed 
at the mill . When shots rang out from the crowd, the panic-stricken soldiers 
responded with three salvos that dispersed the strikers but also took the 
lives of thirty-three workers . Subsequently, funerals for the victims of the 
25.  AGAD KGGW 2494, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 ), 1 905; APL 
KGP 1 5 1 7, Chief of CZl;stochowa County to the Piotrkow Governor, January 24 (February 
6), 1 905. 
26. APL KGP 1 5 17, CZl;stochowa Chief of Police to the Piotrkow Governor, January 27 
(February 9), 1905 . 
27. APL KGP 1 5 1 6, Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Department of 
Police, March 1 2  (25), 1 905 . 
28 .  APL KGP 1 5 1 6, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, January 24 (February 6), 1905 . 
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Katarzyna massacre turned into major demonstrations in the streets of So­
snowiec, which authorities blamed on the local clergy' s  failure to follow 
prescribed processional routes .  
At the same time, more than four hundred pounds of dynamite disap­
peared from stores belonging to the Kazimierz mine, one of the largest in 
the region, putting both owners and the authorities on notice that striking 
coal miners now possessed a formidable weapon of their own to prevent 
a return to work.29 As late as March I ,  only the mines owned by the Saturn 
Company had resumed operations. Shortly thereafter, the general strike 
came to an end in the D�browa Basin, though its conclusion came weeks 
after workers in LodZ and Warsaw had returned to their j obs. The Piotrkow 
governor credited the length of the strike to the workers ' determination 
and, somewhat mistakenly, to socialist and nationalist agitation. Neverthe­
less, he submitted B�dzin County administrative and police officials to a 
scathing criticism for their inactivity during the strike, particularly for their 
failure to offer mediation between labor and management, which might 
have led to earlier settlements and avoided considerable bloodshed. 30 
Elsewhere, the strike was far less imposing. In Lublin, twelve hundred 
workers walked out on January 3 1  but returned to work by February 6.3 1 
The Kielce governor reported " no sign of a labor movement" in his prov­
ince and therefore requested that factories and plants in the region be ex­
empted from posting government appeals to the workers.32 The same could 
be said for LOrnZa and Suwalki provinces. The general strike spread to 
Plock, thanks to the arrival of a crowd of two hundred workers from ad­
jacent Warsaw Province, but ended soon after their departure.33 In the 
towns of Siedlce Province, Jewish journeymen initiated short-lived strikes, 
often lasting less than twenty-four hours. The mere appearance of troops 
in these towns proved sufficient to maintain order. A more serious strike 
occurred at the Elzbietow sugar factory in Sokolow County, where a set­
tlement was not reached until the end of February.34 
Workers ' demands during the general strike varied widely from region 
to region, from industry to industry, and indeed from factory to factory, 
29. Ibid., January 27 (February 9), 1 9°5; AGAD KGGW 2494, Report of the SDPA to the 
WGG, February 8 (2 1 ), 1 905; Kalabiitski, Carat i klasy posiadajt,!ce, pp. 4 1-42. 
30. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (2),  Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, February 1 6  (March I ), 1 905 . 
3 1 .  AGAD KGGW 25 13 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 1 0  (23), 1 905 ; see 
also Alicja Wojcik, Ruch robotniczy na Lubelszczyinie (Lublin, 1 984), p. 45. 
32 .  AGAD KGGW 2508, Kielce Governor to the WGG, January 14  (27), 1 905. 
33 · AGAD KGGW 25 1 6, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, January 22  (February 4), 1 905. 
34· AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, January 25 (February 7), February 
8 (2 1 ), and February 20 (March 5), 1 905. 
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highlighting the absence of advance planning. In many Warsaw factories, 
workers walked out without making any sort of demands whatsoever.35 Not 
only was there nothing to negotiate, but there was no one with whom to 
negotiate. In such cases, management as well as the government, repre­
sented by the factory inspectors, encouraged workers to elect delegations. 
Even then, workers ' initial demands tended to be general and excessive. 
From the socialist movement they borrowed the slogans of the eight-hour 
working day and a fifteen-kopeck hourly minimum wage, not to mention 
a host of political postulates to which they really did not attach any par­
ticular importance. 
Eventually, however, the workers ' strike demands became quite specific, 
focusing on their immediate concerns and reflecting local conditions. At 
the Krusche and Ender textile mill in Pabianice, the workers '  delegates 
presented a list of eight demands which expressed, among other things, 
their desire to form a trade union, to participate in the hiring of foremen, 
to have direct control over the factory sickness fund, to expand the factory 
school, to establish a retirement fund, and to extend the provision of med­
ical care to their families .36 Workers employed by the Saturn Mining Com­
pany in the D�browa Basin demanded the construction of a washroom, a 
school, and a library; free housing heated by coal and wood supplied by 
the company; free midwife care; and female doctors for the medical ex­
amination of women employees.3? Delegates representing the two thousand 
employees of the Cz�stochowa Mining Company in Rakow presented 
eleven demands, which became uniform for all striking crews in the region. 
These included the payment of 50 percent of lost wages in the event of 
illness, the establishment of a school, recognition of the workers ' " depu­
tation" as a permanent body for the conduct of future negotiations with 
management, and the provision of five minutes to wash up at the end of 
each workday.38 Workers from the Elzbietow sugar beet manufacturing 
plant in Siedlce province demanded subsidies for those not housed by the 
factory as well as the right to graze one cow each on company property.39 
Strikers' demands also displayed important similarities beyond the usual 
35.  KalabiDski, Carat i klasy posiadaj(!ce, pp. 1 8-20. 
36. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  ( I ), Director of the Krusche and Ender firm to the Chief of Lask County, 
January 2 1  (February 3), 1 905. For a general study of the provision of medical care in the 
factories, see Zdzislaw Leszczyilski, Zagroienia zawodowe a medycyna jabryczna na zie­
miach polskich na przeiomie XIX i XX w. (Warsaw, 1 986). 
37. APW WWO 23, Copy of demands dated February 9 (22), 1 905 . 
38 .  APL KGP ' 1 5 17 ,  Chief of Czt:stochowa County to the Piotrkow Governor, January 24 
(February 6), 1 905. 
39. AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 ), 1 905. 
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postulates of shorter working hours and increased wages. In almost every 
instance, workers demanded the establishment of a school for their children 
or the expansion and improvement of existing facilities.  They also de­
manded the dismissal of particularly hated company officials and super­
visors. At Elzbiet6w the workers ' list of those to be fired included a deputy 
director, a technician, and a deputy foreman. At the Cz�stochowa Mining 
Company, several engineers were mentioned by name. The employees of 
Saturn went one step further, calling for the unconditional dismissal of 
administrative personnel whenever demanded. Workers also insisted that 
company officials and supervisors respect their personal dignity, which 
entailed abandoning the use of the informal second person "ty" in ad­
dressing the workers and eliIninating searches of employees leaving the 
factory, plant, or mine. Workers also demanded the elimination or reform 
of the prevailing and abusive system of fines as well as direct control over 
sickness funds, to which they contributed but had no voice in distributing. 
Whatever the workers ' demands, the government had no uniform policy 
for dealing with the strikes.  In Warsaw, authorities mainly concentrated on 
preserving or restoring order in the streets. Baron Nolken, the Warsaw 
superintendent of police, issued appeals to the workers to return to their 
"daily occupations " while attempting to convince them that their needs 
would be satisfied by the emperor' s  promise to establish a special labor 
commission in St. Petersburg. These appeals were also coupled with warn­
ings that all means, including military force, would be used to maintain 
public order and security. Nolken also warned that the full force of the 
law would be applied against those workers who, by use of coercion and 
threats, prevented others from entering the factories.4o At the same time, 
the government, through its factory inspectors, assisted the negotiations in 
Warsaw by encouraging the formation of factory delegations. The inspec­
tors, however, did not play a particularly visible role once discussions 
between labor and management actually ensued. 
In the L6dZ region the authorities, led by the Piotrk6w governor, Art­
simovich, were far more active. From the first days of the strike, Artsi­
movich moved quickly and resolutely to maintain order. All alcohol stores 
in L6dZ were closed, and the electric power station was placed under mil­
itary protection. Five new regiments of infantry and six squadrons of cav­
alry immediately strengthened the local garrison.4 1  L6dZ thus avoided the 
major rioting that rocked Warsaw and Radom. With the proclamation of a 
40. APW ZOW 1 078, Proclamations of the Warsaw Superintendent of Police, January 14  
(27), January 20  (February 2), and February 1 ( 14), 1 905. 
4 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2494, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 ), 1 905. 
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state of emergency in Piotrk6w Province on January 30, Artsimovich ap­
pealed to L6dZ workers to end the general strike. He also sought the as­
sistance of the Catholic clergy in this matter.42 The Piotrk6w governor, 
nevertheless, sympathized with some of the workers ' economic demands. 
By holding continuous discussions with representatives of the leading L6dZ 
industrialists, he undoubtedly prevented a massive lockout on February 6, 
thus opening the way to a negotiated settlement four days later.43 
Elsewhere in the province, Artsimovich was less successful. Although 
only six persons died in minor clashes with police and troops in L6dZ 
proper during the general strike, twelve were killed in L6dZ County. Art­
simovich roundly criticized county administrative and police officials for 
losing their composure and even called for legal and disciplinary measures 
against the captain of the Land Guard who " needlessly fired into the 
crowd. " A similar situation existed in the D�browa Basin, where a lack 
of discipline and insubordination characterized the behavior of local offi­
cials. As a result, the general strike in the basin continued well into March, 
when it finally ended, thanks to the active mediation of provincial as op­
posed to county authorities.44 
Workers ' gains during the January-February general strike also varied 
widely. According to Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, the strike 
forced employers to concede wage increases averaging 1 0--1 5  percent and 
a reduction in the workday by one hour.45 In Warsaw, a nine-hour day was 
achieved in the larger factories.46 In L6dZ, eighteen leading firms employ­
ing three-quarters of the city' s labor force agreed to a ten-hour workday 
and wage increases ranging from 5 percent for employees at the top of the 
wage scale to I S  percent for those at the bottom. Firms in Tomaszow and 
Zduilska W ola, whose employees modeled their demands on those of the 
L6dZ workers, followed the lead of the L6dz industrialists . Individual firms 
in the L6dZ region also agreed to certain specific demands of their em­
ployees. The board of directors of the Karol Scheibler Company conceded, 
for example, medical care for the families of workers, the provision of 
female doctors for women employees, an end to searches of female em­
ployees by male supervisors, an increase in the number of classes at the 
42. Korzec, Zr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I ( I ) :  420-42 1 ,  428. 
43. Kazimierz Badziak, "BurZuazja 16dzka w rewolucji 1 905-1907,"  in Rewolucja 1905-
1907 w LOdzi i okrligu, ed. Barbara Wachowska (L6dZ, 1 975), pp. 57-58.  
44. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (2), Piotrk6w Governor to the WGG, February 1 6  (March I) ,  1 905; 
Korzec, Zr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I ( I ) :  520-528. 
45 . Kalabiilski and Tych, Czwarte powstanie czy pierwsza rewolucja, pp. I I 8-I I9 .  
46. Zamowska, Robotnicy Warszawy, p. 1 36.  
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factory school, a decrease in rents for factory dwellings, and an elected 
delegation of workers to meet with management once a week.47 
In the Cz�stochowa region, a negotiating cartel of twenty-two employers 
agreed to recognize workers ' delegations, eliminate searches of employees; 
respect the workers ' personal dignity, establish schools, improve access to 
medical care, and allow five minutes for washing up at the end of the 
workday-this in addition to wage and hour concessions.48 At the Elzbie­
tow sugar refinery, a settlement was reached that reduced the workday by 
one hour, provided a 1 0  percent wage increase, and restricted searches.  
The refinery also promised to open a school, provide ten puds (three hun­
dred sixty pounds) of firewood to each worker annually, respect the work­
ers ' dignity, and not fire any employees because of their involvement in 
the strike.49 
In all of these negotiated settlements, the workers had demanded con­
siderably more concessions, and their limited gains left many dissatisfied. 
Disenchantment increased as inflation quickly began to nullify the effect 
of the wage hikes.  Outside the large factories in the major industrial 
regions, workers had yet to win any concessions (though Elzbietow was 
an exception). Not all workers, moreover, participated in the general strike. 
Those who did not included the approximately eight thousand workers 
employed by the textile industry in Zyrardow, not to mention white-collar 
employees and the tens of thousands who labored in small enterprises and 
artisan shops.  As winter gave way to spring, massive labor unrest continued 
to plague the Kingdom' s  industrial economy. 
Expansion of the Labor Movement 
The workers ' efforts to improve their material condition during the 
January-February general strike won the support of elements of educated 
society cutting across ideological and party lines.  Naturally the radical 
intelligentsia at the head of the parties in the socialist movement was ec­
static. The socialists tended to view the strike as a confirmation of their 
various programs as well as an excellent starting point for future political 
47. Korzec, ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 ( 1 ) :455-457, 485-488;  see also Kazimierz Bad­
ziak and Pawel Samus, "Ruch strajkowi robotnik6w przemyslowych w Lodzi w 1905 r. , "  
in  Wachowska, Rewolucja 1905-1907, pp. 95-97. 
48. APL KGP 1 5 17 ,  Chief of Cz\!stochowa County to the Piotrk6w Governor, January 24 
(February 6), 1 905 . 
49. AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, February 20 (March 5), 1 905. 
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action. The socialist press praised the "heroism" of the working class 
while it downplayed or justified the looting and violence that accompanied 
the general strike. The socialist intellectuals were not alone in their ide­
alization of the "working masses, " whose cause also moved the liberal 
and self-styled " progressive" intelligentsia. In Warsaw, the Committee for 
Aid to the Strikers was set up under the patronage of Kuinica (The Forge), 
a popular liberal journal.50 Sympathy for the workers '  social and economic 
goals also came from the Endecja. In L6dZ the nationalists appealed di­
rectly to industrialists and factory owners to reduce working hours, increase 
wages, insure workers against old age and illness, and provide working­
class children with educational opportunities.5 1 
The support and sympathy of educated public opinion during the general 
strike played an important role in confirming the workers' conviction that 
their demands were just. Moreover, the mediating efforts by administrative 
and police officials in January and February seemed to condone the work­
ers ' resort to illegal methods of collective action. Both factors combined 
to produce a morally and psychologically favorable climate for the contin­
uation and extension of the strike movement in the early spring. 
Immediate issues of wages and working conditions, however, remained 
the motivating force of that movement, given the considerable dissatisfac­
tion with the settlements that ended the general strike, leaving so many 
questions important to the workers entirely unresolved. In L6dZ the agree­
ment carefully mediated by Governor Artsimovich nearly came unglued . 
over the issue of payment of wages during the time of the strike. In fact 
Artsimovich was forced to publish a public denial that he had ordered 
factory owners to make such payments.52 Even so, many workers still re­
mained unconvinced. From February 1 5  through 22,  half of the city ' s  in­
dustrial labor force struck over the issue.53 This time, Artsimovich backed 
the industrialists because he considered the workers '  demand " illegal. "  He 
even went so far as to request an administrative order from the Warsaw 
governor-general forbidding industrialists from paying workers for time 
lost during the general strike.54 Faced with such unyielding opposition, the 
workers withdrew their demand and returned to the mills on February 23 .  
Meanwhile, in  Warsaw Province, a strike finally broke out in  the textile 
50. Halina Kiepurska, Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 967), p. 74. 
5 1 .  APL KGP 1 5 1 5  ( I ) , Appeal of the Regional Circle of the National Democratic Party, 
January 1905 . 
52.  AGAD KGGW 2494, as recorded in the government-sponsored Lodzinskii Listok, no. 
1 8  (January 29/February I I , 1 905). 
53. Badziak and Samus, "Ruch strajkowy," pp. 96-97. 
54. Korzec, tr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I ( I ) : 48 1-482. 
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industry of Zyrardow on February 6. The timing and nature of that strike 
indicate that nationalist influences among the workers were not inconsid­
erable. Socialist appeals to Zyrardow workers to participate in the general 
strike had failed in January and may, in fact, have been frustrated by 
nationalist counteragitation. This did not mean, however, that the nation­
alist movement was unsympathetic to workers ' grievances, and once the 
walkout occurred in Zyrardow, the Endejca moved quickly to form a com­
mittee under its auspices to provide material assistance for the striking 
workers.55 As had been the case elsewhere, management at the huge Zyr­
ardow Manufacturing Company invited its employees to elect two workers 
from each section to form a delegation for negotiations. In addition to wage 
concessions, workers demanded that courses in the factory schools of Zyr­
ardow be conducted in the Polish language-another indication of nation­
alist influences. The Zyrardow management, of course, had no authority 
over the language issue. Regardless, the strike continued until March 2 1 ,  
when workers accepted the wage concessions offered five weeks earlier. 56 
Nationalist influences also may have been involved in strikes at various 
sugar beet refineries in Kutno County, where workers ' demands likewise 
included instruction in Polish at factory schools. Such demands were ab­
sent, however, during the successful three-day strike of 270 workers at the 
Lyszkowicki sugar beet plant in Lowicz County.57 
In Warsaw and its industrial suburbs, new economic strikes occurred at 
the end of February as a result of workers' dissatisfaction with earlier 
concessions. Most were short-lived; at Gerlach and Pulst, the largest firm 
involved, the strike lasted only one day. The strikes at gasworks in Wola 
and Czyste and at brickyards in Mokotow and Pruszkow were somewhat 
more protracted, but by mid-March all strikes in the towns and settlements 
of Warsaw County had ended. The walkouts were accompanied by spo­
radic incidents of violence against strikebreakers. In Wola, for example, 
an employee who had continued working at the gasworks during the strike 
was brutally murdered shortly after its conclusion.58 
The expansion of the labor movement in February and March also em­
braced railroad personnel and white-collar employees, mainly in the War-
55. AGAD KGGW 2500, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 14 (27), 1 905 . 
56. AGAD KGGW 2500, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, February 4 ( 1 7), 1 905, and 250 1 ,  
Warsaw Governor to the WGG, March 9 (22), 1 905 . 
57. AGAD KGGW 2500, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, February 1 9  (March 4), 1 905, 
and Report of SDPA to the WGG, February 21 (March 6), 1 905 . 
58 .  AGAD KGGW 2500, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, February 1 2  (25), February 1 6  
(March I ), February 22 (March 7), and March 3 ( 1 6), 1 905; and 250 1 ,  Report o f  the SDPA 
to the WGG, March 20 (April 2), 1 905 . 
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saw and LodZ regions. A brief statewide strike of railwaymen came to an 
abrupt end when all state-owned railroads, including the Vistula line in the 
Kingdom, were "militarized" (i .e . ,  placed under martial law) on February 
24. The strike continued, however, at the repair shops and passenger sta­
tions of the privately owned Warsaw-Vienna Railroad until a settlement 
was reached. The concessions won by the Warsaw-Vienna employees 
spurred white-collar personnel in the banking, pharmaceutical, and insur­
ance industries to present economic demands. Though bank employees 
extracted concessions without resorting to a walkout, pharmaceutical work­
ers struck for three days in successful support of their demands. But the 
collective action of employees at the state-owned Russia Insurance Com­
pany failed to win any concessions. Postal and telegraph workers, likewise 
employed by the state and intimidated by threats of mass firings, failed to 
present any demands at all in the spring.59 
Radom Province was another important center of the strike movement 
of the early spring, particularly in Opatow, Opoczno, and Konskie counties, 
where workers in heavy industry had failed to participate in the January­
February general strikes .  During the last days of February and the first 
days of March, hundreds of workers from four metal factories in Opoczno 
and Konskie counties struck for higher wages. In the Ostrowiec region, a 
partial strike of two hundred miners quickly spread to the nearby Bodze­
chOw steel mill, where it was accompanied by incidents of vandalism at 
the home of the millowner and at the state vodka store. More than one 
hundred workers also struck at the SteIman iron foundry near Radom. As 
elsewhere, managerial concessions to wage demands brought a quick end 
to these strikes .  The BodzechOw strike, which continued to the end of 
March, proved an exception.60 
From Radom Province the spring strikes spilled over into northern 
Kielce Province, which the governor · a month earlier had characterized as 
an oasis of labor tranquillity. At the Suchedniow iron foundry north of 
Kielce, a settlement negotiated in early February fell apart when the foun­
dry's  six hundred workers raised new wage and hour demands in line with 
concessions won by workers in Radom Province. In this instance, however, 
management refused to budge, and when workers failed to return to their 
59. Pawel Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne w Lodzi i okr�gu 16dzkim w latach 1905-1907 (War­
saw, 1 956), pp. 84, 1 20-1 2 1 ;  Kiepurska, Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, pp. 79-88,  94, 
1 00. 
60. AGAD KGGW 25 1 8, Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, February 1 5  (28), February 
1 8  (March 3), February 1 9  (March 4), February 28 (March 1 3), and March 1 3  (26), 1 905. 
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jobs after many threats, the foundry was closed.61 Even more serious was 
the spread of the strike movement from the D�browa Basin into the eastern 
part of the province, especially Olkusz County. Already on February 9 a 
crowd of two hundred broke into a wire factory at Slawkow and dispersed 
its employees. Of the six arrested in the incident, five were workers from 
B�dzin. Events in the D�browa Basin also may have provided inspiration 
for the March strikes at the Moess and Klucze paper factories, both located 
in Olkusz County, where workers ousted company officials and demanded 
the dismissal of others. Meanwhile, an armed band of fifteen, reportedly 
formed of young workers from the B�dzin region, attacked the adminis­
trative offices of at least three factories in Olkusz County.62 
In Siedlce Province, individual strikes occurred in several sugar refin­
eries, breweries, and glass factories in February. These strikes assumed 
greater importance by the end of the month, however, when they expanded 
to incorporate farm workers. The close relationship between rural prole­
tarians and agrarian farmhands was best illustrated in Sokolow County, 
where a negotiated settlement to the prolonged strike at the Elzbietow sugar 
refinery was not reached until February 27. During their holdout, one hun­
dred workers from Elzbietow appeared on February 2 1  on the nearby 
Ruchna estate belonging to Count Lubienski and persuaded his laborers to 
leave their jobs and join them as they proceeded to other industrial plants 
and estates in the county. Within a week, agrarian strikes hit twenty-seven 
estates in Sokolow County and would soon spill over into neighboring 
counties and provinces (a phenomenon I take up in the next chapter).63 
The Escalation of Labor Violence and the LOdi Uprising 
The expansion of the labor movement by the numerous economic strikes 
of the early spring, like the January-February general strike, was accom­
panied by a resort to force and coercion on the part of striking workers. 
In the vast majority of cases, the threat of physical violence was aimed at 
fellow workers, particularly strikebreakers who refused to leave their j obs 
6 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2508, Kielce Governor to the WGG, February 8 (2 1) , 1 905, and Report 
of the SDPA to the WGG, February 22 (March 7) and March 1 ( 14), 1 905. 
62. AGAD KGGW 2508, Kielce Governor to the WGG, January 28 (February 10), March 
I ( 14), March 9 (22), and March 1 5  (28), 1 905 . 
63. AGAD KGGW 2525, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 1 2  (25), 1 905; see 
also Urszula Glowacka-Maksymiuk, Gubemia siedlecka w latach rewolucji, 1905-1907 
(Warsaw, 1985), pp. 68--69. 
8 8  R E W O L U C J A  
and scabs hired by management during the course of a strike. Such inci­
dents were sufficiently widespread for the Warsaw governor-general to 
issue a special decree on March 4, which warned of administrative- sen­
tences of up to three months in jail and maximum fines of five hundred 
rubles for those found guilty of using coercive means to disrupt trade and 
commerce or the operations of industrial firmS.64 Physical assaults on man­
agerial personnel, however, were rare in the first three months of 1 905. 
During the next three months the situation changed radically. Particularly 
in the Lodi region and in the D�browa Basin, tensions between workers 
and lower-level administrative personnel, engineers, and foremen-many 
of whom were German-were evident well before the revolution. During 
the January-February general strike, workers ' demands in many cases in­
cluded the dismissal of supervisors and company officials. Management 
generally refused to consider such demands, with the result that subsequent 
settlements failed to resolve a fundamental issue of industrial-labor rela­
tions, namely, relations on the shop floor. 
Workers in the D�browa Basin were the first to take matters into their 
own hands, exercising what became known as " factory constitutionalism" 
(a prototype of workers ' self-management) by brute force. No sooner had 
the general strike in the region ended than police reported a series of 
" unceremonious ousters " of foremen, directors, engineers, and supervisors 
from the factories and mines. Complaining that the breakdown of labor 
discipline had slowed production and resulted in enormous losses, indus­
trialists threatened to shut down unless the government took measures to 
protect managerial and supervisory personnel .  The Piotrkow governor tried 
to mollify entrepreneurs with promises of " strong action" against perpe­
trators of violence; for example, five workers from the Czeladi mine were 
sentenced to several months in jail for throwing out their supervisor. At 
the same time, the governor ordered factory inspectors in the region to take 
a more active role in mediating disputes.65 
Somewhat later, during the second half of May, a rash of similar inci­
dents occurred in the Lodi region in conjunction with strikes in smaller 
enterprises that then spread to some of the larger factories by the end of 
the month. On May 1 9, workers of the S. Czamanski Company threw the 
head foreman into the street, a fate shared shortly thereafter by the super­
visors of two other factories.  At the main factory belonging to the giant 
64. AGAD KGGW 2495, Binding Decree of the WGG, February 19 (March 4), 1 905. 
65. AGAD KGGW 2495, Piotrk6w Governor to the WGG, March 3 ( 1 6), 1 905, and 2496, 
Piotrk6w Governor to the WGG, April 25 (May 8), 1 905; APL KGP I S I S  (2), Chief of the 
Piotrk6w Provincial Gendarmes to the Department of Police, March 12 (25), 1 905. 
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Karol Scheibler Company, the director and two foremen were expelled on 
May 29. There were also several cases of factory owners themselves being 
forcibly escorted to the gates of their plants.66 As in the D�browa Basin, 
some L6dZ industrialists complained to the Piotrk6w governor about the 
impotence of the local police as they appealed for greater protection of 
their persons and property. That spring, many of L6dZ 's  wealthier inhab­
itants together with subj ects of foreign states left the city from fear of 
"terrorist acts. "67 
The first in a series of occupation strikes and employer lockouts coin­
cided with the increasingly tense situation in L6dZ. Five hundred workers 
employed by the L6dZ Thread Manufacturing Company in the industrial 
suburb of Widzew, who had failed to win any concessions during the 
general strike, struck a second time on April 7 after the breakdown of 
nearly a month of negotiations with management. The latter responded by 
announcing the closing of the factory. More than half the workers, how­
ever, remained at the factory to stage a sit-in, despite the arrival of a team 
of factory inspectors sent by the Piotrk6w governor to mediate the conflict. 
The inspectors were taken hostage overnight. Only the arrival of troops 
convinced the workers to release the inspectors and leave the factory. Yet 
the conflict with management remained unresolved, and on April 26 the 
factory was closed for an unspecified period-this despite the angry ad­
monishments of Governor Artsimovich, who accused the company' s  
administration o f  complete intransigence and "morally reprehensible" be­
havior. Indeed, company officials not only refused to recognize delegates 
elected by the workers for the conduct of negotiations but also declined a 
meeting with representatives of the Factory Inspectorate.68 Consequently, 
the factory did not reopen until mid-July. 
The brief occupation strike at the L6dZ Thread Manufacturing Company 
undoubtedly influenced workers at the much larger Heinzel and Kunitzer 
firm, also located in Widzew. On April I I , nearly two thousand workers 
from the company' s  weaving mill struck on behalf of their unrealized de­
mands of January and February. Two hundred of them then occupied the 
factory. Although the weavers were poorly prepared for such action and 
lacked provisions, they held out for two days, only giving in when troops 
surrounded the mill as the government moved to prevent such collective 
66. Badziak and Samus, "Ruch strajkowy," p. 102. 
67. KalabiIlski, Carat i klasy posiadajf,!ce, p. 1 70; Korzec, tr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I 
(2): 28-34. 
68. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (2), Piotrk6w Governor to the Management of the L6dZ Thread Man­
ufacturing Company, April 9 (22), 1 905; KalabiIlski, Carat i klasy posiadajf,!ce, pp. 1 1 6-
1 20; Badziak and Samus, "Ruch strajkowy," pp. 97�9. 
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action from spreading even further. State intervention, regardless of its 
intention, again worked to the benefit of management, which closed the 
mIll on April 19 .  In the case of Heinzel and Kunitzer, the subsequent 
lockout lasted until the middle of May.69 
Although the use of troops to maintain order in the L6dZ region was 
accomplished without resorting to violence, workers were clearly angered 
by the presence of military units at or near the factories .  Already, at the 
end of March, more than three thousand weavers from the I. K. Poznanski 
Company struck to demand the removal of troops from factory grounds.70 
The interventions in Widzew further inflamed workers ' passions against 
the government, despite Artsimovich' s behind-the-scenes efforts on their 
behalf. The hostility of the workers, in turn, caused t):1e authorities concern 
over the morale of the soldiers posted at the factories. At the end of April, 
acting on Artsimovich' s  advice, the government began a regular rotation 
of these units, but this did nothing to alleviate working-class resentment 
toward the authorities.7! 
Such resentment soon spilled over into violent confrontations. The in­
ternational workers' holiday of May I ,  preceded by weeks of intensive 
agitation on the part of the socialist parties, provided the occasion for the 
clashes. Duly forewarned, the authorities took precautionary measures.  The 
Piotrk6w governor ordered the closing of all state vodka outlets and private 
drinking establishments well in advance of the holiday. Moreover, forty 
" agitators" were arrested in L6dZ, Pabianice, and Cz�stochowa in a co­
ordinated police action on April 28 .72 On the same day, the acting Warsaw 
superintendent of police informed his city 's  inhabitants in the legal dailies 
of his intention to resort to military force if necessary to prevent May Day 
disturbances.73 
Regardless, the authorities'  measures failed to head off the anticipated 
disorders. In Cz�stochowa' s  industrial suburb of Rak6w, the preventive 
arrest of sixteen socialist agitators actually proved counterproductive when, 
on April 29, a crowd of six thousand workers from three factories dem­
onstrated to demand the release of these " political prisoners. "  In the sub-
69. Badziak and SamuS, "Ruch strajkowy," p. 99; Kalabmski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, 
pp. 1 3 1- 134. 
70. Korzec, ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I (2): 8-10.  
7 1 .  Ibid. , pp.  38-42.  
72. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (2) ,  Piotrk6w Governor to the County Chiefs and the L6dZ Superinten­
dent of Police, April 7 (20), 1 905, and Chief of the Piotrk6w Provincial Gendarmes to the 
Department of Police, April 22 (May 4), 1 905. 
73.  Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, pp. 1 55-1 58 .  
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sequent melee with dragoons sent to the scene, two demonstrators were 
killed.74 In L6dZ, although less than half of the factory labor force actually 
observed May Day by quitting work, police and military units broke up 
some twenty-seven demonstrations during the course of the day. In five 
reported instances there was an exchange of fire that led to the loss of six 
lives .  Two days later, thirteen more were wounded, mainly from revolver 
shots, during rioting that accompanied the funeral of one of the victims.75 
In Kalisz, the May Day holiday was celebrated by a Mass at St. Wojciech 's  
parish church, followed by a procession with patriotic and religious songs. 
Yet despite the admonitions of the parish priest, clashes between the police 
and crowds of workers were not avoided and resulted in a woman's  death. 
Her funeral occurred without incident, perhaps because the police main­
tained a low profile and entrusted the preservation of order to the city fire 
department. 76 
The worst incident of violence, however, took place in Warsaw. Here 
the May Day strike was indeed general, forcing all plants, factories, shops, 
and commercial institutions in the city to suspend operations. By ten in 
the morning, groups of workers had brought a halt to all street traffic. Both 
the PPS and the Bund, having satisfied themselves with such a display, 
heeded well-publicized police warnings and refrained from attempts to 
mount street demonstrations. The SDKPiL, however, proved more impul­
sive when its local leadership decided to test the authorities'  resolve. Al­
though the demonstration and march of two thousand inspired by the Social 
Democrats was far from imposing, once it reached Jerusalem Boulevard, 
it met with disaster. In the subsequent " massacre, "  or exchange of fire 
with police and troops, twenty-six were killed and thirty-four hospitalized 
with serious wounds.77 Forty-five arrests were also made. Five persons were 
killed later in the day, including two women who happened to be on Mar­
szalkowska Street when a bomb exploded near a Cossack patrol.  Subse-
74. AGAD KGGW 249S, Chief of Cz(:stochowa County to the Piotrkow Governor, April 
1 6  (29), 1 905, and 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, April 2S (May 8), 1 905. 
7S. APL KGP I S I S  (3), Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, May I I  (24), 1 905 ; AGAD 
KGGW 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, April 2S (May 8), 1 905 ; Korzec, trMla 
do dziej6w rewolucji I (2): 6 1-74. 
76. AGAD KGGW 2s06, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, April 19 (May 2) and April 2 1  
(May 4), 1 905· 
77. AGAD KGGW 249 1 ,  Acting Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, April 1 9  
(May 2),.. 1 905 . The SDKPiL, anxious to gain publicity for its cause, immediately inflated 
the size of the demonstration (to 20,000) as well as the number of "massacre" victims (to 
So dead and 1 00 wounded); see the account published in the party's underground newspaper, 
Z Pola Walki. no. 8 (May 7, I 90S). 
9 2  R E W O L U C J A  
Mourning the victims of the May Day Massacre in Warsaw, 1 905. (Personal col­
lection) 
quently, police were able to identify twenty-five of the thirty-one victims; 
of these, nearly half were women, half were teenagers, and almost all were 
Roman Catholics.78 
Elsewhere in Warsaw Province only 31 percent of the labor force struck 
on May 1 .79 Conspicuously uninvolved, as they had been during the 
January-February general strike, were the eight thousand workers of Zyr­
ard6w. But workers from the Sochewka paper mill and the Sanniki sugar 
beet refinery in Gostynin County did quit work on May Day, and in Gr6jec 
County three hundred shoemakers from the settlement of Mogielnica ob­
served the holiday by attending a mass meeting wearing red neckties. In 
neither case was the public order disturbed. By contrast, a crowd of one 
thousand Jewish demonstrators in Kaluszyn, Nowominsk County, dis­
persed only when dragoons fired shots into the air.80 
Indeed, outside of Warsaw, L6dz, and Cz�stochowa, May Day strikes 
78. APW ZOW I079, Undated materials compiled by the office of the Warsaw Superinten­
dent of Police. 
79. Stanislaw Kalabinski, "Ruch strajkowy robotnikow przemyslowych Warszawy i gub­
ernii warszawskiej w okresie najwyzszego jego nat�zenia: Proba analizy statystycznej 
lat 1 905-1 906 (Cz�sc I: Rok 1 905) ," Polska Klasa Robotnicza: Studia Historyczne 4 
( 1 973) :  85·  
80.  AGAD KGGW 2502, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, April 20 (May 3),  1 905, and 
Warsaw Governor to the WGG, April 2 1  and 22 (May 4 and 5) ,  1 905 . 
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and demonstrations were isolated and sporadic. The holiday passed without 
major incident in Lomi:a, Plock, Lublin, Kielce, Siedlce, and Suwalki prov­
inces, despite brief strikes by mainly Jewish artisans and craftsmen. The 
D�browa Basin also remained relatively quiet in early May, the reason for 
which police attributed to the coincidental break in instruction at the D�­
browa School of Mines and the resulting temporary absence of nonresident 
students.81 Radom Province also escaped major disorders, despite a general 
strike in the provincial capital and sizable demonstrations in the towns of 
Wierzbnik and Ostrowiec. In the latter instance, the Opat6w County chief 
was called to account by the Radom governor for " actually permitting" a 
demonstration involving a crowd of eight thousand to occur.82 The Wi­
erzbnik demonstration, too, had subsequent repercussions when, several 
days after the event, a crowd of three thousand workers forced the chief 
of the provincial gendarmes and a deputy prosecutor to leave the gmina 
administration building, where they were compiling evidence against the 
May Day "organizers. "83 
As spring gave way to summer, working-class violence took an even 
more elemental tum . Vigilante actions against gangsters, thieves, and pros­
titution rings, beginning in Warsaw and subsequently spreading to other 
urban and industrial centers, threatened to assume the form of a mass 
movement at the end of May. Already in early January, an alarming in­
crease in cases of armed robbery, criminal assault, and public displays of 
prostitution was reported in the Warsaw industrial suburbs of Kolo, Wola, 
and Czyste.84 The breakdown of public order during the massive strikes 
and demonstrations of the first five months of 1 905 gave an even freer 
rein to criminal elements who lived side-by-side with and preyed on the 
working-class population. The forces of the urban police, when not bribed 
by criminal organizations, were nevertheless too few in number and too 
ill-equipped to offer effective protection to persons and property in work­
ing-class neighborhoods-this especially at a time of acute social unrest, 
when their primary attention was naturally focused elsewhere. 
The breakdown of law and order, however, also enabled small groups 
8 I. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (2), Chief of the Piotrk6w Provincial Gendarmes to the Department of 
Police, April 22 (May 5), 1 905· 
82 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 9, Director of the Chancellory of the WGG to the Radom Governor, 
May 26 (June 8), 1 905, and Chief of Opat6w County to the Radom Governor, June 25 (July 
8), 1 905. 
83 .  AGAD KGGW 25 19 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, May II (24), 1 905. 
84. AGAD KGGW 3 14, Internal memorandum of the Chancellory of the WGG, December 
25 (January 7), 1 905; APW ZOW 1079, Internal memorandum of the Office of the Warsaw 
Superintendent of Police, July 25 (August 7), 1 905. 
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and sometimes crowds of workers to take the law into their own hands. 
From the middle of May to the end of July, biweekly informational com­
pilations on " extraordinary incidents and events" drawn up by the Warsaw 
governor' s  office invariably included the discovery of several new corpses 
of "professional thieves"  either riddled with bullets or beaten to death.85 
Three days of rioting directed against brothels at the end of May proved 
even more indicative of the fury of working-class vigilantism in Warsaw. 
Beginning in the Jewish quarter on May 24 and then spreading to Christian 
neighborhoods the next day, crowds of workers attacked pimps, prostitutes, 
and houses of ill  repute throughout the city. More than a hundred apart­
ments were ransacked, with damages estimated at two hundred thousand 
rubles. Five persons were killed on the spot, ten others suffered fatal in­
juries, and forty-two were hospitalized as a result of the rampage, which 
was brought to a halt only when troops were brought in to restore order 
and, ironically, to protect the criminals.86 
The Warsaw vigilantes, despite denunciations of their activities by the 
SDKPiL and PPS, soon found imitators in other industrial working-class 
centers. The SDKPiL condemned the riots as " the blind acts of an uncon­
scious crowd" ;  the PPS tried to direct the movement toward a different 
symbol of the workers' social denigration-alcoholism and the state mo­
nopoly stores .87 The Bund, however, supported the vigilante actions as 
popular attempts to build a new proletarian morality and actively worked 
to spread the attacks on criminal and prostitution rings to L6dZ and the 
D�browa Basin.88 Elsewhere, the movement, which frequently adopted the 
forms and features of pogroms, remained of purely local inspiration. In 
Sieradz (Kalisz Province), after the theft of a necklace from a religious 
icon in mid-June, four "well-known" thieves were beaten by a crowd of 
five hundred and hospitalized. Shortly thereafter, workers of both sexes in 
Ostrowiec carried out an action that resulted in the beatings of several local 
prostitutes.89 
The vigilante movement coincided with a new, even sharper upsurge in 
85. AGAD KGGW 342. 
86. Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, pp. 1 73-175;  Richard D. Lewis, "The Labor Move­
ment in Russian Poland in the Revolution of 1 905-1907" (ph.D. diss. ,  University of Cali­
fornia, Berkeley, 1 97 1 ), pp. 146--1 47 .  
87 .  AGAD AB, druk 249, Leaflet of  the Warsaw Committee of  the SDKPiL, May 1 905; 
Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne, pp. 1 1 6--1 1 7 ;  Lewis, "Labor Movement," pp. 146--147.  
88 .  AGAD KGGW 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, May 21 (June 3), 1 905 . 
89. AGAD KGGW 2507, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, June 9 (22), 1 905, and 25 19 ,  
Radom Governor to  the WGG, June 2 1  (July 4), 1 905 . 
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social tensions. In Warsaw, the factory owner Gustaw Nejmanowicz was 
murdered on Leszno Street on May 25 .90 From the Cz�stochowa suburbs 
of Rak6w and Bleszno came reports of factory administrators "completely 
terrorized" by the workers.9 1 Attacks on police and troops also became 
commonplace, and this was only partially attributable to organized terrorist 
activities. For example, the ambush of two Cossacks in Pabianice by four 
men armed with revolvers in early June was undoubtedly the work of the 
PPS fighting organization. But the murder of the gendarme Primachenko 
on June 1 2  in the village of Lagiewniki in L6dZ County resulted from an 
incident with an angry crowd of working-class demonstrators.92 
The escalation of violence against the background of heightened social 
tensions and labor unrest was bound to lead to the tragedy for which L6dZ 
provided the. unfortunate stage. As previously noted, the January-February 
general strike in L6dZ was much more peaceful than in Warsaw, thanks to 
the timely intervention of Piotrkow governor Artsimovich. May Day, too, 
had been relatively calm. Nevertheless, the several deaths that had resulted 
from the minor clashes of police and troops with crowds on May I and 
again on May 3 left the city in an ugly mood. Shortly thereafter, police 
reported the defiant singing of the prohibited Polish national hymn " Boze 
cos Polsk�" every day in L6dZ churches.93 
Such incidents of defiance toward the authorities were accompanied by 
a new rash of economic strikes.  Beginning in small and medium-sized 
factories in the middle of May, and subsequently spreading to the great 
firms of Scheibler, Grohman, Silberstein, and Steinert by the end of the 
month, the strike wave in L6dZ assumed what the authorities termed "ep­
idemic proportions . " 94 As before, coercion accompanied the walkouts. 
Fighting among workers preceded the strike at the Scheibler factory on 
May 26; the intervention of Cossacks in turn provoked rioting that left one 
worker dead and two injured.95 Elsewhere, workers destroyed machines 
and blocked entrance gates to stop operations at their plants. By such 
90. AGAD KOOW 350, Report of the Warsaw Superintendent of Police, second half of 
May 1 905. 
9 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WOO, May 2 1  (June 3), 1 905. 
92. APL KGP 5 18 ,  Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, May 28 (June 10), 1 905, and Director 
of the Chancellory of the WGG to the Piotrkow Governor, June 9 (22), 1 905 . 
93. APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (3), Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Department of 
Police, May 2 ( 1 5), 1 905. 
94. AGAD KGGW 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WOO, May 21 (June 3), 1 905; Korzec, 
Walki rewolucyjne. pp. 1 27-1 29 .  
95. AGAD KOOW 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, May 1 6  (29), 1 905. 
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means, the number of workers on strike in L6dZ reached eighteen thousand 
by the beginning of June and thereafter fluctuated between eight thousand 
and twelve thousand until June 20.96 
The L6dZ strike epidemic of the late spring and early summer was also 
characterized by several factory occupations. As had occurred in April, 
military units were then sent to remove the workers from the plants or 
posted on factory grounds to maintain order. This ignited what became 
known as the " struggle for the factories, "  in which workers sought to 
block the entrance of troops into the plants or to force their ouster. Oc­
casionally, the results of this " struggle" bordered on comedy, as at Heinzel 
and Kunitzer, where workers attacked a dozen Cossacks while they were 
bathing and forced them to flee the factory completely naked.97 The attacks 
on troops and police posted at the factories, coinciding as they did with a 
new wave of expulsions of foremen and managerial personnel, caused the 
Piotrk6w governor to make an urgent appeal to Warsaw for additional 
regiments of dragoons and infantry. Once those arrived, lockouts took place 
at Heinzel and Kunitzer on June 2 and at Scheibler on June 1 1 .98 
Meanwhile, the number of working-class victims of the " struggle for 
the factories" mounted steadily. On May 28 ,  ten thousand Christian work­
ers participated in the funeral of one of those killed at Scheibler; a second 
demonstration of three thousand Jewish workers occurred the next day. 
Both were peaceful, which influenced the local authorities to permit a third 
demonstration involving four thousand Jewish workers on June 1 4. In hind­
sight, they were to regret their decision; for on June 1 8, police and Cos­
sacks had to be called in to break up an " illegal " political demonstration 
that resulted in the deaths of five Christian and two Jewish workers. The 
SDKPiL and Bund responded by organizing a funeral demonstration for 
June 20, an action subsequently joined by the PPS .  Thirty thousand turned 
up for the protest, accompanied by fourteen red flags, the shouting of 
revolutionary slogans, and speeches by party agitators. 
The situation soon became unmanageable, thanks in part to bungling by 
the authorities. The sheer size of the June 20 demonstration sowed con­
fusion among police and army units, who failed to cooperate when the 
crowd broke through the cordons that had been erected. Worse still, it 
became known that police had absconded with the bodies of the two Jewish 
workers killed on June 1 8  and secretly buried them. This action, designed 
to forestall yet another funeral demonstration, backfired completely. On 
96. Korzec, ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 (2): 1 05,  1 14-1 15 ,  144-147, 1 5 1-152 .  
97 .  AGAD KGGW 2496, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, June I I  (24), 1 905 . 
98. Ibid. , May 19 (June I ), 1 905; Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne, p. 1 33 .  
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June 2 I ,  the authorities met an even larger demonstration of outraged work­
ers which was dispersed only when a company of Cossacks fired directly 
into the crowd.99 
The rioting that day resulted in more than thirty casualties. The next 
morning, the first makeshift barricades went up in the Jewish quarter, un­
prompted by the socialist parties, who were preoccupied in haggling over 
whether to call a general protest strike for June 23 .  Despite the opposition 
of the PPS, this general strike did take place as factories shut down 
throughout the city; but by then, a spontaneous revolt was already in full 
swing. The appearance of barricades also surprised the authorities.  Again, 
police and army units failed to cooperate. Troops dispatched to aid police 
remained passive in the absence of precise instructions from the latter. Nor 
were the police prepared by their training to put down a modem urban 
insurrection, and the situation in L6dZ was the first of its kind in the history 
of the Russian Empire. Consequently, workers armed mainly with nothing 
more than bricks and rocks successfully defended their positions in light 
street fighting on the twenty-second. Encouraged by these results, workers 
from other parts of the city constructed barricaded positions of their own, 
more than one hundred in all by the morning of the twenty-third. loo Mean­
while, gas lanterns were destroyed and state vodka stores ransacked in the 
wholesale rioting that accompanied the breakdown of order in the city. 
On the twenty-third, however, the authorities acted with far more re­
solve. Governor Artsimovich moved quickly to strengthen the forces of 
the L6dZ garrison to twenty thousand men, to allow military commanders 
to act on their own initiative, and to obtain a decree from the tsar pro­
claiming a state of martial law in L6dZ and L6dZ County. 10 1  The first two 
measures proved immediately decisive. Six regiments of infantry and sev­
eral regiments each of cavalry, dragoons, and Cossacks were now thrown 
into the fray, and at the cost of some four hundred casualties (only three 
of whom were soldiers or police), order was restored by the morning of 
June 24. The next day, the Warsaw governor-general entrusted the imple­
mentation and execution of the emergency provisions of martial law to Lt. 
Gen. Nicholas Shuttleworth of the First Cavalry Corps. 102 
99. AGAD KGGW 2496, Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendannes to the SDPA, June 
1 9  (July 2), 1 905; Korzec, trodla do dziejow rewolucji 1 (2): 230-233, and Walki rewolu­
cyjne, pp. 1 34-1 38 .  
100. Korzec, trodla do dziejow rewolucji 1 (2):236-237, 252-263 ; Z Pola Walki, no. 10  
(June 30, 1 905); Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne, pp. 140-144; Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, LOdi 
w latach rewolucji, 1905-1907 (LodZ, 1 975), pp. 62--64. 
1 0 1 .  Korzec, trodla do dziejow rewolucji 1 (2): 239. 
102. Ibid. ,  pp. 242-246; Karwacki, LOdi w latach rewolucji, pp. 67--69. 
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During the course of the fighting in L6dZ, some twenty thousand people 
fled the city, many of them Jews who feared a pogrom in the aftermath of 
the disturbances. Indeed the heaviest fighting had occurred in the Jewish 
quarter; of 1 5 1  killed on the street barricades and subsequently identified 
by police, more than half were Jews. 1 03 
The L6dZ Uprising was the bloodiest single episode of the 1 905 Revo­
lution in Russian Poland. Preceded by sharp tensions in the factories and 
mounting violence in the streets, the social unrest had been exacerbated 
by the poorly conceived and inconsequential measures of the authorities, 
who were then compelled to take severe, repressive action. The ill-fated 
revolt also marked a transition in the newly emergent labor movement. 
Henceforth the influence of the socialist parties began to penetrate the 
movement sufficiently to give it a more organized character. Coercion and 
violence were not thereby eliminated as a result; they simply assumed less 
anarchic forms. In the meantime, L6dZ, which had provided the setting for 
the most elemental passions of disorderly crowds of workers, would remain 
under martial law until the beginning of December. 
The Politicization of the Labor Movement 
At the beginning of 1 905 , the underground political parties of the so­
cialist movement exercised only a slight influence on the industrial work­
ers, whom they considered their principal constituency. Although some 
headway had been made in 1 904 through the antiwar and antimobilization 
movements, the PPS, SDKPiL, PPS-Proletariat, and Jewish Bund could 
claim at most an aggregate total of a few thousand active working-class 
members in the industrial centers of Russian Poland. Most of these, more­
over, were concentrated in Warsaw, and only the PPS could boast of ac­
tually functioning organizations outside the capital. Although socialist 
influences no doubt extended somewhat beyond the minuscule percentage 
of dues-paying, organized members, that range remained strictly limited 
nonetheless. 
In addition, two of these parties, the SDKPiL and Bund, recruited the 
majority of their supporters from artisanal rather than factory labor, al­
though many of the former were affected, if not incorporated, by the fac­
tory system. The support of the PPS-Proletariat was even more confined, 
a problem it never surmounted and which would doom that party to ex-
103. AGAD KGGW 2496, Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the SDPA, June 
1 7  (30) and June 1 9  (July 2), 1 905; Korzec, tr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 (2): 263-286. 
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tinction by the end of the year. For its part, the PPS had only just begun 
to organize cells inside the factories. The socialist parties at the outbreak 
of the revolution essentially remained conspiratorial organizations domi­
nated by radical intellectuals, a far cry from the mass working-class parties 
of western Europe which they took as their model. 
Such organizations could hardly have had much of art impact on events 
during the first few months of 1 905 . Moreover, as a result of the intense 
competition between them, they either failed or refused to cooperate and 
coordinate their actions except in a few localized instances. The January­
February general strike thus occurred with their participation rather than 
under their leadership. Indeed, the socialist parties could only react to the 
largely spontaneous outburst of working-class discontent. The socialist slo­
gan of the eight-hour working day, to be sure, did appear in strike demands, 
but it was also the first to be abandoned once workers entered direct ne­
gotiations with management. And, although the socialist parties issued in­
flammatory appeals in an effort to spread the strike and encouraged the 
use of coercion to enforce working-class "solidarity, " they tried just as 
frequently to restrain the crowd behavior of workers over which they ul­
timately had little control; hence their warnings of " tsarist provocations,"  
their admonitions against looting, and their insistence on maintaining ' 'pro­
letarian discipline. " 
The January-February general strike, nevertheless, left behind a "legal " 
organizational tool, in the form of factory delegations, which proved crucial 
to the subsequent penetration of the labor movement by socialist influences. 
Created primarily at the behest of management or local government offi­
cials for the conduct of negotiations during the general strike, many work­
ers ' delegations remained intact once a settlement had been reached, 
particularly in the larger industrial firms. Frequently, their continued ex­
istence formed part of such settlements. Government guarantees of im­
munity from arrest and prosecution to delegation members, at least during 
the course of negotiations, imbued the delegations with a quasi-legal status, 
as did the absence of official measures to dissolve them afterward. Al­
though the government still refused to recognize the right of workers to 
associate in trade unions, the factory delegations were permitted to become 
a kind of limited substitute. Where they existed, the delegations were thus 
able to represent workers ' interests in disputes with management through­
out most of 1 905, that is, until their replacement by legal trade unions 
conceded in the October Manifesto. 
The socialist parties, especially the PPS and SDKPiL, were quick to take 
advantage of the window of opportunity for open activity provided by the 
factory delegations. Initially, the parties targeted delegation members, who 
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enjoyed obvious authority among fellow workers, for recruitment into the 
ranks. When successfully recruited, delegates received instruction in the 
methods of agitation in order to recruit others. As socialist influences in 
the factories thereby expanded, the parties sought to have their own mem­
bers elected to the delegations. The socialist parties also tended to pick up 
support during strikes, when the factory delegations transformed them­
selves into ad hoc strike committees.  According to Kalabinski, 78 percent 
of the economic strikes of 1 905 in the Warsaw industrial region ended in 
concessions to the workers '  demands. 104  The relative success of the strikes 
could not but work in favor of the socialist parties, whose members on the 
factory delegations were often the loudest proponents of a strike action. 
As a result, the authority originally enjoyed by the factory delegations 
among workers was gradually and partially transferred to the PPS and 
SDKPiL. 
Naturally, competition between these two organizations for influence and 
control over the workers ' delegations became fierce. The PPS or SDKPiL, 
once having gained a majority within a particular factory delegation, would 
then strive to monopolize its membership. Consequently, struggles over 
political turf inside the factories were frequently resolved by the threat or 
use of physical violence, especially once the "working-class"  parties re­
cruited more authentic factory workers, whose traditional method of per­
suasion was the closed fist. Supporters of the minority party, especially if 
they engaged in irreconcilable opposition, often found themselves removed 
from the factory or banned from entering it by fellow workers. 
The extent of this expansion of socialist influences among industrial 
workers through the infiltration of factory delegations became clear only 
in the late spring and summer. All the socialist parties invested consider­
able effort in agitation for a general political strike on May I .  In Warsaw, 
their traditional base, that goal was largely achieved, although it was ac­
companied by the tragedy of the already-mentioned " massacre. " Outside 
of the capital, however, May Day demonstrated the limited range and effect 
of socialist agitational and organizational activity. In industriai centers such 
as L6<lZ and Radom, the May Day action did not nearly reach the propor­
tions of a general strike and barely elicited a response at all from workers 
in the D�browa Basin and iyrard6w. 
The labor movement, therefore, continued to maintain its predominantly 
"wildcat" and apolitical character well into the early summer, through the 
L6<lZ Uprising. Meanwhile, the socialist parties concentrated on building 
104. Kalabmski, "Ruch strajkowy, 1 905," p. 43. 
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up their organizations outside of Warsaw, with L6dZ and the D�browa 
Basin assuming special priority. The fighting in L6dZ, though unantici­
pated, was nevertheless preceded by large funeral demonstrations and mass 
meetings in the factories organized by the socialists. Once the barricades 
went up, the socialist parties found it impossible to reinain on the sidelines. 
The PPS, which tried to prevent the popular revolt from occurring in the 
first place, nonetheless threw its local fighting organization into the fray 
once the fighting began. Consequently, PPS fighters accounted for more 
than one-third of those killed in the L6dZ Uprising. \05 
The bloody events in L6dZ also provided the socialist parties an op­
portunity to test their strength in other industrial regions by exploiting 
working-class solidarity with the L6dZ insurgents. Although the parties 
failed to synchronize their calls for a general political strike in the Warsaw 
region, some 64 percent of the industrial labor force walked off the job 
between June 24 and June 26 to protest the authorities'  strong repressive 
actions in L6dZ. In Warsaw itself, the sympathy strike was accompanied 
by demonstrations, minor skirmishes with police and troops, the construc­
tion of makeshift barricades, and the arrest of 689 persons. Warsaw's  
"June Days," however, never threatened to  turn into the violent outburst 
of crowd passions that had occurred in L6dZ. On June 27, workers returned 
to their factories and calm returned to the streets. 1 06 
The relative success of the general protest strike in Warsaw encouraged 
the socialist parties, which now began to coordinate their efforts, to call 
for similar strikes in industrial centers throughout the Kingdom. Set for 
June 28, the response from workers was far from universal. Yet the results 
were more impressive than they had been eight weeks earlier during the 
May Day action. In Cz�stochowa, where the situation most resembled that 
of L6dZ, the strike was general. All factories and plants in nearby Zawiercie 
also closed as a result of the strike. The response from workers in the 
D�browa Basin, however, had to be even more encouraging to the socialist 
parties. As late as May I ,  the socialists had shown little organizational 
clout in the basin; now, under the impetus of the L6dZ events, the parties 
nearly succeeded in bringing about a general strike. One-day protest strikes 
were also reported in Lublin and several towns and industrial settlements 
of Siedlce Province. 1 07 
105 .  Jerzy Paj�, Organizacje bojowe partii politycznych w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1904-1911 
(Warsaw, 1985), p. 63 .  
106. Kalabinski, "Ruch strajkowy, 1905,"  p.  85;  Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, pp. 
1 75-1 77· 
107.  AGAD KGGW 2496, Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the SDPA, June 
I 7  (30) and June 1 8  (July I) ,  1 905; APL KGP 1 5 1 4, Chief of B�dzin County to the Piotrkow 
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This is not to say that the socialists had captured the labor movement, 
but the parties were quickly learning how to capitalize on popular initia­
tives and actions for their own political purposes. In Cz�stochowa, for 
example, unplanned factory takeovers and a funeral demonstration involv­
ing ten thousand participants certainly abetted the calling of the political 
protest strike in solidarity with the L6dZ workers and helped ensure its 
success. 108 
In the D�browa Basin, the solidarity strike with L6dZ was followed by 
the arbitrary introduction by the workers themselves of the eight-hour 
working day in several mines throughout the region. Tensions in the basin 
were further exacerbated when, at the end of July, the administration of 
the giant Huta Bankowa steel mill responded to the workers' expulsion of 
the deputy director with a lockout. Solidarity strikes in support of the 
workers of Huta Bankowa occurred at Fitzner and Gamper as well as the 
Jan, Reden, Flora, and Mortimer mines. Only at this point did the SDKPiL 
and PPS try, unsuccessfully, to transform the uncoordinated actions in in­
dividual factories and mines into an organized general strike for the eight­
hour working day. The failure of this general strike, however, encouraged 
employers in the region to take stern countermeasures for restoring labor 
discipline. The lockout at Huta Bankowa ended on August 1 6  with the 
complete victory of management and the firing of more than four hundred 
workers. By the end of the month, as many as two thousand miners who 
had insisted on working eight-hour shifts were also fired and then black­
listed from employment in the region. Subsequent efforts by the socialist 
parties to revive the eight-hour movement, understandably, met with little 
response. 109 
Ironically, though the socialist parties failed to mobilize labor in support 
of general economic postulates like the eight-hour working day, they were 
achieving increasing success in inspiring workers to political protest. The 
principal occasion after the L6dZ solidarity strikes was the announcement 
on August 1 9  of election procedures for a consultative assembly, or state 
Governor, June 2 1  (July 4), 1905 ; Korzec, ZrOdla do dziej6w rewolucji I (2): 307-308, 3 1 0-
3 14, 3 1 9-322;  Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, pp. 2 1 6-2 17 ;  Glowacka-Maksymiuk, 
Gubemia siedlecka, p. 97; Wojcik, Ruch robomiczy, p. 63. 
108. AGAD KGGW 2496, Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the SDPA, June 
1 8  (July I ), 1 905; Korzec, Zr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I (2): 307-308. 
109.  AGAD KGGW 2497, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, July 7 (20) and July 14  (27), 
1 905, and Report of the SDPA to the WGG, July 19 (August I ), 1 905; see also Adam 
KaluZa, "Z dziejow walk masowych proletariatu Zagl�bia D�browskiego w 1905 r. 0 8-
godzinny dzien pracy i inne postulaty," Polska Klasa Robotnicza: Studia Historyczne 3 
( 1 972):  229-258. 
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duma, conceded by the tsar in February. The project had taken shape under 
the direction of A. G. Bulygin, the minister of Internal Affairs, and al­
though it assured the peasantry considerable representation in a complex 
system of indirect voting in separate estates, it sharply restricted suffrage 
in urban areas by property and other qualifications, with the result that 
industrial workers were virtually disenfranchised. Throughout the empire, 
radical and revolutionary organizations called for an "active boycott" of 
the forthcoming " comedy of elections, " and the socialist parties in Russian 
Poland were no exception. In the event, a one-day general strike in protest 
of the Bulygin Duma project was called for August 2 I .  
In the Warsaw region, over twenty-one thousand workers responded to 
the socialist appeals, which provided the Warsaw governor-general suffi­
cient justification to request and receive the tsar 's  approval for the impo­
sition of martial law in the city and county. In L6dZ, seventeen thousand 
workers struck, and although the political protest action was far from gen­
eral, it was nevertheless impressive for a city under martial law and for a 
labor movement still trying to pick up the pieces after the abortive uprising. 
In Pabianice, ten thousand quit work on August 2 I ,  although the police 
claimed that the strikers were "unaware of the reasons for the strike" and 
were being "misled by agitators. " 1 1 0 Strikes were also reported in four 
large and fourteen smaller factories in the Cz�stochowa region. Altogether, 
nearly half of all industrial workers throughout the empire who participated 
in the protest strike against the Bulygin Duma were employed in the King­
dom of Poland. I I I 
The greatest display of socialist influences among industrial workers 
occurred during the statewide general strike of October-November, which 
culminated in the major political concessions contained in the October 
Manifesto. Although the general strike of October, like that of January, 
began in the Kingdom with little forewarning and no organized preparation, 
the socialist parties were in a far better position this time to manipulate 
working-class voluntarism. In stark contrast to events in January, the Oc­
tober general strike did not spread from factory to factory by undisciplined 
crowds of roaming workers. Instead, once work stopped in the depots and 
repair shops of the Kingdom as part of the Russian railroad strike, the 
walkout spread mainly by means of the socialist press and organized po-
1 10. Korzec, irodla do dziejow rewolucji 1 (2): 4 14-41 6. 
I I I .  AGAD KGGW 2498, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, August 1 3  (26) and August 1 7  
(30), 1 905, and Report o f  the SDPA to the WGG, August 1 7  (30), 1 905. See also iarnowska, 
"Proba analizy," p. 443 ;  Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, pp. 1 84-1 85 ;  Kalabinski, 
"Ruch strajkowy, 1 905,"  p. 85; and Lewis, "Labor Movement," pp. 2 1 3-220. 
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litical agitation. The role of crowds was largely confined to spreading the 
strike to outlying areas of an industrial region where socialist influences 
had yet to penetrate. 1 12 Separate groups of workers did appear in the streets, 
with the aim of disrupting public transportation, and strike solidarity was 
often enforced by coercive means, but these actions too had an organized 
character. In the latter case, revolver-wielding militants from the fighting 
and self-defense organizations of the socialist parties played a key role in 
persuading the insufficiently "class-conscious" segment of the proletariat 
to join the strike. 
Already, by October 27, the strike was general in Warsaw and L6dZ, 
but workers had walked out without making any demands, and the socialist 
parties were slow in defining the political goals of the movement. Only 
with the proclamation of the October Manifesto on the thirtieth did these 
parties respond with specific political demands. On November 2, a mass 
meeting at the Warsaw Philharmonia, attended by four thousand and dom­
inated'by speakers from the PPS, SDKPiL, and Bund, resolved to continue 
the general strike until martial law was lifted in Warsaw and L6dZ and a 
blanket amnesty granted all political prisoners. The parties also resolved 
to continue revolutionary work aimed at the overthrow of the tsarist gov­
ernment, the convocation of a constituent assembly, the achievement of 
complete equality for the Jews, and the introduction of Polish in schools, 
courts, and other public institutions. 1 I 3  
The mass meeting at the Warsaw Philharmonia took place during the 
"days of freedom" in the Kingdom, a period confined to the first ten days 
of November, when government authority, as well as law and order, nearly 
collapsed. The socialist parties, though able to organize a continuation of 
the general strike and to bring thousands of working-class demonstrators 
into the streets in support of their political goals, still found it difficult, if 
not impossible, to control the actions of the crowds once they formed. In 
Kalisz, for example, a crowd of demonstrators appeared in front of the city 
jail on November I to demand the release of political prisoners. When it 
became clear that the intimidated prison guards would offer no resistance, 
the crowd stormed the jail and ten inmates escaped. 1 I4 No casualties were 
reported in Kalisz, but when a similar incident occurred in front of the 
Warsaw magistrate' s  office on Theater Square later that evening, troops 
1 1 2 .  AGAD KGGW 2504, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 1 8  (3 1 ) ,  1 905 . 
1 1 3 .  AGAD KGGW 2493, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 24 (November 6), 
1 905 . 
1 14. AGAD KGGW 2507, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 24 (November 6), 
1 905. 
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fired several broadsides into the surging crowd, killing forty-four besiegers 
in yet another massacre . l l 5  
Meanwhile, the "days of  freedom" bordered on complete anarchy in 
Cz�stochowa and the D�browa Basin. The commander of the Cz�stochowa 
garrison reported that the crowd took control of the city on November 3 
and was arming itself with weapons smuggled in from Austria. In an appeal 
to the population of the city the next day, he threatened to crush all "rev­
olutionary disturbances" with military force, although privately he be­
lieved that only martial law would do the job. l l6 In the cities and towns of 
the D�browa Basin, the police disappeared entirely from the streets and, 
in some cases, were actually disarmed by groups of workers. Troop 
strength in the region was sufficient only for the defense of dynamite stores 
located near the mines. 1 I7 The socialist parties tried to fill the local power 
vacuum by creating an interparty committee of public safety as well as a 
citizens ' militia. To purchase arms for the militia, representatives of the 
socialist parties demanded large sums of money from factory and mine 
owners, frequently resorting to threats against their lives and property. The 
terrorized industrialists frantically petitioned the Warsaw governor-general, 
requesting that he appeal to imperial Germany for military assistance to 
crush the "Polish insurrection. " l l S Such desperate action proved unnec­
essary. With the introduction of martial law throughout the Kingdom of 
Poland on November 1 0, government forces quickly regained control of 
the situation, and the ten-day "Basin Republic" came to an end. 
The general strike, however, continued in all industrial centers of the 
country well after the introduction of martial law. Its motivating force 
was no longer the political goals of the socialist parties but the economic 
demand of the workers for full payment of wages for the time of the 
strike up to and including October 30, the day of the October Manifesto. 
In L6dZ, the textile magnate I .  K. Poznanski voluntarily offered his work­
ers such payment on October 3 1 .  This led to similar demands through­
out the L6dZ textile industry, which were frequently accompanied by 
threats of violence and the destruction of propertyy9 Hence, long after 
1 1 5 .  Kalabmski, Carat i klasy posiadaj(!ce, pp. 3 1 5-320; Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, 
pp. 201-202. 
1 1 6. AGAD KGGW 2499, Commander of the CZllstochowa Garrison to the Chief of the 
Piotrk6w Okhrana, October 23 (November 5), 1 905; KalabiD.ski, Carat i klasy posiadaj(!ce, 
P· 3OO• 
1 17 .  KalabiD.ski, Carat i klasy posiadaj(!ce, p. 305 . 
1 1 8 .  AGAD KGGW 2498, Petition of Factory Owners of the Sosnowiec-D�browa Region, 
October 26 (November 8), 1 905. 
1 1 9. AGAD KGGW 2499, Provisional Governor-General of L6dZ and L6dZ County to the 
Director of the Chancellory of the WGG, October 27 (November 9), 1 905. 
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Russian workers had returned to their jobs, the general strike continued in 
full force in most parts of the Kingdom. Only when striking railwaymen 
returned to their jobs on November 1 6-and this after considerable pres­
sure from their Russian counterparts-did the strike actually abate; In L6dZ 
the number of striking workers fell precipitously, from a peak of 65,523 
on November 18 to 9,50 1 on November 20. In the Kazimierz, Renard, and 
Feliks mines in the D�browa Basin, workers held out until the end of 
November in an unsuccessful effort to receive wages for the earlier, "po­
litical" phase of the general strike. 1 20 
With lost wages for the October-November strike the common experi­
ence of the vast majority of industrial workers, any future socialist appeals 
for participation in a political strike were bound to meet with hesitation 
and reluctance on the part of the workers, if not their outright opposition. 
Indeed organized opposition within the working class to the socialist move­
ment 's  " strike mania" rapidly gathered momentum after the October Man­
ifesto. Workers earlier coerced into striking or satisfied by the October 
Manifesto concessions allowing the workers ' right of association now 
found a willing means of articulation in the National Workers ' Union (Na­
rodowy Zwi�ek Robotniczy-NZR). The NZR had been created during 
the L6dZ Uprising in June 1 905 as a satellite organization of the National 
League to spread nationalist propaganda among Polish workers and artisans 
and to combat the "harmful" and "alien" influences of the socialist move­
ment. In industrial-labor relations, the NZR assumed a reformist stance, 
offering conditional support to economic strikes; but it emphatically op­
posed political strikes, particularly those that linked the labor movement 
in Poland to supranational, or Russian, revolutionary goals. Before the 
October Manifesto, the NZR enjoyed the support of only a small minority 
of workers, but it rapidly expanded its ranks in subsequent months, even­
tually rising to twenty-three thousand members by the autumn of 1 906. 1 2 1  
The opposition of the NZR to the socialist movement and political 
strikes was also shared by the Association of Christian Workers (Stowar­
zyszenie Robotnik6w Chrzescijanskich-SRCh), legally recognized by the 
tsarist government in 1 906. The SRCh, organized by clerical social activists 
in Warsaw, L6dZ, Cz�stochowa, and the D�browa Basin on the basis of 
Leo XIII ' s  papal encyclical Rerum Novarum of 1 893, was formed specif-
1 20. AGAD KGGW 2493, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 4 ( 17),  1 905; 
Korzec, ZrOdla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 (2):46 1-467 ; Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, 
P· 364. 
1 2 1 .  On the history of the NZR, see Teresa Monasterska, Narodowy Zwiqzek Robotniczy, 
1 905-1 920 (Warsaw, 1973). 
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ically to paralyze socialist influences among industrial and artisanal labor. 
At the same time, the SRCh sought to alleviate working-class poverty by 
concentrating on educational and cultural activity while promoting mutual 
assistance and the cooperative movement. The SRCh, once legal recogni­
tion was granted, like the NZR, succeeded in organizing more than twenty 
thousand workers. 1 22 
With such organized and, in the case of the NZR, sometimes armed 
opposition in place, workers ' support for political strikes quickly began to 
waver. Already in December during the ill-fated Moscow uprising, the 
appeals of the socialist parties in the Kingdom for yet another general strike 
in support of the Moscow insurgents met with a limited response. In L6dZ, 
more than 80 percent of the industrial labor force participated in the De­
cember strike, but in Warsaw, until now the pride of socialist organizational 
efforts, fewer than half walked out. Less than a month later, the socialist 
parties called for a one-day general strike on January 22 to observe the 
anniversary of Bloody Sunday. Again, the response of L6dZ industrial 
workers far exceeded that of workers from the Warsaw region. In general, 
the December and January strikes in the Kingdom drew less than half the 
number of those who had participated in the October-November general 
strike. 1 23 With the exception of a one-day strike in observance of May Day, 
workers ' participation in political strikes continued to decline throughout 
Russian Poland in 1906. 
Nationalist and clerical counteragitation obviously played a major role 
in breaking the political strikes called by the socialist parties . So, too, did 
the repressive ineasures that accompanied the imposition of martial law. 
More important, however, was the genuine desire of workers to take ad­
vantage of a concrete political concession in the October Manifesto which 
affected them most, namely, the right of free association in trade unions. 
For most workers, trade union organization now assumed priority over the 
political goals of convening a constituent assembly or restoring autonomy 
to the Kingdom of Poland. By throwing their organizations into trade union 
activity, the socialist parties showed their recognition of this reality as they 
sought to maintain their political influence among industrial workers. And, 
so long as the socialist trade unions effectively represented and defended 
workers ' economic interests, this influence was partially preserved. 
1 22 .  On the SRCh, see Aleksander Woycicki, ChrZeScijanski ruch robotniczy w Polsce 
(Poznan, 192 1 ) .  
1 23 .  Zamowska, "Proba analizy," p. 440; Lewis, "Labor Movement," p .  266; Stanislaw 
Kalabinski, "Ruch strajkowy robotnikow przemyslowych Warszawy i gubemii warszawskiej 
w okresie najwyzszego jego nat�zenia: Proba analizy statystycznej lat 1 905-1 906 (Cz�sc II: 
1 906)," Polska Klasa Robotnicza: Studia Historyczne 5 ( 1 973): 87. 
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The Trade Union Movement 
Until the autumn of 1 905, the officially tolerated factory delegations, 
which had come into existence at the beginning of the year, represented 
workers' interests in disputes and negotiations with management. As men­
tioned earlier, during the course of 1905, many of these delegations had 
fallen under the control or influence of one or more of the socialist parties. 
Although the parties often succeeded in monopolizing the membership of 
any number of these quasi-legal institutions, each delegation remained a 
separate entity with its area of jurisdiction confined to a particular factory 
or plant, or sometimes only to a particular section of an industrial enter­
prise. In other words, there were no interfactory delegations, and whatever 
coordination did exist during the course of a strike usually came from ad 
hqc committees created by the socialist parties. Still, these strike commit­
tees, especially when they functioned as arenas for the competing parties, 
frequently failed to cooperate with one another. Hence the vast majority 
of economic strikes of 1 905, despite the involvement of socialist parties in 
them, had a local, even wildcat, character quite in line with the predomi­
nantly spontaneous nature of the labor movement during this period. 
At the peak of the October general strike, the SDKPiL transformed the 
factory delegations under its exclusive control into "factory unions" that 
continued to function as individual strike committees. Like the factory 
delegations, these "unions" were too atomized to be a basis for authentic 
trade unions, and they too disappeared once the October Manifesto con­
ceded the right of collective association. Then, without waiting for appro­
priate legislation and taking advantage of the chaotic " days of freedom" 
in early November, the socialist parties actively, but independently, began 
to create trade unions under their political auspices. These organizations, 
however, were just as quickly driven underground by the imposition of 
martial law. 
It would take until the middle of March 1 906 for the government to 
make good on its promise to allow the right of association when it provided 
the legal structure for trade union organization through the issuing of a set 
of " provisional regulations. " While these regulations created a framework 
for the legal registration of unions and associations, they also contained 
stipulations that severely restricted trade union activity. State employees 
were prohibited from forming organizations that concerned themselves 
with wages and working conditions. Their right of association was limited 
to collective participation in bodies that dealt with mutuat assistance, self­
help, and educational-cultural activities. As for employees of private en­
terprise, supraindustrial unions and associations were prohibited, and those 
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legally permitted and organized in individual industries found that their 
territorial range could not extend beyond provincial boundaries. Although 
these unions could engage in collective bargaining activities on behalf of 
their memberships, strikes remained an illegal form of collective action, as 
did the creation of strike funds. All the unions were also prohibited from 
engaging in political activity and from maintaining any affiliation with 
political organizations that harbored "criminal intentions. " The state re­
served for itself the right to suspend all unions and associations that acted 
contrary to the " provisional regulations, " to their own written and legally 
recognized statutes, or that threatened "the peace or public security. " 124 
The revolutionary socialist parties were the obvious targets of the pro­
hibitions on unions "conceived for political aims. "  Such parties now had 
to make a fundamental choice between legality and continued underground 
union organization. In Russia, all of them, including Lenin' s  Bolsheviks, 
eventually opted for the possibilities afforded by legal or " nonparty" union 
activity, although they remained determined to exercise at least an indirect 
influence on the trade union movement. In Poland the SDKPiL, Bund, and 
PPS initially maintained their illegal " party" union organizations. The PPS 
and Bund experienced a change of heart, however, when they realized that 
underground union activity limited both the size and effectiveness of or­
ganizations they hoped would have a mass character. 125 They subsequently 
encouraged party activists to support, join, and help organize "nonparty" 
trade unions. The SDKPiL alone held out, preserving a direct link between 
its political and trade union organizations, and therefore the illegality and 
conspiratorial nature of both. Indeed, the SDKPiL took the principle of 
partyjnosc (party spirit) to the extreme of requiring all party members to 
join Social Democratic trade unions while restricting membership in the 
latter to those who had joined the party. 
In the first months after the March " provisional regulations, "  this strat­
egy gave the SDKPiL certain advantages as the "nonparty" unions went 
through the laborious bureaucratic process of legal registration with the 
authorities. In a report on the activities of " groups and unions " from April 
through October 1906, the Okhrana ascribed the main influence on the 
emerging trade union movement to the SDKPiL. 126 Social Democratic pri­
macy, however, was short-lived; it ended with the legal registration by the 
1 24. APW ZOW 454, "Provisional Regulations on Unions and Associations,"  as published 
in Warszawska Gazeta Policyjna. March 1 8  (3 1) ,  1 906. 
1 25 .  The case for nonparty unions and for the open rather than conspiratorial conduct of 
their activities was made by the PPS activist Bernard Szapiro in a twenty-four-page brochure, 
"Zwi�i zawodowe robotnicze";  AGAD AB, druk 2 17 .  
1 26. APW WWO 41 .  
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end of the year of most of the "nonparty" trade unions supported by the 
PPS and Bund. Moreover, the socialist trade unions, whether "party" or 
"nonparty," faced stiff competition from "Polish" trade unions sponsored 
by the nationalist movement. These unions, with membership restricted to 
Catholic Poles, eventually organized 50,000 members (33,500 in the textile 
industry), or approximately half the total combined membership of the 
various socialist trade unions. 1 27 The Association of Christian Workers 
made no effort to form a union organization of its own, and as a conse­
quence many of its members joined the "Polish" trade unions. The SRCh 
did, however, take the lead in other areas such as cultural-educational work, 
the creation of mutual assistance funds, the provision of j ob-placement 
services and free medical assistance, the establishment of savings and loan 
institutions, and above all, in the promotion of a cooperative movement 
among consumers and small producers. By 1 907, nine cooperative stores 
in Warsaw and eight in L6dZ were in operation after receiving start-up 
capital from the SRCh. 1 28 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, trade union organization 
in the Kingdom embraced 20 percent of the industrial labor force at its 
peak at the end of 1 906 and the first months of 1 907, compared with 5 
percent for the rest of European Russia. In the leading industrial regions 
of LOdz and Warsaw, that percentage was considerably higher. In L6dZ 
sixty-six legal unions and ten illegal (Social Democratic) unions were ac­
tive in 1 907 with a combined total membership of more than eighty-five 
thousand. Of the city 's  industrial labor force, 50 percent had been organ­
ized, including three-quarters of all textile workers (the corresponding fig­
ure for textile workers in European Russia was 3.9 percent). In Warsaw, 
as many as fifty thousand workers were unionized, including more than 
half the employees of the city 's  key metal industry. 1 29 
This achievement over the course of a single year could not, however, 
be sustained. Repressive measures, carefully reserved for the authorities'  
use in the "provisional regulations" of March 1 906, in time struck all the 
unions, beginning with those of the illegal, " party" variety organized by 
the SDKPiL. At the end of 1 907, the authorities moved against the " non­
party" unions supported by the PPS and the Bund, which were deemed 
guilty of violating the spirit of the "provisional regulations" by virtue of 
1 27 .  Monasterska, Narodowy ZwiQzek Robotniczy, pp. 63-64; Ignacy Orzechowski and 
Aleksander Kochailski, Zarys dziej6w ruchu zawodowego w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1905-1918 
(Warsaw, 1964), pp. 1 27-1 37;  Karwacki, ZwiQzki zawodowe, pp. 8<>-90. 
128 .  W6ycicki, Chrzescijanski ruch robotniczy w Polsce, p. 1 36 .  
1 29 .  Karwacki, ZwiQzki zawodowe, pp.  107-1 1 8; Zarnowska, Robotnicy Warszawy, pp. 
242-244. 
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their transparent political associations. The most devastating blows came 
in December with the suspension of all branches of the Union of Metal 
Workers in the Kingdom of Poland, as well as the Textile Workers ' Union 
in L6d.Z and L6d.Z County, the two largest unions associated with the 
PPSyo A month earlier, George Skalon, the Warsaw governor-general, had 
forbidden entrance into the factories " to persons not employed by them 
and, particularly, to delegates of all associations and unions. " 1 3 1  
Taken together, the effect of these measures reduced the range of union 
activity dramatically. Already, by the end of 1 907, trade union membership 
among textile workers in L6d.Z had declined by 60 percent from the peak 
level of mid- 1 907. During the course of 1 908, the "Polish" trade unions, 
which had remained strictly apolitical vis-a-vis the state authorities if not 
their socialist competitors, experienced a precipitious decline in member­
ship, a fate shared by the Christian associations in 1 909. 
The repressive measures of the authorities, however, were only one fac­
tor in the rapid decline of the trade union movement in Russian Poland. 
Equally important was a new economic slump beginning in early 1 907 and 
lasting until the end of the decade. A reduction in orders and a surplus of 
labor gave employers an opportunity to take the offensive against organized 
workers and regain some of the ground lost in 1 905 . Lockouts became 
increasingly commonplace and effective during the course of 1 906. The 
most dramatic example of this counteroffensive was the Great Lockout in 
the L6d.Z textile industry during the first three months of 1 907, which 
nearly broke the back of the socialist unions then and there. 1 32 Unable to 
defend workers ' interests against the aggressive acts of the employers, the 
unions gradually saw their support evaporate . 
Whatever the reasons for the collapse of the trade union movement in 
Russian Poland, the unions did not have sufficient time during their brief 
heyday from mid- 1 906 to mid- 1 907 to redirect indigenous labor protest 
into organized channels. To be sure, there were fewer wildcat strikes during 
this period than during the relative labor anarchy that prevailed in 1 905 . 
Still, many economic strikes retained a localized, voluntaristic character 
that could not be checked by union organizations. Strikes continued to 
occur in individual enterprises or in sections of a plant over the firing of 
a fellow worker, the actions of a single foreman, the hiring of workers of 
1 30. APW ZOW 827, Director of the Chancellory of the WGG to the Warsaw Superinten­
dent of Police, December 8 (2 1 ), 1 907; Karwacki, ZwilJzki zawodowe, pp. 1 35-14 1 . 
1 3 1 .  APK TGGK 7, Proclamation of the WGG, November 4 ( 17), 1 907. 
132 .  See Richard D. Lewis, "Labor-Management Conflict in Russian Poland: The L6dZ 
Lockout of 1906-1 907," East European Quarterly 7 (January 1 974) : 4 13-434. 
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Workers from the Karol Scheibler Mills in L6dz after the Proclamation of the 
Great Lockout, December 1 906. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 38006) 
another nationality or religion, and a host of other particular reasons . Vi­
olence remained a principal means of settling disputes, both with lower­
level management and among workers themselves. 
Moreover, membership in a trade union did not translate into a rock­
hard allegiance, political or otherwise. Even in the strictly " party" trade 
unions organized by the SDKPiL, only half of the estimated thirty thousand 
recruited members actually paid their dues in 1 907, and the proportion was 
considerably less the subsequent year, and this despite a fall in membership 
by nearly half. 1 33 As for the "nonparty" trade unions influenced by the 
PPS and the Bund, the period of their legal activity was cruelly short, 
averaging from six months to a year; only a few of them survived into the 
next decade. Many of the legally registered "Polish" unions were also 
suspended, especially those that discussed the possibility of organizing or 
participating in a strike action. As a result, membership in the trade unions 
was extremely fluid. Workers would move from one union to another, and 
especially in the first year of the provisional regulations, their loyalties 
frequently went to the union, whether legal or illegal, "party" or "non-
1 33 .  Orzechowski and Kochanski, Zarys dziejow ruchu zawodowego, pp. 1 82-1 9°. 
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party," socialist or nationalist, that best defended their immediate eco­
nomic interests. Toward the end of 1 907 and in early 1 908, considerable 
movement occurred from the outlawed socialist organizations to the safer 
haven of still-legal "Polish" unions and Christian associations. When, to­
ward the end of the decade, none of these organizations proved capable of 
defending labor' s  interests against management' s  counteroffensive, most 
workers dropped out of the organized labor movement altogether. 
The trade union movement in Russian Poland, after an initial flurry of 
enthusiastic activity and feverish organization, never really had time to 
consolidate. As a consequence, the labor movement as a whole, born in 
the chaotic conditions of 1 905, never fully matured. Had the authorities 
permitted greater latitude to trade union activity and, in particular, recog­
nized the right of privately employed workers to strike, much of the lin­
gering anomic unrest in the labor movement would have been gradually 
eliminated. A higher degree of stability and cooperation in labor­
management relations would also have been achieved over time. Instead, 
the constant threat of suspension and delegalization, and the all-too­
frequent realization of that threat, created conditions of flux in the labor 
movement and served in the end to promote the continuation of instability 
in industrial-labor relations. This outcome was not immediately apparent 
to employers savoring their victory after the Great L6dZ Lockout, but in 
the first years of the next decade, when economic conditions improved and 
labor unrest resurfaced in unstructured and voluntaristic forms, many in­
dustrialists bemoaned the absence of organized bodies and institutions rep­
resenting workers with whom they might conduct orderly negotiations. 
Yet the labor movement had achieved some significant gains . For most 
workers, the revolution brought improvements in both wages and working 
conditions which survived, at least partially, the postrevolutionary period. 
Of the approximately 1 50,000 workers who joined political parties of all 
tendencies during the course of the revolution, the vast majority became 
participants in the political process for the first time. Not only did this 
mark the beginning of a new era of mass politics, but it also did much to 
promote political literacy among tens of thousands of workers who could 
now distinguish the nuances dividing the political parties and make more 
rational, clearer choices between them. The revolution also removed legal 
barriers to participation in "nonpolitical" organizations that responded to 
the workers' educational, cultural, and professional aspirations. Thus the 
labor movement in Russian Poland, though not permitted to reach maturity, 
was not still-born either. In the years after the revolution, it resembled 
more the perpetual adolescent, experienced enough to know how to act in 
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collective defense of its interests but lacking the wisdom to tolerate op­
posing views, to reject rash actions and violent solutions to immediate 
problems, and. most important, to appreciate the stabilizing virtues of dem­
ocratic processes and institutions. 
C H A P  T E R F 0 U R 
T H E  R E V OLU T I O N I N  
T H E  C O U N T R Y S I D E  
In contrast to the revolt among urban industrial workers in 1 905, with its 
point of departure clearly marked by the January-February general strike, 
it is far more difficult to pinpoint the outbreak of revolution in the Polish 
countryside. On the one hand, although a wave of agrarian strikes swept 
large areas of rural Poland in the spring of 1 905, farm workers were seek­
ing higher wages and improved conditions from landowners-hardly rev­
olutionary demands. The strike movement among farm laborers, moreover, 
was generally peaceful, and once authorities intervened or employers made 
concessions (or both), the agrarian strikes quickly ended. "Gmina action," 
on the other hand, which had already begun to assume the form of a mass 
movement toward the end of 1 904, continued to gain momentum in the 
first months of 1 905 . Aided and abetted organizationally by nationalist­
inspired agitation and publications, the movement retained a strictly 
"legalistic" character. Gradually, however, the movement assumed more 
revolutionary forms, especially when early-summer government conces­
sions on the language and school issues failed to satisfy rural society. By 
autumn, a majority of gmina assemblies were in open revolt against the 
government, expressing their alienation in a flood of increasingly radical 
resolutions. No longer content merely to limit the arbitrary exercise of state 
authority by the Russian bureaucracy, rural inhabitants now sought to re­
place it with locally derived, popular Polish authority. 
To a considerable extent, the growing assertiveness of the gmina move­
ment, its radicalization, and its departure from the cautious and legalistic 
methods set by the Endecja coincided with the near breakdown of Russian 
state authority in the Polish countryside. It would take several months of 
martial law before a semblance of that control could be restored in the 
1 1 5  
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spring of 1 906. In the meantime, the paralysis that struck Russian admin­
istration and police at the local level had profound consequences that ex­
tended beyond the state ' s  inability to check the activities of unruly gmina 
assemblies. Villagers frequently took the law into their own hands, whether 
in resolving property and easement rights (servitudes) disputes or in car­
rying out vigilante justice against real and suspected thieves.  The break­
down of state authority also facilitated a violent turn in long-standing 
ethnic and religious animosities, particularly in the eastern counties of Rus­
sian Poland. Worse still from the government' s  point of view, the coun­
tryside provided a safe haven, indeed a supporting base, for the terrorist 
activities of "revolutionary" bands. Small wonder, then, that reports of 
local officials in the last months of 1 905 and the first months of 1 906 
spoke, in alarming terms, of rural anarchy and insurgency. 
Revolution, most assuredly, came to the Polish countryside. That it failed 
to assume the Russian form of a wave of violence against the manors, 
though of great moment to latter-day Marxist historians,! was immaterial 
to Russian bureaucrats and police on the scene in 1 905 and 1 906. In plead­
ing his case with the Ministry of Internal Affairs for introducing martial 
law throughout the Kingdom of Poland in November 1 905, Warsaw 
governor-general George Skalon placed special emphasis on the disaffec­
tion of the peasantry, the stratum of Polish society the government had 
long considered most amenable to Russian rule.2 It was therefore in the 
countryside that the government suffered its most serious setback. Its forty­
year operating policy in the Kingdom of Poland, based on a presumption 
of eternal peasant gratitude and loyalty to the throne for state-sponsored 
emancipation, had now become completely useless. Instead, it would take 
extraordinary means of repression afforded by martial law and emergency 
rule to bring an end to the revolution in rural Poland. 
Agrarian Strikes 
Although it is difficult to find anything revolutionary in the agrarian 
strikes of the spring of 1 905, they nevertheless assumed the form of a 
purely self-generated mass movement. As already mentioned, the full-time 
farm worker, or ordynariusz, stood at the bottom of the social and eco-
I .  See esp. Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, Czwarte powstanie ezy pierwsza rewol­
ueja: Lata 1905-1907 na ziemiaeh polskieh, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1 976), pp. 1 55 ,  530. 
2 .  Stanislaw Kalabinski, ed., Carat i klasy posiadaj�ee w walce z rewoluej� 1905-1907 w 
Kr61estwie Polskim: Materialy arehiwalne (Warsaw, 1 956), pp. 302-303. 
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nomic order in Russian Poland and endured wretched working and living 
conditions. Moreover, no political party, including the 'socialist organiza­
tions, paid much attention to farm workers before 1 905 . In contrast to their 
activities among other social groups, the parties made . no attempt to or­
ganize farm workers in defense of their economic interests or to mobilize 
them for political purposes. Leadership for a movement therefore had to 
come from the agricultural workers themselves. 
The inspiration for the strikes came from several sources. There was the 
already-noted decline in wages paid to farm workers in money and kind 
during the first years of the twentieth century despite the general recovery 
of agriculture from the agrarian crisis of the preceding decades. The 
January-February strike of industrial workers, particularly when joined by 
employees of sugar refineries located in the countryside, also influenced 
agrarian workers, sometimes directly. Indeed, the first strikes can be traced 
to the action of employees of the Elzbiet6w sugar refinery in Sokolow 
County of Siedlce Province. On February 2 1 ,  approximately one hundred 
workers from Elzbietow appeared on the nearby Ruchna estate belonging 
to Count Lubienski, where they persuaded farmhands to leave their jobs 
and join them as they proceeded to neighboring estates.3 By February 27, 
the date the Elzbietow workers settled with refinery management, twenty­
seven estates in Sokolow County had been struck.4 
The slow, contradictory, and equivocal response of estate owners and 
government officials to the strikes also played an important role, if not in 
their inspiration, then in their rapid expansion. As the strikes spread from 
Sokolow to W�grow County, landowners provided the crowd of striking 
workers with lodging, bread, kielbasa, money, and even horses and wagons 
as it roamed from estate to estate. Not a single landowner in either county 
turned to the authorities for help. On the Ceranow estate, according to 
police reports, farm workers were even permitted to hold a dance in the 
manor kitchen. When the Land Guard arrived, the proprietor himself turned 
the rural police away, informing them that "the county chief has no right 
to interfere with the workers on his estate and that the workers will return 
to their jobs when it pleases him and them. "5 The conciliatory attitude of 
landowners in Sokolow and W �grow counties and their willing concessions 
to the strikers ' economic demands undoubtedly contributed to the spread 
of the strike to six estates in Konstantyn6w County, where, however, 
3. AGAD KGGW 2525, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 1 2  (25), 1 905. 
4. Urszula Glowacka-Maksymiuk, Gubemia siedlecka w latach rewolucji, 1905-1907 (War­
saw, 1 985), pp. 68--69. 
5. AGAD KGGW 2525, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 1 2  (25), 1 905. 
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the atmosphere, was less festive. The landowner Zaborowski refused the 
crowd' s  demand for money, and, as a result, his son was taken hostage. 
For the first time, troops were dispatched to the scene. The mere news of 
their approach together with the intervention of the Huszlew parish priest 
provided sufficient argument for the crowd to disperse and release the 
younger Zaborowski.6 
By that time, the movement had already spread to Lublin Province, 
where it acquired even greater momentum. Here the estate owners proved 
far more recalcitrant, the crowds more coercive, and local authorities less 
prepared to intervene effectively, especially where the conflict pitted Or­
thodox workers against Catholic employers. Before March ended, 358 
agrarian strikes had been recorded in eight counties of Lublin Province, 
compared with 1 29 strikes in Siedlce Province, the original center of the 
movement, and 573 for the entire Kingdom.? Only in Nowa-Aleksandria 
(Pulawy) County, where individual proprietors expressed quick agreement 
to meet workers ' demands provided that other estates followed suit, could 
landowners be accused by authorities of abetting the strike movement' s  
expansion.8 B y  contrast, panic-stricken landowners in ethnically mixed 
Krasnystaw, Hrubiesz6w, and Zammic counties preferred to appeal to au­
thorities for military protection against the crowds rather than negotiate 
workers' demands.9 In Chelm County a dozen Polish landowners tele­
grammed the acting Lublin governor to complain bitterly about the inac­
tivity of the authorities, which, in their opinion, encouraged roaming bands 
of Orthodox (mainly Ukrainian) workers to make threats, demand money, 
and force a suspension of work on local estates. lO 
Toward the end of March, the authorities finally began to take active 
measures, prompted by the pressure of landowners and the threat to public 
order posed by the swelling size of the crowds. Immediately upon receipt 
of the landowners' petitions and complaints, the Lublin governor issued a 
proclamation warning that attacks on the property of the landed class, as 
well as the making of demands accompanied by coercion and threats, 
would be tried by courts-martialY Simultaneously, he demanded that 
6. AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, February 26 (March I I ) ,  1 905. 
7 .  Krzysztof Groniowski, Robotnicy ralni w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1871-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 977), pp. 1 95-1 96; Albin Koprukowniak, Ruchy rewolucyjne na wsi lubelskiej w latach 
H)05-1907 (Lublin, 1 967), p. 57 · 
8. Stanislaw Kalabiilski and Feliks Tych, eds . ,  Walki chlop6w Kr6lestwa Polskiego w re­
wolucji 1905-1907. vol. I (Warsaw, 1 958), pp. 1 5 1-152 .  
9 .  AGAD KGGW 25 13 ,  Telegrams of  the Minister of  Internal Affairs to  the WGG, March 
7 (20) and March 2 1  (April 3), 1 905. 
10 .  Kalabiilski, Carat i klasy posiadaj�ce, pp. 88-89. 
I I . APL KGL 1 905 : 1 20, Proclamation of the Lublin Governor, March 8 (2 1 ), 1 905 . 
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county officials use armed force to disperse the crowds and arrest " agi­
tators. " 12 To assist them, several companies of Cossacks were then dis­
patched to Chehn, Krasnystaw, and Lubartow counties, where the use of 
infantry had earlier proved ineffective against the crowds. 1 3  Smaller units 
were also sent to Zamosc and Hrubieszow counties. 
As in Siedlce Province, the authorities'  employment of military force 
brought the agrarian strike movement to a rapid halt. By the time a com­
pany of Don Cossacks was dispatched to a dozen estates in Chehn County 
in the last days of March, the disturbances had already ended and farm 
workers had returned to the fields. 14 Elsewhere the crowds dispersed with­
out resistance when faced with military force. The arrest of approximately 
five hundred "agitators,"  "organizers,"  and "active personal partici­
pants" also served to pacify the farm workers in Lublin Province. 1 5  The 
subsequent sentencing of those arrested, however, was relatively lenient. 
In Krasnystaw County, for example, of the 1 2 1  arrested during the spring 
strikes, the authorities sentenced 34 to a mere five days in jail and placed 
the remainder under police surveillance. 1 6  
Nieszawa, Kutno, and Wloclawek counties of Warsaw Province, together 
with adjacent Kolo County in Kalisz Province, formed the third major center 
of the agrarian strike movement of the early spring. Wages paid farm work­
ers in this region, especially in comparison with Siedlce and Lublin prov­
inces, were relatively high. The strikes in Wloclawek County, for example, 
occurred on " model estates "  where workers' conditions were reputed to be 
the best in the Kingdom. l? As in Lublin and Siedlce provinces, the strikes 
were spread by impulsively formed crowds of two to five hundred workers 
which dispersed immediately, however, when confronted by military force. I S  
The one exception, and the only tragedy of the strike movement, took place 
at the Lani�ta estate in Kutno County and resulted in twelve deaths. Accord­
ing to subsequent testimony of the owner of Lani�ta, Marian Kiniorski, the 
farm workers did not understand the demand to disperse, made in Russian, 
by the captain of the county Land Guard; instead they believed that he had 
called them to gather around him. As the crowd pressed in, the captain or­
dered the troops to fire. 1 9  
1 2 .  Kalabiilski, Carat i klasy posiadajfJce. pp .  88-89. 
1 3 .  Kalabiilski and Tych, Walki chlop6w 1 : 1 77-178, 208-2 1 3 .  
1 4 .  Ibid., pp. 1 98-1 99. 
15 .  Groniowski, Robotnicy rolni. pp. 198-201 .  
1 6. APL KGL 1 905 :250, Directive of the Lublin Governor, September I I  (24), 1 905. 
17. Kalabiitski and Tych, Walki chlop6w 1 :828 .  
18 .  AGAD KGGW 250 1 ,  Warsaw Governor to the WGG, March 4 ( 1 7) and March 7 (20), 
1 905, and 2506, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, March 10 (23), 1 905. 
19. AGAD KGGW 250 1 ,  Petition of Marian Kiniorski to the WGG, March 18 (3 1 ), 1 905. 
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Striking farm workers from Gostynin County, Warsaw Province.  (Muzeum Nie­
podleglosci 38082) 
Despite the resort to repression, the authorities were not entirely unsym­
pathetic to the plight of farm workers. Ethnic and religious considerations 
partially informed official attitudes, particularly in the eastern counties of 
Lublin and Siedlce provinces where Orthodox peasants, many of them 
former Uniates, labored for Polish proprietors. The pitiful condition of 
agrarian laborers and the purely economic nature of their demands also 
impressed authorities. As soon as the strikes ended in Zamosc and Kras­
nystaw counties, for example, local authorities expressed the opinion that 
most of the farm workers ' demands were justified and encouraged gmina 
officials to take up the matter with landowners .2o Such views seemed to 
pervade upper levels of the bureaucracy as well . Later in the summer when 
farmhands at the Piaski Wielkie estate in Lublin County struck, the Lublin 
governor himself labored hard to budge landowner J6zef Drecki toward 
concessions, justifying his intervention by the fact that the conditions of 
Drecki ' s  workers were far worse than on neighboring estates.2 1 
Elsewhere in the Kingdom, provincial officials sought to persuade land­
owners to raise the standard of living of their workers as a preventive 
measure. Such methods were particularly successful in LOrnZa Province, 
where the only strike of the spring was a one-day walkout by seven work-
20. Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w [ :  [ 90- [ 9 [ ;  APL KGL [ 905 :7912, Chief of Kras­
nystaw County to the Lublin Governor, March [ 8  (3 I ), [ 905 . 
2 1 .  AGAD KGGW 25 [ 4, Lublin Governor to the WGG, July [ 3  (26), [ 905 . 
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ers on an estate in Mazowieck County.22 Indeed, for all of April, reports 
of agrarian strikes came from only three counties of the Kingdom.23 The 
movement then flared up again in May in the western counties of Warsaw 
Province, the northern (Lithuanian) part of Suwalki Province, and two 
counties of Plock Province. In June and July, agrarian strikes were largely 
confined to the Lithuanian counties of Suwalki Province. In November, the 
strike movement returned to the western part of Warsaw Province, affecting 
estates that had not improved workers ' conditions in the spring and sum­
mer. Never again, however, would the agrarian strike movement achieve 
the size and degree of success of the spring, when the vast majority of all 
agricultural strikes in 1905 occurred. 
In the course of the year, agricultural strikes took place in forty-one of 
the Kingdom's  eighty-four counties, affecting some 740 estates .24 Accord­
ing to one estimate, strikes occurred on approximately half the Kingdom' s  
1 ,300 large estates, that is, those larger than 1 ,400 acres.25 At least 600 of 
these estates were located in Lublin, Siedlce, and Warsaw provinces, the 
centers of the spring strike movement. Smaller estates employing but a few 
workers, more typical of the rest of Russian Poland, were largely unaf­
fected by the strikes. 
Crowd behavior and workers ' demands during the agrarian strikes fol­
lowed similar general patterns, although with some interesting variations. 
Everywhere the strikes occurred, they spread like a contagion as groups of 
workers roamed from estate to estate, gathering up new strikers in crowds 
that changed in size and composition as they went. In Krasnystaw and 
Zamosc counties of Lublin Province, farm workers participated in the in­
itiation of six strikes before returning to their own estates. In Kolo and 
Nieszawa counties of central Poland, workers returned home after initiating 
four strikes.26 Through such rotational shifts, sufficient manpower was se­
cured for spreading the strike to the next estate. A few workers, however, 
always remained behind to take care of the livestock. 
The crowds, though generally peaceful, were not entirely nonviolent. 
Actual physical attacks on landowners or destruction of manorial prop­
erty were extremely rare. More commonplace were threats aimed at ex­
tracting from owners small amounts of money and food, and sometimes 
22 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 0, Lomi:a Governor to the WGG, March I I  (24), 1 905 ; Kalabiilski 
and Tych, Walki chtop6w I :  427-429. 
23. Groniowski, Robotnicy rolni, pp. 20 1-202. 
24. Jan Borkowski, Chtopi polscy w dobie kapitalivnu (Warsaw, 1 98 1 ), p. 95 . 
25 .  Richard D. Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside: Russian Poland, 1 905-1906," Carl 
Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 506 ( 1986): 30. 
26. Ibid. ; AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, March 10  (23), 1 905. 
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lodging, to sustain the crowd as it moved on to other estates.  As most 
proprietors readily accepted these demands, the threats were seldom car­
ried out. When they were, the usual consequence was a few broken win­
dows. More frequently, estate officials were coerced into joining the 
crowd or leaving the estate. The crowd also administered beatings to 
workers who refused to strike. The coercion and violence that accompa­
nied the agrarian strikes, however, paled in comparison with that perpe­
trated by crowds of industrial workers. Moreover, although the rural 
police in their small numbers usually proved insufficient to disperse the 
crowds of striking farm workers, there were no instances of resistance to 
military armed forceP 
Strikers naturally sought improvements in monetary wages and in the 
size of the ordynaria, the payments many of them received in kind. Farm 
workers in Sied1ce Province claimed that the tsar himself supported their 
demands for doubling their wages and ordynaria as well as for a nine-hour 
working day.28 In Lublin County, striking farm workers uniformly de­
manded wage increases from twenty to thirty rubles, the local annual norm, 
to forty rubles, as well an increase in ordynaria from twelve to sixteen 
bushels of grain.29 In the Lithuanian counties of Suwalki Province, workers 
demanded a 50 percent increase in wages and in-kind payments.30 Other 
demands frequently included the right to pasture two cows instead of one 
and larger plots for growing potatoes. 
Less frequent were demands for separate living quarters for each fam­
ily and the elimination of the relatively widespread posylka system, 
which required a full-time farm worker to maintain a temporary work­
hand at his own expense. Usually, one of the worker' s  grown children 
performed this function, but if he lacked such, the worker was obliged to 
feed and lodge a helper, for whiS;h he received compensation in kind.3 l 
Other demands were uniquely specific. In the Sied1ce region, workers de­
manded the return of money collected from fines earlier levied against 
them by their employers .32 In Lublin County, workers demanded the con­
struction of day-care facilities for their young children. One proprietor, 
27. For acts of crowd coercion during the agrarian strikes, see Jan Molenda, "Przemoc 
grupowa w rnasowych wys�pieniach chlopow i robotnikow rolnych w Krolestwie Polskim 
na przelomie XIX-XX wieku," in przemoc zbiorowa, ruch masowy, rewoiucja, ed. Eli:bieta 
Kaczyllska and Zbigniew Rykowski (Warsaw, 1 990), pp. 143-145 .  
28 .  Kalabinski and Tych, Waiki chlop6w I :  661)-670. 
29. AGAD KGGW 25 13 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 9 (22), 1 905. 
30. Groniowski, Robotnicy roini, p. 20 1 .  
3 1 .  Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," pp. 30-3 1 ;  Groniowski, Robotnicy roini, p. 
26 1 .  
32 .  AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, March 1 7  (30), 1 905. 
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the owner of Jakubowice Muranowe, actually agreed to this demand, 
providing two separate rooms and adult supervision for 1 20 children un­
der eleven years of age.33 
Generally, owners agreed to make concessions on wages, in-kind pay­
ments, and land usage but ignored the other demands. These concessions, 
however, were usually enough to satisfy farm workers, who ended their 
strikes after a few days. In most cases, local employers concerted their 
response to workers ' demands. In Sokolow County of Siedlce Province, 
where the strike movement began, the landowners met within days of the 
initial strikes and agreed on a 25 percent increase in wages and a 1 5  percent 
increase in ordynaria.34 Similarly, in Warsaw Province, landowners agreed 
to a modest improvement in workers ' conditions without benefit of state 
mediation or pressure. In Lublin Province, where owners were most re­
calcitrant, the state, after using military force to disperse the crowds, suc­
cessfully influenced most employers to make concessions. 
The agrarian strike movement of 1 905 thus resulted in a qualified vic­
tory for the farm workers as it brought economic improvements to the 
poorest stratum of the rural population. This was remarkable for a move­
ment that recruited its own leaders and relied on its own internal organi­
zational impetus. Socialist and populist groups were slow to recognize the 
political possibilities in the agrarian strike movement, whereas the Roman 
Catholic Church and the National Democrats denounced the striking 
crowds, although the latter did try to persuade employers to make volun­
tary concessions. The landowning peasantry, moreover, was generally in­
different to the farm workers ' cause.35 The strike movement succeeded in 
the first months of 1 905, however, primarily because the authorities and 
landowners had been taken by surprise. In the spring of 1 906, when farm 
workers struck again, this time with the external organizational support of 
the PPS, both the authorities and the large landed proprietors were them­
selves better prepared and organized to suppress the strikes and resist 
workers ' demands. 
Gmina Action 
Whereas the movement among farm workers was largely spontaneous 
and devoid of political goals, the movement for communal self-government 
33 .  Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I: 268-269.  
34 .  AGAD KGGW 2525, SiedIce Governor to the WGG, February 25 (March 5) ,  1 905 . 
35. There were, however, some notable exceptions: e.g. , peasants from OpatDw County in 
Radom Province refused to quarter dragoons sent to quell agrarian strikes; Kalabiitski and 
Tych, Walki chlop6w I: 607-608 .  
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in the Polish countryside had an entirely different character, at least until 
the autumn of 1 905 . By the end of 1 904, more than one hundred gmina 
assemblies had passed resolutions calling for the introduction of Polish 
into local administrative, educational, and judicial institutions . At least 
thirty others approved similar resolutions during their winter meetings, 
which concluded in January. Thus, even before the outbreak of the 
January-February industrial general strike and the revolt of student youth 
against the Russian educational system, slightly over 10  percent of the 
1 ,291  gmina assemblies in the Kingdom of Poland had initiated "gmina 
action. "  Already a mass movement, gmina action would affect at least 
two-thirds of all rural communes by the end of the year. In the process, 
however, the movement underwent several significant changes that trans­
formed it into a revolutionary force .  
In its initial phase, from the spring of 1 904 to early 1 905, the movement 
evolved under the close scrutiny of the nationalist movement with its em­
phasis on gradualism, legal methods of struggle, and the language issue. 
The first assemblies were therefore advised to limit their action to a refusal 
to sign Russian-language protocols of their meetings and to the drafting of 
Polish-language protocols in their place, which included resolutions as­
serting the statutory right to use the native language in the conduct of 
gmina affairs. The anticipated rejection of these demands by county and 
provincial officials would then be appealed to a higher authority. The po­
litically cautious, procedurally legal strategy recommended to the peasants 
in the issues of Polak and by TON activists was designed to calm the 
nerves of those who feared government retribution.36 The use of Polish in 
gmina business also made practical sense to peasants, many of whom could 
not understand the reading of Russian-language protocols that awaited their 
signature. 
As the movement evolved in I:he course of 1 904, however, the propo­
nents of gmina action discovered that a principal obstacle lay within the 
local communities themselves in the form of opposition from gmina offi­
cials, particularly the pisarz (the clerk appointed by the county chief) and 
the wojt (the mayor elected by the assembly but confirmed in office by 
the state administration) . Frequently, the pisarz would refuse the assem­
bly ' s  demand that he draft a Polish-language protocol, or the wojt would 
refuse to sign such a protocol and enter it into the official record. Peasant 
supporters of gmina action responded simply by refusing to affix their 
signatures to a Russian-language protocol of the assembly' S  resolutions, an 
action that could temporarily paralyze local " self-government. " 
36. Tadeusz Wolsza, Narodowa Demokracja wobec chlop6w w latach 1887-1914: Pro­
gramy, polityka, dzialalnosc (Warsaw, I992), pp. I 62-I 63 .  
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By the end of 1 904, Polak began to advise assemblies to take a more 
aggressive posture in dealing with recalcitrant gmina officials:  namely, to 
dismiss the pisarz from the local administration if he refused to draft the 
desired protocol and resolutions, to demand that the wojt and plenipoten­
tiaries (pelnomocnicy) arrange for the election of a new pisarz, and to 
entrust the drafting of the protocol and resolutions to a person selected by 
the assembly.37 The opposition of the wojt could be circumvented by em­
phasizing the role of other elected gmina officials, especially the candidate 
mayor, the plenipotentiaries, and the village elders (soltysy).38 Though the 
emphasis still remained on orderly procedure and peaceful methods, the 
tactical shift at the end of 1 904 imparted to the gmina action movement a 
new goal in addition to mere polonization: the reform of local self­
government by making officials truly responsible to the gmina assembly 
as the highest source of communal authority. 
The state administration was slow to comprehend the potential challenge 
this posed to its own authority in the Polish countryside. At the end of 
1 904 and in early 1 905, Russian officials continued the traditional policy 
of refusing to confirm the election of persons of doubtful loyalty to gmina 
offices and of pressuring those deemed loyal to conform to government 
dictates. Protocols drafted in the Polish language were simply rejected, as 
were resolutions demanding the use of Polish in gmina administration. 
Frequently, county chiefs would reconvene the assemblies and appear per­
sonally with members of the Land Guard to inform the peasants of the 
"illegality" of their action. Where intimidation and threats failed to suffice, 
certain county officials resorted to deception, warning gmina assemblies 
that their actions could lead to a restoration of serfdom.39 Such methods 
were only partially effective, especially because actual punitive action was 
mild and aimed at individual "agitators" rather than the collective . For 
example, fourteen peasants from Lublin County were fined ten rubles each 
in mid-January 1 905 for "agitation against the state language" at their 
gmina assembly meetings. Nine months later, however, local authorities 
had yet to collect the fines, fearing that forceful methods could lead to 
popular disturbances.4o 
There is little evidence to suggest that the industrial general strike of 
January-February either stimulated or radicalized the gmina movement, 
with the possible exception of gminy located in or adjacent to industrial 
37. Ibid., p. 2 1  I .  
38.  Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," p. 1 3 .  
3 9 .  Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  64, 1 1 7-1 1 8 .  
40. APL KGL 1 905 :59, Chief of Lublin County t o  the Lublin Governor, September 1 3  (26), 
1 905 . 
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centers. The student strike at institutions of higher and secondary educa­
tion, however, did have a galvanizing effect on gmina action and led to 
the first departure of the popular movement from the tactical norms pre­
scribed by the Endecja. Although the demand for the polonization of ele­
mentary schools had been included in the resolutions of gmina assemblies, 
a boycott of the Russian system of primary education was neither recom­
mended nor, it appears, even contemplated by nationalist politicians. The 
National Democratic leadership, moreover, did not initially support the 
student strikes and was in the process of policy readjustment when 
the movement against the russified schools spread to the countryside. Ini­
tiative therefore devolved to local activists not waiting for instructions from 
above and, more important, to the peasants themselves. 
In the early spring, the movement from below against the Russian pri­
mary school was particularly strong in Plock and Lomi:a provinces, where 
thirty-two and twenty-three communal assemblies, respectively, had al­
ready taken up gmina action.4 1 Documentary evidence reveals a common 
pattern to these incidents. A crowd of peasants would appear at a village 
school, demand instruction in Polish, and then remove their children from 
the school when refused. As a result, instruction was temporarily disrupted 
at dozens of elementary schools. In a few cases, sympathetic teachers ac­
cepted parental demands and began conducting lessons in Polish; others 
actually encouraged the peasants to act.42 The peasants, however, were not 
always steadfast in their boycott action. For example, peasants from the 
village of Swielice in Lomi:a Province removed their children from the 
primary school on March 8, only to permit them to return a few days later.43 
At the Sobotka primary school in L�czyca County (Kalisz Province), par­
ents backed away from their initial demand for the exclusive use of Polish, 
informing the teacher that they would allow their children to return to the 
school if instruction in Russian were limited to three days a week.44 
The methods of peasant protest against the Russian school, moreover, 
remained moderate. Violence was rare and limited to vandalism and de­
struction of portraits of the imperial family.45 Most village communities 
4 1 .  Kalabmski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  561-564; AGAD KGGW 25 10, Report of the 
SDPA to the WGG, February 28 (March 1 3),  1 905 . 
42. AGAD KGGW 2500, Report of SDPA to the WGG, February 23 (March 8), 1 905 , and 
25 1 0, Lomi:a Governor to the WGG, March 1 7  (30), 1 905; APL KGP 1 5 19 ,  Chief of the 
Piotrkow Provincial Gendannes to the Piotrkow Governor, February 24 (March 9), 1 905. 
43. AGAD KGGW 25 1 0, Lom:i:a Governor to the WGG, March 2 ( 1 5), 1 905 . 
44. AGAD KGGW 2506, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 1 0  (23), 1 905 . 
45 . APW WGZZ 1 028,  SDPA to the Chief of the Warsaw Provincial Gendarmes, February 
28 (March 1 3),  1 905. 
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involved in the movement at this stage simply stopped sending their chil­
dren to school. Occasionally, peasants would refuse to a pay a teacher' s  
salary or make capital repairs at a school a s  long as  Russian remained the 
language of instruction.46 Such was the extent of peasant boldness. More 
typical was the timid action of peasants from four villages in Miechow 
County in Kielce Province who permitted their children to remain in school 
but sent them without their Russian textbooks.47 
Timid or not, peasant action against the Russian primary school system 
in the countryside coincided with a growing diversification and assertive­
ness of rural protest. With the next quarterly gmina assembly meetings 
scheduled for March and April, government officials began searching for 
more effective repressive measures. In anticipation of a new round of "il­
legal" assembly demands, the LOrnZa governor requested the authority to 
sentence administratively gmina action "agitators" as well as those who 
attempted to interrupt instruction at state schools.48 To these and other 
appeals, the acting Warsaw governor-general Podgorodnikov responded 
with a proclamation on March 7 " in the aim of preserving order in the 
countryside. "  It warned that those guilty of violating laws regulating peas­
ant self-government at gmina and village assembly meetings could be sub­
ject to administrative fines of five hundred rubles and sentenced to three 
months in jail under Article 1 5  of the statutes of " intensified security. "49 
Because repressive measures remained targeted at individual "agitators" 
rather than entire communities, they failed to intimidate the peasants and 
deter gmina action. Within days of Podgorodnikov' s  proclamation, the Ka­
lisz governor reported that the gmina movement was gaining strength ev­
erywhere in his province. In Slupca County, for example, Polish language 
demands were made by seven more gmina assemblies; in addition, several 
of them refused to assign local funds to support families of reservists.50 
Several other assemblies in Kalisz Province simply refused to sign Russian­
language protocols, thereby, among other things, holding up the distri­
bution of the local tax burdenY Similarly, in Warsaw Province, several 
46. AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, January 27 (February 9), 1 905; 
APL KGP 1 5 19 ,  Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Piotrkow Governor, 
February 24 (March 9), 1 905. 
47. AGAD KGGW 2508, Kielce Governor to the WGG, March 6 ( I 9), 1 905 . 
4S. AGAD KGGW 25 10, LornZa Governor to the WGG, February 14 (27), 1 905. 
49. APL KGP I S I S .  
50. AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, February 26 (March I I ), 1 905, 
and Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 2 ( 1 5), 1 905 . 
5 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the Minister of Internal Affairs, April 2 ( I S), 
1 905· 
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assemblies refused to confirm obligatory expenditures or authorize village 
elders to draw up tax-distribution lists. Moreover, crowds of peasants in 
Warsaw Province continued to withdraw their children from the primary 
schools, forcing many of them to close.52 In LOrnZa Province, assembly 
demands reflected the trend toward diversification and local initiative. 
Some stuck to the traditional demand of introducing Polish into gmina 
administration; others extended language demands to the public schools. 
Several refused to pay for further obligatory subscriptions to O§wiata (En­
lightenment), a Polish-language government publication aimed at the peas­
antry, and a few joined in the nascent tax revolt.53 
The unexpected response of Polish rural communities to Podgorodni­
kov' s  proclamation, as well as the ineffectiveness of the new repressive 
measures, led the authorities to a consideration of limited concessions. 
Although there were a few calls from county administrators for the outright 
suspension of gmina assembly meetings,54 most leading officials in the 
Kingdom, and St. Petersburg as well, continued to cling to the delusion 
that the mass of Polish peasants constituted a basically loyal social and 
political force. The Warsaw governor-general, although he believed that a 
serious threat to Russian authority in the countryside now existed, placed 
the blame on the pernicious effect of nationalist propaganda. 55 Authorities 
also tended to identify their traditional nemeses, the Polish nobility and 
the Catholic clergy, along with the urban-based intelligentsia, as the prin­
cipal leaders of gmina action.56 Such notions, however, did not square with 
reality. The clergy's  involvement was limited to those parts of Kalisz and 
Piotrkow provinces which came within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of 
Bishop Stanislaw Zdzitowiecki of Kujawy-Kalisz, the sole episcopal sup­
porter of clerical participation in gmina affairs.57 The participation of 
urban-based intellectuals in gmina action was even less noteworthy. 
Among the "outsiders,"  a good deal of nationalist agitation in the coun­
tryside was conducted by local landowners who doubled as activists for 
TON and its successor organizations. Nevertheless, the szlachta provided 
52 .  Kalabitlski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  866---867. 
53. Ibid. , pp. 427-429; AGAD KGGW 2 5 1 0, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 
28 (March 1 3), 1 905 . 
54. Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  25 1-255.  
55 .  AGAD KGGW 250 1 ,  WGG to the Minister of Internal Affairs, March 7 (20), 1 905 . 
56. AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 2 ( 1 5), 
1 905, and 25 1 0, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 28 (March 1 3) ,  1 905; APL 
KGL 1 905 :59, Director of the Chancellory of the WGG to the Lublin Governor, April 4 
( 1 7), 1 905 ; Kalabitlski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  892-894. 
57. Robert Blobaum, " The Revolution of 1 905-1 907 and the Crisis of Polish Catholicism, " 
Slavic Review 47, 4 ( 1 988): 674-675, 682. 
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only a minority of community leaders for gmina action. The majority of 
the activists were peasant assembly members and lower-ranking peasant 
officeholders.58 
In any event, the government' s  perceptions of reality led to an attempt 
to undermine "outside agitation" through a series of limited concessions. 
These included certain provisions specifically aimed at Poles in the Edict 
of Religious Toleration of April 30 and the limited language concessions 
contained in the June 19 decision of the Committee of Ministers confirmed 
by the tsar. Neither measure, however, satisfied peasant aspirations or neu­
tralized the gmina movement. Quite the contrary, their ultimate effect was 
to encourage an escalation of peasant demands as well as bolder, more 
arbitrary action in their behalf. 
The Edict of Toleration, often considered in the literature as a concession 
designed for the sole purpose of winning the cooperation of the Roman 
Catholic episcopate in combating the revolutionary movement, was also 
aimed at the church' s  peasant parishioners. To begin, the provision of the 
edict recognizing the right of the tsar's Orthodox subjects to convert to 
other Christian denominations affected hundreds of thousands of former 
Uniate peasants residing in the eastern counties of Suwalki, Lublin, and 
Siedlce provinces (the latter two comprising the so-called Chelm region), 
who could now voluntarily join the Roman Catholic Church. Equally im­
portant, the edict permitted religious instruction in the native language of 
the students enrolled in public schools, thus meeting at least one demand 
that had appeared in many gmina assembly resolutions. 
Whatever the state' s  intentions, the main impact of the edict was to 
further erode Russian authority in the countryside. Before the spring of 
1 905, Polish nationalist and religious agitation had made considerable in­
roads among the ethnically Byelorussian and Ukrainian Uniates. In Siedlce 
Province, where Catholic religious fanaticism was especially strong among 
the peasantry and where draft evasion was particularly widespread, rumors 
abounded that the pope had blessed the Japanese in their war with Russia. 
Peasants also constructed several roadside shrines and crosses without 
official permission in what the state considered to be Russian Orthodox 
communes.59 In Augustow County of Suwalki Province, former Uniates 
stopped sending their children to the state primary schools.60 Organized 
gmina action in these provinces, however, had yet to take firm root. 
58 .  For an attempt to aggregate data on local leadership, see Lewis, "Revolution in the 
Countryside," pp. 1 2- 16. 
59. AGAD KGGW 2525, Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, January 27 (February 9), 1 905 . 
60. AGAD KGGW 2522, Suwalki Governor to the WGG, April 2 ( 1 5), 1 905. 
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The Edict of Toleration unintentionally transformed the nature of resis­
tance in the ethnically mixed eastern counties and stimulated their gmina 
assemblies to act far more aggressively than their counterparts in the King­
dom' s north�central and western provinces, where the movement had orig­
inated. After massive conversions to Catholicism in gminy populated by 
Uniates in Lublin Province, assemblies elected only Catholics to admin­
istrative positions. Such action forced Orthodox mayors, plenipotentiaries, 
and elders either to convert or to lose office.6! In Siedlce Province religious 
tensions flowed outside the gmina assemblies. Catholics and Uniates used 
physical coercion against Orthodox believers resisting conversion, and 
crowds reclaimed by force former Uniate churches that had been turned 
over to the Orthodox Church a generation earlier. In a couple of instances, 
troops had to be sent to defend Orthodox monasteries from menacing Cath­
olic and Uniate crowds.62 Such incidents were sufficient in number by the 
beginning of June to prompt a special proclamation from the Warsaw gov­
ernor-general, who warned that violations of the religious rights of the 
Orthodox minority would be punished to the full extent of the law.63 The 
authorities also refused to confirm the election of converted mayors in 
"Orthodox" gminy and removed Catholics from office in those gminy that 
had excluded Orthodox peasants from participating in the electoral process. 
Far more severe repressive measures, however, would prove necessary to 
contain the ethnic and religious strife in the region.64 
Meanwhile, peasants elsewhere in the Kingdom were unimpressed-as 
the polonization movement gathered momentum-by the edict' s  provision 
permitting religious instruction in the native language. By the early summer 
of 1 905 , 245 gmina assemblies in the Kingdom, some 20 percent of the 
total, had passed resolutions demanding the introduction of Polish in vil­
lage schools and courts as well as local administration.65 Such a level of 
gmina action proved sufficient to force further concessions from the state 
in the form of the Decision of the Committee of Ministers of June 19 .  
By virtue of  this legislation, the government adopted the principle of 
bilingualism in gmina administration.66 Henceforth all gmina books, cor-
6 1 .  APL KGL 1 905 : 1 8, WGG to the Lublin Governor, August 26 (September 8), 1 905 . 
62. AGAD KGGW 2525, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, April 26 (May 9), 1 905 . 
63. APL KGL 1 905 : 1 8 , Proclamation of the WGG, May 20 (June 2), 1 905. 
64. For a more detailed treatment of these issues, see Robert Blobaum, "Toleration and 
Ethno-Religious Strife: The Struggle between Catholics and Orthodox Christians in the 
Chehn Region of Russian Poland, 1 904-1906," Polish Review 35, 2 ( 1 990) : 1 I I-1 24. 
65 . Zenon Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi: Kr61estwo Polskie, 11)05-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 963), p. 1 5 · 
66. AGAD KGGW 262 1 ,  Decision of the Committee of Ministers, June 6 ( 1 9), 1 905. 
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respondence, and protocols could be kept in Polish in addition to Russian. 
The government also promised in the future to hire only bilingual people 
for job vacancies in the commissariats of peasant affairs and to end dis­
crimination based on nationality or religion in state approval of land trans­
actions. As to the future, the government announced that the State Council 
was considering the introduction of zemstvo institutions and justices of the 
peace into the Kingdom, two of Alexander II ' s  "Great Reforms" long 
denied Russian Poland. 
In education, the government reconfirmed the right of Catholics to re­
ligious instruction in the native language of the pupils while permitting the 
Catholic clergy a virtual monopoly on such instruction. More important, 
the government permitted the use of Polish for the study of arithmetic and 
the native grammar in state primary schools. The government was more 
generous to private schools, which were now allowed to use Polish as the 
language of instruction for all subjects except Russian grammar, history, 
and geography, all of which remained compulsory subjects. The latter con­
cession, however, affected very few peasants. 
None of these provisions applied to the "Russian" gminy of Lublin and 
Siedlce provinces (the so-called Chebn region) or to the Lithuanian coun­
ties of Suwalki Province, where Russian remained the sole language of 
administration and educational instruction. In the former, such restrictions 
foreshadowed the separation of the Chebn region from the Kingdom of 
Poland in the postrevolutionary period; in the short term they served to 
exacerbate already tense ethnic and religious relations among a mixed pop­
ulation. Fearing that a wave of Catholic "pogroms" against the Orthodox 
population was imminent, the Siedlce governor pleaded, albeit unsuccess­
fully, for the introduction of martial law in his province already that sum­
mer.67 
In northern Suwalki Province, Kawalaria, Mariampol, Wladyslaw6w, 
and Wylkowyszki counties were almost exclusively inhabited by Lithua­
nian peasants. The failure to extend the language concessions contained in 
the ministerial decision to these counties acted as spur to the Lithuanian 
national movement. Even before June, signs of unrest in the Lithuanian 
gminy had appeared in the form of agrarian strikes and the resolutions of 
a couple of gmina assemblies containing language demands on the Polish 
model.68 After the June decision, gmina action became largely a Lithuanian 
67. AGAD KGGW 2584, Minister of Internal Affairs to the WGG, August 1 9  (September 
I ), 1 905 . 
68. AGAD KGGW 2522,  Suwalki Governor to the WGG, April 2 ( 1 5), 1 905, and Report 
of the SDPA to the WGG, April 29 (May 1 2), 1 905. 
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movement in Suwalki Province. That movement also became far more 
politically radicalized than its Polish counterpart, thanks largely to suc­
cessful agitation conducted by the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 
(LSDP). The demands contained in the July 8 resolutions of the Lesnictwo 
gmina assembly in Wladyslaw6w County, for example, called not only for 
equal rights for Lithuanians and the lithuanization of local government 
agencies and public schools but also for freedom of religion, the introduc­
tion of zemstvo institutions, total gmina control over local expenditures,  
the establishment of a system of universal primary education at state ex­
pense, the reestablishment of a university at Vilnius, the elimination of 
certain taxes, a ban on "Lithuanian" timber exports, and the expansion of 
Jewish residence rights.69 The national movement among Lithuanian peas­
ants, moreover, was aimed not only at the Russian bureaucracy. Peasants 
interrupted homilies of Catholic priests, almost uniformly Poles, who were 
unsupportive of Lithuanian national demands; and a wave of strikes of 
farm workers against Polish landowners, encouraged by the LSDP, en­
gulfed three of the four L..ithuanian counties in July.70 
In the rest of the Kingdom of Poland, thousands of peasants interpreted 
the government 's  concessions as a license to express their emerging na­
tional consciousness. For example, the provision in the Edict of Toleration 
permitting Catholic religious processions spawned various illegal phenom­
ena. In several provinces, volunteer firemen met and accompanied such 
processions in their uniforms; soon they were joined by peasants wearing 
distinctive local and regional costumes, headware, and emblems and car­
rying Polish banners-all this in violation of an imperial ukase of 1 876. 
On such occasions, local music ensembles, formed under the auspices of 
the volunteer fire departments, often played the forbidden "God Preserve 
Poland. " To prevent the religious processions from turning into national 
demonstrations, the Warsaw governor-general instructed provincial au­
thorities to punish violations of the ban on Polish national costumes with 
harsh administrative sentences.7 l 
Neither concessions nor repression, however, could slow the escalation 
of the movement against the government in the Polish countryside. In 
Lomza and Plock provinces, gmina assemblies responded to the language 
concessions of June by calling for a boycott of state-sold alcohol and to­
bacco products. The Lyse gmina assembly in Kolno County (Lomi:a Prov-
69. Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  783-786. 
70. AGAD KGGW 2523, Suwalki Governor to the WGG, June I I (24), June 26 (July 9), 
June 27 (July 1 0), and July 18 (3 1 ) ,  1 905 . 
7 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2577, Circular of the WGG to Provincial Governors, June 1 7  (30), 1 905. 
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ince) even resolved to levy fines on those who failed to adhere to the 
popular ban on drinking and smoking.72 In Mlawa, Ciechanow, and Przas­
nysz countries (Plock Province), peasants attended "congresses" disguised 
as picnics and hosted by local landowners to discuss temperance and 
"other methods of struggle" against the government.73 From Warsaw 
Province as well came reports that the concessions of June were having 
little impact, except to encourage gminy to strive for the complete elimi­
nation of Russian from the conduct of local affairs .74 
The National Democrats, too, sensed the growing militancy among the 
peasantry. The leadership of the Endecja had been surprised by the extent 
of popular antipathy to the Russian educational system and only belatedly 
endorsed the spontaneous action of peasant communities which had closed 
numerous village elementary schools in the spring. In an attempt to regain 
the initiative over gmina action, the Endecja, through the still-influential 
periodical Polak, now instructed peasants to go to the schools at the be­
ginning of the academic year and demand instruction exclusively in Polish. 
If teachers refused, parents were to remove their children from the premises 
and place them in " secret schools. " The Endecja also encouraged gminy 
to assert their right to control and supervise village schools in assembly 
resolutions, including the right to hire and fire teachers.75 
With the battle lines thus drawn, the quarterly gmina assembly meetings 
scheduled for July and August became the most crucial test of peasant 
attitudes toward the concessions of June. In LOrnZa Province, where gmina 
action had struck deep roots, assemblies again went beyond the recom­
mendations of Polak. The Dlugoborz assembly, for example, refused to 
construct two new schools with state assistance until Polish became the 
exclusive language of instruction. The Kubra assembly went even further, 
annulling its resolution of the previous year to build a new school " because 
it would not satisfy the needs of our children. "76 Villagers of Wojciechow 
in Chelm County of Lublin Province resolved not to pay the school tax 
because "we don't need Russian schools. "77 Members of the Krzeczonow 
gmina assembly in Lublin County expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
June concessions by refusing to attend the meeting convened by the au-
72. AGAD KGGW 25 I I , Report of SDPA to the WGG, June 2 1  (July 4), 1 905. 
73 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 7, Plock Governor to the WGG, June 22 (July 5), 1 905, and Report 
of the SDPA to the WGG, June 22 (July 5), 1 905 . 
74. Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  9 1 2--9 1 3 .  
7 5 .  Wolsza, Narodowa Demokracja wobec chlop6w, pp. 1 63-1 64. 
76. AGAD KGGW 25 I I , Report of the SDPA to the WGG, September 13 (26), 1 905, and 
25 12 ,  LornZa Governor to the WGG, October 8 (2 1) ,  1 905. 
77. AGAD KGGW 25 14, Report of SDPA to the WGG, August 30 (September 1 2) ,  1 905. 
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A gmina assembly meeting. Contemporary drawing by Stanislaw Maslowski, 1 906. 
(Muzeum Niepodleglosci 35869) 
thorities on August 7. This did not stop them, however, from sending a 
petition to "President" Sergei Witte, listing their grievances and 
demands .78 In Piotrk6w Province, several gmina assemblies passed reso­
lutions a second time reconfirming and expanding earlier language de­
mands.79 
Gmina action thus continued to move into new terrain. Similarly, the 
opening of the schools in September led to the spread of the popular move­
ment against them despite the state ' s  concessions on bilingualism. Accord­
ing to the Warsaw governor, "disturbances" occurred wherever subjects 
were instructed in Russian.80 Similar reports came from Plock and Lomia 
provinces, where the movement against the schools had begun the previous 
spring. Peasants also forced the closing of schools, for the first time, in 
Piotrk6w, Kielce, and Radom provinces. Usually, parents disrupted lessons 
simply by removing their children from the school, the form of action 
78.  Ibid., July 25 (August 7), 1 905; APL KGL 1 905 :59, Chief of Lublin County to the 
Lublin Governor, July 27 (August 9), 1 905.  
79. APL KGP 1 52 1 ,  List of grnina assemblies that passed Polish-language resolutions, com­
piled in mid-October, 1 905.  
80.  AGAD KGGW 2504, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, September 25 (October 9), 1 905.  
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recommended by Polak, but in one instance an explosion from a petard 
disrupted instruction at the Blaszki primary school in Kalisz Province.8 l 
Meanwhile, as the school boycott intensified in the countryside, " secret 
instruction" proliferated. In fact, during the course of the revolution, the 
authorities would uncover more than three hundred illegal schools, and this 
was only a fraction of the tota1 .82 For example, the nineteen-year-old peas­
ant Antoni Malczewski, whose own education was limited, nevertheless 
organized an underground school on an estate in Plonsk County (Warsaw 
Province), where children of both sexes between the ages of eight and 
fourteen received instruction in Polish grammar and religion for a tuition 
of thirty kopecks.83 Twenty children received similar instruction in the 
home of the peasant Ignacy Zielinski in the village of Dolsznow in Lublin 
County. 84 
By the time of the October Manifesto, gmina action had been taken in 
one-third of all commUnes in the Kingdom of Poland, but the most inten­
sive stage of its development was yet to come. The expansion of the move­
ment before the October Manifesto had been gradual and, for the most 
part, remained nonviolent. Resistance to the government, however, took 
increasingly active and aggressive forms. The growing arbitrariness of 
peasant behavior through gmina action, encouraged by the progressive de­
cline of government authority in countryside, also spilled over into other 
areas of rural life. Whereas the gmina movement was shaped by a signif­
icant degree of political organization, however, certain other collective 
actions of peasant communities-namely, trespassing and vigilantism­
defied organization and control from the outside. 
Servitudes 
Disputes in the Polish countryside over servitudes, or peasant easement 
rights, had a much longer history than gmina action, extending back to the 
emancipation legislation of the 1 860s. The gradual liquidation of private 
servitudes over the course of two generations, accomplished through ne­
gotiated agreements and state intervention, had nevertheless left some vil­
lage communities dissatisfied. Peasants frequently resorted to litigation, 
8 1 .  AGAD KGGW 25°7, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, September 9 (22), 1 905. 
82 .  Borkowski, Chlopy polscy w dobie kapitalizmu, p. 1 1 8 .  
83 .  APW WGZZ 1 730, Chief of  the Warsaw Provincial Gendarmes to  the SDPA and the 
Superintendent of the Warsaw School Directorate, March 22 (Apdl 4), 1 906. 
84. APL KGL 1 905 :25 ,  Chief of the Lublin Provincial Gendarmes to the Lublin Governor, 
December 7 (20), 1 905. 
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sometimes lasting several years, only to receive what they considered un­
just decisions. Regarding easement rights on state-owned property, peas­
ants enjoyed no legal recourse whatsoever. Where the state continued to 
permit peasants to cut timber, gather firewood, graze livestock, and fish, it 
now charged fees. Peasants again felt cheated, especially when these fees 
were increased in the first years of the twentieth century. 
The most bitter disputes revolved around peasant access to private and 
state forests. Because of rising lumber prices and the increasing scarcity 
of timber, estate owners were particularly eager to liquidate forest servi­
tudes. For similar reasons, the state sought to expand profitable timber 
exports while simultaneously limiting peasant access. The liquidation of 
private servitudes and the restrictive forest conservation policies of the state 
affected not only peasant felling of timber in commercial and state forests 
but also the pasturing of peasant livestock and the gathering of firewood.85 
Although the number of servitude-related disputes increased at the be­
ginning of the century, peasants could do little but turn to the courts or 
petition the authorities, forms of collective action that had failed to produce 
the desired results. The gradual breakdown of Russian state authority in 
the countryside in 1 905, however, encouraged peasants to take more ag­
gressive action in defense of their economic interests, action mainly in the 
form of massive illegal trespassing incidents involving entire villages. Be­
lieving that the woods and meadows in dispute were rightfully theirs and 
essential to their survival, peasants also resisted forest guards, the rural 
police, and state officials who tried to halt their illegal felling, pasturing, 
and gathering operations. 
In the course of 1 905, illegal trespassing and servitude-related distur­
bances occurred in 1 89 of 1 ,287 gminy, or 14.7 percent of the total, peak­
ing in the last three months of the year.86 The peasants had various sources 
of inspiration for taking illegal and forceful action. The governor of Pio­
trkow Province, where some of the first incidents occurred, believed that 
peasants derived their example from industrial workers " who gained de­
sired results by illegal means. " 87 Similarly, villagers of Czarna in Radom 
County reportedly began cutting down trees and resisting state forest 
guards under the leadership of the artisan Michal Wierzbicki, who sought 
85. Krzysztof Groniowski, Kwestia agrarna w Kr61estwie Polskim, 1871-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 966), p. 1 36 .  
86. Borkowski, Chlopy polscy w dobie kapitalizmu, p.  96; Lewis, "Revolution in the Coun­
tryside, "  p. 26. 
87. AGAD KGGW 2495 , Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, March 1 ( 1 4), 1 905; Pawel 
Korzec, ed., ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1905-1907 w okrf!gu 16dzkim, vol. I, pt. 1 (War­
saw, 1 957), pp. 547-550. 
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asylum with his rural relatives after his participation in the . "disorders" in 
Radom.88 In nearby Hza County, peasants invoked the name of the emperor 
in claiming that the disputed forest land belonged to them.89 Peasants who 
illegally felled timber near Przasnysz in Plock Province, with damages 
estimated at seven thousand rubles, were apparently persuaded in their 
action by soldiers returning from service in the central Russian provinces, 
where, according to the soldiers, "even the old ladies are chopping. "90 
Peasants also had long memories, basing their claims to easements on 
ancestral rights. Illegal peasant grazing on the Klomnice estate in Nowor­
adomsk County (Piotrk6w Province) was only the most recent episode in 
a twenty-year dispute .9! Peasants from the gmina of Szumowo in LOrnZa 
County, led by a candidate soltys, justified their illegal trespassing and 
felling of timber in the state forest with the argument that " the land be­
longed to our fathers. ' '92 State forest rangers in Wielun County (Kalisz 
Province), in attempting to remove trespassing villagers from Dzietrzyniki, 
were told by resisting peasants that this part of the forest had been "stolen" 
from their ancestors and that they were only reclaiming what was rightfully 
theirs.93 
Ambiguities in government policy also played a role in encouraging 
illegal peasant behavior. As an economic concession to assist the rural 
economy, the Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains decided in the 
late spring to permit peasants to pasture livestock in specially designated 
areas of state forests where grazing did not harm young growth. The con­
cession, instead of being greeted by peasant gratitude, was immediately 
misconstrued as a license for free, unrestricted access to state forests. For 
example, six hundred peasants from the villages of Wilkow and Psary in 
Kielce County took the ministry's decision to mean that they now had the 
right to graze two cows each in the nearby state forest. The villagers, armed 
with clubs and scythes, could not be persuaded that they had been mis­
informed. Subsequently, the Land Guard arrested one of the peasant lead­
ers, but a crowd liberated him from the gmina jail. Finally the Land Guard, 
this time assisted by dragoons, arrested sixteen peasants involved in the 
storming of the jail and other acts of resistance to the authorities.94 
88.  Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  605--607. 
89. AGAD KGGW 25 1 8 ,  Radom Governor to the WGG, January 30 (February 1 2), 1 905 . 
90. AGAD KGGW 25 17 ,  Plock Governor to the WGG, December 7 (20), 1 905 . 
9 1 .  Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  506. 
92. AGAD KGGW 25 1 0, Lomi:a Governor to the WGG, March 2 ( 1 5), 1 905 . 
93. AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, April 25 (March 8), 1 905. 
94. AGAD KGGW 2509, Kielce Governor to the WGG, June 9 (22), June 21 (July 4), and 
June 25 (July 8), 1 905 . 
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The Szydlowiec state forest, spanning parts of three counties in Radom 
Province, provided the setting for a similar chain of incidents. Conflict 
between dozens of villages and state authorities began in mid-May when 
the state raised its fee for pasturing livestock from nine to forty kopecks 
per head. Peasants were given until June 2 to pay the new fee or remove 
their livestock. But when they learned from various newspapers about the 
government' s  concessions on access to state forests, the peasants refused 
to pay any fee and violently resisted the attempts of rangers and the Land 
Guard to halt their operations . Eventually, after several weeks of illegal 
grazing and felling, a " flying detachment" of Cossacks successfully dis­
lodged the trespassing villagers . Arrest warrants were issued for twenty­
four "main agitators,"  who subsequently received jail sentences ranging 
from one week to two months, a mild punishment considering that the 
Radom governor had recommended their exile from the Kingdom.95 
The greatest number of trespassing incidents resulting from misinterpre­
tations of government concessions occurred in the Spala imperial forest, 
one of the tsar's favorite hunting grounds, which spanned large parts of 
Piotrkow and Radom provinces. After the ministry's  decision, peasants 
from 1 30 villages arbitrarily grazed their livestock and, to a lesser extent, 
cut down timber in the forest. Peasants, defending what they considered 
their legitimate rights, resisted efforts to remove them with clubs and axes. 
As the tsar was personally concerned, the minister of Internal Affairs took 
charge, ordering the dispatch of four squadrons of cavalry to stop the tres­
passing, arrest the leaders, and sequester the peasants ' livestock.96 Peasants 
in Opoczno County (Radom Province) continued to graze their cattle in 
Spala, however, until disease rather than troops forced them to remove 
their livestock.97 
The government' s  inconsistent application of repressive measures in re­
sponse to the trespassing incidents added to the confusion. Generally, resort 
to military force came quickly when the peasants continued to trespass on 
state property and resisted forest guards and rural police. On private estates, 
however, the government tried to rely on mediation and other political 
means to end disputes. Some officials proved less than sympathetic to 
complaining landowners. The chief of Noworadomsk County (Piotrkow 
Province), for example, refused to intervene on behalf of the landowner 
Ziolkowski, who "grossly exaggerated" an incident of illegal grazing on 
95. AGAD KGGW 25 1 9, Radom Governor to the WGG, June 1 3  (26), June 14 (27), and 
July 3 ( 1 6),  1 905; Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w, I: 626-627, 63 1 ,  638--644. 
96. AGAD KGGW 2 5 1 9, Minister of Internal Affairs to the WGG, June 8 (2 1 ), 1 905. 
97. Kalabmski and Tych, Walki chlop6w, I :  634--635. 
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A servitudes dispute . Contemporary drawing by M. Koscielniak, 1 905. (Muzeum 
Niepodleglosci 24539) 
his estate .98 The Piotrkow governor, who requested several squadrons of 
cavaltty to end trespassing in the Spala imperial forest, restricted his inter­
vention in incidents on private estates to dispatching county officials and 
peasant commissars to the scene, where they were to resolve matters 
"without the spilling of blood. "99 Sometimes, the peasants' use of force 
against estate officials compelled the state to intervene, particularly on the 
250,000 acres of forests owned by the Zamoyski estates in Lublin and 
Siedlce provinces, where some 1 48 villages engaged in illegal logging and 
pasturing. Even then, provincial authorities subsequently tried to persuade 
Count Zamoyski to drop his lawsuits against the offending peasants. 100 
Peasants often asserted their claim to easement rights by denying access 
to others. In July, peasants from the village of Prusy in Stopnica County 
(Kielce Province), led by their elder, refused to pennit agricultural workers 
employed by a neighboring estate to graze livestock on a parcel of disputed 
land. 1 o l  More frequently, they interfered with the operations of logging 
98. Ibid., pp. 501-502. 
99. Ibid. ,  pp. 5 1 6--5 1 7; Korzec, tr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1 ( I ) : 562-564. 
l OO.  Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," p.  27; APL KGL 1 906: 1 55 ,  Lublin Governor 
to Count Konstanty Zamoyski, August 30 (September 1 2), 1 906. 
l O l . AGAD KGGW 2509, Kielce Governor to the WGG, July 16 (29), 1 905 . 
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firms in forests belonging to private estates.  One of the more famous in­
cidents occurred in a forest owned by Count Zamoyski in Bilgoraj County 
(Lublin Province) which had been leased to the A. Franke Lumber Com­
pany. At the end of March, twenty peasants appeared at the site and de­
manded a halt to logging operations. When the lumberjacks refused, a 
crowd of fifty peasants arrived the next day, confiscated the logging equip­
ment, and drove the Franke workers from the forest. 102 Peasant opposition 
to logging operations also made its way into gmina assembly resolutions. 
For example, the Wyszkow gmina assembly (Warsaw Province) at its quar­
terly meeting in late December demanded not only unlimited access to 
state forests but an end to all timber exports as well. 1 03 
Although peasant assertion of easement rights sometimes merged with 
gmina action, servitudes disputes were more likely to promote class antag­
onisms in rural society and thereby undermine the polonization movement. 
The Endecja, the main political force behind gmina action, came out 
strongly against illegal peasant trespassing, claiming that the agrarian dis­
putes were fanned by "subversives" and provided the Russian government 
a pretext for employing military force. 104 Such appeals to national solidar­
ity, however, were largely ineffective among peasants convinced of the 
legitimacy of their claims. The Kalisz governor reported that although 
gmina action was widespread in his province, in economic matters peasants 
were " looking after their own interests. " 105 In Radzyit County (Siedlce 
Province) peasants met with landowners on the Milianow estate, where the 
latter tried to win them over to the idea of gmina action. The peasants 
began to leave, however, when told that this did not mean they could fell 
timber and graze cattle on private estates. 106 Likewise, nationalist agitation 
made little headway in Zamosc County (Lublin Province), the scene of 
some of the more bitter servitudes disputes. lo7 
Disputes over land use in rural society, moreover, were not confined to 
peasants and noble landowners, even though they certainly represented the 
vast majority of cases. In Tomaszow County (Lublin Province) the neigh-
1 02 .  APL KGL 1 905 : 1 20, Chief of Bitgoraj County to the Lublin Governor, March 3 I (April 
1 3) ,  1 905. 
103.  APW WGZZ 1 7 I I ,  Protocol of the Wyszkow Gmina Assembly Meeting, December 
15 (28), 1 905 . 
104. APW WGZZ 1747, Appeal of the National Democratic Organization in Opatow, No­
vember 1 905. 
105 .  AGAD KGGW 2507, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, October 29 (November I 1 ) , 1 905 .  
1 06.  AGAD KGGW 2526, Report of  the SDPA to  the WGG, September 2 ( 1 5) ,  1 905 . 
107. AGAD KGGW 25 1 5, Provisional Governor-General of Lublin Province to the WGG, 
November 1 8  (December I ), 1 905 . 
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boring Catholic and Orthodox villages of Nabroz and Radkow, respec­
tively, had their long-standing dispute over common land referred to the 
grnina court. When the court found in favor of the latter, the Catholic 
peasants vented their dissatisfaction with the decision by attacking the vic­
tors . 108 In Radom Province, factory workers from Ostrowiec intervened on 
behalf of tenant farmers in a dispute over common land with peasant pro­
prietors from the village of Godzielin. In this instance, only the timely 
mediation of Opatow County officials prevented a violent confrontation. 1 09 
The Jewish community of Mi�dzyrzec in Siedlce Province illegally gath­
ered wood on an estate, of the same name, where it claimed servitude 
rights. Police arrested ten community leaders, and when a crowd of one 
thousand Jews attempted to free them, it had to be dispersed by military 
force. Similarly, the Jewish inhabitants of W�grow, also in Sied1ce Prov­
ince, in their property dispute with the owners of local flour mills, were 
responsible for eight thousand rubles in damages resulting from trespassing 
incidents at the end of May. I 1 0 
In all these incidents, more extreme manifestations of rural class con­
flict-namely, actual peasant land seizures and attacks on individual nobles 
and their property-were indeed rare, particularly in comparison with the 
central Russian provinces. Overall, there were only fourteen cases of peas­
ant land seizure in the Kingdom of Poland during the revolution; of these, 
half took place in Lublin Province. I I I Where they did occur, they were 
based almost entirely on disputes over access and compensation, rather 
than ownership. In March, I SO peasants attacked the manor of Jozef Kle­
mensowski, owner of the Celejow estate in Lublin Province, after he re­
fused to turn over eight morgs (approximately eleven acres) of land in 
exchange for lost servitudes . 1 1 2 Similarly, villagers from Skurcza in Ga­
wrolin County (Sied1ce Province) arbitrarily seized sixty morgs (eighty 
acres) of land long disputed with the owner of the Wilga estate. l l 3 In fact, 
only one documented land seizure was not related to servitudes; in Cz�s­
tochowa County, four hundred peasants seized two morgs of land from the 
Mykanow estate for the construction of a chapel. I 1 4  
108 .  APL KGL 1 906:9 1 ,  Chief of the Lublin Provincial Gendarmes to  the Lublin Governor, 
January 14 (27), 1 906. 
109. KalabiTIski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I :  61<)--620. 
1 10. AGAD KGGW 2525, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 21 (April 3), 1 905, 
and 2526, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, May 23 (June 5), 1 905. 
I I  I . Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," p. 28. 
1 1 2 .  Kalabinski and Tych, Walki chlop6w I: 1 36-137 .  
1 1 3 .  AGAD KGGW 2526, Sied1ce Governor to  the WGG, July 28 (August 10), 1 905. 
1 14. AGAD KGGW 2498, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, September 17  (30), 1 905. 
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In disputes over easement rights on private and state property, peasants 
generally engaged in willful acts of civil disobedience. Open violation of 
property rights, most often coupled with resistance until confronted by 
superior force, characterized peasant behavior. Peasants considered their 
clearly illegal behavior legitimate, based on just claims and rights recently 
lost. Only in rare instances did they allow their hunger for additional land 
to extend beyond those claims and perceived rights. Peasant action may 
have been arbitrary, even lawless, in the effort to defend or recapture ease­
ment rights, but it knew certain limits. The vigilante movement in the 
countryside, in contrast, recognized almost no legal boundaries as peasants 
took the law into their own hands. 
Rural Vigilantism 
Peasant reliance on the instrumentalities of popular justice in Russian 
Poland, of course, long predated the first decade of the twentieth century. 
As in other cultures, popular justice, or samosQ,d (literally, self-justice), 
among the Polish peasantry had multiple applications : to enforce compli­
ance with locally established mores, to punish petty theft and other property 
transgressions involving members of the local community, or to protect 
the village from threats posed by "outsiders . "  1 1 5 When dealing with their 
own members, village communities relied on traditional forms of ritualized 
public humiliation, rather than outright violence, to prevent future viola­
tions of customary standards or recognized property rights . Violence was 
usually reserved for "outsiders" who themselves had committed an act of 
violence against individual villagers or were believed to constitute a danger 
to the community as a whole. Peasants resorted to popular justice because 
it was "natural" but also because they believed it to be a more effective 
deterrent than a regular legal system that had yet to take deep root in the 
countryside. 
What distinguished popular justice during the revolution in Russian Po­
land was a dramatic upsurge in violent vigilante actions directed at criminal 
elements and reSUlting in scores of fatalities. Like the cases involving il­
legal peasant trespassing, the number of violent incidents of samos�d began 
to escalate in the spring of 1 905 and peaked during the last three months 
of the year. Unlike the mass trespassing incidents, which declined dra­
matically after the implementation of martial law at the end of 1 905 , vi-
1 1 5 .  Cf. Stephen P. Frank, "Popular Justice, Community, and Culture among the Russian 
Peasantry, 1 870--1 900," Russian Review 46 ( 1 987): 239-265 . 
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gilantism remained a relatively widespread phenomenon in the Polish 
countryside throughout 1 906 and well into 1 907. It also appears to have 
had greater range. During a two-year period from May 1 905 to May 1 907, 
twenty-eight counties in nine provinces reported incidents of violent vigi­
lantism. l l 6 Yet vigilantism, like illegal peasant · trespassing, was hardly a 
unified and organized mass movement, as village communities responded 
individually to local stimuli . For example, in Siedlce Province vigilante 
activity was confined to the summer months of 1 905 ; in Plock Province, 
peasant samos�dy peaked in the early autumn of 1 906. In Lublin and War­
saw provinces, in contrast, vigilantism was a more or less constant feature 
of the entire period. 
Systematic scholarly analysis of peasant samos�dy during the revolution 
is nonexistent. Nevertheless, it is not particularly difficult to determine the 
causes of the dramatic increase. First, as mentioned, the efficacy of popular 
justice was deeply rooted in village tradition. Second, though official sta­
tistics are not especially reliable, they do denote a sharp increase in rural 
crime rates at the turn of the century, partly from the general increase in 
population, partly from the deterioration of the rural police as a crime 
deterrent. Exceedingly overburdened, understaffed, and poorly paid, the 
Land Guard found it difficult to cope with organized bands of criminals 
who cooperated in extensive networks, engaged in armed robbery over 
large areas, and lived in their own heavily guarded settlements. Demoral­
ized elements of the Land Guard, moreover, frequently found it in their 
interest, physical or financial, to turn a blind eye, allowing the criminal to 
work without fear of capture. A populist pamphlet of the era no doubt 
expressed peasant perceptions : "We all know full well that our police are 
pals of the thieves . If something is stolen and the injured party turns to the 
police, they either will not make an effort to investigate, or they only 
pretend to investigate-of course, in such a way that they do not find the 
guilty party. " l l ? 
Peasants lived in constant fear of these gangs, as reporting their activities 
frequently invited revenge. Yet the gangs also inspired a burning hatred 
among their victims; for the theft of a peasant's horse or livestock could 
bring economic ruin to a household. With the gradual decline, then near 
collapse, of Russian authority in the Polish countryside over the course of 
1 1 6. These figures are based on data collected by the author from Polish central and pro­
vincial archives; unfortunately, because documentary sources refer both to specific incidents 
and to "several" or "a number" of vigilante actions in a given locality, more elaborate 
quantification is rendered impossible. 
1 1 7 .  Quoted by Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," p. 22 .  
1 4 4  R E W O L U C J A  
1 905, coupled with the preoccupation of the police with combating political 
agitation, social disturbances, and the like, criminal elements took advan­
tage of the situation to increase their parasitic activities. Yet the breakdown 
in government authority also eliminated the most important barrier to the 
peasants ' ridding their communities of the gangs of armed robbers and 
horse thieves through their own action. The result was a wave of mob 
violence in the countryside unprecedented in the postemancipation era. 
The rural vigilante movement began in the late spring of 1 905 in Pio­
trkow and Siedlce provinces. In early June, peasants from the village of 
Srock in Piotrkow County, after attending morning Mass, broke into the 
gmina jail and beat two thieves to death. l l s Six weeks later, the body of 
the locally notorious Jozef Woszczak turned up near the village of Dobron 
in Lask County. In this case, the thief had been apprehended by the peas­
ants themselves during an attempted armed robbery. 1 1 9 
In Lukow County of Siedlce Province, groups of peasant vigilantes 
killed four thieves and administered severe beatings to two others in mid­
June. Seven criminals, fearing similar action against themselves, voluntar­
ily turned themselves in to local authorities. This attempt to escape popular 
justice failed, however, when a crowd of forty broke into the county jail. 1 20 
Similarly, in Radzyil County, five thieves were beaten to death in early 
July; of the five, only one had actually been convicted of a crime. 12 1 
All of this paled in comparison with the scale of vigilantism in Wlodawa 
County, the scene of a recent crime wave and where a number of gmina 
assemblies had complained bitterly that the authorities were not taking 
sufficient action. The theft of church money and valuables in the town of 
Wlodawa on July 1 5  served as the trigger: the incident incited a crowd of 
two hundred Christians, who were then joined by Jewish teenagers, to hunt 
down the suspects. Three "well-known" thieves were caught and beaten, 
another drowned in a pond, and five others turned themselves in. 1 22 The 
movement then spread to surrounding villages, where crowds of peasants, 
numbering up to a thousand, set off in search of known and suspected 
thieves. Alarmed by the size of the crowds, the Wlodawa County chief 
issued a circular forbidding samos�dy and warning peasants that they 
would be punished if they continued their violent action. Instead, he invited 
1 1 8 .  AGAD KGGW 348, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, June 4 ( 1 7), 1 905. 
1 19 .  Ibid. ,  July 14 (27), 1 905. 
1 20. AGAD KGGW 34 1 ,  Siedlce Governor to the WGG, June 14 (27), 1 905, and 2526, 
Report of the SDPA to the WGG, June 13 (26), 1 905. 
1 2 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2526, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, June 25 (July 8), 1 905. 
1 22 .  Ibid. , July 20 (August 2), 1 905, and 34 1 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, July 23 
(August 5), 1 905 . 
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peasants to report the criminals to the authorities. At the same time, the 
Siedlce governor sent urgent appeals to both the Catholic and Orthodox 
clergy to denounce vigilantism in their homilies. Not that clerical influence 
always deterred the peasants. One priest who interfered with a vigilante 
action after Mass in Kriwowerba was told, "If you defend a thief, you too 
are a thief. " The crowd went on to murder six criminals . 1 23 
Most crowds, although they failed to disperse, nevertheless rounded up 
dozens of thieves and escorted them to county officials in Wlodawa. Be­
tween August 7 and August 9 alone, peasants deposited fifty-two thieves 
in the county jail. Claiming that "they want[ed] to be able to sleep at night 
without fear of being robbed, " the peasants warned the county chief that 
they would kill his prisoners if they were released. 1 24 
The story, unfortunately, does not have a happy ending. To prevent the 
anger of the population from falling on the police, the county chief detained 
the thieves for several weeks. Formal charges could not be brought against 
many of them, however, and the chief eventually ordered their release. 
Some villages then tried a different tack. For example, the inhabitants of 
Dubeczno petitioned the Siedlce governor to exile eleven thieves from their 
midst. Because eight had not been formally charged with a crime, only 
three of the named persons were deported from the province. Meanwhile, 
the criminals took their revenge. Shortly after the Siedlce governor pro­
claimed an end to samos�dy in Wlodawa County, the homes of peasants 
from Chmelew and Lubicin were set ablaze by arsonists in retaliation for 
the villages '  participation in the vigilante movement. 1 25 
In the autumn, the center of the movement shifted to Warsaw and Lublin 
provinces. Beginning with a samos�d carried out by thirty peasants in the 
gmina of Lukowiec in Nowominsk County in early September, the move­
ment in Warsaw Province soon ranged over six counties. 1 26 In Warsaw 
County, peasant samos�dy followed on the heels of and may have been 
inspired by a wave of working-class attacks on criminal gangs in Warsaw' s  
industrial suburbs. 1 27 In Plonsk County, inhabitants from several villages 
1 23 .  AGAD KGGW 2526, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, August 17 (30), 1 905, and 
Siedlce Governor to the WGG, August 26 (September 8), 1 905. 
1 24. AGAD KGGW 2526, Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, August 1 ( 1 4) and August 
4 ( 1 7), 1 905, and Siedlce Governor to the WGG, August 2 ( 1 5), 1 905; and 341 ,  Sied1ce 
Governor to the WGG, August 17 (30), 1 905. 
1 25 .  AGAD KGGW 2526, Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, September 12 (25), 1 905 ; 2527, 
Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, October 7 (20), 1 905; and 34 1 ,  Report of the SDPA to the 
WGG, September 2 1  (October 4), 1 905. 
1 26. AGAD KGGW 2503, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, August 27 (September 9), 1 905. 
1 27 .  AGAD KGGW 342, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, October 12 (25), 1 905. 
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went on a rampage against criminals in late October, leaving five victims 
in their wake. 1 28 A distinguishing feature of the vigilante movement in 
Warsaw Province, especially in the months after the October Manifest(), 
was the attempt to institutionalize popular justice as an alternative to the 
regular legal system. The gmina of Belsk in Grojec County resolved to 
form its own police and claimed that if the authorities released a criminal, 
"he will then be brought before the people ' s  court. " 129 Peasant courts and 
committees to prosecute criminals were also set up in the gminy of Ra­
decznica, Wola Boglowska, and Przybyszew. 1 3o 
In Lublin Province, peasant vigilantism swept over seven counties, be­
ginning in areas that were predominantly Polish in November and Decem­
ber and then spreading to the largely Ukrainian communities of Chelm and 
Zamosc counties in the first months of 1 906. In Lublin County, one of the 
few places where the agrarian section of the PPS wielded some influence 
in the countryside, vigilante assaults on settlements inhabited by criminals 
were reportedly inspired by socialist agitation. 1 3 1 If so, they provide the 
only cases of external involvement and organization. Dozens of peasants 
were arrested in these incidents, but punishment was relatively light. For 
example, fourteen peasants from the colony of Borzechow, the scene of a 
particularly violent samos�d, were sentenced to one-month jail sentences 
for their active leadership of a vigilante mob of two hundred. 1 32 The con­
tagion of popular justice also spread to the Jewish communities scattered 
in small towns throughout the province .  In Chelm a crowd of Jews captured 
sixteen local thieves and held them in a prayer house until they agreed to 
return the stolen goods; those who refused were administered severe beat­
ings before the authorities could intervene. 1 33 
Violent samos�dy were also reported in Kielce, Radom, LOrnZa, and 
Suwalki provinces in the last three months of 1 905. In Ilza County (Radom 
Province), crowds of as many of five hundred peasants tried to eliminate 
criminals in the area. Dragoons stopped one of these crowds near Lipsko 
on November 1 6. When the frenzied mob refused to disperse, the soldiers 
1 28 .  Ibid. , November 8 (2 1 ), 1 905 . 
1 29.  AGAD KGGW 2505 , Warsaw Governor to the WGG, December 28, 1 905 (January 
10, 1 906). 
1 30. Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," pp. 23-24. 
1 3 I .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 5 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 16 (29), 1 905, and 
Lublin Governor to the WGG, December 4 ( 1 7), 1 905. 
1 32 .  AGAD KGGW 25 15 ,  Provisional Governor-General of Lublin Province to the WGG, 
December 30, 1 905 (January 1 2 , 1 906); APL KGL 1 905 : 1 78/2, Chief of Lublin County to 
the Lublin Governor, December 10 (23), 1 905. 
1 33 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 5 ,  Report of SDPA to the WGG, December 22,  1 905 (January 4, 
1 906). 
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fired, mortally wounding six peasants. 1 34 In Suwalki Province, vigilantism 
was largely a Lithuanian movement. The most violent incident occurred in 
Mariampol County, where Lithuanian peasants waged a running battle with 
criminal arsons. On the night of December 14-15 ,  a crowd pummeled 
seven thieves, who later died from their injuries. In this instance, the au­
thorities were not inclined toward leniency; nine members of the crowd 
were arrested and charged with murder. 1 35 
Armed robbers and horse thieves were the overwhelming majority but 
not the only targets of peasant vigilantism. In May 1 905, Stanislaw Torka, 
a forest guard on the Kruszyn estate in Noworadomsk County (Piotrk6w 
Province) shot and killed the peasant Ewa Cesielska while she was illegally 
gathering firewood. A crowd of four hundred peasants then descended on 
Kruszyn, intending to carry out vigilante justice. Although stopped by es­
tate officials and members of the Land Guard, the crowd gave them a week 
to tum over Torka, threatening to pillage the estate if refused. The incident 
ended when Torka fled before the peasants ' deadline expired. 1 36 In January 
1 906, the body of a state forest ranger was found in the village of Borki 
in Konskie County (Radom Province). His death was apparently the work 
of peasant vigilantes who retaliated against the guard' s  behavior during 
recent trespassing incidents. 1 37 In addition to forest guards, hated members 
of the rural police, soldiers who had displayed excessive brutality in deal­
ing with the local population, and gmina officials who cooperated with the 
execution of repressive measures all figured among the victims of peasant 
samos�dy. 
Vigilantism, although it peaked in the last months of 1 905, was the most 
persistent of the agrarian movements. New waves of peasant violence 
against thieves were reported in Plock, Kielce, and Warsaw provinces in 
the summer of 1 906 and in Lublin and Radom provinces during the winter 
of 1 9°6-1 9°7 . The mere restoration of formal state authority in the coun­
tryside was not enough to eliminate the popular resort to samos�dy. Only 
with the dramatic increase in the size of the Land Guard in subsequent 
years, coupled with an improvement in the material condition of the police, 
1 34. AGAD KGGW 2520, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November IS (28), 1 9°5, and 
Provisional Governor-General of Radom Province to the WGG, November 1 8  (December 
I ) ,  1 905 . 
135 .  AGAD KGGW 2524, Suwalki Governor to the WGG, December 3 ( 1 6), 1 905 . 
1 36. AGAD KGGW 2496, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, May 1 7  (30), 1 905 ; APL 
KGP S I S ,  Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Piotrkow Governor, May 1 3  
(26), 1 905; Korzec, tr6dla do dziej6w rewolucji I ( I ) :  587-588.  
1 37 .  AGAD KGGW 5 17, Report of the Radom Governor's  Office for the second half of 
January 1 906. 
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were the authorities able to check the expanding rate of rural crime as well 
as the spontaneous and violently reactive response of its peasant victims. 
Well before then, however, when rural vigilantism was reaching its peak 
at the end of 1 905, it merged with other movements in the Polish coun­
tryside, both organized and spontaneous, to create a situation that many 
high-ranking state officials in the Kingdom characterized as "complete 
anarchy. "  
Rural Poland after the October Manifesto 
The October Manifesto, with its promise of constitutional guarantees of 
basic civil freedoms along with a generally elected legislative assembly, 
also encouraged hopes for the restoration of an autonomous Kingdom of 
Poland. Rural Poland, the principal stage of the movement for home rule 
through gmina action, therefore greeted the manifesto of October 30 with 
genuine enthusiasm, even gratitude. The manifesto was officially pro­
claimed to the population during church services on Sunday, November 5 ,  
and was followed by large but peaceful demonstrations in hundreds of 
small towns dotting the Polish countryside. Throughout Russian Poland 
these national processions adhered to a fairly common pattern, indicative 
of a high degree of organization. They were almost exclusively initiated 
by National Democratic activists and sympathizers, whether landowners in 
Nowominsk County (Warsaw Province), physicians in Pultusk County 
(also Warsaw Province), Catholic clergy in Kalisz Province, or volunteer 
firemen in Ciechanow County (Plock Province) . 1 38 Members from all walks 
of rural society participated in the colorful processions, which were headed 
by the clergy and accompanied by the orchestras of volunteer fire depart­
ments intoning "Boze cos Polsk� ."  The volunteer firemen also assumed 
responsibility for preserving order. After an expression of thanks to the 
tsar for the new " freedoms," the crowds dispersed to their homes, which 
were then illuminated by candles. The only incidents of violence occurred 
later that night and involved the vandalism of unlit homes, usually be­
longing to local Russian administrative and police officials.  In the town of 
Turek (Kalisz Province), for example, a stockbroker, a tax assessor, a no-
1 38 .  AGAD KGGW 2504, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, November I S  (28), 1 905 ; 2505, 
Warsaw Governor to the WGG, November 22 (December 5), 1 905 ; 2507, Kalisz Governor 
to the WGG, October 29 (November I I ) ,  1 905; and 25 1 7, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, 
November 3 ( 1 6), 1 905 . 
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tary, a treasury official, and a postal-telegraph official, all Russians, had 
their windows smashed. 1 39 
Despite the peaceful and celebratory mood of early November, rural 
society did not patiently await the implementation of the new "freedoms. " 
Encouraged by nationalist propaganda and widespread reports in the Polish 
press of imminent political autonomy, peasants wasted little time in step­
ping up their attacks on the most visible symbols of foreign rule. The 
destruction of Russian-language road, street, and building signs now as­
sumed epidemic proportions in parts of Warsaw, LOrnZa, Lublin, Suwalki, 
and Siedlce provinces . 1 4o Elementary schools, another traditional target of 
rural discontent, also came under increasing popular assault. In Warsaw 
Province alone, sixty-six primary schools were closed in early November 
because of attacks on schools and teachers, boycotts by pupils and parents, 
or the refusal of gmina assemblies to meet contracted obligations. 14 1  Peas­
ants in Ilza County (Radom Province) added state vodka stores and local 
government buildings to their list of "Russian" targets. 1 42 
In this atmosphere charged with expectations of home rule, gmina action 
now assumed the proportions of a tidal wave. In the three months following 
the October Manifesto, more than four hundred communal assemblies 
joined the movement for the complete polonization of rural administrative, 
educational, and judicial institutions. Although gmina action continued to 
follow orderly procedural forms, the diversity and assertive nature of the 
assembly resolutions point to the movement' s  growing popularization and 
radicalization. In Nieszawa County (Warsaw Province) all gmina assem­
blies resolved in early November to withhold funding for village schools 
until Polish became the exclusive language of instruction. 1 43 Some assem­
blies, like that in Lubanie, further resolved not to pay the salary of the 
village school teacher, to forbid the presence of members of the Land 
Guard at assembly meetings, and to replace bilingual road and building 
signs with their Polish equivalents. 1 44 The Czemiernik gmina assembly (Lu­
bartow County, Lublin Province) went further: in addition to demanding 
1 39.  AGAD KGGW 25°7, Report of the SDP A to the WGG, October 29 (November I I ), 
1 905. 
140. AGAD KGGW 2504, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, October 25 (November 7), 1 905; 
25 1 2, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 18 (December I ), 1 905 ; 25 1 5 ,  Report 
of the SDPA to the WGG, November 1 ( 1 4), 1 905 ; 2524, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, 
December 5 ( 1 8), 1 905 ; and 2527, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 1 6  (29), 
1 905. 
1 4 1 .  Michal Szulkin, Strajk szkolny 1905 roku (Wroclaw, 1 959), pp. 1 5 1-152 .  
142 .  AGAD KGGW 2520, Report of the SDPA to  the WGG, November 4 ( 1 7), 1 905. 
143.  AGAD KGGW 2504, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, November I ( 1 4), 1 905. 
144. AGAD KGGW 2504, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 9 (22), 1 905. 
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the polonization of local institutions and the barring of police functionaries 
from assembly meetings, it resolved to prepare the official gmina seal in 
Polish, to remove the settlement of disputes between peasants from the 
jurisdiction of peasant commissars, and to resist the implementation of 
administrative fines and sentences . 1 45 
According to the governor of Piotrkow Province, gmina action gathered 
particular strength in those parts of his province where local community 
officials, namely mayors and clerks, joined the movement. 146 Indeed, as 
Richard Lewis has pointed out for the country as a whole, the expanded 
role of gmina administrators in this intense phase of the movement rep­
resented a most dramatic change in local leadership patterns. 147 Earlier 
viewed as "lackeys" of the Russian government because of their refusal 
to support or cooperate with the implementation of "illegal" assembly 
resolutions, mayors and clerks had lost a good deal of their authority. Some 
had actually been removed from office by their constituents; others had 
been subjected to violent physical attacks. For example, the pisarz of Cmie­
low gmina (Radom Province), a well-known opponent of gmina action, 
was murdered on September 22 . 1 48 The escalation of such incidents, to­
gether with the desire to maintain their positions and salaries, prompted 
the defection, especially after the October Manifesto, of increasing numbers 
of community officials to the side of the government' s  opponents. 
The steady erosion of this former base of support in the Polish country­
side, coupled with the perception that the revolutionary movement was 
making ever-deeper inroads among a previously apolitical peasantry, con­
tributed to the government' s  decision of November 10 to extend martial 
law from the Warsaw and Lodz industrial regions to all of Russian Poland. 
But whereas military rule helped to pacify urban areas as the great general 
strike came to an end, it did little to restore immediate order to the villages. 
Concentrating its main effort in the cities, the state lacked the manpower 
and resources to reestablish its authority, quickly and effectively, in the 
countryside. To be sure, "binding" decrees were issued by the Warsaw 
governor-general as well as by the "temporary" provincial military gov­
ernors . The local population was made liable for all property damage 
incurred as a result of attacks on public and state institutions; those who 
resisted payment could be subjected to fines of up to three thousand rubles 
145. APL KGL 1 905 : 1 94. 
146. APL KGP 1 52 1 ,  Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, January 25 (February 7), 1 906. 
147.  Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside," p. 1 5 .  
148 .  AGAD KGGW 25 19, Report o f  the SDPA to the WGG, September 19  (October 2), 
1 905. 
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or to three months in jail. 149 In Radom Province, rural communities were 
made responsible for the defense of telegraph lines, railroad tracks, and 
bridges and financially liable for all damages to state property " regardless 
of the circumstances . " 1 50 
Yet the attacks on state institutions and property continued, and efforts 
to collect fines from rural communities met with open resistance. In Opa­
tow County (Radom Province), not only did rural residents refuse to defend 
state property, but they began actively to resist tax collection, a phenom­
enon that quickly spread to other parts of the province. 1 5 1  Without the 
means of enforcement, the state ' s  attempt to impose martial law in rural 
Poland only served to exacerbate existing tensions. In Kielce Province, 
relatively quiet thus far according to its governor, martial law immediately 
transformed an "abnormal" relationship between the population and the 
authorities to one of "open hatred" of the former for the latter. 152 Likewise 
in Lom.za Province, the genuine gratitude to the tsar displayed in early 
November quickly dissipated after the proclamation of martial law. 153 
The decision to lift martial law at the end of November, made after a 
mere eighteen days in force, that is, before it had made any real impact, 
also proved ill-advised. Again, as in early November, small towns became 
the scene of large Polish patriotic demonstrations. In the meantime a clear 
shift had occurred in popular attitudes. The largely peasant crowds now 
claimed victory, which is how they interpreted the lifting of martial law, 
and, unwilling to wait for further concessions from above, they began to 
seize its fruits from below. The next three weeks, from December I to 
December 22 (the date when martial law was reimposed), marked the peak 
of the revolution in the countryside. 
During these three weeks, state power virtually collapsed as rural com­
munities defiantly substituted " Polish" for " Russian" authority. In Plonsk 
and Kutno counties of Warsaw Province, gmina correspondence was con­
ducted exclusively in Polish, whereas in the remaining counties of the 
province, peasants signed only the Polish text of assembly protocols . 1 54 In 
Mlawa County (Plock Province), one of the original centers of gmina 
149. APL KGP 1 5 I S ,  Decree of the WGG, October 1 6  (29), 1 905. 
1 50. AGAD KGGW 2520, Proclamations of Provisional Governor-General of Radom Prov­
ince, November 4 ( 1 7) and November 6 ( 1 9),  1 905 . 
1 5 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2520, Provisional Governor-General of Radom Province to the WGG, 
November 9 (22), 1 905. 
152 .  AGAD KGGW 2509, Kielce Governor to the WGG, November 7 (20), 1 905 . 
1 53 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 2, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 1 0  (23), 1 905. 
1 54. AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, November 24 (December 7), 
1 905. 
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action, twenty-five mayors and clerks appeared before the county chief 
without their Russian badges and submitted only Polish versions of their 
assemblies'  resolutions.  Earlier they had agreed to resign en masse if the 
authorities removed any of their number from office. 1 55 Similarly, twenty­
four gmina court officials from the first circuit of Plock Province collec­
tively resolved to conduct legal proceedings and correspond with the 
authorities exclusively in the Polish language. 1 56 The arbitrary and exclu­
sive use of Polish also extended to the village schools throughout the King­
dom. Teachers who refused to abide by gmina decisions were summarily 
dismissed and their schools closed. In Garwolin County (Siedlce Province), 
the teachers themselves resolved to conduct lessons solely in Polish at their 
local congress of December 1 0. 1 57 
Gmina assemblies, moreover, asserted the right to elect all local officials, 
either in community resolutions or through direct action. For example, in 
Kolo County (Kalisz Province), all gmina clerks appointed by the county 
chief were removed from office and replaced by newly elected ones. 1 5S 
Other rural communities sought to democratize local government by elim­
inating property qualifications for participation in assembly meetings. Dur­
ing this period, many assemblies, such as the one in Izbica (Krasnystaw 
County, Lublin Province), permitted those without voting rights to partic­
ipate in its meetings, in blatant disregard of the warnings of county and 
police officials who were also in attendance. 1 59 A late-December resolution 
of the Wyszk6w gmina assembly (Pultusk County, Warsaw Province) ex­
tended the vote to all inhabitants of the commune, including one hundred 
people who had attended the meeting illegally and affixed their signatures 
to its protocol. l 60 
The democratization of gmina action at the end of 1 905 indicated the 
growing appeal of populist, and to a lesser extent, socialist propaganda in 
the villages. Three PPS agitators, for example, attended the aforementioned 
I SS .  AGAD KGGW 2 5 1 5 ,  Resolutions of the Congress of Gmina Mayors and Clerks of 
Mlawa County, November 29 (December I 2) 1 905, and 25 1 7, Report of SDPA to the WGG, 
December 1 6  (29), 1 905. 
1 56. AGAD KGGW 25 17,  Telegram of the Provisional Governor-General of Plock Province 
to the WGG, December I I (24), 1 905, and Senior President of the Warsaw District Court 
to the WGG, December 1 6  (29), 1 905. 
1 57 .  AGAD KGGW 2527, Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, December 3 ( 1 6), 1 905 . 
1 58 .  AGAD KGGW 2507, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, December I O  (23), 1 905 . 
. 1 59 .  APL KGL 1 905 :26712, Chief of the Lublin Provincial Gendarmes to the Lublin Gov­
ernor, December 3 1 ,  1 905 (January 1 3 ,  1 906). 
1 60. APW WGZZ 1 836, Resolutions of the Wyszk6w Gmina Assembly of December I S  
(28), 1905 . 
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Wyszk6w assembly meeting . 1 6 1  Populist influences, however, were making 
even greater inroads. In November, an appeal of the Polish People ' s  Union 
(Polski Zwi�ek Ludowy-PZL) had called upon peasants to demand the 
convocation of a national legislature in Warsaw, equal voting rights for all 
community members, radical tax reform, and a limitation of the military 
service of the Kingdom's  residents to their own country, all of which now 
found their way into the resolution:; of several gmina assemblies . 1 62 In­
spired by the success of this agitation, the PZL went even further in De­
cember, encouraging peasants not to pay taxes or provide recruits. It also 
called upon community officials to refrain from dealing with the Russian 
government until demands for "our own national government" had been 
satisfied. 1 63 
Such propaganda harmonized with the radical and exceedingly anarchic 
inclinations of the peasants themselves. The peasant tax revolt, which had 
begun in Radom Province in early November, spread quickly to several 
other provinces after the lifting of martial law. Some assemblies resolved 
not to pay specific taxes; others sanctioned nonpayment of all taxes. Gov­
ernment efforts to collect encountered violent resistance. Tax collectors 
were chased from the villages; local officials assisting in tax collection 
were physically assaulted; and county officials were prohibited from 
auditing community records. To break the resistance of Siemien gmina 
(Radzytl County) to tax collection, the Siedlce governor ordered the se­
questering of peasant livestock, which was then sold at government auc­
tion. l 64 Local inhabitants responded, however, by boycotting the auction. 
In Opat6w County (Radom Province), where the tax revolt eventually in­
volved ten gminy, the use of Cossacks to collect taxes, though temporarily 
successful, deprived towns in this mixed rural-industrial region of adequate 
troop strength. 1 65 
Similarly, in Opatow County, conscripts from eleven gminy refused in­
duction into the army. 1 66 At the settlement of Grodzisk (Blonie County, 
Warsaw Province), a crowd of peasants prevented recruits from reporting 
for military service. Troops sent to restore order then clashed with local 
1 6 1 .  APW WGZZ 2484, Report of the Chief of the Warsaw Provincial Gendarmes, Sep­
tember 20 (October 3), 1 906. 
1 62 .  AGAD KGGW 2505, Appeal of the PZL, November 1 905 . 
1 63 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 7, Plock Governor to the WGG, December 10 (23), 1 905. 
1 64. AGAD KGGW 2527, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, December 1 ( 14), 1 905 . 
1 65 .  Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajf,lce, pp. 388, 4 1 0. 
1 66. AGAD KGGW 2520, Provisional Governor-General of Radom Province to the WGG, 
December 24, 1 905 (January 6, 1 906). 
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residents, leaving two dead in a bloody melee. 1 67 Throughout the Kingdom, 
gmina assemblies passed resolutions calling on local recruits to refuse mil­
itary service. As a result of this widespread popular resistance to conscrip­
tion, according to one account, the authorities were able to mobilize in the 
Kingdom in 1 905 only 70 percent of those called up for military service . 1 68 
Rural communities frequently coupled their refusal to provide recruits 
for the tsar 's  army with resolutions that renounced their obligation to pro­
vide supplies (usually in the form of food and lodging) for the Land Guard 
and provincial gendarmes. In its resolution, the Koscielnice gmina assem­
bly (Turek County, Kalisz Province) justified its refusal to subsidize the 
rural police "because the Land Guard is not necessary. " 1 69 The Otwock 
assembly (Nowomiitsk County, Warsaw Province) went even further, re­
solving to remove the Land Guard from the gmina and to replace it with 
a popular guard formed from local inhabitants . l 7O Throughout Siedlce Prov­
ince, where a branch of the monarchist and ultranationalist Union of the 
Russian People had recently announced its existence, crowds of peasants 
mustered in arms (mainly hunting weapons) to defend their communities 
from the rumored arrival of "Black Hundreds. " 1 7 1  The formation of pop­
ular militias and self-defense forces in the countryside coincided, moreover, 
with the already mentioned creation of "people ' s  courts" to administer 
popular justice and defend village communities from rural crime. 
As peasants formed their own indigenous institutions, attacks on Russian 
state institutions continued to escalate. In Warsaw Province, post offices, 
vodka retail outlets, and local administrative offices provided the principal 
targets of crowds that numbered in the several hundreds. One such crowd 
ransacked gmina administration offices in Rudzienko, ousted the local 
mayor and clerk, and destroyed deeds and documents in the chancellory. 1 72 
Rioting in the settlement of Bialobrzegi (Radom Province) resulted in dam­
ages to state property in the amount of almost two thousand rubles as local 
residents "failed to take any measures to stop the looting and aid po-
1 67 . AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Vice-Governor to the WGG, December 2 ( 1 5), 1 905, 
and Warsaw Governor to the WGG, December 17 (30), 1 905 . 
1 68 .  Borkowski, Chlopi polscy w dobie kapitalivnu. p. 1 1 8. 
1 69.  AGAD KGGW 2507, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 30 (December 1 3) ,  
1 905. 
1 70. APW WGZZ 1724, Chief of the Gendarmes of Warsaw, NowomiIisk, and Radzymin 
counties to the Chief of the Warsaw Provincial Gendarmes, January 5 ( 1 8), 1 906. 
1 7 I .  AGAD KGGW 2527, Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, November 29 (December 1 2) ,  
1905 ; Provisional Governor-General of Siedlce Province to the WGG, December 23 and 26, 
1 905 (January 4 and 7, 1 906). 
172 .  AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, December 19, 1 905 (January I ,  
1 906). 
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lice ."  1 73 In the four Lithuanian countries of Suwalki Province, incidents of 
arson against state institutions became so widespread as to convince St. 
Petersburg to approve provincial requests for a localized reintroduction of 
martial law already on December I7}74 
Crowd violence, moreover, did not confine itself to institutions. Gmina 
assemblies in Lithuanian Suwalki openly threatened police officials and 
gendarmes with death if they even appeared in their communities. Con­
sequently, all twenty-four members of the Land Guard in Wylkowyszki 
County were transferred to the county seat out of concern for their lives. 1 75 
Similarly, members of the rural police in Gostynin County (Warsaw Prov­
ince) and Kolo County (Kalisz Province) asked to be either transferred or 
relieved of their duties because of threats against their lives. 1 76 A dramatic 
increase in attacks on the rural police, "even on their quarters at night," 
totally "terrorized" and "paralyzed" the Land Guard in Kielce Province, 
according to its governor. 1 77 Likewise in LOrnZa Province, those members 
of the Land Guard who resided among the population, few in number and 
poorly armed, found themselves " in an impossible situation" and were 
"in daily fear for their lives. " 1 78 
Everywhere the precarious condition of the Land Guard inspired 
alarming reports from provincial officials bemoaning anarchy, chaos, and 
the collapse of civil administration. Equally alarmed were the National 
Democrats, who feared losing control over events in the countryside to 
peasant spontaneity and political rivals. Already in November, the Endecja 
warned against "excesses" of rural violence fanned by "subversives"  
which only served to  provide the Russian government with a pretext for 
military intervention. 1 79 By December, the Endecja was reduced to using 
the argument that it would be much worse under German rule, which would 
be the inevitable result if the peasants listened to "the socialists. "  1 80 The 
truth of the matter, however, was that by the beginning of winter, appeals 
for calm behavior, regardless of the quarter from which they came, could 
1 73 .  AGAD KGGW 252 1 ,  Radom Governor to the WGG, February 22 (March 7), 1 906. 
1 74. AGAD KGGW 2524, Circular of the Suwalki Governor to County Chiefs, December 
3 ( 1 6), 1 905; and 2584, WGG to the Minister of Internal Affairs, December 2 ( 1 5), 1 905. 
1 75 .  AGAD KGGW 2524, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 5 ( 1 8), 1 905. 
1 76. AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Vice-Governor to the WGG, December 3 ( 1 6), 1 905; 
and 2507, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 30, 1 905 (January 1 2, 1 906). 
1 77 .  AGAD KGGW 2509, Kielce Governor to the WGG, November 7 (20), 1 905 . 
1 78 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 2 ,  Provisional Governor-General of LomZli Province to the WGG, 
December 2 1 ,  1 905 (January 3, 1 906). 
1 79.  APW WGZZ 1 747, Appeal of the National Democratic Organization in Opatow, No­
vember 1 905. 
1 80. AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, December 14  (27), 1 905 . 
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not hope to restore order in a situation where organized state authority had 
seemingly evaporated. To reestablish that authority, the Russian govern­
ment reintroduced martial law to the entire Kingdom on December 22 .  
In  the course of 1 905 , revolution indeed came to  the Polish countryside. 
Though not marked by violent social upheavals of peasants against the 
landed class, the revolt nevertheless resulted in a displacement, albeit tem­
porary, of Russian authority from rural Poland. The creation of an alter­
native authority by popular forces from below to fill the vacuum left by 
the temporary abandonment of the countryside by Russian officials, nev­
ertheless, failed to happen. To be sure, for the first time in its history, the 
peasantry of Russian Poland became actively engaged in political life. As 
a consequence of its inexperience, however, that engagement became ab­
sorbed more in the elimination of existing institutions than in their replace­
ment by viable alternatives that could withstand a reassertion of state 
power. Makeshift people ' s  courts could not substitute for a regular system 
of justice, nor could " secret instruction" be mistaken for a system of 
education. Popular guards and militias likewise failed to take the place of 
a regular police and army. Russian military rule, once it was applied with 
far greater seriousness of purpose, easily swept these ad hoc popular in­
stitutions away. 
Yet restoring order in the Polish countryside proved no easy task, despite 
the severity of martial law after December 22 .  In some provinces, the 
process lasted months, elsewhere years . In the meantime, gmina assemblies 
continued to pass illegal resolutions; armed bands continued to attack state 
institutions; rural police and county officials remained targets of assassins; 
educational institutions remained closed; and vigilantism continued to 
claim victims among the criminal element. Eventually, through a massive 
injection of additional personnel and resources, the Russian government 
succeeded in arresting the upheaval that had engulfed the Polish country­
side by the end of 1 905 . It never succeeded, however, in fully reestablish­
ing the institutional authority of the state over the rural popUlation. 
C H A P  T E R F 1 V E 
T H E  STR U G G LE O V ER 
E n U C A TIO N 
Already on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, students in the Kingdom's  
institutions of  higher and secondary education formed the most politicized 
social group in the country. Although divided by ideological differences, 
party sympathies, and ethnicity, students had been prepared by established 
traditions of self-organization and political protest for the role of an avant­
garde in the antiwar and antimobilization movements of 1 904. Incidents 
inside the schools multiplied, and by the end of the year rumors of a 
nationwide student strike were rife. 
Preparations for some sort of broad student action were still in the plan­
ning stage, however, when industrial workers preempted them with their 
own massive general strike. The sudden emergence of a mass, though 
politically inchoate, labor movement galvanized the students at the end of 
January, particularly in Warsaw. Within weeks, students strikes had spread 
throughout the country, fanned by political agitation, varying degrees of 
parental sympathy, and government bungling. The perseverance of the stu­
dents, coupled with mounting strike-associated violence, led to minor con­
cessions in the. spring and summer. The political unacceptability of these 
concessions, which were both too little and too late, transformed the stu­
dent strikes into a nationwide popular boycott of state educational insti­
tutions at all levels in the fall. 
Despite even greater government concessions, the boycott continued into 
1 906 and beyond. By that time, however, the struggle over education had 
long ceased to be merely a bipolar affair between Polish society and the 
Russian state over the language of instruction, curricula, and faculty ap­
pointments. As the "Muscovite" educational model declined in the face 
of popular rejection, competing "Catholic,"  "national," and "progres-
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sive" models emerged to fill the vacuUJll. In the end, the inability of the 
Polish actors to reach a compromise with each other played into the hands 
of the resilient Russian authorities and doomed or undermined all the Po­
lish alternatives. By the eve of the Great War, the state ' s  revamped system, 
though no longer the tool of russification it once was, had been restored 
as the main instrument for educating the Kingdom's  young generation. 
The Warsaw Epicenter 
On January 28, as the general strike of industrial workers moved into 
high gear, meetings involving hundreds of students convened at Warsaw 
University and the Polytechnical Institute. At both institutions the organi­
zational impetus came from the more radical student groups, who used 
existing mutual-aid associations to mobilize their colleagues. Zjednoczenie 
(Unity), the student self-help organization at the Polytechnical Institute, 
was formed in 1 898, shortly after the opening of the institute. Unlike its 
counterpart at Warsaw University, Zjednoczenie did not split into nation­
alist and socialist wings. I Consequently, 850 of the institute ' s  1 , 1 69 en­
rolled students answered Zjednoczenie' s  call to convene at eleven in the 
morning of the twenty-eighth, led by a core of approximately 200 activists 
roughly divided between the nationalist youth organization Zet and the 
Union of Socialist Youth.2 A police cordon quickly surrounded the insti­
tute, as students debated until five o'clock the next morning the wording 
of a resolution to be presented to the school ' s  director. By that time, their 
number had dwindled to 300. These, too, departed when the director re­
fused to meet with their elected delegates, who were to deliver a compro­
mise resolution containing demands for both the "nationalization" and 
"democratization" of the institute. Anticipating a strike, the director tem­
porarily suspended classes and closed the school until order could be re­
stored.3 
The restoration of "order" proved elusive, however, as the student re­
volt spread to other institutions. At the end of February the Polytechnical 
Institute ' s  Pedagogic Council, by a majority of thirteen to four, voted to 
I .  Bogdan Nowroczynski, ed., Nasza walka 0 szkol� polskQ, 1901-1917: Opracowania, 
wspomnienia, dokumenty, vol. I (Warsaw, 1 932), pp. 259-274. 
2 .  AGAD KGGW 258 1 ,  Report of the Director of the Warsaw Polytechnical Institute to the 
Institute ' s  Pedagogic Council, February I I (24), 1 905 . 
3. AGAD KGGW 2488, Director of the Warsaw Polytechnical Institute to the SDPA, Jan­
uary 1 6  (29), 1 905 . 
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close the institute for the remainder of the semester.4 Ironically; the closing 
of the institute brought an end to Zjednoczenie as well. When the institute 
reopened for the fall semester (this too proved temporary), the ideological 
gulf between nationalist and socialist student sympathizers could no longer 
be bridged by common interests . Coexistence in a mutual-aid organization, 
particularly in the charged political atmosphere of September and October, 
had become unthinkable. 
At Warsaw University, where the nationalist Pomoc Bratnia (Fraternal 
Aid) competed with the socialist Spojnia (Union), such coexistence had 
ended already in 1 899 over the issue of solidarity with the strikes and 
protest actions of Russian students of that year. Although Pomoc Bratnia 
remained the larger of the two mutual-aid organizations, it was Spojnia 
that initiated the meeting of students at the university on January 28 .  In­
ability to agree on a common set of resolutions and demands in advance 
of the gathering led to a nationalist boycott.5 Consequently, only 432 of 
the 1 ,66 1 enrolled students attended the socialist-sponsored meeting. This 
minority resolved to strike if its demands for polonization and democrati­
zation of the university were not met. The students then dispersed without 
incident on the arrival of the police, whose subsequent investigation turned 
up vandalized portraits of the tsar and a few littered appeals printed by the 
Warsaw committee of the Bund.6 
Only later would the nationalist students join the strike at Warsaw Uni­
versity. Their position may have been confused somewhat by the attitude 
of their elders in the National League and the Endecja. Though vocal 
proponents of the po Ionization of the country' s public educational system, 
the political leaders of the nationalist movement opposed strikes as a matter 
of principle. The rapid spread of the student strike to Warsaw's  secondary 
schools, however, led to a change of heart. Already on January 28, pupils 
at the Real School, followed by their counterparts at the Rontaler School 
of Commerce, the Second, Fourth and Fifth Boys ' gymnasia, and the Sec­
ond Girls' Gymnasium, walked out of their classes.7 Although political 
4. AGAD KGGW 258 1 ,  Protocol of the Pedagogic Council of the Warsaw Polytechnical 
Institute, February 1 5  (28), 1 905 . 
5. Nowroczynski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� polsk� I :  24 1 ;  see also Edmund Staszynski, Polityka 
oswiatowa caratu w Kr6lestwie Polskim: Od powstania styczniowego do 1 wojny swiatowej 
(Warsaw, 1 968), pp. 1 26-1 30. 
6. APW WGZZ 10 10, Chief of the Warsaw Okhrana to the Chief of the Warsaw Provincial 
Gendannes, January 27 (February 9), 1 905 . 
7. Staszynski, Polityka oswiatowa, pp. 1 3 1-135 ;  Nowroczyilski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� pol­
skQ 1 :293-340, 345-348; Stanistaw Kalabinski, ed., Carat i klasy posiadaj�ce w walce z 
rewolucjQ H}05-1907 w Kr6lestwie Polskim: Materialy archiwalne (Warsaw, 1 956), pp. 
I I-13 ·  
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initiative for this largely unplanned turn of events seemed to rest with the 
Union of Socialist Youth, many students who sympathized with the na­
tionalist movement joined in the strikes and participated in the work of ad 
hoc committees created to draft student demands. These strike committees, 
in turn, sent representatives to a Circle of Delegates, set up in early Feb­
ruary to coordinate the student movement in Warsaw's  secondary schools.8 
It was at this point that the Endecja decided to accept the student strikes 
as a fait accompli and to give the movement a " national " character by 
attempting to take over its leadership, beginning with the Circle of Dele­
gates. At the same time, the Endecja created a special organization, the 
Union for the Nationalization of the Schools (Zwi�ek Unarodowienie 
Szkol), to counter the influence of the " progressive, " that is, liberal and 
socialist, Circle of Educators (Kolo Wychowawcow), the only organization 
among adults to come out immediately in support of the student strike 
movement.9 
Before that movement could spread even further, however, Curator 
Aleksandr N. Schwartz of the Warsaw Educational District ordered the 
closing of all Warsaw schools for the duration of the workers ' general 
strike. This preventive action served only to give the student movement an 
opportunity to organize itself more efficiently, as the Circle of Delegates, 
now roughly balanced between socialist and nationalist sympathizers, ham­
mered out a compromise set of demands for the thirty-six schools it came 
to represent. Once factories and plants in Warsaw resumed operations, 
Schwartz attempted a gradual and selective reopening of the city ' s  sec­
ondary schools beginning on February 8. The curator' s  strategy backfired 
miserably. At the Rontaler School and at the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Boys ' 
gyInnasia, a majority of the students boycotted classes. At the Fourth Girls'  
GYInnasium, Jewish students joined their Catholic colleagues, mainly from 
the fifth, sixth, and seventh forms, in a walkout that forced the closing of 
the schoo1. 1 0 As a result, Schwartz again suspended instruction in all War­
saw secondary schools on February I I  and turned to punitive measures. 
The authorities ordered the arrest of twenty-five student activists, mainly 
on the charge that they had prevented others from attending classes. I I At 
the Fifth Boys' GYInnasium, school authorities expelled fifty-three students 
8. NowroczyiIski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� pols� I :  274-283.  
9 .  Stanislaw Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej: Okres 1887-1907 (London, 1964), pp.  247-
250; Halina Kiepurska, lnteligencja zawodowa Warszawy (Warsaw, 1 967), pp. 1 02-1 04. 
10 .  NowroczyiIski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� pols� 1 :348-354; AGAD KGGW 2488, Report 
of the SDPA to the WGG, January 29 (February 1 I ) ,  1 905. 
1 I . Michal Szulkin, Strajk szkolny 1905 roku (Wroclaw, 1 959), pp. 6 1-64. 
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identified as strike leaders. Similar action was taken at the Fourth Girls' 
Gymnasium. 1 2 
The repressive measures were aimed as much at parental and adult opin­
ion as at the student "troublemakers. "  In the first weeks of the Warsaw 
school strike, that opinion had not been particularly sympathetic to the 
students. Conservative groups as well as the Roman Catholic episcopate 
opposed the student walkouts in no uncertain terms; the majority of parents 
and guardians, although they may have sympathized with certain goals of 
the strike, nevertheless opposed the students ' methods.B Given this rela­
tively favorable climate of opinion, Schwartz scheduled a meeting with 
concerned "parents" for February 1 9  at the Warsaw Museum of Industry 
and Agriculture. With the walkouts spreading to the provinces, the curator 
obviously hoped to gain from the meeting a resolution condemning the 
strikes and thereby exert parental pressure on the students to return to 
classes. The endorsement of the student strikes by the Endecja, however, 
did much to frustrate the curator' s  plans. Some fifteen hundred prominent 
citizens and parents turned up for the meeting with Schwartz, and although 
the majority remained ambivalent toward the strike, they approved a res­
olution demanding Polish as the language of instruction in the Kingdom's  
schools. 1 4  
This resolution, although a blow to the authorities, appeared as  a betrayal 
to certain student leaders, especially given that the older generation had 
remained silent on other issues affecting the schools. Even students who 
belonged to organizations connected with the nationalist movement had 
concerns that went beyond the mere polonization of the schools. In the 
Circle of Delegates they had agreed to support "progressive" demands for 
placing the public schools under the control of " society" and for an end 
to restrictions and discrimination in admissions policy. Socialist and liberal 
student leaders, of course, had more far-reaching demands, including co­
education, freedom of assembly and speech in the schools, the establish­
ment of universal primary education at public expense, and an end to 
compulsory religious instruction. 1 5 Despite these differences, which more 
1 2 . NowroczyTIski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� polskf,! I :  336-337, 354. 
1 3 .  Kiepurska, Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, p. 1 04; Staszynski, Polityka oswiatowa, 
pp. 1 53-154. 
14 .  AGAD AB, XIX- IO. An excellent account of the public meeting with Schwartz was 
published by the liberal newspaper Iskra, no. 6 (February 19 ,  1 905). See also Kiepurska, 
Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, pp. 105-107; Szulkin, Strajk szkolny 1905 roku, pp. 66-
67; and Staszynski, Polityka oiwiatowa, pp. 149-150. 
15 .  For a comparison of nationalist and "progressive" postulates as presented in the debates 
of the Warsaw Circle of Delegates, see Staszynski, Polityka oswiatowa, pp. 143-145. 
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than once threatened student solidarity, the central committee of the Circle 
of Delegates considered it necessary to reaffirm its original strike demands 
in a public appeal of February 26. The appeal reminded adults that youth 
were fighting not only for Polish schools but also for a more "democratic" 
system of education; the statement also served to prevent a break with 
Jewish students, who had joined the walkout in considerable numbers. 1 6  
Curator Schwartz, meanwhile, chose to ignore the parental resolution 
altogether and went ahead with his plan to reopen the Warsaw middle 
schools on February 20. This time, striking students appeared at the 
schools, forming patrols to dissuade and prevent others from attending. 
Violent incidents, accompanied by numerous arrests, occurred at the Real 
School, the Fifth Boys ' Gymnasium, and the Second Girls' Gymnasium. 17 
At the Third Boys' Gymnasium, only sixty pupils out of a student body 
of more than three hundred attended classes. I S  Where Poles were in a 
minority of the student body, as in the Sixth Boys ' Gymnasium, their action 
took the form of a simple walkout. The strike also spread beyond the 
middle schools to private schools, vocational Sunday schools attended by 
young artisans, and schools of commerce. At the Seven-Class Preparatory 
School at 6 1  Grzybowska Street, twelve-year-old boys led the first walkout 
of Polish pupils from a city primary schoo1. 19 After a week of violent 
confrontations, further arrests, and ever-declining attendance, Schwartz was 
forced to suspend instruction once again. 
The schools would remain closed for an entire month, as the authorities 
prepared a new wave of expulsions. For example, the Pedagogic Council 
of the Real School immediately decided to expel thirty-two students, two 
of them on "wolves' tickets,"  which prohibited their reenrollment in 
any of the empire ' s  middle schools. A few weeks later, 361  others were 
expelled from the Real School "for nonpayment of tuition. "  After the 
authorities decided to reopen the schools on March 2 1 regardless of the 
number of participating students, another 1 07 were expelled from the Real 
School for nonattendance.2o Before the spring semester had ended, 1 ,945 
students had been expelled from the Warsaw boys ' gymnasia alone.2 1 
The mass and indiscriminate expUlsions, coupled with the curator' s 
decision to ignore the parental resolution of February 1 9, turned public 
1 6. Nowroczynski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� polslcQ I :  283-292. 
17 .  Ibid., pp. 3 1 4-3 1 5, 33!r-337, 343-345 ; AGAD KGGW 2489, Report of the Warsaw 
Superintendent of Police to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 ) ,  1 905. 
18. Nowroczyilski, Na.sza walka 0 szkol� polslcQ I: 348-35 1 .  
19 .  Ibid. , pp. 365-369. 
20. Ibid. ,  pp. 3 1 5-3 17 .  
2 I .  Staszyilski, Polityka oswiatowa, p. 1 66. 
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opinion decisively against the authorities. Only conservative groups re­
mained opposed to the student action, but now even they considered it 
necessary to circumvent the unresponsive Schwartz and the educational 
bureaucracy in the Kingdom and to turn directly to St. Petersburg for a 
resolution of the school crisis. On March 9 , a petition with thirty thousand 
signatures was handed over to Sergei Witte and the Committee of Ministers 
requesting the reestablishment of Polish schools in the Kingdom.22 Mean­
while, the shift in public opinion had abetted the spread of the school strike 
to the provinces, a development that would force the central authorities to 
entertain seriously the idea of concessions. 
The School Strike in the Provinces 
In the first week of February, the student strike began to spread rapidly 
from Warsaw to the outlying provinces. As early as February 4, Warsaw 
governor-general Chertkov wired the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the 
alarming information that instruction had been suspended at almost all the 
country's  middle schools, prompted by student walkouts over Polish lan­
guage demands and preventive closings.23 A few days after Chertkov's  
telegram, gymnasia in  Biala, Plock, and Wloclawek joined the list.24 
Already on January 30, the Lublin Boys ' Gymnasium had suspended 
classes. There, students struck not in solidarity with the Warsaw student 
movement and Polish language demands but as a result of an incident 
within the schooJ.25 Provincial authorities soon found good reason, how­
ever, to keep the school closed. At the nearby Institute of Agriculture and 
Forestry in Pulawy, long a hotbed of student unrest, a majority of the 
students voted on February 3 to strike for the remainder of the academic 
year.26 Meanwhile, a Zet delegate arrived in Lublin from Warsaw to help 
organize walkouts and prepare student petitions in the middle schools. To 
preempt a strike at the Lublin Girls '  Gymnasium, the governor ordered its 
closing, along with all other schools in the city, on February 3. The schools 
reopened in Lublin on February 8,  but two days later, more than one hun­
dred girls walked out of the gymnasium after demanding Polish as the 
22.  Ibid., p. 1 52 .  
23 .  AGAD KGGW 2488, Telegram of the WGG to the Ministry of Intemal Affairs, January 
22 (February 4), 1 905. 
24. StaszyTIski, Polityka oswiatowa, pp. 1 35-1 36. 
25 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 3 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, January 20 (February 2), 1 9°5; 
NowroczyTIski, Nasza walka 0 szkol{! polslcQ I: 47 1-472. 
26. AGAD KGGW 25 1 3 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, January 24 (February 6), 1 905. 
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language of instruction as well as the introduction of Polish literature into 
the curriculumY 
As in Warsaw, parents in Lublin Province initially opposed the actions 
of their progeny. At the Hrubieszow Boys' Progymnasium, a student walk­
out collapsed after a couple of days as a result of active parental interven­
tion against the strike.28 At the same time, a parental committee formed to 
negotiate with school authorities at the Lublin Boys ' Gymnasium, thus 
deliberately undermining a recently formed student strike committee. The 
gulf separating the generations seemed unbridgeable to Mieczyslaw Skrze­
tuski, a student leader at the gymnasium: "Fathers and sons : these were 
two separate worlds. Unable to understand each other, they fought each 
other instead. The older generation spoke of constructive work, about po­
sitions and wealth. On the other hand, we were the 'madmen' [szalency] 
of that time, nurtured in the underground and on the romanticism of our 
great poets . We wanted to fight; we had no concern for our careers or for 
personal success. ' '29 Soon after meeting with the parents, the authorities 
decided to reopen the school on February 2 1  after a selective expulsion of 
twenty-eight students distinguished by their active role in the strike. In this 
case, however, the young people held firm as a majority continued to 
boycott classes. Their number increased after a bomb exploded on school 
grounds the evening of March 5. By the end of the month, the authorities 
had expelled more than two hundred male and female students from Lub­
lin 's  middle schools, nine of them on "wolves' tickets." 3o 
In Lomza, by contrast, parents stood strongly behind student demands. 
Lomza Province, as already noted, was an early center of the gmina action 
movement and its advocacy of the polonization of local administration and 
institutions, including the schools. As elsewhere, however, initiative for the 
strike in the Lomza middle schools belonged to the students themselves, 
and they moved into action after the arrival of a delegate from Warsaw.3 1 
On February 3, a majority of the students from the sixth, seventh, and 
eighth forms walked out of the Boys ' Gymnasium. The gates were then 
closed by the school ' s  administration to prevent the departure of pupils 
from the lower forms.  The striking students subsequently forced the closing 
of the LOrnZa Girls'  Gymnasium, where a partial walkout had already oc-
27- Ibid. , February 10 (23), 1 905. 
28 .  Ibid. ,  February 19 (March 4), 1 905 . 
29. Nowroczynski, Nasza walka 0 szkolf! polskQ I :  469. 
30. Ibid. , pp. 475-477; AGAD KGGW 250 1 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 1 0  
(23), 1 905. 
3 1 .  Nowroczynski, Nasza walka 0 szkolf! polskQ I :  405-414.  
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curred, before returning to their own school. Fearful of a violent incident, 
the director closed the gymnasium.32 
In an attempt to exert pressure on parents and guardians to intervene in 
the strike, school authorities in LOrnZa soon announced their decision to 
expel all students who failed to return to classes by February 1 4. This plan 
was undermined, however, when Curator Schwartz ordered a blanket clos­
ing of all middle schools under the jurisdiction of the Warsaw Educational 
District until February 20. The respite gave both students and parents an 
opportunity to plot further action. When instruction resumed in LOrnZa on 
that date, only a small minority of Catholic and Jewish students (thirty­
three out of four hundred) attended class at the Boys ' Gymnasium. By 
contrast, only ten Orthodox and Lutheran students (out of I I 5) joined the 
strike. Similar ratios prevailed at the Girls' Gymnasium. The next day, the 
percentage of Catholic pupils attending classes at the two middle schools 
dropped even lower.33 
Meanwhile, hundreds of parents, including several employed by the state 
administration, sent a petition to the Ministry of Education in St. Petersburg 
in which they expressed their support of student demands for instruction 
in the Polish language, for Polish teachers and administrative personnel, 
and for a curriculum that included Polish language and history as its main 
subjects.34 Both students and parents subsequently held firm to these de­
mands, despite the immediate expulsion of twenty-nine male and fifty fe­
male students for "active participation" in the school "disorders . "  
Parental support also proved crucial to the success o f  the strike in the 
Kalisz middle schools. Here police reports went so far as to blame the 
strike on the hostile attitude of parents toward school authorities.35 Equally 
important in this case was a student solidarity that crossed ethnic and 
religious boundaries. The written demands presented at the Kalisz Boys ' 
Gymnasium on February 7, which placed equal weight on the goals of 
polonization and democratization, included the signatures of several Rus­
sian students from the upper forms as well as nearly all of the school ' s  
Jewish students. Consequently the walkouts left only eighteen students at 
the Boys ' Gymnasium, twelve at the Girls' Gymnasium, and one student 
at the Kalisz Real School .J6 In March, the strike spread to the L�czyca 
32 .  AGAD KGGW 25 10,  Lomi:a Governor to the WGG, January 23 (February 5), 1 905 . 
33 .  Ibid., February 10 (23), 1 905. 
34. AGAD KGGW 25 10, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 15 (28), 1 905. 
35 .  AGAD KGGW 2506, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 3 ( 1 6), 1 905. 
36. Ibid., February 4 ( 1 7), 1905 . 
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Teachers Seminary and the Kolo School of Commerce, although at the 
latter, Jewish students refused to join in a walkout over exclusively 
"Polish-national" demands.37 
The authorities eventually reopened all the above-mentioned schools in 
Kalisz Province at the end of March, even though only a small minority 
of enrolled students attended. In the event, the resumption of instruction 
was accompanied by a good deal of violence and vandalism aimed at 
" strike-breaking" students and their parents. On April 10, for example, a 
bomb was planted at the Real School. Although the bomb failed to explode, 
the incident nevertheless had the anticipated effect on attendance.38 
In LodZ and its satellite towns of Zgierz and Pabianice, the Piotrkow 
governor, on his own authority, immediately closed all schools in a pre­
ventive measure connected to the outbreak of the workers ' general strike. 
Student declarations and walkouts in this textile industrial region were thus 
delayed until the end of February. Even then, only a minority of the stu­
dents, almost exclusively Poles, joined in the strike, as ethnic diversity and 
divisions (German, Jewish, and Russian students generally outnumbered 
their Polish counterparts in LodZ) undermined student solidarity.39 In such 
a setting, the otherwise typical demand for Polish-language instruction, 
even when coupled with "democratization, " was more likely to draw op­
position than support. 
In contrast, the provincial capital of Piotrk6w, untouched by either labor 
unrest or the governor' s  preventive action, became the scene of major 
student disturbances that closed the boys and girls '  gymnasia as well as 
the Alexander Academy, an elite six-year elementary school. Unlike in 
LodZ, a substantial number of Germans and Jews joined the majority of 
Polish students in a walkout marked by both vandalism against school 
property and "terror" against the parents of " strike-breaking" students. 
In the latter instance, this amounted to throwing ink bottles through apart-
37. AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, March 9 (22), 1 905 . The petition 
of students at the L�czyca Teachers Seminary, however, went beyond demands for instruc­
tion in the Polish language and called for an end to discrimination on admissions, freedom 
of speech and assembly, and the liquidation of the school authorities'  extracurricular super­
visory and disciplinary powers; see Pawel Korzec, ed., ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 1905-
1907 w okr�gu 16dzkim. vol. I, pt. I (Warsaw, 1 957), pp. 630-63 1 .  
38.  AGAD KGGW 2506, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, April I ( 1 4), 1 905, and 2507, 
Report of the Kalisz Governor to the Emperor, mid-May 1 905; Nowroczynski, Nasza wailea 
o szkol� polskQ I: 391-397. 
39. AGAD KGGW 2494, Piotrk6w Governor to the WGG, January 25 (February 7), 1 905; 
APL KGP 1 5 1 5  (2), Declaration of Students at the L6dz Boys' Gynmasium, February 14 
(27), 1 905, and Report of the Director of the L6dZ Girls' Gynmasium, February 17 (March 
2), 1 905; NowroczyiJ.ski, Nasza wailea 0 szkol� polskQ I: 456-46 1 .  
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ment windows. The school authorities, however, acted swiftly, and by Feb­
ruary 3, they had already expelled 257 from the Boys' Gymnasium, 1 86 
from the Girls' Gymnasium (including thirty-three Jews specially noted by 
the school ' s  director), and 1 37 from the Alexander Academy.40 
As already noted, the preventive actions taken by the authorities, partic­
ularly the blanket closing of all middle schools on February 7 by Curator 
Schwartz, proved mostly counterproductive. Indeed the curator' s  decision 
drew loud protests from certain provincial administrative quarters. For ex­
ample, the Suwalki governor expressed his disagreement with Schwartz 
directly to the Warsaw governor-general over the closing of the Suwalki 
Boys ' Gymnasium, " inasmuch as no disorders have occurred there. "41 He 
was successful in getting the school reopened on February 1 6, an event 
marked nonetheless by a petition and walkout of 1 17 Polish students. As 
nonstriking Russians, Lithuanians, and Jews constituted the majority of the 
student body, however, the gymnasium remained open. The Suwalki gov­
ernor also opposed the expulsion of the striking Poles as premature, with 
an eye to allowing parents and guardians a chance to encourage a return 
to classes. The governor' s  prudence, which contrasted starkly with the 
hasty administrative reaction elsewhere, reduced the number of student 
strikers by one-fourth within days of the original walkout.42 
Meanwhile the rash action of the central school authorities undermined 
the efforts of the Sied1ce governor to end a walkout at the Sied1ce Boys ' 
Gymnasium. Here, 1 50 Polish students had presented a petition to the 
school ' s  director and left classes on February 3 .  After a conference between 
the governor and parents employed by the state administration, however, 
sixty students quickly returned, leaving only ninety to face potential ex­
pulsion. The decision of February 7 to close all middle schools without 
exception thus angered the governor because " it plays into the hands of 
the Polish party. "43 Two weeks later, the governor' s  fears were confirmed. 
The reopening of the gymnasium of February 20 was met with a much 
larger walkout as some Jewish students joined their Polish colleagues, 
whose demands now linked polonization with democratization. Ultimately, 
40. AGAD KGGW 2494, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 ), 1 905; APL 
KGP 1 5 17 ,  Captain of the Piotrkow County Land Guard to the Piotrkow Governor, January 
1 9  (February I ) , 1 905 ; Korzec, irodla do dziejow rewolucji I ( I ) : 602--607; Nowroczylli;ki, 
Nasza walka 0 szkolfJ polski,! I :  369-38 1 .  
4 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2522,  Suwalki Governor to the WGG, January 2 5  (February 7), 1 905. 
42. AGAD KGGW 345, Report of the Suwalki Governor' s  Office on Events in the Province 
for the first half of February 1 905, and 2522, Suwalki Governor to the WGG, February 3 
( 1 6) and February 5 ( 1 8), 1 905. 
43 · AGAD KGGW 2525, Sied1ce Governor to the WGG, January 27 (February 9), 1 905. 
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205 students were expelled from the Siedlce Boys' Gymnasium instead of 
the ninety earlier anticipated, a sizable group that quickly became a major 
disruptive force in the provincial capital.44 
The blanket closures of February 7 thus resulted in a radicalization of 
student demands, the growing sympathy of parents for the school strikes, 
and the increased involvement of non-Catholic and especially Jewish stu­
dents in the movement against the state system. The decision of Curator 
Schwartz to renew instruction in all secondary schools on February 20, 
regardless of the number of students in attendance, now turned many in­
stitutions into battlegrounds. Especially those Catholic students who con­
tinued to attend classes were frequently subjected to violent threats and 
outright physical assault from their coreligionists. In Warsaw these students 
eventually required police or military escorts, whose protection reduced, 
but did not end, the attacks against them.45 Unguarded facilities and the 
homes of school officials were also targeted, although the damage usually 
remained confined to broken glass, more the consequence of well-aimed 
rocks than crudely devised bombs. When police and troops began patrol­
ling the schools and surrounding areas, parents of " strike-breaking" stu­
dents became the principal targets. County officials in Warsaw Province 
and in Cz�stochowa reported receiving daily complaints from parents vic­
timized by "terrorist" acts that in essence, consisted of vandalism of their 
property.46 
In many provincial centers, striking or expelled students were considered 
by local authorities to be not only a public nuisance but a threat to the 
social order. Expelled gymnasium students played a conspicuous role in 
local public disturbances in Siedlce, compelling provincial officials to force 
their removal from the city to their places of residence.47 In Sochaczew 
(Warsaw Province), striking students mixed with and agitated among local 
inhabitants; in Plock they appeared prominently in the town's  first May I 
demonstration. Such incidents prompted the Warsaw governor to opine that 
nowhere else in the empire was student antipathy toward the government 
as strong as in Russian Poland.48 
44. Ibid., March 6 ( 1 9) and March 8 (2 1 ) ,  1 905. 
45 . AGAD KGGW 2490, Acting Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the Chancellory of 
the WGG, May 18 (3 1 ), 1 905 . 
46. AGAD KGGW 2500, Warsaw Governor to WGG, February 1 8  (March 3), 1 905; APL 
KGP 1 5 1 9, Director of the Cz\;stochowa Boys' Gymnasium to the Piotrk6w Governor, Feb­
ruary 26 (March l l ) , 1 905 . 
47. AGAD KGGW 2525, Sied1ce Governor to WGG, March 6 ( 1 9), 1 905. 
48. AGAD KGGW 250 1 ,  Warsaw Governor to the WGG, March 22  (April 4), 1 905, and 
25 1 6, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, April 25 (May 8), 1 905 . 
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The Student Strikes: An Analytic Balance Sheet 
According to contemporary Polish press accounts, some 25 ,000 students 
participated in the school strikes of the late winter and spring of 1 905 . 
Such claims are only partially confirmed by the available statistical evi­
dence. From the Central State Historical Archive in Leningrad, the histo­
rian Edmund Staszyilski retrieved a report by Curator Schwartz drafted in 
late June which contains incomplete data on the strike in twenty-seven 
state secondary schools. According to this report, only 4,479 (37 .2 percent) 
of the 12 ,039 students enrolled in the twenty-seven schools on January I ,  
1 905, continued to attend classes at the end of the school year in June. 
The level of student attendance ranged from 4.9 percent at the Warsaw 
Third Boys' Gymnasium to 75-4 percent at the L6dZ Boys ' Gymnasium, 
the latter owing to the low percentage of Polish students enrolled in the 
schoo1.49 
The data in the curator' s  report, although valuable for the schools named 
therein, cover fewer than half of the gymnasia and pro gymnasia in the 
Kingdom and slightly more than half of the total number of students en­
rolled in these institutions. None of the girls' gymnasia outside of Warsaw 
are represented in the curator' s  report, nor are any of the Kingdom's  
twenty-four schools of commerce that came under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Finance. Yet according to reports of provincial and county 
officials, students at many of these institutions also proclaimed strikes and 
walked out of their classes. If the curator' s  sample is representative and 
the 62 .8  percent level of strike participation is applied to the 1 7,000 stu­
dents and pupils unaccounted for in his report, a total estimate of 1 8 , 1 1 6  
striking secondary school students i s  the result. T o  b e  sure, this figure does 
not include striking students from institutions of higher education, the ar­
tisanal trade schools, and the few primary schools that participated in the 
spring strike. Nevertheless, the 25,000 students cited in press accounts 
appears a somewhat exaggerated number; it is more likely that approxi­
mately 20,000 students of all ranks participated in the strike at this stage. 
In January 1905, approximately 1 7,000 Catholic students (i .e . ,  Poles and 
a sprinkling of Lithuanians from Suwalki Province) were enrolled in the 
Kingdom' s  secondary schools, and from their number came the majority 
of striking students. Yet not all Polish students participated in the strike 
action during the first half of 1 905, for which there is sufficient evidence 
in the numerous reports of violent threats and attacks against " strike-
49. StaszyiJ.ski, Polityka oswiatowa, p. 1 68 .  
R E W O L U C J A  
breakers. " The parents of many of these nonparticipating and subsequently 
ostracized students were employed at various lower levels in the state 
administration, which could and did provide the authorities significant lev­
erage in any number of instances. This, however, was not the only deter­
minant of Polish participation in the strike. In report after report, the 
initiative for strike actions in the gymnasia was assigned primarily to stu­
dents in the fifth, sixth, and seventh forms. Conspicuously absent, partic­
ularly in the boys' gymnasia, are students from the eighth, or graduating, 
form. For example, only seventeen of the 257 students expelled from the 
Piotrkow Boys ' Gymnasium came from the eighth form.50 These older 
students, near the end of their studies, obviously had a good deal to lose 
from their participation in the strike, including future matriculation at a 
university. Among their less career-minded female counterparts who, as 
mentioned, were denied access to higher education in any case, such factors 
were of considerably less concern. 
Jewish students also participated in the school strike movement, espe­
cially in the girls' gymnasia, where no ceiling existed on Jewish enrollment 
(a 10  percent maximum applied in the boys' gymnasia) . In any case, Jewish 
participation was naturally higher in those strikes where student demands 
went beyond polonization and emphasized issues of discrimination based 
on nationality and religion. Yet here, too, other considerations came into 
play. In Kielce, a group of Jewish students expelled from the boys ' gym­
nasium formed the Committee of Jewish Youth, which through acts of 
coercion and vandalism sought to enforce strike solidarity among their 
coreligionists. In a confrontation at the entrance to the gymnasium, Jewish 
students still attending the school told the committee that they were "Rus­
sian, " not "Polish" Jews, and that for them the strike was irrelevant.5 1 
Such divisions among Jewish youths, between students whose families had 
resided in Poland for generations and the children of the recent wave of 
Jewish migration from Russia (the so-called Litwaks), undoubtedly influ­
enced the nature of Jewish participation in the school strikes, especially 
outside the major urban areas. 
Nevertheless, the role of Jewish students in the school strike was of far 
greater proportional significance than that of Russian students, the sons and 
daughters of state officials and Orthodox clergy who constituted 20 percent 
of the student body in the boys ' gymnasia and 33 percent in the girls' 
gymnasia. Despite later efforts by officially approved historians in the Po-
50. APL KGP 1 5 17 ,  List of Students Expelled from the Piotrkow Boys' Gymnasium, dated 
January 2 1  (February 3), 1 905 . 
5 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2508, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, March 28 (April 10), 1 905. 
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lish People ' s  Republic to highlight the participation of Russian students in 
the school strike,52 the documentary evidence points to only individual 
cases, which can hardly be taken as representative. 
Regardless of the number, age, and nationality of the student strikers, it 
is clear that their actions resulted from their own initiative and organiza­
tion. Both interwar and postwar historiography, a good deal of which is of 
partisan political inspiration in the first place, has wrongly assigned credit 
for the initiation of the strikes and whatever success they enjoyed to 
nationalist, " progressive, " or socialist groups active among the student 
youth, depending, of course, on one ' s  political point of view. Although a 
sizable minority of the students was indeed highly politicized, such polit­
icization could and did result in the movement' s  fragmentation rather than 
in the kind of solidarity necessary to a strike ' s  success. And while indi­
vidual students connected or sympathetic to the nationalist and socialist 
movements jockeyed for positions on strike committees or were dispatched 
to agitate students at other schools, this involvement hardly translates into 
a leading role for the political organizations. Instead of initiating the strikes 
as a vanguard, the politically organized among the students reacted to a 
situation that their own carefully laid and competing plans and preparations 
had not foreseen. 
In reality, most of the participants in the school strike movement were 
not bound by rock-hard political allegiances; had they been, it is probable 
that the movement would have collapsed of innumerable factional splits. 
Student solidarity was cemented instead by ties of friendship, shared ex­
perience, and of course, peer pressure, which together transcended political 
divisions. These ties, in turn, were fostered by the long-standing traditions 
of secret instruction, especially in the self-education circles and mutual-aid 
organizations, and by the socializing effects of the schools themselves. 
Other agents of socialization, namely, parents and custodians, played a 
major-and often overlooked-role in the strikes.  Parental attitudes, 
whether in support or opposition, frequently proved crucial to the outcome 
of a given strike. 
Adult opinion, initially ill-disposed to the students' strike action, com­
pletely shifted over the course of the spring. The curator' s clumsy attempts 
to manipulate parents and custodians without giving consideration to their 
views and the subsequent heavy-handed methods of various authorities in 
dealing with the strike, especially the mass expulsions of students, turned 
adult opinion first in the direction of ambivalence and then toward support 
52 .  E.g., see Szulkin, Strajk szkolny 1905 roku, pp. 1 60-167. 
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of the student movement. To the authorities, it was the "moderate" opin­
ion of adult society rather than " radical " student demands that ultimately 
counted. Having once ignored that opinion at considerable cost, the regime 
prepared to abandon futile repressive measures for the enticement of con­
cessions. These concessions, however, proved too little and came too late 
to prevent the struggle over public education from entering a second phase, 
in which the striking students gave way to a much broader social move­
ment. 
The Failure of Concessions 
The first government concession to public opinion on educational issues, 
and the only one during the course of the spring strike, came as an after­
thought to the state ' s  religious reform, which culminated in the Edict of 
Toleration of April 30, 1 905 . Most important to this chapter is Point 14  of 
the edict, which permitted the use of Polish as the language of Catholic 
religious instruction in all state schools while entrusting that instruction 
exclusively to the Catholic clergy. 
This concession, of major significance to the Catholic episcopate, was 
expected to have an impact on Polish public opinion as well . In Prussian 
Poland, where the language of religious instruction was a major issue be­
tween state and society, such a gratuitous gesture might well have fore­
stalled a subsequent wave of school strikes in 1 906 and 1 907.53 In 
revolutionized Russian Poland, however, it only served to exacerbate pop­
ular dissatisfication with the church' s  stance in relation to the existing 
school strikes.  From the beginning, the Catholic hierarchy and a majority 
of the lower clergy in the Kingdom had greeted the student strike move­
ment with hostility. The conservative PrzeglQd Katolicki (Catholic Re­
view), expressing the views of the episcopate, condemned specific student 
demands and especially the idea of coeducation as contrary not only to 
Christian morality but, incredibly, "to Jewish morality as well . "54 Local 
clergy in Olkusz County (Kielce Province) went so far as to betray student 
plans for a walkout at the Olkusz Trade School to the authorities .55 Priests 
53 .  See John 1. Kulczycki, School Strikes in Prussian Poland, IC)OI-I90T The Struggle 
over Bilingual Education (Boulder, 1 98 1 ) . 
54. " Slowko do naszych reformator6w," przeglfJd Katolicki, no. 6 (February 9, 1 905): 
89-90. 
55 .  AGAD KGGW 2508, Kielce Governor to the WGG, January 28 (February r o), 1 905. 
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like Father Biernacki, who protested the expulsion of one hundred Catholic 
students from the Biala Boys ' Gymnasium (Siedlce Province) by refusing 
to continue in his position as a teacher of religion at the school, were few.56 
The church naturally accepted Point 14  of the edict with gratitude to the 
state and prayers for the tsar. With its own narrow interests now satisfied, 
the episcopate launched a new campaign against the student strikes. In a 
pastoral letter to Polish parents and guardians in early June, Warsaw arch­
bishop Wincenty Popiel, while admitting that " the present school system 
does not fulfill the spiritual and national needs of our children, " neverthe­
less denounced the prolonged absence from school, which in his view 
promoted only laziness, demoralization, and the lack of civic virtue. " Your 
conscience and heart will tell you," the archbishop concluded, "that a bad 
school is better than no school at all . "57 
The archbishop' S  letter was met with public outrage. Nationalists joined 
liberals and socialists in
' 
vilifYing him. 58 By this time, however, even the 
government had come to the realization that more concessions were nec­
essary. In the countryside, an increasing number of gmina assemblies had 
demanded the polonization of village schools, and some cornmunities had 
already taken action by removing their children from the schools. The 
specter of a nationwide boycott of the state primary school system coupled 
with the hostile reaction to the archbishop' s  letter forced the government 
to announce additional measures in the summer in the hope of opening the 
new academic year peacefully. 
The state ' s  concessions, however, proved too minor. On June 19 ,  the 
Committee of Ministers issued a decree, confirmed by the tsar on July 22,  
which permitted the use of Polish for the instruction of arithmetic in  pri­
mary schools and made possible the creation of a lectureship in Polish 
language and a chair in Polish literature at Warsaw University. It also 
conceded the exclusive use of Polish as the instructional language for Po­
lish grammar lessons in state primary and secondary schools and held out 
the prospect for future private schools where Polish would become the 
medium of instruction for most subjects. 59 Even so, the limitation of Polish 
language study to two hours per week in the state middle schools remained 
unchanged, as did the ban on informal conversation in Polish inside the 
56. AGAD KGGW 2527, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, February 26 (March I I ), 1 905. 
57. AGAD AB, druk 257, Pastoral letter of the Archbishop of Warsaw to Polish Parents, 
June 1 0, 1 905. 
58 .  E.g., APW WGZZ 1 7 I I , Appeal of the National Workers' Union of August 1 905. 
59. AGAD KGGW 262 1 ,  Decision of the Committee of Ministers, June 6 ( 1 9), 1 905. 
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schools. And although study of Polish grammar was now introduced into 
the uniform curriculum of the teachers seminaries for the first time, Russian 
remained the language of instruction for this new subject as well .60 
For a moment the state ' s  concessions, insignificant as they were, coupled 
with parental fears of another lost school year, stirred up considerable 
controversy over the efficacy of continuing social action against the Rus­
sian schools, especially among the Warsaw intelligentsia. Nonetheless, all 
the major political parties and organized groupings, with the exception of 
the conservative ugodowcy (conciliationists), came out in favor of contin­
uing the school strikes. The central committee of the National League, in 
an appeal of August I ,  called for an "absolute boycott" of the Russian 
school system and the simultaneous organization of " secret" Polish 
schools.6 1  For their part, the socialist parties continued to demand both the 
democratization and the polonization of public education and to sanction 
the resort to violence against " strike-breaking" students and parents. 
Influential voices, however, came out against continuation of the strike 
into the new school year, including those belonging to two leading Warsaw 
historians, Szymon Askenazy and Tadeusz Korzon. Askenazy, in particu­
lar, claimed that the school strikes were antidemocratic because only the 
wealthy had resort to private instruction. These men were joined by the 
lawyer Adolf Peplowski, who at the February 1 9  public meeting with Cu­
rator Schwartz had done much to frustrate the efforts of the authorities to 
pit adult society against the striking students. From Krakow, the novelist 
Boleslaw Prus entered the fray, deriding Askenazy, Peplowski, and other 
opponents of the strike as " legitimists. "  Meetings of lawyers, engineers, 
and railroad employees passed motions, often after heated debate, in favor 
of continuing the boycott.62 
Although the majority of adult opinion favored the boycott, ultimately, 
and for the last time, the fate of continued action against the Russian 
schools rested with the students. Members of the Warsaw Circle of Dele­
gates and the countrywide Central Organization of Middle School Youth 
met during the summer and reaffirmed their decision to continue the strike. 
With the onset of the new school year, these organizations then ceased to 
exist, as many of their members left the Kingdom to pursue their educa­
tions, and others threw themselves into the whirlwind of party politics .63 
60. Staszytlski, Polityka oSwiatowa, pp. 75-83, 1 70. 
6 1 .  AGAD AB, druki ulotne 148 .  
62. See Halina Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 974), pp.  1 28-
1 33,  as well as her Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, pp. 1 66-1 7 1 .  
63. Nowroczynski, Nasza walka 0 szkol� pols� I :  282-283.  
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Similarly, the nationalist and socialist mutual-aid organizations at Warsaw 
University reacted to the administration's  attempts to reopen the university 
by resolving at a joint meeting on October 7 to boycott the institution until 
its polonization. They then voted to dissolve themselves.64 Shortly there­
after, students at the Polytechnical Institute, where it all began, passed the 
briefly worded resolution: " The strike continues . '  '65 
The continuation of the student strike or (to put it more accurately at 
this phase) school boycott into the new academic year and its rapid spread 
to both urban and rural elementary schools forced the government to make 
its most significant concession on educational issues. An imperial rescript 
of October 14, as foreseen in the Ministry of Education's  administrative 
decree of June 19 ,  agreed to the use of Polish as the medium of instruction 
in private schools for all subjects with the exception of compulsory courses 
in Russian language, history, and geography. At the same time, Aleksandr 
Schwartz was relieved of his duties as curator of the Warsaw educational 
district and transferred to Moscow. His departure was followed by that of 
many teachers, mainly Russians, whose positions were taken up by Poles. 
For an increasingly radicalized society, the tsar' s rescript represented, at 
best, a partial victory, one that was acceptable to conservatives and some 
moderates but fell far short of the more commonly shared goal of a Polish 
public school system. Many striking students and their parents did not 
possess the means to afford a private education. Students at the secondary 
level often came from privileged backgrounds, but the elementary schools, 
most of which existed in the vast Polish countryside, were populated 
mainly by pupils from the lower classes. Hence, despite the concessions 
of October 1 4, the boycott of the elementary schools intensified, especially 
in rural Poland. 
The peak of the movement against the state educational system coin­
cided with the events of late October and early November and the accom­
panying chaos and anarchy that threatened to overwhelm the government. 
As the October general strike moved into high gear, the authorities moved 
quickly to close the three institutions of higher education in Warsaw-the 
Polytechnical Institute on October 27, the Veterinary Institute on October 
28 ,  and Warsaw University on November 2 .66 The Pulawy Institute of 
Agriculture and Forestry remained open until November I I  and the proc-
64. Ibid., p .  249. 
65. Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewoiucji, p. 1 33 .  
66 .  AGAD KGGW 258 1 ,  WGG to the Minister of Finance, October 14  (27), 1 905, WGG 
to the Minister of Education, October 1 5  (28), 1 905, and Curator of the Warsaw Educational 
District to the WGG, October 2 1  (November 3), 1 905 . 
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larnation of martial law. In the meantime, students from the institute led 
crowds that attempted to agitate troops from the nearby garrison and or­
ganized mass meetings attended by several thousand local residents. Once 
the authorities got around to ordering an indefinite suspension of instruction 
at the Pulawy Institute, the order was accompanied by the immediate arrest 
of four students and two professors.67 
The period was also marked by increasingly violent attacks on those 
public primary and middle schools that had con.inued instruction. Club­
wielding crowds sacked the Lipno Teachers Seminary as well as secondary 
schools in Kielce and Kalisz.68 Similar "disorders" also interrupted in­
struction in the L6dZ primary schools and in several towns of Plock Prov­
ince. In LOrnZa the homes of parents who continued to send their children 
to the "Muscovite" schools now becarne constant targets for petards, pro­
jectiles, and other small explosives.69 
Throughout the country, individuals and groups, taking advantage of the 
temporary paralysis of the state administration, began to take matters into 
their own hands. On November 6, a meeting of Polish teachers, many of 
them members of the Endecja' s Union for the Nationalization of the 
Schools, resolved to conduct lessons exclusively in Polish in all Warsaw 
city schools. This prompted the closing of all Warsaw schools for a week. 
Upon renewal of instruction, gangs of armed students visited several 
schools, threatening Russian teachers with death if they failed to leave the 
city. Pupils were then escorted to schools where both the teachers and the 
language of instruction were Polish.7° In L6dZ, citizens elected their own 
" school council," which, in turn, passed resolutions making Polish the 
language of instruction.7 ! Throughout the countryside, peasant " school so-
67 . APL KGL 1 905 :250, Chief of Nowa-Aleksandrya County to the Lublin Governor, Oc­
tober 2 1  (November 3), 1 905; AGAD KGGW 25 15 ,  Chief of Nowa-Aleksandrya County to 
the Commander of the Warsaw Military District, October 20 (November 2), 1 905, and 
Reports of SDPA to the WGG, October 1 3  (26), October 28 (November I I ),  and November 
1 I (24), 1 905 . 
68. AGAD KGGW 2507, Curator of the Warsaw Educational District to the WGG, October 
26 (November 8), 1 905, 2509, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 25 (November 
7), 1 905, and 25 1 7, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 3 1  (November 1 3), 1 905. 
69. AGAD KGGW 25 12 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, September 30 (October 1 3), 
1 905, and LornZa Governor to the WGG, October 14 (27), 1 905; and 2517 ,  Plock Governor 
to the WGG, October 3 1  (November 1 3), 1 905; APL KGP 1 5 19 ,  Piotrk6w Governor to the 
L6dZ Chief of Police, January 8 (2 1) ,  1 906. 
70. AGAD KGGW 2493, Report of the Warsaw Superintendent ,of Police, October 25 (No­
vember 7), 1 905, Curator of the Warsaw Educational District to the WGG, October 24 
(November 6), 1 905, and Report of the Inspector of Warsaw City Schools, November 8 
(2 1 ), 1 905 ; see also Kiepurska, lnteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, pp. 242-243. 
7 1 .  Eugenia Podg6rska, Szkolnictwo elementarne w LOdzi w latach 1808-1914 (L6dZ, 1 966), 
pp. 1 32-1 33 .  
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cieties " arbitrarily dismissed teachers who refused to cooperate in replac­
ing Russian with Polish as the instructional language. 
None of this, however, moved the government to further concessions 
beyond the provisions of the imperial rescript of October 14 .  Meanwhile, 
the emergency powers of martial law helped arrest and then bring an end 
to attempts to polonize the public school system. The crackdown fell on 
all those who had actively participated in the polonization movement. One 
hundred forty-two teachers who had arbitrarily replaced Russian with Po­
lish as the medium of instruction were dismissed from their positions.72 
Expelled students were forbidden from wearing their school uniforms; 
those who remained enrolled were prohibited from frequenting restaurants, 
cafes, dairy bars, and confectionaries, and they were subjected to strict 
curfews. Violations of these martial law decrees carried stiff fines and 
prison terms (three thousand rubles and/or three months), and liability ex­
tended to parents and guardians of the offenders .73 Instruction at Warsaw 
University, the Polytechnical and Veterinary institutes, the Institute of Ag­
riculture and Forestry in Pulawy, and the D�browa School of Mines re­
mained suspended indefinitely as higher education in the Kingdom ceased 
to function for the next several years. 
The struggle to po Ionize the system of public education thus came to an 
end in early 1906, despite lingering protests. Yet even martial law could 
not force society to send its youth to the state-run schools, partially bilin­
gualized by the reforms of June and October. As the boycott continued, it 
became clear that as far as educational issues were concerned, martial law 
had brought about a stalemate. To avoid the loss of an entire generation 
of students and pupils, society now turned to legally permitted activity, the 
creation of private schools and other educational institutions, as foreseen 
in the October imperial rescript, where Polish could function as the prin­
cipal language of instruction. The initial success of the private Polish 
schools and the perceived necessity to compete with them in turn com­
pelled the state first to make its last concessions to bilingualism, then to 
move against the private schools. Unfortunately, this important achieve­
ment of the revolution could not be sustained in subsequent years, as in­
ternal divisions over the purpose and curriculum of the private Polish 
72. Zenon Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi: Kr61estwo Polskie, 1905-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 963), p. 2 1 .  
73 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 2, Proclamation o f  the Provisional Governor-General of Lomi:a 
Province, November 8 (2 I) ,  1 905, and 2520, Binding Decree of Provisional Governor­
General of Radom Province, November 1 3  (26), 1 905 ; APL KGP 1 549, Binding Decree of 
the Provisional Governor-General of Piotrkow Province, December 1 9, 1 905 (January I ,  
1 906). 
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schools abetted the plans of key government officials to suppress them 
entirely. 
The Polska Macierz Szkolna and Other Educational Initiatives 
During the school strikes and boycott of 1 905, underground institutions 
of secret instruction, a long-established weapon of popular resistance to 
russification, provided an alternative educational experience for many stu­
dents and pupils engaged in the movement against the state schools. At 
the end of April 1 905, the "progressive" Circle of Educators collaborated 
with its nationalist counterpart, the Union for the Nationalization of the 
Schools, in the organization of the Polska Macierz Szkolna (Polish Moth­
erland Schools) to institutionalize and coordinate the activities of the secret 
study circles. A majority of these circles, particularly in the provinces, 
quickly Came under the influence of proponents of the Endecja, a natural 
development given the long experience in secret instruction of the pro­
nationalist TON organization. By early 1 906 the Polska Macierz Szkolna 
had organized a network of seventy-seven circles (twenty in Warsaw), a 
sufficient base for the subsequent development of a legally recognized 
private Polish school system.74 
Legalization, however, proved a slow process.  Although the October 
rescript permitted the creation of private Polish schools, educational or­
ganizations had to await the March 1 906 law on unions and associations 
before they could apply for registration with the authorities. Although the 
Polska Macierz Szkolna circles immediately submitted their organizational 
statutes to the provincial governors for approval, months followed before 
actual confirmation. The Warsaw governor, for example, withheld his 
agreement to the registration of eighteen of the circles in Warsaw until the 
end of AugusC5 Further, the private schools sponsored by the organization 
were required to submit for official approval their curricula and the number 
of hours of instruction planned for each subject before the beginning of 
the school year, as the state sought to ensure provisions for the teaching 
of Russian language, history, and geography. The authorities also reserved 
for themselves the right to confirm teachers appointed by the Polska Ma­
cierz Szkolna. 
74. Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi, pp. 29-30. 
75. APW ZOW 625, Warsaw Governor to the Warsaw Superintendent of Police, August 1 2  
(25), 1 906. In L6dZ, the first Polska Macierz Szkolna school was already operational in April 
1 906; see Podg6rska, Szkolnictwo elementame, pp. 1 40-14 1 .  
T H E  S T R U G G L E  O V E R  E D U C A T I O N  1 7 9  
Emblem of the Polska Macierz Szkolna, 1 907 . (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 24850) 
Meanwhile, the character and goals of the private Polish schools had 
become a matter of considerable public controversy. The circles, though 
treated individually by the state, were not in fact autonomous units; they 
were subordinated to a main directorate that in tum was dominated by 
proponents of the Endecja. Gazeta Polska (The Polish Gazette), the main 
organ of the National Democratic Party in the Kingdom, considered the 
propagation of " Christian culture and love of country" to be the main task 
of the Polska Macierz Szkolna.76 The rigorous but conservative program 
of instruction worked out by the organization ' s  Department of Popular 
Education for the private elementary schools quickly drew fire from " pro­
gressive" educational activists associated with the liberal and socialist 
movements who had long called for an end to compulsory religious in­
struction. "Progressives" also protested enrollment practices that discrim­
inated on the basis of sex, religion, and nationality. 
Nevertheless, because the Polska Macierz Szkolna had much broader 
curricula and therefore represented an improvement over the Russian state 
76. Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi, p. 38.  
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schools, most "progressives" continued to support the Polish organization 
simultaneously directing their energies to other educational enterprises, es­
pecially the Association of Courses for Adult Illiterates established by Ste­
fania Sempolowska and the University for All created by the eminent 
sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki. At the same time, the socialist parties and 
associated trade unions sponsored lectures, readings, libraries, and other 
cultural-educational activities for their members .?? While these programs 
focused on the urban working class, a group of Lublin intellectuals led by 
the writer Stefan Zeromski formed the Society for the Spread of Education, 
better known as Swiatlo (The Light), to reduce illiteracy among the peas­
antry. These left-wing initiatives, however, were not connected to each 
other and could only offer a limited alternative to the Polska Macierz 
Szkolna, which eventually engaged in similar activities. For example, the 
evening and weekend courses of its Uniwersytet Ludowy (People' s  Uni­
versity) were designed to rival those of Krzywicki ' s  University for All. 
If the Polska Macierz schools were insufficiently secular and modem for 
the "progressives,"  they proved far too secular and "modernist" for the 
Kingdom' s  Roman Catholic episcopate. Shortly after the October imperial 
rescript, the conservative Catholic press began its campaign for a Polish 
school system based on "Christian principles ," claiming that the not-yet­
legalized Polska Macierz schools had already become "a seedbed of moral 
anarchy. "?8 The following February, a pastoral letter of the Polish bishops 
reiterated the church' s  demand for a private school system "not positivist 
and materialist, but true and Catholic . '  '?9 Throughout the summer the epis­
copate maintained its pressure on the Polska Macierz Szkolna to adopt a 
clear " Catholic" direction while blaming the organization's  failings in this 
regard on the Endecja. Yet despite its considerable misgivings, as a new 
school year rapidly approached, the episcopate not only decided to tolerate 
the new schools but encouraged the participation of parish clergy in their 
local administrative circles.80 
Having surmounted these many obstacles, the Polska Macierz Szkolna 
77. See Jadwiga Krajewska, "Z dziejow oswiaty robotniczej : BibJioteki robotnicze w Kro­
lestwie Polskim w latach I 870--I9 I4," Polslm Klasa Robotnicza: Studia Historyczne 5 
( I 973): I 9 I ,  207; and Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, Zwif,Jzki zawodowe i stowarszyszenia 
pracodawcow w Lodzi (LodZ, I 972), pp. 286--3 I I .  
78. "Co warta jest szkola obecnie niby juz 'polska,' " PrzegiQd Katolicki, no. 47 (Novem­
ber 23,  I 905): 729-732. 
79. Przeglf,Jd Katolicki no. I I  (March IS ,  I 906) : I 46--1 48, and no. 12 (March 22, I 906) : 
1 66-170. See also Roman Dzwonkowski, Listy spoleczne biskup6w polskich, 1891-1918 
(Paris, I 974), pp. 106-107·  
80.  ADK AK OA-21 r 3 ,  Stefan Zwierowicz, Bishop of Sandomierz, to the Diocesan Clergy, 
October I ,  1 906. 
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An adult literacy course at the Rudzki Factory in Warsaw. (Muzeum Niepod­
leglosci 358 I I )  
opened the new school year with 680 registered schools enrolling approx­
imately seventy thousand students. By any measure, this was a considerable 
achievement, although serious problems and gaps remained. The main em­
phasis had been the organization of elementary schools; consequently only 
six middle schools were registered with the authorities in 1 906. The net­
work was particularly strong in Warsaw and Lublin provinces, weakest in 
Suwalki Province, with its large Lithuanian population, and nonexistent in 
the Chelm region of Siedlce and Lublin provinces, an area of mixed pop­
ulation where the establishment of private Polish schools was prohibited.8 '  
The organizational success of the Polska Macierz Szkolna nevertheless 
compelled the state to undertake one last reform of the Kingdom' s  public 
schools. In an attempt to head off popular support for the organization, the 
Ministry of Education in early March 1 906 informed Vladimir Belaev, the 
new curator of the Warsaw educational district, that all subjects in the one­
class elementary schools could be taught in Polish (or Lithuanian in the 
northern counties of Suwalki Province), with the exception of Russian, 
8 1 .  Staszynski, Polityka oswiatowa, p. 202 ; Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi, pp. 3 1-33 .  
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which remained an obligatory subject.82 By this not-inconsiderable con­
cession, the state elementary school ceased to be a tool of russification. 
The government obviously felt less pressed in the area of secondary edu­
cation, where the Polska Macierz Szkolna had yet to create a viable alter­
native. Nevertheless, the state began to permit the employment of Polish 
faculty in mathematics and the classical languages, and it lifted the long­
standing ban on informal conversation in Polish on school grounds.83 
Despite these concessions, the popular boycott of the state schools held 
firm, and support for the' Polska Macierz Szkolna continued to grow. By 
1 907, there were some 78 1  circles grouping 1 16,341 members. Before the 
opening of the 1 907-1 908 academic year, these circles presented to the 
authorities requests to approve 1 ,247 schools, which included many new 
middle schools .  This was a significant expansion over the previous year. 
The government, however, approved only 68 1 schools, one more than the 
year before, an ominous sign for the nascent private Polish school system.84 
Moreover, state educational authorities, beginning in September 1 907, re­
quired all one-class elementary schools, including those operated by the 
Polska Macierz Szkolna, to offer Russian language instruction a minimum 
of fourteen hours per week. This unwelcome interference in the curricula 
of the private schools invited evasion and circumvention by the instructors 
and inevitable conflict with the state. 
Meanwhile, the Catholic Church renewed its attacks on the new school 
organization. In the autumn of 1 906, many lower clergy had responded 
enthusiastically to the opportunity to participate in the work of the Polska 
Macierz Szkolna. In half of their circles in the countryside, priests held 
key administrative positions . Even if religion were not an obligatory sub­
ject in these schools, such a level of clerical participation assured an im­
portant place for religious studies in the curriculum. To say the least, the 
new school system' s  authorities gave the clergy much freedom of action, 
and many priests became ardent supporters of these private Polish schools. 
Yet the conservative Catholic press reminded its readers that " the church 
is not represented by priests, even in the thousands, but only by the bishops, 
the successors of the apostles. "85 
Before the 1906-1 907 academic year was over, it became clear that the 
Polish bishops would be satisfied with nothing less than complete episcopal 
supervision of the Polska Macierz Szkolna, including its teachers, text-
82.  Podg6rska, Szkolnictwo elementame, p. 1 34. 
83 .  Staszyfiski, Polityka oswiatowa, pp. 75, 237-238.  
84.  Kmiecik, Ruch oSwiatowy na wsi, p .  37 .  
85 .  "Spraw Koscielnych," przeglqd Katolicki, no.  46 (November 15 ,  1 906) : 705-708. 
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books, and methods of instruction. In the first months of 1 907, PrzeglQd 
Katolicki renewed its campaign against the "pantheistic" Endecja as a 
prelude to attacks on the organization as a "non-Catholic" institution, 
attributing what it called its "areligious, pagan, and liberal" character to 
nationalist tutelage. If the private schools system were truly " Catholic, "  
it intimated, the bishops would be  represented on  its main directorate.86 By 
June the episcopate presented three nonnegotiable demands to the Polska 
Macierz Szkolna. In addition to representation of the episcopate on the 
main directorate, the bishops demanded that all its institutions be guided 
in a "Catholic spirit" (as opposed to a nondenominational "Christian 
spirit' ') and that clerical teachers of religion occupy a preeminent position 
among the faculty, which would enable them to guarantee the "Catholic 
direction" of the schools. If its demands were not met, the episcopate 
threatened, it would " forbid the clergy and the faithful any involvement 
in the Polska Macierz Szkolna as a faithless and, therefore, dangerous 
institution. ' '87 
The main directorate, although it continued its efforts to convince the 
episcopate that it was not "anticlerical," rejected the bishops' attempt to 
confer upon its schools an exclusively Catholic religious character. Claim­
ing that "the most fundamental issues of the church were at stake" in the 
matter of the national, albeit private, school system, the episcopate effec­
tively declared war, triggering a conflict for which it held the " narrow 
nationalism" of the Endecja directly responsible.88 Those clergy and prom­
inent lay Catholics who defended Polska Macierz Szkolna, or tried to 
soften the attacks against it, were themselves subjected to strident polem­
ical abuse. For example, Cecylia Plater-Zyberk6wna, founder of both the 
Catholic Society of Friends of Youth and the Catholic Women's  Union, 
was branded "a nymph of the modernists" by Catholic conservatives for 
her support of the private school system.89 Meanwhile, clerical supporters 
of the motherland schools were accused of religious indifference and false 
patriotism. In any event, moderate Catholics and reformist clergy were 
unable to prevent the church boycott of the Polska Macierz Szkolna that 
marked the opening of the 1 907-1908 academic year. 
86. Ks. dr. Wi. Namiotko, "Polska Macierz Szkolna," przegl(!d Katolicki, no. IO (March 
7, 1 907): 149-153 .  
87 .  ADK AK OA-2/1 3 ,  Administrator of  Kielce Diocese, Ks .  Franciszek BrudzyTIski, to  the 
Diocesan Clergy, June IS, 1 907. 
88 .  Ks. Charszewski, " Kosci61 a Polska Macierz Szkolna," przegl(!d Katolicki, no. 20 (May 
16, 1 907) : 3 1 7-3 1 8, and no. 2 1  (May 23, 1 907) : 328-330. 
89. Ryszard Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy chrZeScijariskie w Kr6lestwie Polskim, J()05-I9I8 
(Lublin, 1 978), pp. 1 1 9-120. 
R E W O L U C J A  
The organization might have survived the boycott of the Catholic Church 
had it not been for state action against it. In the middle of June 1 907, 
Warsaw governor-general George Skalon ordered the closing of all Polska 
Macierz schools in Ostrow County (LornZa Province) and the dissolution 
of the county circle because of its " antigovernment tendencies and activ­
ity. " At issue was the circle' s  projected use of Polish patriotic illustrations 
in geography and history textbooks.90 The main directorate protested Ska­
lon' s decision, which, it argued, would deny hundreds of children all pos­
sible educational opportunity.9 1 By mid-November the Polska Macierz 
Szkolna had successfully petitioned the LOrnZa governor, whose recom­
mendation to reopen the Ostrow County private schools was accepted by 
the Warsaw governor-general.92 
Despite the successful resolution of its conflict with the state in Ostrow 
County, Polska Macierz Szkolna was obviously anticipating a more general 
crackdown. Already in April 1 907, the main directorate had called upon 
its circles in the countryside to organize a parallel network of underground 
schools and to train teachers specifically for the tasks of secret instruction. 
The authorities, too, prepared for such a contingency, compiling precise 
information on both the registered and the secret motherland schools, in­
cluding the courses, lecturers, and thirteen locations of the Uniwersytet 
Ludowy. Between August and December, the authorities were thus able to 
uncover and dissolve hundreds of secret schools in LOrnZa, Siedlce, War­
saw, and Lublin provinces.93 
It was therefore not surprising that within less than a month after the 
reopening of Polska Macierz schools in Ostrow County, the Warsaw gov­
ernor-general issued a directive closing all these schools in the Kingdom 
of Poland. Skalon cited three reasons for his decision: Polska Macierz 
Szkolna had encouraged "narrow-nationalistic particularism" in its edu­
cational activities among the masses; it had violated legal provisions re­
garding Russian language instruction; and its leadership had fallen into the 
hands of "Polish separatists. "94 In this single stroke, the most significant 
educational achievement of the revolution came to an ignominious end. 
90. AGAD KGGW 7 1 9, WGG to the Acting Governor of Lomia Province, JlIIle 3 ( 1 6), 
1 907· 
9 1 .  AGAD KGGW 7 1 9  Petition of the Main Directorate of the Polska Macierz Szkolna to 
the WGG, September IO (23), 1 907 . 
92 .  AGAD KGGW 7 19, Lomia Governor to the WGG, November 1 ( 14),  1 907 . 
93.  Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi, p. 43; APW ZOW 625, Lists compiled by the Office 
of the Warsaw Superintendent of Police, September 27 (October 3), 1 907, and October 27 
(November 9), 1 907. 
94. APW ZOW 625, Directive of the WGG, December 1 ( 14),  1 907. 
T H E  S T R U G G L E  O V E R  E D U C A T I O N  
The Polska Macierz Szkolna went down with a whimper, not a bang. 
The socialist press protested the closing, but not too loudly. With the sub­
sequent suppression in mid- I 908 of the Association of Courses for Adult 
Illiterates and the University for All, accompanied by the arrests of Stefania 
Sempo}owska, Stefan Zeromski, and other "progressive" educational and 
cultural activists, the SDKPiL even withdrew its support for a continuation 
of the boycott of the state schools, referring to such action as a "demon­
stration of impotence. " 95 Within three years, the Union of Socialist Youth 
followed suit. At the other end of the political spectrum, the episcopate 
blamed the closing of the Polska Macierz Szkolna on the Endecja and on 
its "monopolistic" attitudes, which had "enslaved" the private Polish 
schools.96 Meanwhile, parish circles of the newly formed conservative 
Catholic Union energetically entered the field of educational activity while 
seeking ways to transfer the defunct organization' s  funds to schools ded­
icated to "spreading education in the Catholic spirit. "97 The authorities, 
however, were to apply strict limits to even this activity in subsequent 
years . 
Yet even the nationalist movement failed to mount any kind of signifi­
cant protest against the delegalization of the private school system. The 
Polish Circle in the Third State Duma, although dominated by the Endecja, 
had been reduced substantially in size by Prime Minister Stolypin' s  arbi­
trary revisions of the electoral law. Thus weakened and disoriented, the 
Polish Circle did not even attempt an interpellation of the government over 
the suppression of the Polska Macierz Szkolna.98 The Endecja 's  subsequent 
turn toward conciliation of the government, punctuated only by occasional 
criticism of Russian policies in the Kingdom, would lead to its own aban­
donment of the boycott of the state schools in 1 9 1  I .  
Such apparent public apathy toward the fate of the motherland schools 
further encouraged the government to retreat from other concessions made 
in 1 905 and 1906. Beginning in 1 908, state educational authorities required 
that teachers of Russian language, history, and geography be of Russian 
nationality in those private Polish schools that survived the dissolution of 
the Polska Macierz Szkolna. A year later, the state required that diplomas 
95 . Janusz Zarnowski, "Z dziejow strajku szkoJnego 1 905 r. ,"  przegl{!d Historyczny 46, 
1-2 ( 1 955): 2 1 1-2 1 2 . 
96. "Zamkni�cie Poiskiej Macierzy Szkoinej ,"  Przegl{!d Katolicki. no. 5 1  (December 19 ,  
1 907): 8 1 2-8 13 .  
97. Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy. p. 102 ;  Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na  wsi. pp. 53-54. 
98. Zygmunt Lukawski, Kolo Polskie w rosyjskiej dumie panstwowej w latach 1906-1909 
(Wroclaw, 1 967), pp. 1 23-139. 
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for students completing studies in the private elementary schools be written 
in Russian. In the public elementary schools, starting with the 1908-1909 
academic year, the state required the teaching of arithmetic in both Polish 
and Russian, which in turn ended the employment prospects of teachers 
not fluent in the state language. In addition, Russian primers were re­
introduced in public elementary schools after November 1908 .99 
The state continued to underfund public education in the Kingdom in 
the meantime. The increase in the number of village schools from 2,977 
in 1904 to 3 ,662 in 1 9 1 2  was far more the result of gmina initiatives than 
of the insignificant increase in state outlays for elementary education. That 
increase, moreover, failed miserably to satisfy existing needs. In Radom 
Province, the public schools could accommodate only 20 percent of 
estimated demand for elementary education. Consequently, in 1 9 1 1 ,  only 
twenty-five children per thousand inhabitants attended state primary 
schools in the Kingdom, compared with 1 29.7 per thousand in " impov­
erished" and "backward" Austrian Galicja. lOo 
The private Polish schools could pick up only some of the slack. On the 
eve of the Great War, eight hundred private elementary schools enrolling 
seventy thousand pupils had survived the state ' s  repressive policies, but 
they accommodated only 1 8  percent of all elementary school pupils. The 
situation was drastically different in the middle schools. Public secondary 
education still served as a tool of russification and continued to receive far 
more generous levels of state funding. Popular opinion, however, remained 
hostile toward the state middle schools, and the people effectively contin­
ued to boycott them despite the abandonment of such action by key polit­
ical parties and organizations. Consequently, by 1 9 1 4, the 1 9 1  private 
middle schools and schools of commerce had come to play a dominant 
role in secondary education in the Kingdom, enrolling 38,000 pupils, com­
pared with the 23 ,500 enrolled in state institutions. lO l  
In effect, the crisis of education in Russian Poland continued after the 
revolution, but this does not mean that positive change had not resulted 
from the events of 1 905 and 1 906. The state elementary schools in the 
Kingdom, though not significantly expanded, had nevertheless been trans­
formed into partially polonized institutions that differed little from their 
99. Podgorska, Sz/wlnictwo elementarne, pp. 1 4 1 ,  1 5 1-152 ;  Staszyllski, Polityka oswiatowa, 
p. 229· 
100. Staszyllski, Polityka oswiatowa, pp. 239-240; Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi, pp. 
80--82 .  
IO! .  Staszynski, Polityka oswiatowa, pp.  207-209. For an excellent study of Warsaw's  
private secondary schools, see Jolanta Niklewska, Prywatne szkoly srednie w Warszawie, 
1905-1915 (Warsaw, 1987). 
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private Polish counterparts. Also as a consequence of the revolution, the 
Polish language made its way into the state secondary schools, schools of 
commerce, and teachers seminaries, although not to the extent that they 
could effectively compete with the legally permitted private schools. Al­
though a Polish school system, represented by the aborted Polska Macierz 
Szkolna, withered on the vine, the blows struck against russification as 
state educational policy were substantial indeed. 
Most significant, the revolution sparked an unprecedented popular 
awareness of and interest in education, a consciousness made manifest by 
workers living in the slum district of Baluty in L6<lZ, when in mid- 1 906 
they decided to tax themselves in order to create five new elementary 
schools so long as Polish served as the language of instruction. 102 So long 
as the University for All and the Uniwersytet Ludowy remained legally 
registered institutions, tens of thousands who otherwise would have had 
no opportunity to continue their education enrolled in evening and weekend 
courses in both town and countryside. Before it was suspended, the As­
sociation of Courses for Adult Illiterates provided remedial learning to 
thousands of industrial workers. Such popular enthusiasm survived the 
above-mentioned institutions, all of them suppressed by 1 908. Between 
1 9 1 2  and 1 9 14,  more than a thousand new village schools were created by 
local, communal initiative with no effective help from the state. On the 
eve of the World War I, twenty gminy in Kielce Province alone passed 
resolutions calling for a system of universal primary education. 103 These 
and many other examples of a new cultural consciousness support the 
conclusion that the revolution had not only stirred broad social passions 
and emotions but also encouraged the popular mind to strive for satisfac­
tion of that most basic of human intellectual needs-the need to learn. 
102.  Podg6rska, Szkolnictwo elementame, p. 1 35 .  
103 .  Kmiecik, Ruch oiwiatowy na  wsi. p. 95. 
C H A P  T E R s x 
T H E T R A N S F O R M A T IO N  O F  
PO LIT IC A L  C U LT U R E  
Polish politics during the Revolution of 1 905 has traditionally been pre­
sented as a conflict of competing ideologies, parties, and personalities­
that is, as political history. The struggle between nationalism and socialism 
(between realism and idealism, for a more contemporary cast of mind) , 1 
between the National Democratic Party and the Polish Socialist Party, be­
tween Roman Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski-such is the material for the 
conventional "textbook" rendition of Polish politics during the revolution. 
A slightly more sophisticated political history would mention loyalism, 
populism, and " international socialism" as other competing though less 
attractive ideologies; the Party of Polish Realists, the Polish People ' s  Un­
ion, and the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania 
as parties of at least temporary significance; and perhaps Erazm Piltz, Ste­
fan Brzezinski, and Rosa Luxemburg as political personalities worthy of 
more than just passing attention. Yet regardless of the number of ideolo­
gies, parties, and actors historians have placed on this stage, the historio­
graphic backdrop of politics interpreted politically has overwhelmed the 
literature.2 Unfortunately, far too many historians have also succumbed to 
I .  See Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism versus Realism (Cambridge, Mass. ,  1 967), 
and The Meaning and Uses of Polish History (Boulder, 1 987). 
2 .  The most eloquent rejection of the traditional historiographic emphasis on the role of 
political parties during the revolution is Elzbieta Kaczyrlska, "Tlwn i margines spoleczny 
w wydarzeniach rewolucyjnych: Krolestwo Polskie, 1 904-1907,"  Dzieje Najnowsze 1 5 ,  1-
2 ( 1983): 22 1-230. Similarly, Pawel Samus, Dzieje SDKPiL w Lodzi, 1893-1918 (LodZ, 
1 984), consciously de-emphasizes political personalities, tactics, and ideology to provide a 
brilliantly researched sociologic dissection of a single local political organization. 
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the temptation or, what is worse, have been pressured to take sides and 
pronounce judgments on the basis of partisan political considerations .3 
This chapter concerns the politics of the revolutionary era not as political 
history, but as integrative social history. A conscious de-emphasis on the 
role of political parties, ideologies, and personalities puts them in a more 
balanced historical perspective without denying the political significance 
of the revolution; for that significance can be properly appreciated only in 
its social context, in the totality of social experiences of the revolutionary 
years. From this larger perspective, the most striking political development 
of the revolution was that of popular political participation, reflected in the 
emergence and rapid growth of organizations claiming to represent the 
interests of mass constituencies. The resulting democratization of Polish 
political culture is indeed a development so profound that one may dare 
label it revolutionary. It is this genuinely popular aspect of the Revolution 
of 1 905 that most clearly distinguishes it from the previous gentry-led 
movements and insurrections. Though the seeds of this transformation may 
have been sown decades earlier, it was the Revolution of 1 905 that brought 
forth the harvest of change. As a consequence, the largest and most im­
portant territory of partitioned Poland entered the modem political era, the 
era of mass politics. 
An emphasis on the political debut of the "mass" nation rather than on 
the political parties whose growth embodied that process is thereby justi­
fied. The principal significance of the political parties is that they served 
as conduits for popular participation and, in the process, were themselves 
transformed as organizational structures evolved to accommodate new 
mass constituencies. The conduct of politics also changed under popular 
pressure. Politics, to the extent that the changing conditions of Russian rule 
allowed, became more open and less conspiratorial, more representative 
and less elitist-in a word, more democratic.  Democratization of political 
life, however, was also accompanied by vulgar forms of discourse and 
physical forms of action, by radicalization, polarization, fragmentation, and 
violence. Such phenomena tended to cut across party lines as politics 
ceased to be the preserve of a gentry and intelligenstia elite and began to 
serve as a tool for realizing popular aspirations. 
3 .  Stanislaw Kalabinski, Antynarodowa po/ityka endecji w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 
1 955), is a prominent example of the politically partisan historical writing of the communist 
era in Poland. Wladyslaw Pob6g-Malinowski, Narodowa Demokracja, 1887-1918: Fakty i 
dokumenty (Warsaw, 1 933), though of a different era and political perspective (i .e. ,  of the 
Pilsudski camp), is hardly less tendentious. 
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The National Democrats 
By the beginning of the revolution, the nationalist movement, or En­
decja, had already attained the status of a mass movement. That status, 
however, had been achieved not so much through the agency of the Na­
tional Democratic political party, from which the movement took its name, 
but through the existence of several agencies, including the party, all of 
which revolved in different orbits around the conspiratorial National 
League. 
Unlike its satellite organizations, the National League throughout its his­
tory was a rather narrow and elitist group; within the Kingdom of Poland 
its membership numbered only three hundred, drawn primarily from the 
propertied classes and professional intelligentsia. Within the league, effec­
tive power rested in the hands of a five-man central committee, led by 
Roman Dmowski, and in the offices of the Krakow-based Przeglqd 
Wszechpolski (All-Polish Review), edited by Dmowski and J. L. Poplawski. 
By contrast, organizations affiliated with the league, especially the Society 
for National Education (TON) with some six thousand members, opened 
their ranks to popular participation in both town and countryside. The or­
ganizational model of satellite organizations, " open" to mass participation, 
revolving around a closed conspiratorial center (the composition of the 
central committee of the league did not change between 1 896 and 1 905), 
produced an inevitable tension between the popular democratism embodied 
by the former and the paternalistic democratism pursued by the latter. Thus 
arose a paramount question that was never truly resolved: Would the Iud 
(people) be the basis of the movement' s  "national policy" or merely its 
tool? 
This fundamental contradiction of the Endecja-of a movement con­
sciously based on the participation of the Iud, on the one hand, but headed 
by an elite that distrusted popular initiative, on the other-remained sub­
merged before 1905 . The Endecja was far from being a centralized political 
machine, and the ties binding organizations like Zet or TON to the league 
were far more elastic than is usually assumed. This organizational slack­
ness, necessitated by prerevolutionary conditions of political activity and 
however distasteful to the movement' s  leadership, nevertheless served to 
maintain an impressive degree of unity within the movement as a whole . 
The revolution, by creating new and unprecedented opportunities both 
for the "national policy" of the leadership and for popular initiatives 
"from below, " presented the Endecja  with an immediate organizational 
crisis. Its first victim was TON, the most genuinely popular nationalist 
organization in the Kingdom. TON's  primary activity was in the country-
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side, where it had played a significant role in the first phase of the gmina 
action movement. But the illegal actions initiated by TON were soon sub­
sumed by the active participation and involvement of the peasants them­
selves, and their demands only partially coincided with those of " national 
policy" as conceived by Dmowski and his colleagues in the league. Many 
TON village circles became caught up in the wave of popular enthusiasm, 
and by summer, the Endecja 's  presumed leadership over the gmina action 
movement was largely fictitious. 
The nationalist leadership ' s  effort to regain influence in the Polish coun­
tryside began with an effort to assert central control over TON's  mass 
organization. This was most easily accomplished by the dissolution of 
TON, effected in June 1 905 , and the placing of its village circles under 
the direct jurisdiction of commissars appointed by the National League. 
This proved a transitional measure before the absorption of the rural TON 
circles into a new, more centralized Organizacja Narodowa (National Or­
ganization) more responsive to the directives of the Endecja  leadership.4 
Simultaneously, TON's  urban circles, then numbering as many as three 
thousand working-class members, were transformed into the Narodowy 
Zwi�ek Robotniczy (NZR-National Workers Union). Its first five-man 
main directorate included two members of the National League, Czeslaw 
Sobolewski and Gustav Simon. The other three members came from the 
Jan Kilinski Union, a vanguard of the Zet organization centered in the 
Warsaw Polytechnical Institute .s 
The dissolution of TON and its replacement by two entirely new organ­
izations had been preceded by changes within the league organization it­
self. In the pages of Przeglf,!d Wzechpolski and elsewhere, Roman 
Dmowski responded to the new situation and opportunities created by the 
revolution with arguments and justifications for a strong, efficient, cen­
tralized organization to guide a unified nation in the struggle for the real­
ization of Polish "national interests" within a weakening Russian Empire.6 
In line with such thinking, the league' s  home committee in the Kingdom 
was expanded to include new people, primarily representing propertied 
elements that far preferred the Endecja conception of controlled change 
from above to unrestrained revolution from below. In turn, the home com­
mittee created a new, smaller executive headed by Dmowski. The Kingdom 
4. Tadeusz Wolsza, "Towarzystwo Oswiaty Narodowej, 1 899-1905 ,"  Kwartalnik Histo­
ryczny 94, 2 ( 1987) : 95---96. 
5 .  Teresa Monasterska, Narodowy ZwifJzek Robotniczy, [1)05-[920 (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 
28-34· 
6. See esp. "Nasze cele i nasze drogi" and "Podstawy polityki polskiej ,"  in Roman Dmow­
ski, Wyb6r pism (Warsaw, 1 990), pp. 1 2 1-130 and 147-152 ,  respectively. 
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itself was divided into five regions, each responsible to one of the members 
on the executive committee, who appointed commissars to particular dis­
tricts.7 Finally, the prospect of future legal political activity within a semi­
constitutional structure, generated by the so-called Bulygin project within 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, led to an increased emphasis on recruit­
ment into the National Democratic Party. 
These changes, both in organization and in the social composition of the 
league' s  governing bodies, could not occur without some fallout. Stanislaw 
Kozicki, the more or less "official" historian of the early Endecja, notes 
that the influx of propertied members, especially into the National Dem­
ocratic Party, led to tensions with the old, "democratic" organizations 
active among the popular classes.8 The founding of the Polski Zwi�ek 
Ludowy (PZL-Polish People ' s  Union) at the end of 1 904 by a group of 
TON educational activists was an early expression of rank-and-file dissat­
isfaction with the Endecja leadership, its centralizing tendencies, and its 
courtship of wealthy and influential landowners. The publication of the 
program of the PZL coincided, not accidentally, with the dissolution of 
TON, to provide disenchanted members of that organization' s  village cir­
cles with a "populist" alternative to the envisioned Organizacja Naro­
dowa.9 
Despite such defections, the Endecja  considerably strengthened its mass 
base during the course of the revolution. Although its leadership distrusted 
and sought to restrain popular initiative, whether in the communal assem­
blies or in the movement against the state school system, Dmowski and 
his colleagues were careful to maintain a public posture of strong support 
for and even defense of popular causes so long as they conceivably pro­
moted "Polish national interests. "  Not all popular movements met these 
select criteria, however. Workers ' strikes, whether agrarian or industrial, 
gradually fell into the category of the politically unacceptable. 
During the January-February general strike in industrial areas and the 
spring agrarian strikes in the countryside, the Endecja leadership openly 
sympathized with the workers' efforts to improve working conditions. Iri 
a well-publicized appeal to the L6dZ textile industrialists at the end of 
January, the National Democratic Party supported workers ' demands for 
7. Andrzej Micewski, Roman Dmowski (Warsaw, 1971) ,  pp. I I 2-I I 3 .  
8 . Stanislaw Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej: Okres 1887-1907 (London, 1 964), pp. 276--
278. 
9. Bronislaw Radlak, Polski Zwi(lzek Ludowy w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 
20-22.  
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wage increases, a reduction of working hours, employer-supported retire­
ment and health insurance, and training programs for working-class 
youth. \0 In the D�browa Basin, representatives of the Endecja went further 
and joined members of the PPS and SDKPiL on the strike committee that 
drafted a list of economic demands on behalf of the region' s  mine work­
ers. 1 I  In the countryside, the Endecja attempted to adapt more of a medi­
ating role, a tactic occasioned by the need to reconcile conflicting interests, 
of peasant and landowner, within its own organization. Consequently, it 
urged employers to make concessions to the "just" demands of farm work­
ers, while calling upon the latter to present demands in the form of petitions 
rather than strikes. 12 
Within months, the sympathetic and tolerant, if not wholly supportive, 
attitude of the Endecja leadership toward the strike movement gave way 
to hostile opposition and dramatic counteraction. The rapid growth in so­
cialist party influence on the labor movement, the socialists ' "mania" for 
political strikes and demonstrations, their active encouragement of class 
conflict, and the coercive methods employed to achieve strike solidarity 
forced the Endecja  to come out increasingly often against industrial strikes. 
So, too, did the damage caused to the Kingdom's  economy by prolonged 
walkouts and factory closings. A movement that sought to galvanize the 
nation's  strengths to take advantage of the empire ' s  weakness and force 
concessions in the direction of self-rule could not long tolerate the social 
and economic disruptions caused by industrial strikes. Nor could it long 
tolerate the socialists, who in Dmowski' s  words, were "quite capable of 
inciting the crowd but incapable of controlling it. " 1 3 
The National Workers ' Union, emerging from the organizational womb 
of TON, provided the Endecja not only with an embryonic mass working­
class organization of its own but also with "our main army in the struggle 
with revolution, " said Dmowski . 14 Within a month of its creation, the NZR 
became engaged in extensive antistrike and anti socialist counteragitation, 
10. APL KGP 1 5 1 5 (cz. I) ,  Appeal of the Regional Circle of the National Democratic Party 
to LOdZ Industrialists and Factory Owners, January 1 905 . 
I I .  Adam KaluZa, "Z dziejow walk masowych proletariatu Zagll;bia D�browskiego w 1 905 
r. 0 8-godzinny dzien pracy i inne postulaty," Polska Klasa Robotnicza: Studia Historycme 
3 ( 1 972): 235-236. 
1 2 . Jan Molenda, "Carat i klasy posiadaj�ce w wa1ce z rewolucj� 1 905-1 907 r. na wsi 
polskiej ,"  Przegll;!d Historyczny 46, 1-2 ( 1 955):  146. 
1 3 .  Dmowski, Wyb6r pism, p. 1 29.  
14.  Jerzy Janusz Terej , Idee, mity, realia: Szkice do dziej6w Narodowej Demokracji (War­
saw, 197 1 ), p. 45· 
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especially in L6dZ, where during the middle of the June " uprising, " Okh­
rana agents circulated three hundred copies of an NZR proclamation. 1 5 In 
the aftermath of the violence in L6dZ, Slowo Polskie (The Polish Word), 
the nationalist organ from Lw6w, declared war against the "anarchy" 
spread by socialist "criminals" and brandished "the knife and the re­
volver" as the best arguments against socialism. 16 
Months would pass before the nationalist movement developed the ca­
pability to back up its violent rhetoric. In the meantime, the NZR slowly 
built up its mass organization. Its June program committed it not only to 
oppose class struggle but also to work for the improvement of workers ' 
conditions, the regulation of labor-management relations through collective 
bargaining, and the sponsorship of cultural and mutual-aid activities among 
its working-class membersP The NZR' s opposition to labor walkouts, es­
pecially during the heady days of the autumn of 1905 when the strike 
movement peaked, necessarily restrained expansion of its membership. For 
example, the efforts of the Narodowe Kolo Kolejarzy (NKK), the nation­
alist enclave among railworkers, to prevent the Russian rail strike from 
spreading to the Kingdom in October had little impact. Indeed, many NZR 
members broke with the organization' s  leadership and supported the Oc­
tober general political strike. 
Two months later, however, during the Moscow uprising and the proc­
lamation of martial law in the Kingdom, the NZR not only maintained 
discipline within its own organization but together with the NKK was able 
to neutralize socialist agitation for a general strike in the Kingdom in sup­
port of the Moscow insurgents. I S  In the course of 1906, the NZR capitalized 
on a perceptible shift in workers' attitudes, on the growing opposition 
among workers themselves to strikes as the means of first resort in resolv­
ing conflicts with management, and on the possibilities afforded by legal, 
trade union activity. By the time of its third congress in June 1 906, the 
NZR could count sixteen thousand members; by October that number had 
1 5 .  Stanislaw Kalabiilski, ed., Carat i klasy posiadaj(!ce w walce z rewolucj(! 1905-1907 w 
Kr6lestwie Polskim: Materiaty archiwalne (Warsaw, 1956), p. 205 . 
1 6. Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, vol. I ( 1 864-
1 9 1 4), 2d ed. (London, 1 963), p. 568. 
17. Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej, pp. 260--276; Monasterska, Narodowy Zwi(!zek Ro­
botniczy, pp. 41-62. 
18.  In the Warsaw region, for example, less than 30 percent of the industrial labor force 
participated in the December strike; see Stanislaw Kalabiilski, "Ruch strajkowy robotnikow 
przemyslowych Warszawy i gubemii warszawskiej w okresie najwyzszego jego nat�zenia: 
Proba analizy statystycznej lat 1 905-1 906 (Cz�sc I :  Rok 1 905)," Polska Klasa Robotnicza: 
Studia Historyczne 4 ( 1 973): 90. 
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risen to twenty-three thousand. 1 9  Within a year of its creation, the NZR 
had become competitive with socialist parties formed more than a decade 
earlier, and not only in the factories but also in the streets. 
Despite being a movement that consciously sought to restrain the popular 
revolutionary tide of 1 905, and in many instances swam against it, the 
Endecja nevertheless remained the strongest mass political movement at 
year's end. The centrally orchestrated organizational transformations had 
caused only slight damage, limited for the most part to defections from the 
intelligentsia, while paving the way for the creation of a genuine political 
machine. By early November that machine was capable of organizing mas­
sive, yet peaceful, demonstrations of one hundred thousand participants, 
not only in Warsaw but in every provincial center and county seatthrough­
out the Kingdom where landowners and peasants, workers and intellectuals 
stood shoulder-to-shoulder in singing the Polish patriotic hymn "Boze cos 
Polsk�" (God Preserve Poland). Within months this machine would win a 
sweeping victory in the Kingdom's  first elections to the Russian Sf;ate 
Duma. 
The SDKPiL and PPS 
The problem of adjusting to the new era of mass politics confronted not 
only the Endecja but the two principal socialist parties in the Kingdom as 
well . The difference was that the Endecja  was far more successful in the 
making that adjustment. For the PPS the organizational strains caused by 
popular participation ultimately led to a party split in November 1 906 as 
representatives of the party's  old insurrectionist tradition collided with pro­
ponents of the new politics of mass action. The SDKPiL, unable to rec­
oncile its leadership' s  addiction to conspiracy with the need for openness 
in its mass organizations, effectively sentenced itself to a postrevolutionary 
future on the political fringe. 
Several years ago I devoted the major part of a monogtaph to the po­
litical-organizational problems of the SDKPiL, all of which tended to flow 
to and from the Revolution of 1 905, the highwater mark of that party' s  
history.2o In  1 904 the SDKPiL, under the leadership of  Feliks Dzieri:yIlski, 
effectively transformed itself from a loose and highly vulnerable network 
19 .  Monasterska, Narodowy Zwi{!zek Robotniczy, pp. 34-40. 
20. Robert Blobaum, FeWes Dziertyriski and the SDKPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish 
Communism (Boulder, 1 984). 
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of circles into a tightly controlled, centrally directed, and far more disci­
plined organization that in its strict adherence to conspiratorial principles 
could withstand tsarist repressive measures. By the end of that year, the 
SDKPiL finally appeared ready to play on the same field as its more es­
tablished counterparts, the PPS and the Jewish Bund. 
Yet in the first months of 1 905, confronted by the challenges of revo­
lutionary mass politics, this lean, conspiratorial organization found itself 
in danger of " losing its head and bursting open," in the words of its 
alarmed creator.2 1  The growth in membership, modest in comparison with 
what was to come, led to increased needs for party publications, under­
ground presses, and trained agitators which simply overwhelmed party re­
sources. Unable to secure additional resources from the central party organs 
abroad, DzierZyfiski uncharacteristically argued for granting greater auton­
omy to local organizations as a temporary expedient in order to better 
respond to demands of the moment. Nevertheless, as late as July, Dzier­
Zyfiski referred to the "disparate" state of the party organization "owing 
to simple exhaustion; absolutely everyone is exhausted. ' '22 
Accommodating the requirements of a genuine mass organization was 
simply beyond the SDKPiL' s  means throughout most of 1 905, especially 
at the local level. In provincial centers like Cz�stochowa, Radom, and 
Lublin, local Social Democratic committees were forced to rely on com­
petitors, namely the PPS and the Bund, for the publication of appeals, 
smuggling operations, and other forms of "technical" assistance. In Lu­
blin, the party did not possess its own printing press until the end of the 
year; in Radom, it borrowed weapons from the PPS for its " armed 
defense" units.23 These were difficult circumstances to accept for a central 
party leadership determined to set the SDKPiL apart from its socialist ri­
vals, both ideologically and politically. Thus, while local party units en­
tered into agreements and alliances with the PPS and the Bund out of 
necessity, efforts to achieve cooperation at the national level were repeat­
edly frustrated by the Social Democratic leadership.24 
2 1 .  Feliks DzierZyilski, Pisma wybrane (Warsaw, 1 95 1) ,  pp. 1 1 3-1 15 .  
22 .  CA PZPR, AM 25/ 1 ,  Zesp61 Feliksa DzierZytlskiego, from a fragment of  a letter dated 
July 19 ,  1 905. 
23 .  Jan Boniecki, "Rewolucja 1905-1907 w Radomiu," Biuletyn Kwartalny Radomskiego 
Towarzystwa Naukowego I I , supplement ( 1974) : 35;  Alicja Wojcik, Ruch robotniczy na 
Lubelszczyinie (Lublin, 1 984), pp. 59-60. 
24. E.g., the party leadership dismissed an appeal from the PPS for cornmon action against 
the tsarist government in the aftermath of the January-February general strike with the 
justification that the SDKPiL could not cooperate with an organization for which "socialism 
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In struggling to keep pace with the mass movement, the SDKPiL at 
times appeared to engage in reckless adventurism. Its involvement in an 
ill-timed and poorly planned mutiny inside the Pulawy garrison in April 
1 905 was more the result of organizational chaos, youthful inexperience, 
and misleading information than any grand strategy of revolutionary agi­
tation among the troopS.25 Similarly, the SDKPiL' s  irresponsible behavior 
in events leading to the " massacre " in Warsaw on May 1 was mainly a 
response to pressure from below for a mass demonstration and in opposi­
tion to the more cautious tactic of general work stoppages planned by the 
PPS and the Bund. Unfortunately, in trying to score points against its rivals, 
the SDKPiL knowingly accompanied thousands of marchers into a con­
frontation with troops and police who had been issued well-publicized 
instructions to disperse May Day street demonstrations by force. Finally, 
the needs of a mass party forced the SDKPiL' s  most experienced and 
indispensable activists to "come out" into the open, out of their conspir­
atorial shells, to attend larger gatherings, to meet with various party groups, 
and to assert their authority. On one such occasion at the end of July, 
however, the authorities succeeded in rounding up the entire leadership of 
the party' s  Warsaw organization.26 
In 1 906, however, the SDKPiL developed the technical and organiza­
tional capacity of a genuine mass party, and none too soon, as membership 
swelled. By the summer of 1 906 the SDKPiL counted some twenty-six 
thousand members in fifty-six organizations, with the greatest expansion 
occurring in the first six months after the October Manifesto. A second 
growth spurt that pushed party membership to forty thousand took place 
in the last months of 1 906 as a consequence of both extensive recruitment 
efforts during the Great L6dZ Loclrout and the defections that accompanied 
the split of the PPS.  At the same time, party activity assumed less impulsive 
forms, turning away from the almost blind involvement in strikes and dem­
onstrations which had characterized most of 1 905 . In 1 906, party activity, 
is only a facade" ;  T. Daniszewski, ed., SDKPiL w rewolucji 1905 roku: ,Zbi6r publikacji 
(Warsaw, 1 955), pp. 105-1 10 ,  Later attempts to reach agreements with the PPS and the 
Bund during the summer were frustrated by the party leadership's  jealous protection of its 
" independence" ;  see Halina Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1974), 
pp. 142-143, and "Iiul' skaia ( 1905g.) konferentsiia Bunda s Pol ' skoi Sots.-dem. ,"  Prole­
tarskaia Revoliutsiia I I  ( 1922): 1 82-1 86. 
25.  Ignacy Pawlowski, Wojskowa dziatalnosc SDKPiL w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 
1956), pp. 1 33-140; Wladyslaw Kowalski, "Ze wspomnien 0 probach powstania 
pulawskiego," Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego 3 ( 1 976): 66-7 1 .  
26, Blobaum, Feliks Dzieriynski. pp. 1 37-1 38; Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji, p .  1 65 .  
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forced by the new requirements of mass politics, shifted to the organization 
of trade unions, the holding of frequent conferences of party members at 
all levels, systematic reporting from local organizations, and eventually, 
participation in elections to the Russian State DumaY 
Much of the SDKPiL' s  newfound organizational strength, however, was 
deceiving. Party membership followed the geographic faultline of the King­
dom's industrialization; 85 percent of the SDKPiL' s  members came from 
Warsaw and Piotrkow provinces, 75 percent from Warsaw and LodZ. Out­
side of a few thousand members grouped in the party' s  Lublin and Radom 
organizations, the SDKPiL remained practically nonexistent in the rest of 
the Kingdom, not to mention Lithuania, where despite its name, the party 
had failed to maintain an organizational presence. As a radical Marxist 
party that prided itself on its ideological correctness, the SDKPiL made 
almost no effort to organize in the vast Polish countryside, even among 
farm workers. Other nonproletarian elements of the population were sim­
ilarly ignored. In sharp contrast, the SDKPiL spared no effort in the LodZ 
industrial region, where it came to possess its most formidable organiza­
tion. Here, especially, the SDKPiL realized its ambition of being a multi­
national party able to unite Polish, German, and Jewish workers under one 
political-ideological roof through a variety of organizational, cultural, and 
linguistic vehicles.28 
The SDKPiL thus became a mass party whose influence was far more 
regional than national. Yet even in the country' s  industrialized areas, the 
party leadership ' s  continued insistence on conspiracy-style discipline and 
loyalty, only now from a new mass membership, served to limit its influ­
ence. Unlike the Endecja, for whom the party was considered secondary 
to the broader national "movement," the SDKPiL quite consciously ex­
tolled the primacy of the party over the broader labor movement. Perhaps 
this was mere wishful thinking, born of the party' s  experiences of 1 905 
when the masses, rather than the party, had played the leading role. In any 
case, the party principle, or partyjnosc, dominated the organizational con­
ceptions of the party leadership. The most deleterious effect of partyjnosc 
was on Social Democratic trade union activity. Rather than seize the op­
portunity created by the March 1 906 laws on unions and associations for 
participating in legal (and therefore nonparty) trade unions, the SDKPiL 
leadership insisted on maintaining its own clandestine union organization 
under strict financial and political subordination to the party. The "He who 
27. See J. Krasny, "Stan organizacji SDKPiL W 1 905-1 907 r. ," Z Pota Watki, 1 ( 1 926): 
35-64· 
28. See Samus, Dzieje SDKPiL w Lodzi, pp. 68-1 14. 
T H E  T R A N S F O R M A T I O N  O F  P O L I T I C A L  C U L T U R E  1 9 9  
is not with us, is against us" attitude thus excluded many workers for 
whom the effectiveness of a given trade union, rather than its political 
label, became the primary criterion for participation?9 
Partyjnosc, in reality, was a means of maintaining the central control of 
the party leadership, not only over the SDKPiL' s  trade unions but over the 
mass organization as a whole. The centrifugal tendencies that had threat­
ened to tear the SDKPiL apart in 1 905 had thus led to an even stronger 
centripetal organizational reaction in 1 906. Excessive centralization, es­
pecially the monopolization of power and decision making by a narrow 
elite, would in turn give rise to an opposition movement within the party; 
not surprisingly, one of its first manifestations occurred among trade union 
activists.30 Five years later, in 1 9 1 2, the rift between supporters of the 
party' s  central executive committee, the main directorate, and proponents 
of decentralization and local organizational automony would result in a 
split of the SDKPiL. But by then, the party' s  mass organization, which 
had given rise to such issues in the first place, had become a thing of the 
revolutionary past. 
The split of the PPS, in contrast, did not wait for the postrevolutionary 
era; for it occurred at the peak of that party' s  development as a mass 
organization. Indeed, conflict between the party' s  traditional elite, the 
Starzy (Old Guard), and the Mlodzi (The Young), a group that based itself 
on the vision-then the reality-of a mass organization, was perceptible 
as early as 1903 . The prerevolutionary origins of the party' s  dual person­
ality, which would split the party during the revolution, therefore require 
a brief discussion. 
Whereas the SDKPiL developed the organizational forms of a mass party 
relatively late, racing to catch up with new social and political realities, 
the PPS already possessed the organizational capacity of a mass party by 
1904. In that year, seventeen city workers ' committees labored in a terri­
torial structure divided into six regions. In L6dZ, where PPS membership 
stood at five hundred by the end of the year, the party organization was 
further subdivided into five districts.3 !  Moreover, the PPS had created party 
cells in many of the larger factories, the only socialist party to do so before 
29. Blobaum, Feliks Dziertynski, pp. 1 60-1 6 1 .  For a justification of partyjnosc as it applied 
to the trade union movement, see Rosa Luxemburg, Massenstreik, Partei, und Gewerkschaf 
ten (Hamburg, 1 906) . 
30. See Stanislaw Pestkowski, " SDKPiL i kwestja zwi�k6w zawodowych w 1 905-1907 
r. ,"  Z Pola Walki, 7-8 ( 1 929) : 96--1 20; and Waclaw Konderski, "Wspomnienia dzialacza 
zwi�6w zawodowych SDKPiL," ibid., 1 3  ( 1 96 1 ) : 7 1-80. 
3 1 .  Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, LOdzka organizacja Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej-Lewicy, 
1906-1918 (L6dZ, 1 964), p. 38 .  
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Publishing Gornik (The Miner), the PPS Newspaper in Sosnowiec . (Muzeum Nie­
podleglosci 727 1 )  
the revolution. While party members from the intelligentsia continued to 
contribute 80 percent of the membership dues, party numerical strength 
was already firmly anchored in a rank and file composed of industrial 
workers. Finally, the PPS had initiated agitation in the countryside, devel­
oping five "activity groups" that hoped to organize workers in the sugar 
beet plants, distilleries, and breweries scattered throughout rural Poland.32 
Against this background of a mass organization in the making, a process 
far more advanced than in the case of the SDKPiL, the PPS was confronted 
at an earlier stage by the same contradictions that would later plague the 
32 .  Anna Zamowska, Geneza rozlamu w Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej, 1904-1906 (War­
saw, 1965), pp. 2 1-28, 46. 
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Social Democrats. In the first years of the century, the Starzy, led by J6zef 
Pilsudski, sat at the top of the PPS hierarchy, dominating the Central Work­
ers ' Committee (CKR), especially its three-person executive commission, 
as well as the party' s  leading theoretical organ Przed§wit (Pre-Dawn) and 
the Foreign Committee of its emigre organization. Reared in the traditions 
of conspiracy and nurtured by dreams of renewing armed struggle for Pol­
ish independence, the party' s  Old Guard considered the socialist movement 
and its organizational expression through the PPS a means of recruiting a 
mass base of support, and potential fighters, for the country' s  liberation. 
Yet as the PPS developed the vehicles for recruiting a mass base, 
younger activists involved in the organizational spadework began to per­
ceive that effective recruitment of workers required something more than 
merely raising before them the lofty goal of an independent Poland. For 
example, Stanislaw J�drzejewski ' s  initial support of Pilsudski ' s  plans for 
an armed uprising turned to opposition after his experience as head of the 
party' s  L6dZ Committee.33 Organizational and political realities soon 
brought on a theoretical debate, especially within the emigre organization, 
over two fundamental and related issues: the place of the goal of a dem­
ocratic independent Polish state in the party' s  program and the party' s  
relationship to a revived Russian revolutionary movement. More immedi­
ately, a minority within the Central Workers ' Committee, composed of 
Feliks Sachs, Jan Rutkiewicz, and Adam Buyno, all with ties to the party 
organization in the Kingdom, began at the end of 1 903 to act in open 
opposition to the Starzy leadership. Charging that the CKR and especially 
its executive commission had lost contact with the organization in the 
Kingdom, the opposition called for the convocation of a new party con­
gress, which, it hoped, would sanction a general democratization of deci­
sion making in the PPS. 
The Russo-Japanese War and the issues arising from it widened the 
cleavage between the Starzy and Mlodzi during the course of 1 904. As 
mentioned earlier, the Starzy sought to take immediate advantage of the 
war in the Far East hoping it would escalate into a general European con­
flict. By supporting the Japanese side, the Starzy intended to give history 
a push while gaining an ally for its efforts to resurrect an independent 
Polish state-thus the secret discussions between representatives of the 
party leadership, including Pilsudski, and Japanese diplomatic and military 
officials in London and Tokyo, in a vain effort to win Japanese support, 
moral and material, for PPS armed activity against the Russians. Mean-
33 .  Karwacki, LOdzka organizacja Polskiej Panij Socjalistycznej, pp. 39-40. 
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while, inside the Kingdom itself, the Mlodzi discovered through practical 
experience among the would-be proletarian warriors that workers were 
more easily mobilized by agitation that focused on declining living stan­
dards brought on by the war and on the disruption to their lives caused by 
mobilization. Thus while the Starzy labored to prolong and extend the 
Russo-Japanese conflict, the Mlodzi organized dozens of successful dem­
onstrations against the war. 
These glaringly contradictory responses to the Far Eastern war eventu­
ally led in October to a conference of the CKR in Krakow, which resulted 
in a temporary and unstable compromise. The bankruptcy of its foray into 
diplomacy forced the Starzy leadership to make concessions to the oppo­
sition that had congregated mainly in the party's  Warsaw and LodZ organ­
izations. A good deal of controversy had revolved around the party' s  poorly 
trained "fighting circles of workers' self-defense," created by the Mlodzi 
to defend demonstrations organized by the PPS but intended by the Starzy 
to provide cadres for the future Polish legions that were to carry out an 
armed insurrection. At the Krakow conference the leadership was forced 
to abandon its grand projects, accept the opposition' s  emphasis on political 
agitation and organizational activity, and recognize the burgeoning Russian 
revolutionary movement as an ally against the tsarist autocracy. At the 
same time, however, the Mlodzi agreed to Pilsudski ' s  newly revised tactics 
of "armed action" and to engage the Russian government on a limited 
scale through the aegis of the fighting cirCles. Pilsudski assumed respon­
sibility for the smuggling of men, arms, and ammunition to the self-defense 
circles, which would now participate in "armed demonstrations" and in 
terrorist actions against the regime' s  most hated representatives .  The fight­
ing circles did, however, remain formally subordinate to the directives of 
the regional party committees controlled by the Mlodzi.34 
The events of 1 904, culminating in the October conference of the CKR, 
had transformed the dual personality of the PPS into a dual power rela­
tionship between the party's  Old Guard and the representatives of the 
emerging mass organization. The January-February general strike quickly 
disrupted this balance of power within the PPS and tipped the scales in 
favor of the Mlodzi. During the strike, taboos disappeared. The SDKPiL 
and the Jewish Bund, once scorned rivals, were now courted by local PPS 
organizations as partners in a common revolutionary cause. In the party' s  
34. Zarnowska, Geneza rozlamu, p .  149; Wladyslaw Pob6g-Malinowski, l6ze! Pilsudski, 
1867-1914 (London, 1 964), pp. 287-290; Jerzy Paj�, Organizacje bojowe partii polity­
cznych w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1904-1911  (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 44-49; Henryk Piasecki, 
Zydowska organizacja PPS, 1893-1907 (Wroclaw, 1 978), p. 1 06.  
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published declarations, Poland's  national liberation was linked directly to 
the outcome of the revolution in the empire rather than to the hallowed 
old conception of armed struggle with Russia.35 By March, the Mlodzi, 
convinced that the mass organization in the Kingdom stood behind them, 
decided to move for control of party executive institutions. 
To do so, the Mlodzi had first to circumvent one such institution, the 
executive commission of the CKR monopolized by the Starzy. Without the 
prior agreement of the executive · commission, a party conference trans­
formed itself into the Seventh Congress of the PPS, which, in turn, elected 
a new CKR that excluded the Old Guard with the single exception of 
Pilsudski. Programmatic pronouncements, moreover, showed the complete 
lack of support among the party rank and file for the old project of an 
armed uprising. The independence of Poland remained a goal of the party' s  
political activity, now translated, however, into the demand for a constit­
uent assembly in Warsaw, which itself was made dependent on the victory 
of the Russian revolution. Finally, the congress entrusted the new CKR 
with transforming the cadre-type fighting circles into a mass offensive force 
through the creation of a new fighting organization, the Organizacja 
Spiskowo-Bojowa (OSB), whose executive, the Wydzial, was subordinate 
to and directed by the CKR.36 
At first the Starzy treated the Seventh Congress as an illegal "coup" by 
the Mlodzi, ignoring its decisions and opposing the new OSB.37 For a 
moment, a divorce of the old and now-dethroned conspiratorial elite from 
the younger representatives of the party' s  mass organization seemed im­
minent. Yet for the next nineteen months, a split was avoided, largely 
because the Starzy were still left with considerable room to maneuver. 
Until the June party council, the Starzy maintained their control of Przed­
swit as well as a presence in the CKR.38 Once these strongholds were lost, 
developments within the party' s  fighting organization offered the Starzy an 
opportunity to rebuild a power base. 
The PPS fighting organization, whether in the form of the OSB or its 
35. Karwacki, LOdzka organizacja Polskiej PartU Socjalistycznej, p. 45; Zarnowska, Geneza 
rozlamu, pp. 1 69-1 70; Piasecki, Zydowska organizacja PPS, p. 1 32 ;  AGAD KGGW 250 1 ,  
Appeal o f  the C KR  o f  the PPS to the Polish Intelligentsia, February 1905. 
36. For a discussion of the Seventh Congress of the PPS, see Zarnowska, Geneza rozlamu, 
pp. 1 76-190. For differing interpretations among Starzy and Mlodzi over the meaning of a 
constituent assembly in Warsaw, see K. J. Cottam, Boleslaw Limanowski, 1835-1935: A 
Study in Socialism and Nationalism (Boulder, 1 978), p. 1 57. The creation of the OSB is 
discussed in Paj�, Organizacje bojowe, pp. 55-58. 
37. Pobog-Malinowski, loze! Pilsudski, pp. 299-300. 
38 .  Zarnowska, Geneza rozlamu, pp. 2 14, 229-230. 
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successors, itself became a mass entity. This development was unique to 
the PPS, from whose general membership at least one-eighth belonged to 
its fighting organization. As membership in the fighting organization in­
creased, from the 1 ,345 "fighters" in the OSB (March-October 1905) to 
the 6,533 "fighters" at the time of the November 1 906 party split,39 the 
question of the fighting organization' s  relationship to other party institu­
tions inevitably arose. The relatively open recruitment into the fighting 
organization also made it vulnerable to provocation and mass arrests. 
Through adroit manipulation of these issues and problems, the Starzy were 
able to stage a remarkable political comeback, a comeback that would tear 
the PPS apart. 
The expansion of the fighting organization' s activities after the January­
February general strike and the shift from a "defensive" to an "offensive" 
strategy resulted, in practice, in scores of assassination attempts on high 
administrative and police officials. Most of these actions failed, and the 
more successful assassinations of police spies, informers, and provocateurs 
did not lessen the fighting organization' s  vulnerability. The most dramatic 
case involved the captured PPS fighter Shlomo Eksztein, from whom the 
Okhrana extracted information about the fighting organization's  leading 
activists (several of whom were subsequently arrested), their involvement 
in past assassination attempts, and their plans to kill the new Warsaw 
governor-general, Konstantin Maksimovich.40 Already in June, the Starzy 
began to call for the autonomy of the fighting organization' s executive 
committee, its conversion to a conspiratorial body, and a shift in strategy 
from the costly acts of terrorism against individual representatives of the 
regime to disciplined partisan-style action against state institutions. 
Such arguments failed to impress the Mlodzi-dominated CKR but found 
growing resonance within the fighting organization itself, especially its 
Wydzial headed by Walery Slawek. After the experience of the L6dZ Up­
rising, which strengthened Pilsudski ' s  position, the Wydzial planned and 
carried out several raids on county treasuries in July and August without 
the knowledge of the CKR. Only one of these raids was successful, that 
carried out by J6zef Montwill-Mirecki at Opat6w, which brought the or­
ganization over sixteen thousand rubles.4 1 In arrests, the raids were as 
39. Paj�, Organizacje bojowe, p. 108 .  
40. AGAD KGGW 2492, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, July 1 4  (27), 1 905, 
with enclosed protocol of the Okhrana investigation. 
4 1 .  Zarnowska, Geneza rozlamu, p. 272; Pob6g-Malinowski, laze! Pilsudski, p. 323;  AGAD 
KGGW 2572, Radom Governor to the WGG, July 27 (August 1 0),  1 905, and Report of the 
SDPA to the WGG, August 9 (22), 1 905. 
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costly as the assassination attempts, but a future direction of "armed ac­
tion" and the means for financing it had been indicated. 
By mid-October, Pilsudski and the Starzy had managed to regain a 
foothold in the fighting organization, which as a result of the Minsk party 
council, underwent another structural mutation. An Organizacja  
Techniczno-Bojowa (OTB-Technical Fighting Organization) now re­
placed the OSB to serve as "a fighting school for the entire party" in 
preparation for an armed revolution in the Kingdom. Simultaneously, the 
Minsk council created the Central Fighting Circle under the direction of 
Pilsudski, whose main tasks were to perfect arms-smuggling operations, 
train instructors, build laboratories, and create new fighting units for the 
larger organization. The latter' s  executive, the Wydzial Bojowy (Fighting 
Department), was organized along the strict conspiratorial lines advocated 
by the Starzy, which enabled Pilsudski to gradually remove it from the 
supervision and control of the CKR. The concessions to the Starzy and the 
return to a power-sharing formula, designed to uphold party unity, proved 
in the end a recipe for disaster. 
In the last months of 1 905 and the first months of 1906, when the fate 
of the revolution appeared to hang in the balance, the CKR and the regional 
committees looked to the fighting organization as an armed revolutionary 
force available for immediate action on any number of fronts. Pilsudski 
and the Starzy, true to their traditional insurrectionary conceptions, sought 
to preserve, train, and militarize the party' s  fighting forces for a future 
uprising. Consequently, the Wydzial Bojowy refused to carry out the in­
structions of the CKR, resulting in endless conflict. 
Meanwhile, the Starzy continued to regain lost political ground. The 
failure of the December general strike and the reimposition of martial law 
on the entire Kingdom supported the Old Guard' s  arguments, presented in 
its factional organ Nowe Zycie (New Life), for beginning to prepare for an 
eventual Russo-Polish war by disengaging the party from ineffective par­
ticipation in empirewide revolutionary manifestations. From Austrian Po­
land, the venerable Polish Social Democratic leader Ignacy Daszyllski 
came to the aid of the Starzy. In an open letter published in the Krakow­
based Naprz6d (Forward) in early January 1 906, Daszyilski wrote a blis­
tering attack on the politics and tactics of the Mlodzi-dominated CKR. He 
especially targeted the involvement in the December general strike and 
support for an autonomous Kingdom within a constitutional and democratic 
Russia, when, in his opinion, a separate Polish state should be the move­
ment' s most important and immediate political goal . Coming from the most 
respected Polish socialist in Europe and a person whose own fame rested 
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on legal, parliamentary activity and leadership of an open, mass party, 
Daszytlski' s  open letter stung the Mlodzi to the quick.42 
Placed on the defensive, the Mlodzi were forced to make concessions 
to their opponents at the Eighth Congress of the PPS, which met in Lwow 
during the second half of February 1 906. Although the Mlodzi retained a 
majority on the CKR, its overall composition became decidedly more 
"centrist. " More important, all the party' s  fighting organizations were 
made subordinate to the Wydzial Bojowy, that is, to Pilsudski. Unfortu­
nately, the congress failed to spell out the relationship between Pilsudski ' s  
Fighting Department and the central party organs.43 
Naturally, the Mlodzi and Starzy continued to go their separate ways 
after the Lwow congress. As the mass organization turned to agrarian strike 
agitation and legal trade union activity that spring, Pilsudski worked even 
harder to make the Wydzial Bojowy a secret agency with the aim of re­
moving it from the supervision and control of the CKR. Pilsudski' s  plans 
for striking a major blow against the Russian state administration, which 
required both time and a buildup of forces, were undermined, however, 
within the fighting organization, whose rank-and-file bojowcy itched for 
immediate action. To maintain his support within the fighting organization, 
Pilsudski was forced to agree to a series of small-scale terrorist actions 
carried out during the spring of 1 906.44 These attacks on post offices, ar­
mored cars, postal trains, and local administration occurred without the 
authorization of the CKR and led to constant quarrels between it and 
Pilsudski' s  Fighting Department. 
A June 1 906 party council proved to be the last effort to reach a com­
promise between the Mlodzi and Starzy and avoid a split of the PPS. To 
mollify the Old Guard, the CKR was again revamped, now constituted 
entirely of "centrists. "  Moreover, the OTB and Central Fighting Circle 
were merged into a single fighting organization, and Pilsudski was recon­
firmed as head of the Wydzial Bojowy. Much to the chagrin of the Old 
Guard, however, the June council placed Pilsudski' s  Fighting Department 
under the direct supervision of the CKR, and regional units of the unified 
fighting organization were made subordinate to the regional party com-
42. So shocked were the Mlodzi by Daszyilski's  letter that not until a year later, after the 
party split, did they upbraid the socialist veteran for being a "realist" in GaJicja but "a  
romantic and a dreamer regarding our revolutionary struggle" in  the Kingdom; see M.  
Kowienski, "Raslo niepodleglosci Polski dawniej a dzis,"  Mysl Socjalistycma (Socialist 
Thought), no. 1 (May 1907). 
43. Zamowska, Geneza rozlamu, pp. 33 1-337. 
44. Pob6g-Malinowski, J6zej Pilsudski, pp. 338-34 1 .  
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mittees .45 To oversee "the reorganization of the party ' s  fighting forces ," 
the council appointed a special commission. 
Despite the new "centrist" orientation in the CKR, the Starzy responded 
to the decisions of the June council by convening a "conference of fight­
ers" in Krakow in July which refused to permit members of the newly 
appointed commission to attend its deliberations and severely criticized the 
proposed changes in the fighting organization.46 The Starzy rejected the 
idea of a split, however, and would continue to do so until the bitter end. 
Divorce from the party' s  mass organization, still considered the main re­
cruiting ground for " fighters " in Pilsudski ' s  guerrilla military organization 
of the future, was something to be avoided at all costS.47 
Yet precisely because the bojowcy were recruited from the mass organ­
ization, the Starzy could not control the impulse for action among those 
who, as a leading Pilsudskiite historian put it, " did not know how to gaze 
into the future. '  '48 The failure of Pilsudski and his collaborators to restrain 
the bojowcy had already led to the decisions of the June council. Between 
August and November, the clamor within the fighting organization for 
"real activity" would lead to several actions reluctantly sanctioned by the 
Wydzial Bojowy and roundly condemned by the CKR. The first major 
incident, "Bloody Wednesday" of August 15 ,  1 906, was the fighting or­
ganization 's  coordinated and murderous assaults on unsuspecting Russian 
police, gendarmes, state officials, and soldiers in various parts of the King­
dom, which left seventy-six dead, including many innocent bystanders.49 
Apart from the hail of public criticism that rained down on the PPS from 
rival parties across the political spectrum, the CKR was especially embar­
rassed by the attacks on the Russian army, whose troops it was trying to 
agitate for the revolutionary cause. 
The CKR's decision in the aftermath of Bloody Wednesday to restrict 
the party' s  "fighting tactics"  to pure self-defense set the stage for the 
November split. The fighting organization's  attack on a postal train near 
45 . Pajilk, Organizacje bojowe, pp. 87-88.  
46.  Zamowska, Geneza rozlamu, p. 417 .  
47 . On the attitude of the Starzy toward a party split, see Teodor Ladyka, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna (Frakcja Rewolucyjna) w latach 1906-1914 (Warsaw, 1 972), pp. 26--30. 
48. Pobog-Malinowski, J6zef Pilsudski, p. 338.  
49. For official reports on Bloody Wednesday, see AGAD KGGW 5 1 9, Report of the Plock 
Governor's  Office on Events in the First Half of August 1906; APL KGP 1583,  Piotrkow 
Governor to the WOO, August 4 ( 17), 1 906; APW WWO 4 1 ,  Report of the Warsaw Okhrana 
on the Activities of the PPS, April 1 to October I ,  1906; and Pawel Korzec, ed., tr6dla do 
dziej6w rewolucji 1905-1907 w okr�gu 16dzkim, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1964), pp. 348-349, 37fr-
374· 
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Imprisoned members of the PPS Fighting Organization in Radom, 1 907 . (Muzeum 
Niepodleglosci 473) 
the Rogow station in Piotrkow on November 8 ,  the third such action or­
ganized not only without the CKR's knowledge but in spite of its prohi­
bition of such action, led to sixteen casualties among the Russian soldiers 
guarding the train.50 This time, the CKR suspended the Wydzial Bojowy. 
The Starzy responded by organizing yet another "conference of fighters" 
in Zakopane, which defended the Rogow action and, in the form of an 
ultimatum, demanded that the CKR's suspension of the Wydzial Bojowy 
be lifted. When the Ninth Congress of the PPS convened in Vienna on 
November 1 9, it not only upheld the suspension but declared the Zakopane 
conference illegal and rejected Pilsudski ' s  "mandate" to represent the 
fighting organization. The Starzy then walked out of the Vienna meeting, 
only to hold a separate conference in Krakow and create the PPS­
Revolutionary Faction. The Mlodzi and the party centrists who had con­
stituted an overwhelming majority at the Ninth Congress subsequently be­
came known as the PPS-Left.5 1 
At the time of the November split, the PPS counted fifty-five thousand 
50. Adam Pr6chnik, Studia z dziej6w polskiego ruchu robotniczego (Warsaw, 1958), pp. 
409-449· 
5 1 .  For the denouement of the PPS drama, see Zamowska, Geneza rozlamu, pp. 440-458; 
Pob6g-Malinowski, l6ze! Pilsudski, pp. 353-369 ; and Ladyka, Polska Partia .Socjalistyczna, 
pp. 1 9-30. 
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members, making it numerically the strongest socialist party in the King­
dom. The PPS, first and foremost, was a party of the industrial proletariat, 
maintaining its strongest base among workers in heavy industry and in the 
larger factories. It had also enjoyed the greatest success of any party in 
trade union organization. At the time of the split, thirty-seven thousand 
members belonged to the unions affiliated with, but not directly linked to 
or controlled by, the Polish Socialist Party.52 By preserving the "nonparty" 
label, however fictitious, the PPS-connected unions managed to maintain 
a precarious legal status that furthered rather than restricted the party' s  
influence on  the labor movement. So great was the authority of  the PPS 
on the shop floor that workers in several instances took their conflicts with 
management to the party for resolution. 
This rank and file was at first confused and disoriented by the party split. 
After the defection of a few hundred members to the SDKPiL, a majority, 
or approximately thirty-six thousand, sided with the PPS-Left, and nineteen 
thousand went with the Revolutionary Faction, as the latter took advantage 
of a good deal of sentiment against the split in several local organizations. 
But the Revolutionary Faction' s  numerical support had been inflated by 
the confusion, and its disinterest in the bread-and-butter issues of wages 
and working conditions, symbolized by its withdrawal from the trade union 
movement, quickly led to an erosion of the facade of mass support. Within 
a year of the split, the Revolutionary Faction would be compelled by its 
own weakness to dissolve its organization in LodZ.53 
Through its reluctant divorce with the Mlodzi, the Starzy effectively 
separated from the PPS mass organization as well. Even that part of the 
fighting organization, numbering more than three thousand, which sided 
with the Old Guard' s  tactic of active armed struggle would soon shrink to 
nothing through provocation and arrests, no longer able to replenish it 
ranks. After some dramatic sparks in 1 907 and a spectacular last hurrah in 
September 1 908 when the armed robbery of a postal train at the Bezdany 
station near Vilna brought in more than two hundred thousand rubles, the 
Revolutionary Faction' s  fighting organization withdrew to Galicja  in 1 909 
with fewer than a hundred members. 54 From there, Pilsudski and his small 
camp of followers would continue their lonely championship of Polish 
independence by armed conquest, only now through supraparty agencies. 
52. Janina Kasprzakowa, Ideologia i polityka PPS-Lewicy w latach 1907-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 965), p. 30. 
53 .  Ibid., p. 28;  Ladyka, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, pp. 33-35, 83-88, 1 26-1 28 .  
54 .  Paj3k, Organizacje bojowe, pp. 100- 1 0 1 ;  Ladyka, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, pp. 
1 22-1 23 .  On the Bezdany train robbery, see Wladyslaw Pob6g-Malinowski, Akcja bojowa 
pod Bezdanami, 26 wrzeinia 1908 (Warsaw, 1 933). 
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As a consequence, they gave up even the ghost of the PPS, whose legacy 
had passed long before from the old conspiratorial elite to activists 
schooled in the politics of a mass organization. 
Other Parties 
Just before the revolution, the General Jewish Workers Union, or Bund, 
was the envy of and, in many instances, the model for other socialist parties 
in Russian Poland. Although the mainstay of the Bund' s organization was 
its membership in the empire' s  Lithuanian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian 
provinces, its two thousand members in the Kingdom of Poland put it 
numerically ahead of both the PPS and the SDKPiL. The Bund, moreover, 
had perfected its agitation, publication, and smuggling operations and had 
pioneered in the development and deployment of " self-defense" forces. 
Despite this headstart, the Bund' s organization in the Kingdom did not 
share in the spectacular growth that characterized its Polish counterparts. 
Bund membership in Russian Poland reached a peak of only eight thousand 
during the course of the revolution, something less than would be expected 
of a "mass" party. 
The Bund' s relative organizational failure in the Kingdom during the 
revolution was due primarily to stiff competition from numerous rivals for 
the political support of the Jewish masses. First of all, the two Polish 
Marxist parties did not hesitate to invade the Bund's turf, despite the lat� 
ter's  repeated insistence on an exclusive right to organize among the 
Yiddish-speaking poor. The Jewish Organization of the PPS, set up 
specifically for that purpose, claimed a membership of fifty-two hundred 
" organized comrades "  in October 1 906, although fewer than half that 
number actually paid party dues.55 Although the " internationalist" men­
tality of the SDKPiL prohibited it from creating a separate Jewish organ­
ization, it too claimed eight hundred active Jewish members and another 
fifteen hundred "sympathizers" in July 1 906.56 Even greater competition 
came from the Zionist movement, especially from its leftist, socialist var­
iations. Both the Zionist-Socialist and the Poalei-Zion parties, consisting 
of only handfuls of members in 1 905 , underwent rapid organizational ex­
pansion in 1 906 as they developed local committees, trade unions, and 
regularly appearing publications. The sudden emergence and popularity of 
55. Piasecki, Zydowska organizacja PPS, pp. 22 1-222.  
56. Krasny, " Stan organizacji SDKPiL," p. 60. 
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these organizations, according to Okhrana reports, definitely limited the 
Bund's  possibilities of expanding its influence. 57 
Although its potential mass constituency was carved up into so many 
pieces, the Bund did maintain a more highly visible political presence than 
its Zionist rivals. Through a variety of terrorist actions, ranging from as­
sassinations of state officials to the organization of popular actions against 
brothels, the Bund was able to project an image more formidable than its 
numbers would suggest. The Bund's  " self-defense" force of eight hundred 
"fighters" was equal to that of the SDKPiL, despite the latter' s  possession 
of five times as many members in its mass organization. 58 Only the PPS 
rivaled the Bund in the proportion of party members under arms. The 
Bund' s  militancy, however, exposed it to provocation and, like the PPS­
Revolutionary Faction, it was forced to disband its L6dZ organization at 
the end of 1 907 after a series of arrests.59 
Although the Bund survived both the revolution and its competition, 
weakened but intact, the PPS-Proletariat was forced to leave the field by 
revolution's  end. Ludwik Kulczycki ' s  party, which had split from the PPS 
in 1900, could never expand its organization beyond Warsaw, nor could it 
develop a program that set it apart from its rivals. Unable to benefit from 
the revolutionary activity of 1 905, the Proletariat became, in the Okhrana' s  
words, "a  party in a state of  collapse" during the first ten months of  1906, 
"caught in a struggle for its existence, against the government on the one 
hand and against other revolutionary parties, especially the PPS, on the 
other. "60 Reduced to propaganda activity, the Proletariat was unable to 
stop defections to the mass organizations of the PPS and SDKPiL, espe­
cially to their trade unions, nor the subsequent draining of party finances . 
By the time the Okhrana filed its next periodic report, the PPS-Proletariat 
had issued its last proclamation. 
Even more fleeting were the anarchist and communist groups that 
emerged in Warsaw during the peak period of the revolution at the end of 
1905, only to be returned to oblivion by the martial law repressions of 
1906 and 1907. Numbering at most a few hundred young men and women, 
mainly in their teens and disproportionately Jewish, the membership of 
these groups engaged almost exclusively in terrorist activities .6 1  "The 
57. APW WWO 4 1 ,  Reports on the Activities of the Bund and SDPKiL, and Zionist­
Socialists and Poalei-Zion, respectively, for the period April-October 1906. 
58. Paj�, Organizacje bojowe. p. 1 85 .  
59 .  Karwacki, LOdzka organizacje Polska Partii Socjalistycznej. pp. 148-149. 
60. APW WWO 41, Report on the Activities of the PPS-Proletariat, January-October 1 906. 
6 1 .  According to Jerzy Paj�, 240 "fighters" participated in the anarchist-communist ter­
rorist organizations; see Paj�, Organizacje bojowe. p. 202. 
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Spirit of Destruction is the Spirit of Creativity," proclaimed a November 
1 905 appeal of the group "International,"  which went on to call for the 
establishment of an "anarchist commune" by means of individual and 
mass terror.62 Such slogans found absolutely no resonance among the gen­
eral population. Typical was the attitude of the Jews of Kawalaria in 
Suwalki Province who petitioned the authorities to deport an anarchist who 
had offended them by his violent language at a mass meeting.63 
Isolated from the population, the anarchist groups could not hope to 
survive. Not surprisingly, thirteen members of the "International" group 
became the logical choice for the first executions under martial law on 
January 1 5 ,  1 906, with more to follow at the end of the month.64 The 
January executions wiped out the International group, but a series of arrests 
later that summer revealed the existence of Zmowa Robotnicza (Workers 
Conspiracy), a group whose members had been recruited mainly from the 
fighting organizations of other parties.65 One last flurry of anarchist activity 
hit Warsaw in the spring of 1 907, but the arrest by the Okhrana between 
June 1 6  and July 30 of forty-six anarchists from various smaller groups 
brought an end to this short-lived phenomenon.66 
Between the socialist and nationalist parties stood populist and liberal 
parties, the Polski Zwiw;ek Ludowy (PZL-Polish People ' s  Union) and 
the Pedecja (the popular acronym for the Progressive Democratic Union), 
respectively. The PZL, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was formed in 
November 1904 by renegades from the Endecja-inspired TON organiza­
tion. From the beginning, village school teachers played a primary role 
among the populist rank and file . Conceived as a cadre-style organization 
that would serve as the basis for the formation of a mass party similar to 
the Stronnictwo Ludowe (People ' s  Party) in Austrian Poland, the PZL dif­
fered in its social and political radicalism from its populist counterpart in 
Galicja. Populism in Russian Poland thus came to be characterized by a 
strident antic1ericalism, opposition to cooperation with noble landowners 
in agrarian circles and rural cultural organizations, and a preparedness to 
collaborate with the socialist parties, especially the PPS.67 
62. See the documentary collection Anarchizm i anarchiici na ziemiach polskich do 1914 
roku, ed. Hennan Rappaport (Warsaw, 1 98 1 ), pp. 1 8-2 1 .  
63. AGAD KGGW 2524, Report of the SOPA to the WGG, October 2 8  (November 1 0),  
1 905. 
64. Rappaport, Anarchizm, pp. 24-25, 27-28 .  
65. Ibid. , pp .  37-38; APW WGZZ 2495 includes files, compiled between September and 
November 1 906, on six members of the group, four of whom were women. 
66. Rappaport, Anarchizm, pp. 48-64. 
67 . Radlak, Polski Zwiqzek Ludowy, pp. 1 3-2 1 ;  Jan Molenda, "Miejsce ruchu ludowego 
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In its first program, published in May 1 905, the PZL called for supreme 
authority to reside in a democratically elected Polish parliament. During 
the course of 1 905, however, the PZL adopted some of the utopian, coop­
eratist conceptions of the former socialist theoretician Edward Abra­
mowski. Indeed, at the end of the year, Abramowski would draft a revised 
PZL program that in its statement of maximum goals foresaw a "People ' s  
Republic " whose economy would be  transformed through a process of 
voluntary association. Closer to the ground, Abramowski ' s  minimum pro­
gram called for the Kingdom's  political autonomy, realized through both 
a national legislature and wide-ranging popular self-government at the local 
leve1.68 Regarding the latter, the PZL placed much emphasis on the gmina 
movement and went far beyond the Endecja 's  goal of po Ionization of rural 
administrative and educational institutions. Instead, the PZL called for 
equal voting rights for all inhabitants of the gminy, whose affairs should 
be decided exclusively by the local population. The PZL also called on 
rural communities to engage in active civil disobedience and asked gmina 
and village officials not to carry out their responsibilities until the tsarist 
government conceded home rule to an autonomous Polish administration.69 
At the Peasants Congress organized by the PZL in June 1906 in Warsaw, 
the majority of those in attendence were proprietors of medium-sized hold­
ings, people who enjoyed authority in their communities either as model 
farmers or as elected local officials. Most were literate and some had con­
tributed correspondence to newspapers such as Gazeta Swif,!teczna (Holiday 
Gazette) which enjoyed broad circulation in the Polish countryside.70 This 
emerging rank and file influenced PZL attitudes toward the basic issues of 
land reform and agrarian strikes. The populists favored the nationalization 
of church and (Russian) state property and the expropriation of private 
estates, albeit through legislative acts and with due compensation for the 
former owners. This respect for property also informed the PZL' s ambig­
uous position on agrarian strikes, which fluctuated between sympathy for 
the demands of farm workers and fear of the ruinous effects of work stop­
pages on the agrarian economy. 7 1  
w Zyciu wsi i wsrod innych obozow politycznych," i n  Po/ska XIX wieku: Panstwo­
spoleczenstwo-kultura, ed. Stefen Kieniewicz (Warsaw, 1 982), pp. 353-403. 
68. Radlak, Polski Zwi(!zek Ludowy, pp. 25-26. 
69. AGAD KGGW 2505, Appeal of the PZL of November 1 905, and 25 1 7, Plock Governor 
to the WGG, December 10 (23), 1 905; APW WWO 44, Okhrana translation into Russian 
of Appeal of the PZL of February 1 906. 
70. Radlak, Polski Zwi(!zek Ludowy, p. 3 1 .  
7 1 .  Ibid., pp. 29, 36--37; see also Wieslaw Piatkowski, Idee agrarne ugrupowan politycznych 
w Kr6lestwie Polskim w latach 1892-1918 (LodZ, 1 992), pp. 1 1 2-1 25.  
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Unfortunately for the PZL, the conditions of martial law and the restric­
tion on legal political activity halted its evolution toward an independent, 
peasant mass party able to compete at the national level . When the first 
blows of repression fell in the middle of 1 906, the PZL had organized 
circles in forty-one gminy of Warsaw Province and had made some sig­
nificant inroads in Lublin and Plock provinces. The party was virtually 
nonexistent, however, in other regions. Moreover, it lacked the survival 
instincts of the PPS and SDKPiL, nurtured by years of conspiratorial ac­
tivity. From mid- 1906, the PZL concentrated increasingly on educational, 
economic, and cultural activity, traditions derived from the movement' s  
prerevolutionary roots in TON, while Stefan Julian Brzezinski and Zyg­
munt Nowicki vainly struggled to maintain a series of legal press organs. 
After mass arrests of populist activists in the spring and summer of 1907, 
the PZL simply ceased to exist. 
Despite its short life, the PZL did leave behind a significant legacy, as 
the organization's  remnants found new homes in the educational movement 
in the countryside, spearheaded by the journal Zaranie (The Dawn), and 
in the " Staszic" circles of peasant agriculturalists.72 Led by Maksymilian 
Malinowski and Jadwiga Dziubinska, postrevolutionary populism survived 
nationalist competition and the active opposition of the Catholic episcopate 
to fonn a new political party, the Stronnictwo Ludowe (People' s  Alliance) 
in 1 9 1 5 . Mergers with smaller groups and name changes would follow, but 
in 1 9 1 8, as a Polish state resurfaced on the political map of Europe, the 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Wyzwolenie (Polish People' s  Alliance­
Liberation) would take its place as the principal peasant party in the fonner 
Russian zone. True to its revolutionary roots, the PSL-Wyzwolenie re­
mained throughout its history more radical and anticlerical than its coun­
terparts from the Polish territories previously under Austrian and Prussian 
rule. 
Like the populists, the Progressive Democrats traced their immediate 
organizational roots to the last months of 1904, when Spolecznosc Polska 
(Polish Society), a forum among the liberal Warsaw intelligentsia inspired 
by the j oumal Kuinica (The Forge), organized a series of barely disguised 
political meetings to discuss the crisis created by the Russo-Japanese War 
and also the possibility of organizing a broad opposition movement. With 
the exception of the uncompromising SDKPiL, the socialist parties were 
72.  On the Zaranie and "Staszic" movements, see Piatkowski, Idee agrame, pp. 1 26-- 1 39, 
and Zenon Kmiecik, Ruch oswiatowy na wsi; Kr6lestwo Polskie, 1905-1914 (Warsaw, 
1963), pp. 79-15 1 .  The Staszic circles were named after Stanislaw Staszic, a famous Polish 
patriot of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
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drawn to the Spolecznosc Polska meetings by the prospect of using them 
as a tribune for their own political propaganda.73 The association of Polish 
liberalism with the radical labor movement grew stronger in late January 
1 905 when Kuinica sponsored the formation of the Committee for Aid to 
the Strikers. Subsequent strikes by railroad personnel, postal and telegraph 
workers, and employees in the pharmaceutical and insurance industries 
brought the liberal intelligentsia into .direct contact with the strike move­
ment. Inspired by the promises in the October Manifesto, the formation of 
unions and associations among these occupational groups, as well as 
among teachers, lawyers, engineers, and technicians, followed immediately 
thereafter. 
At the end of November, representatives of twelve professional unions, 
representing six thousand members, met in Warsaw, where five unions 
immediately joined an umbrella organization, the Union of Unions of the 
Kingdom of Poland (Zjednoczenie Zwi�6w Kr6lestwa Polskiego), cre­
ated in imitation of the liberal Russian model. By the end of January 1 906, 
eleven unions had joined the Polish variant.74 In Russia, the Union of 
Unions provided the liberal movement, represented politically by the Con­
stitutional Democrats, with its primary base of popular support. Such might 
have been the case for the newly formed Progressive Democratic Union 
as well, had it not been for a fundamental division over the issue of par­
ticipation in elections to the Russian State Duma. 
Immediately after the October Manifesto, on November 2, 1 905, the 
Pedecjajoined the various socialist parties in a mass meeting at the Warsaw 
Philharmonia attended by some four thousand people. The physical re­
moval of representatives of the Endecja  set the tone for the meeting and 
isolated the Progressive Democrats in their announced intention to partic­
ipate in the Duma elections. Pedecja speakers, who explained that the par­
ty' s  elected candidates would walk out of the Duma if that body failed to 
accept demands for the Kingdom's  autonomy, a general political amnesty, 
and the lifting of martial law, nevertheless failed to carry the day against 
the socialists . The meeting passed instead a series of radical resolutions 
and resolved to boycott the elections and settle for nothing less than the 
overthrow of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly.75 
Worse still, the Pedecja had failed to gauge the mood of its potential 
73. Halina Kiepurska, Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy. 1905-1907 (Warsaw, I 967), pp. 
64-67· 
74. Ibid., pp. 229-238, 294· 
75. AGAD KGGW 2493, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 24 (November 6), 
I 905; APW ZOW 34, Internal Memorandum of the Office of the Warsaw Superintendent 
of Police, October 2 I  (November 3), I 905. 
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constituency in the Union of Unions, which a few days after the meeting 
in the Warsaw Philharmonia, came out in favor of an election boycott.76 
For a time, it appeared that the Pedecja would follow that constituency and 
adhere to the boycott, but at the last minute its leadership, headed by the 
journalist Aleksander Swi�tochowski, decided to enter the campaign. 
Rather than face the Endecja  juggernaut alone, the Pedecja hastily entered 
into an electoral alliance with the assimilationist Jewish Electoral Com­
mittee, which itself had few ties with the mass of Yiddish-speaking Jews. 
This alliance not only widened the chasm between the Pedecja  and the 
radical parties but encouraged the Endecja, concerned that Jewish votes 
for Polish liberals could lead to the defeat of its own candidates, to tum 
to anti-Semitism in its electoral propaganda.77 The result was a crushing 
defeat for Polish liberalism in the first Duma elections, a defeat that stood 
out in marked contrast to the success of the Russian Constitutional Dem­
ocrats (on which, more below). Although the Pedecja survived to partici­
pate in subsequent duma elections, it never managed to elect a single 
candidate. 
Traditional Polish conservatism, whose banner was picked up in October 
1 905 by the Stronnictwo Polityki Realnej (Party of Realistic Politics), was 
also pushed to the political margin as a consequence of the revolution. 
Aristocratic and conciliationist, the Realists were unable to offer a credible 
alternative to the Endecja. On the one hand, the long campaign of the 
conciliationist journal Kraj for bilingualism in the Kingdom's  administra­
tion, courts, and schools and for equal rights for the tsar' s Polish subjects 
was largely realized in 1 905 as a result of government concessions. Yet 
these concessions had been achieved by applying active political pressure 
on the authorities, tactics the conciliationists adamantly opposed. On the 
other hand, the Endecja 's  strong and effective opposition to the radical 
patriotic and socialist movements, especially its propaganda of "realism" 
and " sobriety" in Polish politics, expropriated what was left of the con­
ciliationist program.78 
Nevertheless, the Realists challenged the Endecja  in the first Duma elec­
tions and were swamped, despite the relatively heavy weight assigned by 
the empire' s  electoral law to the landowners' curia. The election results 
forced the Realists to seek an accommodation with the nationalist move-
76. Kiepurska, lnteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, p. 333.  
77. See Stephen D. Corrsin, "Polish-Jewish Relations before the First World War: The Case 
of the State Duma Elections in Warsaw," GAL-ED I I  ( 1 989) : 37-4 1 .  
78.  Zenon Kmiecik, "Kraj " za czas6w redaktorstwa Erazma Piltza (Warsaw, 1 969), pp. 
400-402; Henryk Wereszycki, Historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1918, 2d ed. (paris, 1 979), 
pp. 225-243 . 
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ment. Despite significant differences between the two parties (the Realists 
had opposed the school strike and boycott yet were far more tolerant to­
ward the Kingdom's  ethnic minorities than the Endecja),  they entered a 
multiparty alliance, known as the "National Concentration, " for elections 
to the Second State Duma. The Endecja 's  manifest domination of the Na­
tional Concentration led to the last-minute withdrawal of the Realists from 
the electoral alliance, again with no real effect on the balloting. The identity 
of traditional Polish conservatism may have been thereby salvaged, but 
Polish nationalism had established a near monopoly on the right of the 
political spectrum. 
The shared fate of the Pedecja  and the Realists is highly illustrative of 
the transformation of Polish political culture during these years. Traditional 
liberalism and conservatism had emerged from the old "political nation" 
of the szlachta and intelligentsia of gentry origin. Already before 1904, the 
prerevolutionary positivist and conciliationist ideologies of the traditional 
elite had been eclipsed in political importance by the popular ideologies 
of nationalism and socialism. When the events of the revolution placed the 
"mass nation" at the center of the political stage, the liberal and conser­
vative movements, although they took the form of modern political parties, 
could never acquire the substance of modern political organizations. With­
out mass support, the progressives and the Realists could at best hope to 
survive on the political periphery. Indeed, that they survived at all was 
primarily by virtue of electoral laws that discriminated in favor of the old 
elite and an imperial political strategy that conferred on these parties a 
legal and almost protected status to enable them to compete with their 
mass-based competitors. Yet such competition was at best symbolic, at 
worst artificial, and in any case without real significance. 
A Question of Violence 
Another attribute of the transformation of political culture in Russian 
Poland denied to and rejected by the conservatives and liberals ,  but shared 
in common by the mass-based parties, was the resort to violence as a means 
of political struggle. The debut of the "mass nation" was accompanied 
from the beginning by various forms of popular violence that created a 
climate for the political terrorism waged by the parties. Indeed, the political 
resort to violence peaked at the same time as the numerical strength of the 
mass organizations. The decline of the latter, worn down by martial law 
and dashed hopes, accompanied a circumscribing of party-promoted vio-
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lence. In a word, the efficacy of terror as a political weapon depended 
largely on the attitudes and actions of the " mass nation. " 
Before I 904, only the PPS-Proletariat openly advocated the use of terror 
for political ends, although it did not possess the organizational means to 
translate words into deeds. Similarly, the insurrectionary program of the 
mainstream PPS featured in Przed§wit represented wishful thinking rather 
than political reality. Its first fighting circles were created only in April 
I 904, and their purpose was neither to carry out terrorist actions nor to 
provide a cadre for an insurrectionary army but, rather, to defend workers' 
demonstrations. Even this limited task of workers' self-defense could not 
be realized until the end of the year. The Bund, in contrast, had developed 
and deployed armed units much earlier, but their purpose was also defen­
sive, namely, to protect the Jewish poor against the violence of pogroms. 
The "armed defense" by the PPS of its planned demonstration on Grzy­
bowski Square in Warsaw on November I 3 ,  I 904 (see Chap. 2), marked 
the transition between defensive and offensive action against the authori­
ties. The Grzybowski Square incident also coincided with increasing cases 
of confrontation betweens crowds and those sent to disperse them. As the 
authorities resorted to force in breaking up the large street gatherings, vi­
olence frequently resulted. The PPS tactic of "armed defense" therefore 
corresponded with a growing popular mood to fight back when threatened 
by police and troops. 
Already, at the end of 1 904, and especially during the January-February 
general strike of I 905, criminal elements mixed with protestors and dem­
onstrators, adding yet another dimension to the escalating popular violence. 
In her germinal article on urban crowd behavior during the revolution, 
Elzbieta Kaczyrlska notes that the line dividing the industrial proletariat 
from socially marginal groups was a very thin one. Economic necessity 
could blur that line, drawing "occasional criminals" not only from the 
relatively large number of unemployed but from wage earners as well. By 
day, these "occasional criminals" might find themselves in a crowd of 
striking workers. By night, after the dispersal of the crowd by force, the 
younger members of this group might join with more hard-core criminal 
elements in knocking out street lanterns and looting private shops. For their 
part, the socialist parties, without exception, excused such lawlessness and 
even sanctioned it, in respect to private property, as a form of class strug­
gle .79 
79. Kaczyllska, "Tlum i margines spoleczny," pp. 222-224; see also her chapter "Tlum a 
wladza: Anatomia masowych ruchow spolecznych w Krolestwie Polskim na przelornie XIX 
i XX wieku," in przemoc zbiorowa, ruch masowy, rewolucja, ed. Elzbieta Kaczyllska and 
Zbigniew Rykowski (Warsaw, 1 990), pp. 67-1 04. 
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The January-February general strike, together with the popular violence 
that accompanied it, provided an immediate impulse toward armed action 
within the emerging mass political organizations. In February, the PPS 
created the first its succession of fighting organizations designed to deal 
direct blows to the " tsarist apparatus of oppression. ' ' 80 Similarly, the Sixth 
Congress of the Bund, also held in February, envisaged a more offensive 
strategy for its forces, whose activities were now stepped up dramatically.8l 
At the same time, the Endecja created the first of its paramilitary organi­
zations, Bacznosc (On Guard), primarily as a response to the growing 
influence and militarization of the socialist movement.82 Of the major par­
ties, only the SDKPiL continued to lag behind in the formation of armed 
units, a process that began in earnest only after the abortive June uprising 
in Lodi:.83 
Already in February, Okhrana agents in Austria and Prussia noted wide­
spread smuggling of revolvers and explosives into the Kingdom, coming 
from the same operations that for years had provided safe passage for 
agitators and antigovernment literature.84 With these weapons, the PPS� in 
particular, initiated its campaign of assassination, whose intended victims 
soon became clear: not only targets with high public visibility but also 
lower-ranking members of the state apparatus whose main distinction had 
been their cruelty in dealing with popular unrest. The beginning of the 
terrorist offensive was marked by the wounding of Baron Nolken, the War­
saw superindentent of police, at the end of March during a bomb explosion 
at the Twelfth Police Precinct in Praga.85 Attacks on the Sied1ce and Cz�s­
tochowa chiefs of police quickly followed, although lower police func­
tionaries were the most frequent victims. According to data compiled by 
the Office of the Warsaw Governor-General, more than one hundred police, 
gendarmes, and soldiers were killed in terrorist attacks between January 
1 905 and April 1 906; by September 1 906, the official death toll by political 
assassination had reached well over two hundred, not to mention an equal 
number of "others, " namely, police spies and informers .86 
80. Paji!k, Organizacje bojowe, p. 55 .  
8 1 .  Henry 1. Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905 (Stanford, 1 972), 
P· 3 1 3 · 
82 .  Paj�, Organizacje bojowe, pp. 1 92-193;  APW WWO 2 1 ,  Appeal and Statutes of Ba­
cznosc, March 1 2 , 1 905 . 
83 .  Pawel Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne w Lodzi i okr�gu 16dzkim w latach 1905-1907 (War­
saw, 1 956), p. 152 .  
84 .  AGAD KGGW 2488, Report of  the SDPA to  the WGG, February 1 ( 14), 1 905 . 
85 .  AGAD KGGW 2490, Acting Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, March 1 3  
(26), 1 905, and Report o f  the SDPA to the WGG, March 22 (April 4), 1 905 . 
86. KalabiDski, Carat i klasy posiadajf,!ce, pp. 474-476, 541-542. 
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Attempts far outnumbered successful assassinations, however, and the 
biggest fish, including the Warsaw governors-general Maksimovich and 
Skalon, tended to get away. Moreover, the attacks on lower-ranking Rus­
sian state, police, and military personnel, carried out by individuals or small 
groups primarily from the PPS fighting organization, were at best only 
indirectly linked to the popular stuggle. Although the crowd might rejoice 
at the death of a hated police constable, a senior officer of the Land Guard, 
or captain of the dragoons, it would mourn the fatalities from its own 
ranks-bystanders caught unaware in the spray of bullets or by an ex­
ploding bomb. Indeed the numbers of innocent and intended victims were 
too often evenly matched in these incidents, and even the most meticulous 
researcher is hard pressed to find evidence of the crowd actively assisting 
the assassins. 
Having a similarly ambiguous connection to the popular movement was 
the use of force and violent threats to collect funds for party purposes. 
Armed units of the Bund and the SDKPiL, in particular, helped meet the 
financial needs of their parties by aiming a revolver at the class enemy. 
Although the coerced funds in part provided support for families of arrested 
workers and other more noble ends, the majority were designated for the 
purchase and smuggling of more arms.87 In the last months of I 905 and 
the beginning of I 906, a time when state authority in the Kingdom nearly 
collapsed, these same bands not only engaged in " revolutionary" tax col­
lection but transformed themselves into "revolutionary" police and mili­
tias as well as into " revolutionary" courts. The terror and expropriation, 
the violation of human and individual rights by these bands, in time turned 
a considerable segment of public opinion against the parties they suppos­
edly represented. For example, the Bund's loss of influence to Zionism in 
places like Suwalki, Cz�stochowa, Pultusk, Mazowieck, Mariampol, and 
Zelech6w was accompanied by anger over a terror that intruded even into 
community religious practices.88 Similarly, workers at the Miller factory in 
Rokice Nowe near L6dZ in April I 906 rose to the physical defense of its 
owner against an armed band from the SDKPiL, killing one of his attack­
ers.89 
87. AGAD KGGW 2498, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, September 17 (30), 1 905 ; APL 
KGP 1 5 1 5  (2), Chief of the Piotrkow Provincial Gendarmes to the Department of Police, 
March 1 2  (25), 1 905. 
88. AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, December 15 (28), 1 905; 2 5 1 2 ,  
Lomi:a Governor to the WGG, October IO  (23), 1 905 ; 2522, Suwalki Governor t o  the WGG, 
May 1 8  (3 1 ), 1 905, and Report of the SDPA to the WGG, June 4 ( 1 7), 1 905; and 2524, 
Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 5 ( 1 8), 1 905 . 
89. APL KGP 1 582, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, April 1 5  (28), 1 906. 
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But certain terrorist actions of the political parties did have widespread 
popular support, especially those whose original inspiration came from 
below. The same disorder and weakness of regular police forces that en­
couraged Mafia-style urban gangsters and bands of rural horse thieves, 
whose principal victims came from the popular classes, also permitted 
workers and peasants to engage in bloody retaliatory actions. In the late 
spring of 1905, the Bund was the first party to realize the possibilities for 
mass mobilization afforded by popular vigilantism. Its active participation 
in attacks on prostitution houses in the Jewish sections of Warsaw, L6dZ, 
and D�browa, which also served as havens for gangsters, brought the Bund 
an instant and popular notoriety. The PPS and SDKPiL soon followed suit. 
After publicly proclaiming war against criminal gangs, the PPS fighting 
organization began hunting down people whose activities were well known 
to both the police and their victims. For example, the PPS eliminated four 
Ostrowiec gangsters involved in the armed robbery of a local parish 
priest.90 Similarly, both the PPS and the SDKPiL assigned fighters to assist 
the local peasant vigilante movement against horse thieves in Lublin 
county.91 Even the Endecja joined in the vigilante movement. Among other 
actions, its fighters carried out death sentences against five card-playing 
gangsters aboard the steamer Wawel as it cruised the Vistula.92 
Besides thieves and gangsters, institutions and symbols of Russian state 
authority provided the proponents of political violence with both vulnerable 
and popular targets. Terrorist attacks on state vodka outlets, gmina admin­
istration offices, the russified schools, state forest headquarters, jails and 
prisons, and tax collectors were frequently attended by large crowds that 
both enjoyed and joined in the action. For example, the PPS attack on the 
Opat6w County treasury in July 1 905, resulting in the "expropriation" of 
sixteen thousand rubles, involved as many as sixty people.93 Similar num­
bers of participants, mainly from the small and dispersed factories in the 
countryside, turned out for PPS actions against state vodka outlets and 
administrative offices in Siedlce Province.94 After such attacks, rural com­
munities in Kielce Province not only refused to cooperate with the au­
thorities in identifying the main perpetrators but provided them asylum and 
90. AGAD KGGW 2520, Radom Governor to the WGG, December 14 (27), 1 905 . 
9 1 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 5, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, November 1 6  (29), 1 905, and 
Lublin Governor to the WGG, December 4 ( 1 7), 1 905. 
92.  AGAD KGGW 5 1 2, Report of the Warsaw Governor' s  Office for the Second Half of 
March 1 906. 
93. AGAD KGGW 2572, Radom Governor to the WGG, June 27 (July 1 0), 1 905 . 
94. Urszula Glowacka-Maksymiuk, Gubemia siedlecka w latach rewolucji 1905-1907 
(Warsaw, 1 985), p. 1 02 .  
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arms; in several gminy, crowds of peasants even attacked jails to free 
captured party fighters.95 
Nowhere, however, did the attacks of political armed bands merge with 
the broader popular movement as much as in the Lithuanian counties of 
Suwalki Province, where by the end of 1 905 the authorities themselves 
recognized the de facto rule of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 
(LSDP). For the Lithuanian population, the LSDP championed popular 
aspirations for national self-rule (much like the Polish Endecja) and pressed 
social grievances against the region' s  dominant Polish elite. The party' s  
attacks on  vodka outlets, and then on  primary schools, and its expropria­
tions from Polish landowners and parish clergy received such a degree of 
popular sanction that the state was forced to resort to the most drastic 
measures to restore even a semblance of order.96 
Popular support for political violence began to wane in 1 906, in part 
because of a successful state strategy that made the local population crim­
inally and fin�cially liable for damages caused by terrorist actions in their 
communities. At the same time, however, the violence itself became in­
creasingly removed from the popular movements from which it drew its 
sustenance. For the political parties, filling party coffers was a principal 
object of the expropriations and assaults on state institutions; the attacks 
on 1 59 state vodka retail outlets alone had brought to the parties nearly 
one hundred thousand rubles. It did not take long for greed to replace 
ideology as a motivation. In L6dZ, a PPS fighting unit, formed entirely of 
workers, transformed itself into a criminal band that continued to expro­
priate money in the name of revolutionary goals.97 In Warsaw, a gang of 
professional criminals actually posed as a PPS fighting unit.98 
Sometimes, the criminals were not even disguised. All the mass parties, 
beginning with the Endejca, eventually resorted to hiring gunmen to carry 
out political assassinations. The SDKPiL fighting units in Warsaw were so 
riddled with criminal elements that after failing to stop their unauthorized 
95 . AGAD KGGW 2509, Provisional Governor-General of Kielce Province to the WGG, 
December 20, 1 905 (January 2, 1 906) and December 26, 1 905 (January 8, 1 906). 
96. The authority of the LSDP was so great at the end of 1 905 that the Lithuanian rural 
population paid taxes to the party rather than the state. After failing to collect taxes with 
the help of troops, the state resorted to sequestering peasant livestock, flogging, and ulti­
mately, to courts-martial; see AGAD KGGW 2524, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, 
December 1 7  (30), 1 905, and Suwalki Governor to the WGG, December 3 1 ,  1 905 (January 
13 ,  1 906). 
97. Kaczyllska, "Tlum i margines spoleczny," p. 224. 
98. AGAD KGGW 520, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, April 5 ( 1 8), 1 906. 
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activities, the party was forced to dissolve them in August 1 906.99 The 
infiltration of criminals into these organizations not only blurred the dis­
tinction between organized political violence and simple banditry; it also 
provided a ready means of entry for the Okhrana into the same organiza­
tions . Not bothered by political or ideological scruples, the criminals and 
their information could easily be bought. Through such means, the Okhrana 
was able to force the dissolution of the organizations of the Bund and 
PPS-Revolutionary Faction in L6dZ in 1 907. 
More popularly demoralizing, however, was the use of coercion, vio­
lence, and terror against political opponents. Political quarrels, once con­
fined to the pages of the underground press, turned rhetorically violent in 
the aftermath of the October general strike. The SDKPiL and the Endecja, 
especially, engaged in a war of words that turned into deeds by the end of 
the year. After months of exchanging political epithets, a shooting incident 
at the editorial offices of the National Democratic Goniec (The Messenger) 
in Warsaw during the October general strike brought Social Democratic 
promises of revenge, which were carried out in December. loo Shortly there­
after, competition between the Endecja and the PPS took a violent turn in 
Zyrard6w after weeks of bitter tension resulting from an incident in which 
nationalists had prevented socialists from entering a Catholic Church with 
their red banners. \0 1  The campaign for elections to the First State Duma 
would further escalate the interparty fighting in Warsaw, when the PPS, 
SDKPiL, and Bund, as part of their tactic of "active boycott," sought to 
disrupt Endecja  preelection meetings, incidents that were accompanied 
with exchanges of gunfire. The bloodiest incident of fratricide in Warsaw, 
however, occurred in the summer of 1 906 when an emissary of Dmowski, 
sent to act as a mediator in a citywide strike of tanners, was murdered by 
a PPS unit. The Endecja retaliated on August 2 with a countermove that 
led to the deaths of nine socialists. \02 
The interparty strife in Warsaw, which peaked during the election cam­
paign to the Second State Duma, nevertheless paled in comparison with 
the situation in L6dZ, which approximated a localized civil war. From the 
the spring of 1905, labor violence was far greater in L6dZ than in Warsaw. 
99. Kaczynska, "Hum i rnargines spo!eczny," pp. 226--227; Kiepurska, Warszawa w re­
wolucji, pp. 3 14-3 1 5 .  
100. AGAD AB, druk 249, Leaflet o f  the Warsaw Committee o f  the SDKPiL, October 30, 
1 905 ; Micewski, Roman Dmowski, p. 1 1 5 ;  Pob6g-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polity­
cma Polski 1 :568. 
1 0 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to WGG, January 2 ( 1 5), 1 906. 
102. Micewski, Roman Dmowski, pp. 1 29-1 30. 
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The use of coercion to achieve strike solidarity, the forced ouster of of­
fensive factory foremen and managerial personnel, and the rioting and bar­
ricades of the June uprising all formed a climate of violence capable of 
transforming the fiercely intense competition among the parties for popular 
support into armed confrontations. The L6dZ organizations of the Bund, 
SDKPiL, PPS,  and NZR were numerically the strongest of their respective 
parties, and surrounding Piotrk6w Province provided the locale for para­
military and terrorist activity. 
During the October and December general strikes, opponents of the 
walkouts, belonging mainly to the NZR, were forcibly removed from the 
factories, an action reminiscent of the earlier ouster of foremen and man­
agers . Later attempts by the socialist parties to organize a series of political 
protest strikes in the first half of 1 906 were met with strong nationalist 
counteragitation. As armed units of the socialist parties and the NZR either 
sought to impose the will of the respective majority or to retaliate against 
the use of force, fighting broke out in several of the larger L6dZ factories 
(including Poznanski, Heinzel and Kunitzer, and Karol Scheibler) and 
spread subsequently to Pabianice, Zduitska W ola, and B�dzin in the D�­
browa Basin. 103 By November, incidents of terror related to interparty strife 
had become far more frequent than acts against the authorities in L6dZ and 
the surrounding industrial region. 
All this was merely a forerunner to the bloodletting that accompanied 
the Great L6dZ Lockout. In December, the first month of the lockout, 57 
persons fell victim to the fratricidal struggle in L6dZ. 104 Before the lockout 
ended in May 1907, the interparty warfare had taken another 3 1 6  casual­
ties, the largest number in the last three weeks, as the Endecja successfully 
negotiated a resumption of work. 105 Even then the interparty violence con­
tinued. One historian estimates the total number of victims of the civil 
strife in L6dZ from January 1 906 through July 1907 at 722 casualties, 
including 322 deaths. l06 For the Kingdom as a whole, fratricidal warfare 
claimed at least 1 ,000 casualties, a figure comparable to the number of 
soldiers, police, gendarmes, and state administrative personnel struck down 
during the revolution. 
103. Korzec, ir6dla do dziej6w rewolucji 2 :20-2 1 ,  1 34-1 38,  144-145,  1 92-1 94, 1 97-198 ,  
209, 257, 297, 439-441 .  
1 04. Stanislaw Kalabmski and Feliks Tych, Czwane powstanie czy pierwsza rewolucja: Lata 
1905-1907 na ziemiach polskich. 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1 976), pp. 565, 569. 
105. APL KGP 1 6 10.  Piotrkow Governor to the Department of Police, May 26 (June 8) 
and July 31 (August 1 3), 1 907. 
1 06. Karwacki, LOdzka organizacja Polskiej Panii Socjalistycznej. p. 1 2 1 .  
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Victims of fratricidal fighting in the L6di suburb of Batuty, 1 907. (Muzeum Nie­
podleglosci 84 1 4) 
Public opinion reacted to the interparty violence with horror and disgust. 
It was that opinion which forced the parties to hold a "peace conference" 
in L6dz after the Great Lockout. Despite a negotiated truce that was ob­
served in the main and promises to return to more acceptable methods of 
political struggle, membership in all parties involved in the fighting de­
clined precipitously in the second half of 1 907; and only part of that decline 
could be blamed on state repression. By this time, crowds and revolution­
aries no longer mingled in search of gangsters . Attacks on state institutions 
had long ceased to be public spectacles and had instead become isolated 
acts of terrorism. By the second half of 1 9°7, only the PPS-Revolutionary 
Faction continued to champion violent political action. Its murder of the 
L6dz industrialist Mieczyslaw Silberstein on September 1 3 ,  resulting in the 
execution of eight socialist workers without trial ten days later, brought 
the wrath of public opinion down on the party-and barely a murmur of 
public protest on behalf of the workers. l o7 Without popular support, sanc­
tion, and sustenance, political violence came ingloriously to its end. 
107. Richard D. Lewis, "The Labor Movement in Russian Poland in the Revolution of 
1905-1907" (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Berkeley, 197 1 ), pp. 435-436. 
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Legal Political Activity 
The violence and party terror of the revolutionary years were in part the 
result of a frustrating inability to achieve substantive political change 
through legal means. Indeed, until the October Manifesto, legal and peace­
ful political expression simply was not possible. The earlier announcement 
in August of the government' s  plan for a consultative assembly-an im­
perial Duma-which had been prepared under the supervision of the Min­
ister of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Bulygin, raised but few hopes. The 
severely restricted franchise to the so-called Bulygin Duma, coupled with 
the Warsaw governor-general ' s  decision to limit participation in preelection 
meetings to private persons and societies not suspected of antigovernment 
views, 108 attracted only the clerical-conservative right. As for the Endecja, 
the initial impulse of the party leadership to participate in the projected 
election campaign found little support in the mass organization. In the 
Warsaw region, the mass protests against the "Bulygin Duma" organized 
by the socialist parties proved sufficiently disruptive that the government 
felt compelled to impose martial law. 
While the statewide October general strike rendered moot the contro­
versy over the Bulygin Duma, the consequent October Manifesto, with its 
promise both of a statewide legislative Duma elected by universal male 
suffrage and of proportional representation for the Kingdom, raised genuine 
hopes. The prospect of real political change contained in the manifesto was 
celebrated in several dozens of massive demonstrations and processions 
throughout the Kingdom during the first week of November, including one 
on November 5 in Warsaw which drew as many as one hundred thousand 
marchers. Widespread rumors followed, encouraged by the nationalist 
press, that like Finland, the Kingdom would soon be granted complete 
political autonomy. l09 In the meantime, the Endecja sponsored a delegation 
to St. Petersburg, headed by party leader Dmowski, to present the case for 
Polish autonomy to Count Sergei Witte, the tsar's prime minister and au­
thor of the October Manifesto. l l° 
Before the delegation could meet with Witte, however, the government 
responded to the wave of popular demonstrations with the imposition of 
martial law, for the first time embracing the entire Kingdom, on November 
108.  Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajfJce, pp. 29�29 I .  
109.  E.g., see Goniec LOdzki (L6dZ Messenger), no. 287a (November 1 0, 1 905) : I .  
1 10. The Endecja's  main organ, przeglfJd Wszechpolski (All-Polish Review), before the 
sending of the delegation to Witte, dispatched a message of its own to the Russian govern­
ment: "Give us authority in the country, and we shall restore order." Quoted by Terej , Idee, 
mity, reaUa, p. 46. 
{tl8-rZ i Willt. " 
....... ... .  _.--' ""'DrilL. /'11 6nl'.f'(i� IlItJlI. 
"The Emperor and Witte. The Pain of the People Is the Pain of the Monarch. " 
Political cartoon of the signing of the October Manifesto, 1 905. (Muzeum Nie­
podleglosci 26 164) 
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ro. The majority of the delegation opposed the idea of meeting with Witte 
under such conditions and decided to return to the Kingdom. Dmowski, 
alone, remained in St. Petersburg, but his conversation with Witte failed 
to budge the Russian statesman from his position that it was strategically 
perilous, and therefore impossible, to grant home rule to a territory where 
one-third of the Russian army was stationed. l ! 1  Already, at this point, a 
fundamental change of political status within the Russian Empire no longer 
had a chance, but Dmowski persisted; only now he would place his hopes 
in the future state duma. This decision to involve the Endecja  in the quag­
mire of the quasi-constitutional political processes of the empire would 
ultimately cost Dmowski and his party a great deal of accumulated political 
capital. 
The socialist parties, in contrast, adopted a cynical attitude toward the 
October Manifesto from the very beginning. Their smaller demonstrations 
demanded-in addition to political autonomy-the immediate end of cen­
sorship, a broad political amnesty, and the lifting of martial law in Warsaw 
and LodZ. 1 l2 The subsequent imposition of martial law on the entire King­
dom, the closing of the short-lived legal socialist dailies, and, above all, 
the government' s  proclamation of complicated and antidemocratic election 
laws in December turned the socialists decisively against the government' s  
constitutional project. l l 3 The electoral ordinance, with its indirect elections 
and heavily weighted franchise in favor of the upper and middle classes, 
ensured that industrial workers especially would have little effect on the 
balloting and led to separate decisions among all the socialist parties to 
organize an "active boycott" of the elections to the imperial Duma. 1 l4 
The Endecja's decision to participate and the socialist decision to boycott 
the elections actively, that is, to disrupt the campaigns of participating 
parties, made violent confrontations a certainty. A meeting of three hundred 
residents of Opole in Lublin Province, which appealed for unity among 
the political parties as the only means of advancing the cause of auton-
I I I . Micewski, Roman Dmowski, pp. I I  6-I 1 9 .  
I 1 2 .  KalabiiJ.ski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, pp. 298-299. 
I I 3 .  See, e.g. , the articles "Illegal Elections for the Workers" and "A Duma under the 
Whip" in the SDKPiL' s  Czerwony Sztandar, nos. 37 (January 5, 1 906) and 4 1  (January I I , 
1 906), respectively. 
1 14. According to the new electoral ordinance, the thirty-seven seats granted the Kingdom 
were decided by the vote of colleges comprised of 850 general electors. Of these, 286 came 
from landed curia, 1 94 from the peasants' curia, 341 from the urban curia, and 29 from the 
workers' curia. Of the eighty-three general electors al10ted to the city of Warsaw, only three 
came from the workers' curia. On the electoral ordinance as it affected the Kingdom, see 
Zygmunt Lukawski, Kolo Polskie w rosyjskiej dumie panstwowej w latach 1906-1909 
(Wroclaw, 1 967), pp. 14- 16. 
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omy,1 15 probably represented the sentiment of a considerable cross-section 
of public opinion on the eve of the first Duma elections. Boleslaw Pros, 
the renowned novelist, added his own influential voice to that sentiment 
in an open letter that criticized both the socialist-led boycott and the na­
tionalist attempts "to monopolize political life" and called upon the non­
party majority to overcome and override the looming interparty strifeY6 
Nevertheless, both the Endecja  and the socialist parties, for whom the 
first and the revolver spoke louder than the silent majority, held fast to 
their positions. The socialist boycott was largely successful in the workers ' 
curia. In Radom, only railroad workers cast their ballots. 1 I7 In L6dZ, the 
boycott was accompanied by a general strike of more than 50,000 workers 
from 293 factories; out of nearly 500 factories in the L6dZ region, the 
elections could be held in no more than 20. 1 18 Balloting took place in only 
9 of 1 14 Warsaw factories, with the result that of 1 9,500 eligible voters, 
barely 300 cast their votesY9 Apart from the workers ' curia, however, the 
boycott failed. In the peasants ' curia, only gminy in close proximity to 
Warsaw sympathized with the boycott. In Lublin Province, the only part 
of the Polish countryside where the socialists had any tangible influence, 
elections were held in all but 1 3  out of 144 gminy. 120 The vast majority of 
voters in the urban and landed curiae also ignored the boycott, with the 
exception of landowners in radicalized L6dZ County, where only 28 1 out 
of 876 eligible voters appeared at the pOllS. 12 1  
The results were inevitable. With the election contested only by the 
Realists and the Pedecja, the National Democrats took thirty-four of the 
Kingdom's  alloted thirty-seven seats, one of which had been reserved for 
the "Russian" population of the Chelm region; the two remaining seats 
were won by Lithuanian candidates in Suwalki Province. The Endecja 
wasted little time in claiming possession of a mandate to strive for its 
1 15 .  APL KGL 26712, Chief of Nowa-Aleksandrya County to the Lublin Governor, Decem­
ber 2 ( 1 5), 1 905. 
1 1 6. AGAD AB, druk 284. 
1 1 7 .  AGAD KGGW 252 1 ,  Telegram of the Provisional Governor-General of Radom Prov­
ince to the WGG, April 6 ( 19), 1 906. 
1 1 8 .  APL TGGP 3, Commander of the LodZ Military Region to the Provisional Governor­
General of Piotrkow Province, March 29 (April I I ), 1 906; Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne, p. 
209· 
1 1 9 .  Lukawski, Kolo Polskie, p. 23.  
1 20. Jan Molenda, "Carat i klasy posiadajQce w wa1ce z rewolucja 1 905-1 907 r. na wsi 
polskiej ,"  Przegl�d Historyczny 46, 1 -2 ( 1 955): 1 67;  Wojcik, Ruch robotniczy na Lubel­
szczyinie, p. 98.  
1 2 I .  APL TGGP 4, Commander of the L6dZ Military Region to the Provisional Governor­
General of Piotrk6w Province, March 30 (April 1 2), 1 906. By contrast, 74.3 percent of the 
eligible voters in L6dZ's  urban curia participated. 
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version of legal-political autonomy. 1 22 Yet once in st. Petersburg, the 
nationalist-monopolized Polish Circle, even when bolstered by the twelve 
votes of Polish representatives from Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Ukraine, 
could not reap any real political dividends from the Endecja's  sweeping 
electoral victory in the Kingdom. 
Most important, the Polish Circle alienated all prospective allies who 
might have backed the Kingdom's  autonomy in the First State Duma, be­
ginning with the Russian Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets. The Polish 
Circle behaved like an embassy in a foreign capital, shunning participation 
in the Cadet-dominated Duma presidium or in the Duma delegation sent 
to London to participate in a European parliamentary congress. The Polish 
Circle also continued Dmowski ' s  flirtation with the Russian government 
and even joined the pro-government opposition to the Cadet-inspired Duma 
resolution on agrarian reform. The Cadets consequently backed away from 
the resolutions of the Russian zemstvo congresses of September and No­
vember 1 905, which had supported the Kingdom's  political autonomy and 
agreed to bring the issue before the Duma. Not only were the Cadets 
unwilling to place the matter of Polish autonomy on the Duma agenda, but 
when the Polish Circle presented its own declaration on autonomy to the 
Duma on May 12 ,  1 906, it was given a cool reception in the liberal Russian 
press. 
The Poles also isolated themselves from delegations representing the 
empire ' s  other national minorities, which together with the Polish Circle 
made up 41 percent of the First Duma. The circle ' s  exclusive interpretation 
of autonomy was based partly on the conviction that the Russians, whether 
in the Duma or the government, would more readily agree to narrowly 
Polish demands than to autonomy for all nationalities. More significant, 
however, was the Polish Circle ' s  poorly hidden opposition to autonomy 
for Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Ukraine, where the Polish element would 
be dwarfed by the non-Polish majority populations. That attitude alienated, 
for example, the Ukrainian autonomist-federalist group, which otherwise 
might have supported the circle ' s  declaration on the Kingdom's  autonomy, 
and left the circle open to charges of hypocrisy. 1 23 
The tsar's abrupt dissolution of the First State Duma in the summer of 
1906-which, characteristically, the Polish Circle refused to protest by 
1 22 .  AGAD AB, druk 200, Appeal of the National Democratic Party, May 7, 1 906. 
1 23 .  On the Polish Circle 's  travails in the First State Duma, see Lukawski, Kolo Polskie, 
pp. 37-65, as well his article "Rosyjskie ugrupowanie polityczne wobec sprawy autonomii 
Krolestwa Polskiego w okresie 1 905-1907,"  Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellon­
skiego: Prace Historyczne 9 ( 1 962): 1 54-158 .  Less valuable is the discussion in Edward 
Chmielewski, The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma (Knoxville, 1 970), pp. 33-36. 
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signing the Vyborg Manifesto initiated by the Cadets-sent the Poles home 
empty-handed and set the stage for new elections. In the interim, the 
SDKPiL and the Bund, after their formal entrance into the Russian Social 
Democratic Workers Party as autonomous organizations, had reversed their 
position on the Duma and decided to form an electoral alliance to challenge 
the Endecja in the workers ' and urban curiae. Their prospects were un­
dermined, however, by the decisions of both faction� of the PPS to continue 
the boycott and by their own refusal to join the Pedecja in a Concentration 
of the Left to oppose the National Concentration centered around the En­
decja. 
Nevertheless, the appearance of new players on the electoral field made 
the second election campaign to the Duma in January and February of 
1 907 far livelier than the first. According to one observer, "There were so 
many pre-election meetings of all sorts in Warsaw that it was hard to find 
a suitable hall, " and this despite the Warsaw governor-general ' s  ban on 
such meetings organized by the SDKPiL and the Bund. l 24 Police actions 
and continued PPS boycotts notwithstanding, the SDKPiL-Bund alliance 
carried the workers ' curiae in Warsaw, L6dZ, Radom, and the D�browa 
Basin. In L6dZ's  urban curia, the alliance received a respectable 26.2 per­
cent of the vote, compared with 48.9 percent for the National Concentration 
and 23 .8  percent for the Pedecja. 125 The SDKPiL also ran a successful 
campaign in the Pulawy region of Lublin Province and managed to elect 
four of its candidates in the peasants ' curia. 126 
Yet despite these successes, the deck was stacked against the socialists 
in the general electoral college by the weighted franchise. Moreover, by 
refusing to enter into an agreement with the Pedecja (which, for example, 
would have defeated the Endecja in L6dZ), the socialists let pass their only 
opportunity to send delegates to the Second State Duma. Consequently, 
that delegation was dominated once again by the Endecja and its allies. 
Headed this time by Dmowski himself, who won one of Warsaw' s  two 
seats, the Polish Circle returned to St. Petersburg with a revised project of 
autonomy for the Kingdom of Poland. 
The experience of the Polish Circle in the Second State Duma proved 
even more frustrating. Its new autonomy project, far less ambitious than 
the first one and containing provisions of equal rights for the Kingdom's  
national minorities, nevertheless provoked an even more hostile reaction 
1 24. Quoted by Corrsin, "Polish-Jewish Relations,"  p. 43; Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posia­
daj�ce, pp. 546-548. 
1 25 .  Korzec, Walki rewolucyjne, p. 274. 
I 26. Wojcik, Ruch robotniczy na Lubelszczyt.nie, p. I 28 .  
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in the Russian press . 1 27 Thus when the tsar' s new prime minister, Peter 
Stolypin, suggested limited self-government based on the Kingdom' s  " lo­
cal peculiarities" as an alternative, Dmowski and the Polish Circle took 
the bait. On the critical issue of calling up 465,000 new conscripts to the 
colors, the Polish Circle ' s  pro-government position proved decisive in the 
voting. Recognizing that he held the swing vote between pro- and anti­
government forces, Dmowski then began to hold out the enticement of a 
pro-government vote on the state budget in exchange for Stolypin' s  support 
for the polonization of the state school system in the Kingdom. Rather than 
submit to what he viewed as political blackmail, Stolypin dissolved the 
Second State Duma and used the intervening period to rewrite the empire ' s  
electoral laws, in  the process reducing the Kindom' s  representation to 
twelve relatively harmless seats (two of which were now reserved for the 
"Russian" population). l28 
By the time elections were held for the Third State Duma in the fall of 
1907, the popular political enthusiasm generated by the revolution had 
vanished. Although the PPS-Left now joined the SDKPiL and the Bund 
on the ballot, the majority of voters declined to exercise their rights, which 
had been rendered farcical by the new electoral ordinance. The disap­
pointed hopes were reflected in Lublin Province, where fifty-five gminy 
failed to hold elections to the peasants' curia. 1 29 Only 25 percent of the 
eligible electorate cast ballots in Warsaw. Where the elections were un­
contested, the percentage of participating voters was considerably less . 1 3o 
Ironically, the unplanned "passive boycott" of the duma in the autumn of 
1907, inspired by popular apathy and disillusionment, proved more wide­
spread than the " active boycott" organized by the socialist parties eighteen 
months earlier. 
Like the resort to violence, participation in the Russian constitutional 
experiment had failed to change existing political conditions in the King­
dom of Poland, resulting ultimately in the widespread demoralization of 
1 27 .  Lukawski, "Rosyjskie ugrupowanie," pp. 1 5 8-1 59. Inside the Kingdom, the conser­
vative Catholic press took the Polish Circle to task for its inclusion in the autonomy project 
of equal rights for Jews; see przeglQd Katolicki, nos. 40 (October 3, 1 907) and 42 (October 
17 ,  1 907) : 629-630 and 66 1-662, respectively. 
1 28 .  On the Polish Circle ' s  misadventures in the Second State Duma, see Lukawski, Kolo 
Polskie, pp. 80-1 23, Chmielewski, Polish Question, pp. 36-38, and Alfred Levin, The Sec­
ond Duma: A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Exper­
iment (Hamden, Conn.,  1 966), pp. 1 28 ,  1 32 ,  1 39, 1 93 , 339-340. 
1 29 .  Wojcik, Ruch robotniczy na Lubelszczytnie, p. 1 29.  
1 30. Lukawski, Kolo Polskie, p. 1 29.  
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groups and individuals who, only a few years earlier, had become politi­
cally active for the first time. Yet like the mass mobilizations and dem­
onstrations of political enthusiasm of 1 905, the popular apathy of 1907 and 
the subsequent postrevolutionary years would also form part of the modem 
Polish political experience. On many future occasions, during the interwar 
period, the postwar communist era, and in the most recent postcommunist 
years, a majority of Poles would act in similar fashion. Similar, too, is the 
subsequent history of polarization and fragmentation, those other phenom­
ena that marked the birth of modem Polish mass politics in the first years 
of the twentieth century. 
Before 1905, the main issue was whether the "mass nation" could par­
ticipate in public life. After 1 905, the question has been the extent to which 
it would chose to, by what means (legal or illegal, peaceful or violent), 
and in how many different factions and configurations. The ultimate sig­
nificance of the Revolution of 1 905, therefore, is that, for the first time, 
the popular classes were confronted with such choices, thus altering forever 
the course of a political experience that for centuries had been the preserve 
of an ancient elite. 
C H A P  T E R S E V E  N 
T H E C H U R C H  A N D  
TH E R EV O LU TI O N  
F or the Roman Catholic Church-the only traditional "Polish" institution 
to survive successive nineteenth-century insurrections and subsequent 
. waves of Russian repression-adjusting to the demands of the modern era 
and the new postrevolution political culture proved especially troublesome. 
With its independence compromised, its finances controlled, its practices 
closely scrutinized, and its official ties with Rome forcibly severed by the 
Russian autocracy after the January Insurrection of 1 863, the Polish Church 
had, by the turn of the century, already found it increasingly difficult to 
satisfy the spiritual needs of its rapidly growing and changing flock. Al­
though Russian state policies did much to restrict the church' s  access to 
that flock, the ultramontane conservatism of the hierarchy, coupled with 
an aging clergy' s  addiction to routine, had further engendered an ignorance 
of and an indifference toward the modern set of social problems, aspira­
tions, and concerns confronting many Polish Catholics. l  
As a result, the church was surprised by its inability to exercise any 
significant influence on the population at the onset of the revolution in 
January and February of 1 905 . In subsequent months, the church experi­
enced a profound crisis that seemed to endanger its traditional relationship 
with Polish society. Faced with the prospect of complete political isolation 
on the one hand and a schismatic movement of disillusioned clergy on the 
other, the church was eventually forced to make room for reformist im-
L An earlier version of this chapter appeared under the title "The Revolution of 1 905-1907 
and the Crisis of Polish Catholicism," Slavic Review 47, 4 ( 1 988): 667-686, and is reprinted 
here, with some modifications, by permission of the American Association for the Advance­
ment of Slavic Studies. 
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pulses based on western European models and experience. In the end, the 
church survived the revolutionary crisis and even emerged somewhat 
strengthened. It failed, however, to take full advantage of the opportunities 
for Catholic social action afforded by the revolution, as old methods, ways 
of thinking, and personnel continued to dominate clerical practices. 
Church, State, and Society before the Revolution 
The crisis that suddenly confronted the church during the revolutionary 
era was the direct consequence of a long period of intellectual and organ­
izational stagnation at a time of rapid population growth, internal and ex­
ternal migration, urbanization, and industrialization. The failure of the 
church to adapt to the fluidly changing times had several causes, principal 
among them, the church' s  relationship with the Russian state after the 
January Insurrection of 1 863. The church' s  supporting role during that 
insurrection made it a likely target of subsequent Russian retribution. The 
post-January crackdown subsequently devastated the church in the King­
dom, tearing apart an organization carefully constructed over centuries. The 
exile of members of the hierarchy along with hundreds of diocesan chap­
lains and monks, the confiscation of church property, the liquidation of 
1 24 out of 176 cloisters, a decade of forced vacancies in six of seven 
bishoprics, the closing of the Theological Academy in Warsaw, and the 
placing of the hierarchy under the authority of the Theological College in 
St. Petersburg all had paralyzing effects on many of the church' s  activities.2 
Designed to deny the church an independent base and freedom of action 
in Russia 's  Polish provinces, these repressive measures also created a lead­
ership vacuum and an internal organizational instability that undermined 
traditional discipline. 
Russian policies also attempted to isolate the church in the Kingdom 
from the outside world and from its own parishioners. Official contacts, 
not only with Rome but with Catholic institutions elsewhere in Europe 
(including, most significantly, Prussian and Austrian Poland), were strictly 
prohibited. Inside the Kingdom, contacts between bishops and diocesan 
clergy were carefully restricted and supervised by the Russian government 
after 1 864. A bishop could not undertake a visitation of his diocese or 
appoint and transfer clergy without the permission of the state authorities. 
2 .  By 1 870, 227 clerics had been exiled, 37 sentenced to death, 200 imprisoned, and 44 
forced to flee the country; see Ryszard Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy chrZeScijanskie w Kro­
lestwie Polskim, 1905-1918 (Lublin, 1 978), pp. 38-39. 
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The nomination of professors at theological seminaries was also subject to 
state confirmation. Finally, the authorities created obstacles to the clergy' s  
access to  the Catholic population. Until 1905 , pastoral letters from the 
bishops to the faithful were prohibited. In addition, priests could not accept 
newcomers from other parishes on their own initiative (this at a time of 
dynamic migration), nor could they administer sacraments to the ill in 
"public places" such as hospitals and sanatoriums. 
If this were not enough, measures of russification were introduced to 
loosen the traditional bonds tying the Catholic Church to Polish language, 
history, and culture. The church was required to conduct its official busi­
ness and correspondence in the Russian language, which in turn justified 
the obligatory study of Russian at theological seminaries. Beginning in 
1 875, Russian also became the language of instruction for the study of 
history in the seminaries. Eventually, even the required prayers for the tsar 
and members of the imperial family had to be said in Russian. 
The Vatican initially responded to the Russian assault on the Polish 
church by breaking diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg, but in 1 882 
those ties were restored when Leo XIII reached an accommodation with 
the Russian government which brought little relief to the Polish clergy. 
Terrorized by Russian repression and virtually abandoned by Rome, the 
hierarchy in the Kingdom was forced to make a fundamental change in its 
political strategies toward the Russian state, to exchange its late- 1 850s and 
early-1 860s policy of moderate opposition and cautious confrontation for 
one based on fear of reprisal and calculated loyalism. The main fear, of 
course, was that even the most modest form of clerical protest could result 
in more drastic measures against Roman Catholics, including the closing 
of churches.3 Reinforcing the hierarchy' s  reluctance to cross swords again 
with the Russian government was the fact that Wincenty Chosciak-Popiel, 
the titular head of the church in Russian Poland as archbishop of Warsaw, 
shared in the bitter experience of Siberian exile after the January Insurrec­
tion. A policy of loyalism toward the autocracy seemed the only way to 
provide insurance against further repression. Repeated demonstrations of 
loyalty, it was also hoped, might eventually win the church some breathing 
room in its relationship with the state. 
The hierarchy' s  accommodation to the post-January status quo reflected 
at the time a larger trend in the opinion of a traditional political elite still 
3.  Such fears were not baseless. In 1 905, Warsaw governor-general George Skalon threat­
ened to close all churches that had become forums for patriotic demonstrations and the 
singing of national hymns; see APL KGL 1 905 : 1 8 ,  WGG to the Polish Bishops, September 
30 (October 1 3), 1 905. 
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unchallenged by the practitioners of modem mass politics, and not only in 
the Congress Kingdom but in Prussian and Austrian Poland as well. "Tri­
ple Loyalism, " the conservative-clerical backlash to the failure and tragic 
consequences of the January Insurrection, as mentioned in Chapter I ,  was 
intended to conciliate Poland' s  foreign rulers with expressions of political 
loyalty in exchange for modest concessions in the national-cultural sphere. 
Similarly, Warsaw positivism, the more liberal and progressive intellectual 
tendency of the immediate post-January era, also rejected political con­
frontation with the Russian authorities and concentrated instead on 
"organic work. " Thus, the church's  adoption of a loyalist stance and its 
resignation from political activity in pursuit of limited and "realistic" 
goals fit squarely the prevailing mood of the 1 870S and early 1 880s. 
The embrace of a loyalist strategy by the church nevertheless restricted 
its activities to the performance of narrowly defined pastoral duties, and 
even these became increasingly difficult to fulfill because of the weak state 
of church finances and rapid demographic change that outstripped church 
resources. The population explosion of the last decades of the nineteenth 
century in Russian Poland, combined with migration from the countryside 
to industrial centers, stretched traditional parish organization beyond its 
limits. By 1905, gigantic and overpopulated urban-industrial parishes had 
become commonplace. Holy Cross parish in L6dZ, frequently cited in the 
Catholic literature of the period as a prime example, contained 1 42,000 
parishioners served by only eight clergy.4 
To make matters worse, the demographic explosion in urban and indus­
trial parishes came at a time when the church's  independent financial base 
(which consisted mainly of income derived from landed property and tithes 
before the January Insurrection) had been largely eliminated and replaced 
by inadequate state subsidies .  The possibilities for new capital construction 
in these parishes were consequently limited. For example, the Warsaw 
district of Powisle in 1 905 contained one hundred thousand Catholics be­
longing to three parishes. Yet all of Powisle was served by only three 
small churches, the largest of which could accommodate only twenty-seven 
hundred believers at a time. Other major urban parishes suffering from 
severe shortages of clergy and places of worship included Resurrection 
parish in L6dZ (90,000 parishioners); Praga (82,000), Wola (65,000), and 
All Saints (62,000) in Warsaw; St. Zygmunt' s  in Cz�stochowa (50,000); 
Radom (34,000); and Sosnowiec (3 1 ,000) .5 The fulfillment of normal pas-
4· "Trudnosci duszpasterstwa w wielotysittcznych parafiach," Wiadomosci Pasterskie 3, 5 
( 1 907): 298-302. 
5 .  Ibid.; see also Aleksander Woycicki, ChrZeScijariski ruch robotniczy w Polsce (Poznan, 
192 1 ), pp. 7 1-72 .  
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toral duties in these primarily working-class parishes became nearly im­
possible, and thousands of parishioners were left with many of their 
religious needs unattended. When Franciscan missionaries from Krakow 
were allowed by the Russian authorities in 1 906 to visit urban-industrial 
parishes in the Kingdom, they were shocked to discover that most workers 
had not had their confessions heard in over a year.6 
Though many of the reasons for the sad situation in urban parishes can 
be attributed directly to the policies of the Russian government, the needs 
of urban parishioners were not the first priority of the church itself. Too 
often the limited funds available to the church for capital construction were 
spent instead on expensive monuments or shrines and the adornment of 
cathedrals, a practice termed " building the material church. " 7  Unfortu­
nately, the "material church" left many urban areas without even the most 
elementary wooden structures. 
Nor was the cadre policy of the hierarchy designed to meet the needs 
of urban parishioners. No effort was made to redress the growing imbal­
ance between the relatively large number of priests serving in rural areas 
as well as at the residences of bishops and the dramatically small number 
of clergy serving in the large urban-industrial parishes. At the same time, 
the ecclesiastical authorities tended to nominate as administrators to these 
parishes older men whose origins and experience were far removed from 
the cities and working-class elements of the population. Placement in urban 
parishes had become, in fact, a reward for years of service in poor, more 
sparsely populated rural parishes. Because the collection of fees (oplaty) 
for the performance of certain pastoral duties (marriages, funerals) was a 
major supplement to the otherwise meager income of the lower clergy, the 
large number of Catholics in an urban parish could lead to a marked im­
provement in the financial status of the new parish priest. 8 
These older chaplains, accustomed to the long-established practice in 
rural areas of sitting in their churches and waiting for their parishioners to 
come to them, possessed neither the energy nor the temperament to satisfy 
the more elusive religious needs of urban parishioners, let alone understand 
their specific social concerns and aspirations. Evidence drawn from files 
on clergymen which came across the desk of the Warsaw superintendent 
of police as part of the process of state confirmation of appointments and 
6. See Czeslaw Bogdalski, Wspomnienia z misyi odprawianych od 1900-1908 r. w Kr61es­
twie Polskim (Krakow, 1 908). 
7 .  Marian Fulman, "Wielkomiejskie i fabryczne parafie," Wiadomosci Pasterskie 2, 2 
( 1906) : n 
8. Ibid., p. 80. 
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transfers supports this conclusion. The aggregation of data from 1 24 of 
these files for the period 1 905-1 907 provides, moreover, an excellent pro­
file of the Warsaw clergy during the years of the revolution.9 The data 
demonstrate clearly that the Warsaw clergy was aging, nearly 60 percent 
of its members having been born before the January Insurrection of 1 863. 
In their fifties and sixties by 1 905, they had completed their seminary 
studies and entered the priesthood at a time of the most intense Russian 
repression against the church. Even more striking are their geographic and 
social origins: more than 90 percent originated in the provincial nobility. 
As might be expected, only a small minority (slightly more than 10 per­
cent) engaged in extrapastoral social activities, which were, of course, scru­
pulously noted by the police. Significantly, those deemed "active" outside 
their churches (thirteen priests) came from a variety of social backgrounds, 
not excluding the nobility, and were born without exception after the Jan­
uary Insurrection. 
In addition to the effects of age and social background, a profound in­
tellectual inertia also left the church ill equipped to deal with major social 
issues once they had been so forcefully raised by the revolution. The pro­
hibition of all official contacts with Rome and European Catholicism iso­
lated the church in the Kingdom from the leading currents of contemporary 
Catholic thought. Hence, at a time when the rest of Catholic Europe (in­
cluding Prussian and Austrian Poland) was discussing and putting into 
limited practice the social encyclicals of Leo XIII, especially Rerum No­
varum with its call for adapting the church' s  mission to the industrial age, 
the "social question" had yet to find an audience among the overwhelming 
majority of Catholic clergy in Russian Poland. Because of state censorship, 
Rerum Novarum itself was not discussed in the Catholic press in the King­
dom until the revolution, fourteen years after its pronouncement. The first 
bishop to comment officially on the "social question" was Tomasz Kulin­
ski of Kielce diocese, but this came in late November 1 905, ten months 
into the Revolution. \0 Furthermore, the curricula of Catholic seminaries 
completely ignored social studies before the revolution, leaving the clergy 
as a whole intellectually unprepared to absorb the Catholic social teachings 
9· APW ZOW 1 549, 1 552,  1 556--7, 1 563, 1 565, 1 577, 1 579, 1 586, 1 588, 1 592, 1 594-6, 
1 598-1600, 1 602, 1 606, 1 6 17 ,  1 6 1 9, 1 627, 1 629-33, 1 636, 1 638, 1 640-3, 1 645, 1 649-50, 
1 655-6, 1 659, 1 663-4, 1 672, 1 675, 1 678, 1 680, 1 682-4, 1 688---9, 1 695-7, 1 701-2,  1 704, 
1 707---9, 1 7 1 3 , 1 7 1 6--7, 1 72 1 ,  1 723-4, 1 726, 1 728, 1 730, 1 732-3, 1 735-7, 1 744, 1 747, 1 750, 
1 752,  1 754, 1 76 1 ,  1 763-7, 1 770-3, 1 776--8, 1 780-1 ,  1 788---90, 1 795-6, 1 799, 1 80 1 ,  1 807, 
1 809, 1 8 1 2, 1 8 14, 1 8 1 7, 1 822,  1 824, 1 826, 1 829, 1 832-4, 1 840, 1 842, 1 853, 1 862, 1 878, 
1 882, 1 884, 1 889, 1 900, 1 902-3, 1 907. 
10. ADK AK OA-2/9, Bishop of Kielce to the Diocesan Clergy, November 23, 1 905. 
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of Wilhelm Kette1er, Gaspard Marmillod, Henry Manning, James Gibbons, 
Ludwik Windhorst, and other contemporary theologiansY 
This is not to imply that there were no Catholic social initiatives un­
dertaken in the Kingdom of Poland before the revolution. The indefatigable 
Honorat KoZminski, father superior of the Capuchin monastery of Nowe 
Miasto, organized a network of semiconspiratorial assemblies of monks 
and nuns which acted as a substitute for the cashiered cloisters earlier 
engaged in social work. By 1 895, sixteen such assemblies had been formed, . 
including the Factory Sisters and the Servants of Mary, both active among 
urban industrial workers. At the turn of the century, Father Karol Blizinski 
initiated missionary activity aimed specifically at the Warsaw proletariat, 
organizing two religious conferences for workers attended by three thou­
sand and five thousand people respectively in 1 898 and 1 899. 1 2  Undoubt­
edly these initiatives touched as many if not more Polish workers than the 
prerevolutionary socialist movement. Nevertheless, these initiatives were 
uninformed by a broader theory or plan of action and lacked the official 
support of the hierarchy. As such they were bound to remain sporadic, 
isolated, and confined to a few thousand workers. 
A Church in Crisis 
This long period of organizational stagnation, political paralysis, and 
intellectual inertia prepared the way for a church crisis during the revolu­
tion which took several forms:  the striking unpopularity of the church' s  
continuing adherence to loyalist policies toward the Russian government; 
the embrace of a new and-in the eyes of the church-"heretical" faith 
called socialism by tens of thousands of Polish workers; the end of church 
monopoly over popular opinion in the countryside as a result of the pen­
etration and expansion of the nationalist and populist movements; and fi­
nally, internal divisions among the clergy, including the first and only 
schism in the history of Polish Catholicism since the Reformation. 
In 1904 there already were clear signs that the church hierarchy' s  po­
sition of calculated loyalism not only lacked popular support but could 
provoke violent opposition. The official support of the hierarchy for Russia 
in its war against Japan, symbolized by Archbishop Popiel ' s  sponsorship 
1 I .  The problem of absorbing Christian sociology "in one gulp" was addressed by Ks. K. 
Max, "Dzialalnosc spoleczna kaplana,"  Wiadomosci Pasterskie 2 ,  6 ( 1 906) : 32 1-328.  
12 .  Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy, pp. 46--5 1 ,  59--60. 
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of a train of medical supplies and personnel to the Far Eastern front, flew 
in the face of popular sympathy for Japan, growing resistance to mobili­
zation, and a general boycott of government fund-raising efforts . Hostility 
to the church' s  policy became glaring when, at the end of March 1 904, 
windows were smashed in the Warsaw homes of Prince Wlodzimierz Cze­
twertytiski, Baron Leopold Kronenberg, Ludwik Gorski, and other "con­
ciliationists " authorized by the archbishop to collect contributions for the 
medical train. 1 3  
The lower clergy, meanwhile, displayed little enthusiasm for the Russian 
war effort in general and for contributions to the archbishop 's  medical train 
in particular. In reports by provincial governors to the chancellory of the 
Warsaw governor general, the attitude of the parish clergy toward the war 
was described merely as "correct. "  Provincial governors complained that 
the clergy lacked fervor, expressing neither sympathy for nor opposition 
to the cause of Russian arms in the Far East. Typical was the behavior of 
Father Jozef Szcz�snik, who in the Church of the Holy Cross in LodZ read 
imperial wartime proclamations in such a muffled voice that police con­
stable Pilipenko, sitting a couple of rows from the pulpit, could not hear 
a word. 14 
The hierarchy's  failure to elicit support for the Russian war effort in 
1904 was followed by its complete inability to influence an aroused public 
opinion in 1 905 . Appeals to striking workers in January and February to 
return to their jobs had no effect and displayed a woeful lack of familiarity 
with or concern for working-class conditions. The episcopate willingly at­
tribut�d the cause of the strikes to outside agitation, completely ignoring 
depressed wages and exploitative practices in the factories . 1 5  Naturally, that 
appearance of siding with management only fed the anticlerical propaganda 
mills of the socialist parties, which in turn served only to reinforce the 
episcopate ' s  obsession with socialist "agitators" and "subversives. " 
The hierarchy' S  opposition to the simultaneous strike and boycott move­
ment against the russified school system proved even more unpopular than 
its useless appeals to the workers. The archbishop ' s  pastoral letter of July 
27, 1 905, while expressing sympathy toward the desire of Polish youth to 
have instruction in their native language, nevertheless called for an end to 
1 3 .  AGAD KGGW 2280, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the Acting WGG, March 1 8  
(3 1 ), 1 904· 
14 .  AGAD KGGW 2308, Piotrkow Governor to the WGG, February 28 (March 1 2), 1 904. 
1 5 .  AGAD AB 23 I I , plik XIII, Pastoral Letter of the Archbishop of Warsaw to the Polish 
People, undated; see also Archbishop Popiel ' s  appeal, "Or\)dzie Arcypasterskie," Przeglf,!d 
Katolicki, no. I I (March 1 6, 1 905): 1 54. 
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the boycott of the Russian schools, arguing that "a  bad school is better 
than no school at all ."  16 Instead of heeding the archbishop 's  advice, public 
opinion in the Kingdom greeted his letter with protests from across the 
political spectrum. 17  
The success of socialism in capturing the imaginations of thousands of 
Polish workers during the revolution was, from the church' s  point of view, 
the most alarming aspect of its " troubled times. " Given the weakness of 
the church and its mission in urban-industrial areas, the popularity of so­
cialism during this period can be at least partly explained by its ability to 
pose as a new religion. The Polish socialist movement' s  active and largely 
unconscious borrowing of religious symbols and metaphors; its self­
reference as a "new faith,"  a "new creed, " and a "new gospel" ;  its quite 
conscious use of traditional religious melodies for ' :proletarian hymns" -
all were important, even crucial, elements in its efforts to reach industrial 
workers in the first years of the twentieth century. And whereas the tra­
ditional religion seemed to offer only old, mechanical sacramental ism, the 
"apostles" of socialism conjured up visions of "the Kingdom of God on 
earth," which is how they often described their final goa1 . I S  In this sense, 
the popularity of socialism during the revolutionary era cannot be equated 
with a tendency toward a decline of religiosity among Polish workers. On 
the contrary, the spiritual needs of a still very traditional working class, 
although insufficiently attended by traditional religious institutions, were 
greater than ever before, as demonstrated by an equally enthusiastic recep­
tivity to later Catholic missionary activity. 1 9  A large proportion of Polish 
workers during the revolution, unlike their political and religious leaders, 
did not necessarily perceive a contradiction between socialism and Ca­
tholicism. Rather, the evidence suggests that socialist sympathies and tra-
1 6. AGAD AB, druk 257, The Archbishop of Warsaw to Polish Parents, June 10, 1 905. 
Popiel ' s  position contrasted starkly with that of the episcopate in Prussian Poland, which 
despite its similarly loyalist inclinations, publicly condemned Prussian school policies aimed 
at germanization and tacitly supported the Poznanian school strikes of 1 906-1 907; see Wil­
liam W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 
1772-1914 (Chicago, 1 980), p. 1 83 .  
17 .  At the same time, however, Archbishop Popiel urged the tsar through private channels 
to allow the introduction of Polish into the schools; see Tadeusz Krawczak, "Rewolucja a 
Zycie spoleczno-religijne: Powstanie mariawitow" (Seminar paper, Institute of History, War­
saw University, 1985), p. 10.  
18 .  Andrzej Chwalba, "Krzyz i czerwony sztandar," Znak 341 (April 1 983):  65 1 .  
19 .  In the large working-class parish of Chojny near LodZ, fifteen to twenty thousand par­
ticipated in evening Masses conducted by Krakow Franciscans at the end of 1 907; see 
Bogdalski, Wspomnienia, p. 322.  
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ditional religious beliefs could be and were entirely compatible in the 
working-class culture of the early twentieth century.20 
Yet precisely because socialism posed as a new religion that could solve 
not only socioeconomic problems but metaphysical ones as well, the Cath­
olic Church treated it as the most dangerous of heresies. In the pastoral 
letters of the bishops to the Polish population and the diocesan clergy 
during the revolution, the socialists were seldom referred to by name but 
were labeled conversely as "false prophets," "agitators of evil ," and 
"wolves in sheep ' s  clothing. "2 l The lower clergy could be even less spar­
ing in epithets, frequently condemning the socialists as " messengers of 
Satan" or personifications of the "horned enemy" himself.22 Yet simplistic 
condemnations of socialism in pastoral letters and from the pulpit, even 
the use of confessionals against suspected socialist sympathizers, could not 
alter the fact that the church was failing to minister to the religious needs 
of the urban population and only served to illuminate its ignorance of the 
conditions in which that population lived and worked. 
The church also began to lose ground in the countryside to the compet­
ing ideologies of nationalism and populism. Lulled to sleep by its ancient 
position of unquestioned authority in the villages and the traditional indif­
ference of the peasantry to national issues, the church was caught off guard 
by the awakening of national consciousness among rural inhabitants during 
the revolution. As a consequence, the village clergy exercised little influ­
ence on the movement in the communes for local self-government and the 
polonization of rural institutions . The leadership of the gmina action move­
ment, especially in 1905, included surprisingly few parish priests .23 Instead 
there were several reported cases of active opposition of individual cler­
gymen to the gmina movement. A few even informed the Russian author­
ities of "illegal" actions taken by communal assemblies.24 In retaliation, 
the homes of such priests became targets of local vandals. 
20.  For an excellent analysis of the confluence of religious and class consciousness among 
Polish workers during the revolution, see Maria Dorota Kowalska, " Swiadomosc religijna 
klasy robotniczej Krolestwa Polskiego w latach 1904-1907,"  przeglfJd Powszechny 5 (May 
1986) : 2 1 3-224. For a more general discussion of popular religiosity at the turn of the 
century, see Daniel Olszewski, "Stan i perspektywy nad religijnosci� XIX i pocz�tku XX 
wieku," Nasza Przeszlosc 59 ( 1 983): 45-67. 
2 1 .  ADK AK OA-2/ 1 3 , Bishop of Kujawy-Kalisz to the Catholic Population, December 20, 
1905; ADP PWD, Bishop of Plock to the Polish People, December 3 1 ,  1905 . 
22 .  ADK KD OD-2/ 1 .  
23 .  Richard D .  Lewis, "Revolution in the Countryside: Russian Poland, 1 905-1 906," Carl 
Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 506 ( 1 986): 7 .  
24 .  Such instances were reported in Polak, no.  9 (September 1905); see also Stanislaw 
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If the attitude of the church toward the gmina movement was ambiva­
lent at best, its reaction to the agrarian strikes that swept over large parts 
of rural Poland in the spring of 1 905 was unambiguously hostile. The 
church viewed all strikes, industrial and agrarian, as violations of divinely 
sanctioned property rights as well as of the seventh and tenth command­
ments. Yet the vehemence with which it greeted strikes by farm laborers, 
unquestionably the most impoverished segment of the entire population, 
can only be explained by the noble origins of the vast majority of the Po­
lish clergy. For similar reasons, the church denounced arbitrary actions by 
peasants to settle long-standing disputes with noble landowners over ease­
ment rights. In a letter of March 1 905 to the diocesan clergy, the bishop 
of Kielce portrayed the Polish countryside as a scene of wild revolution­
ary anarchy, a place of "vigilantism in the place of justice, hatred in the 
place of love for one 's  neighbor, violence in the place of order. "25 This 
reaction from one of the more politically moderate members of the epis­
copate typified the church' s  response to the agrarian social issues of the 
revolution. 
Such attitudes were no help to the 'church in its efforts to prevent the 
nationalist and populist movements from making significant inroads in the 
Polish countryside, even though the allegiance of rural inhabitants to 
the church in matters spiritual remained unshaken. Actually, the church 
shared a certain common ground with Polish nationalism and its chief 
exponents in the National Democratic Party. Both favored a "realistic" 
approach to the Russian governrnent, seeking to move it to concessions 
while strongly opposing efforts to overthrow it by revolutionary means. 
Both despised the socialist movement and assumed combative positions 
toward those political parties advancing and promoting it. Both were fun­
damentally anti-Semitic. Still, the church distrusted the nationalist move­
ment, particularly its secular emphasis, its past links to freemasonry, and 
its demagogic appeal to the masses. Despite the avowedly pro-Catholic 
tactical stance the National Democrats assumed during the revolution, the 
bishops continued to denounce the ideology of "integral nationalism" 
which called upon the church to play the role of a "national institution" 
subordinate to the " national interest. ' '26 As a result, conservative Catholic 
KalabiIlski and Feliks Tych, eds. ,  Walki chlop6w Kr6lestwa Polskiego w rewolucji 1905-
1907, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1 958), pp. 892-894. 
25. ADK AK OA-2/9. 
26. On the relationship between the Endecja and the Roman Catholic Church, see Bogumil 
Grott, "Rola katolicyzmu w ideologii obozu narodowego w swietle pism jego ideolog6w i 
krytyki katolickiej ,"  Dzieje Najnowsze 1 2 , 1 ( 1 980): 63---94; and Teodor Mistewicz, "Rola 
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publicists did not hesitate to label Polish nationalism "areligious," "pa­
gan," and "pantheistic," though they refrained from condemning it out­
right as a heresy (a charge reserved for socialism)P The well-publicized 
conflict of the Catholic hierarchy with the National Democrats, peaking in 
their bitter dispute over the role of the church in a private Polish school 
system, and particularly in the Polska Macierz Szkolna (see Chapter 5), 
clearly illuminated the differences between the two camps for all those 
who cared to see. The church' s  disapproval, however, did little to under­
mine the growing popularity of nationalism among rural Polish Catholics, 
who voted overwhelmingly for the National Democrats in successive elec­
tions to the Russian State Duma in 1 906 and 1 907. 
In its numbers, territorial range, and organizational depth, the populist 
movement posed a far lesser threat than nationalism to the church' s  tra­
ditional position in the countryside. As already noted, the Polish People ' s  
Union, the political arm of  the populist movement, lasted barely two years 
before it was effectively suppressed by the Russian authorities in early 
1 907 . Yet because of populism's  social and class overtones, including its 
support for agrarian strikes and radical land reform, the church treated it 
as an enemy far more dangerous than Polish nationalism. In particular, the 
populist slogan "Sami sobie " (We by ourselves) was interpreted by church 
officials to mean not only " without the nobility" but also " without the 
clergy. "28 The church therefore sought to remove populist publications 
such as Siewba (Sowing) and Zaranie (The Dawn) from peasant cottages 
and to eliminate schools and cooperative circles organized by the populists. 
In Kielce diocese, the bishop resorted to the excommunication of four 
populists; elsewhere, the clergy, acting on its own, often refused to ad­
minister the sacraments to readers of the populist press.29 This was not 
enough, however, to prevent the growth of a populist readership in the 
years after the revolution, nor was it sufficient to restore rural parish priests 
to their previous position of unchallenged authority in the villages. 
While the church focused on the external challenges posed by the mass 
political movements to its traditional position in society, it remained rel-
religii i kosciola rzymsko-katolickiego w swietle pubiicystyki poiskiego ruchu nacjonalis­
tycznego," Kwartalnik Historyczny 9 1 ,  4 ( 1 985): 765-789. 
27·  "Blt:dy 'Mysli Poiskiej , ' "  Przegl�d Katolicki, no. 39 (September 27, 1 906) : 593-595; 
Ks. dr. WI. Namiotko, "Demokracya narodowa i jej zasady," ibid. , no. 5 (January 3 1 ,  1 907) : 
69-7 1 .  
28 .  Ks. A. BrykczyTIski, "Wai:ny obowiQZek," Przegl�d Katolicki, no. 5 2  (December 26, 
1 907) :  827· 
29. Zenon Kmiecik, Ruch oiwiatowy na wsi: Kr61estwo Polskie, 11)05-1914 (Warsaw, 
1 963), pp. 1 40--147· 
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atively blind to the far greater danger of growing divisions and dissent 
within its own ranks. At one end of this spectrum, the revolution promoted 
the emergence of what was later called the "modernist" tendency, per­
sonified almost totally by the figure of Izydor Wyslouch.30 A Capuchin 
monk and a product of one of the semiconspiratorial assemblies organized 
by his father superior, Honorat KoZminski, Wyslouch appointed himself 
the "conscience" of the church during the years of the revolution. Writing 
for lay publications under the pseudonym of Antoni Szech, Wyslouch sub­
jected the church and its conservative social policies to a scathing criticism. 
He also expressed strong sympathies for the ideals, if not the practices, 
of the socialist movement and collaborated openly with various populist 
enterprises. Perhaps only a tiny fraction of the Polish clergy shared 
Wyslouch' s  social radicalism, but his articulate attacks on the church' s  
inertia in the face o f  contemporary social and political questions had a 
much broader appeal, particularly among reform-minded members of the 
younger clergy.3! 
Alarmed by the resonance of Wyslouch' s  uncensored criticisms, the 
church authorities finally took disciplinary action against him in the spring 
of 1906. In April, Wyslouch was sent to a Jesuit academy in Innsbruck for 
" continuing education. " At the same time, he agreed under pressure to 
submit all of his future writings to ecclesiastical censorship. With 
Wyslouch effectively silenced, the conservative Catholic press embarked 
on what amounted to a mud-slinging campaign against him.32 To respond 
to his attackers, Wyslouch returned to Russian Poland at the end of 1 907, 
having decided once again to circumvent the censors. Within a year, how­
ever, Wyslouch was forced to leave the Capuchin order, and all of his 
publications were placed on the Index. Henceforth, the Polish church' s  
struggle against " Szechism" in  the Kingdom was made synonymous with 
growing conservative attacks on "modernism" in larger European Catholic 
debates.33 
30. For a popular but slanted biography of Wyslouch, see Henryk Syska, Przechodzieri z 
gory duchu: 0 ksi�dzu Antonim Szechem (Warsaw, 1 955). A more scholarly approach to his 
career may be found in J6zef Keller and Zygmunt Poniatowski, eds. ,  Studia 0 modernistach 
katolickich (Warsaw, 1 968), pp. 1 69-236. 
3 1 .  See Marian Fulman, " Szakale, czy ludzie?" Wiadomosci Pasterskie 3, 2 ( 1 907): 1 24-
1 26, for an impassioned defense of Wyslouch' s  "pure and honest" intentions as well as his 
striving for "Catholic reform that would correct the impotence of the Polish church at a 
most critical moment for society. " 
32 .  See esp. Ks. Kajetan Szymkiewicz, "List otwarty," przeg/qd Katolicki. no. 1 8  (May 3,  
1 906) : 268-270; and J. Popiel, "0 p. A. Szechu, i do niego,"  ibid., no.  45 (November 8, 
1 906) : 68g-69 1 .  
33 .  Bishop Apolinary Wnukowski of Plock, even before Wyslouch' s  departure from the 
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At the opposite extreme from "modernism" was the Mariavite move­
ment, led by a group of forty young priests whose rebellion against the 
hierarchy and traditional discipline was based on an idealized medieval 
model of a devout and ascetic clergy. Whereas Wyslouch inveighed against 
the church for ignoring the affairs of this world, the Mariavites (from the 
Latin Maria vita) believed that the clergy' s  preparation of Catholics for 
the other world was lacking in devotion. Yet the Mariavites also struck a 
social chord in their substitution of Polish for Latin in the liturgy, their 
opposition to receiving fees for the performance of routine pastoral duties, 
and their attacks on the "noble" lifestyles of the parish clergy. And in 
contrast to Wyslouch, the Mariavite clergy eventually commanded the al­
legiance of tens of thousands of believers in twenty-two parishes.34 
The source and inspiration of the Mariavite movement can be traced to 
the visions of the nun Felicja Kozlowska, whose career, like Wyslouch's ,  
began in one of Honorat KoZminski ' s  semi secret assemblies. Engaged in 
missionary and social work among the parishioners of Plock, Kozlowska 
by 1 900 had convinced several young vicars-many of them recent grad­
uates of the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg-of the validity of her 
visions. They were also attracted to the practices Kozlowska derived from 
those visions, which she deemed essential to salvation: continual adoration 
of the Most Holy Sacrament through daily personal communion and the 
daily intercession of Mary achieved through round-the-clock prayer shifts 
of believers in their churches or chapels. From the beginning, Kozlowska's  
followers among the clergy were characterized by an extraordinary pastoral 
zeal that gained for the movement many adherents, particularly in urban 
and mixed urban-rural parishes, where the church had not shown much 
initiative. The Mariavites, by contrast, served free meals to the poor, 
opened up shelters for the children of working-class families, and organized 
cooperative shops among the unemployed.35 
Initially the Mariavite movement attracted little attention from the hi­
erarchy and other members of the clergy. Only once the movement began, 
without the approval of the episcopate, to assume organizational form, 
through the creation of the Assemblies of Mariavite Chaplains and Mar­
iavite Sisters, did the church react. In the summer of 1903, the archbishop 
of Warsaw transferred six Mariavite priests to less densely populated rural 
Capuchin order, banned his publications along with other "modernist" brochures, books, 
and newspapers that "aim at the overthrow of revealed religion" ;  see APD PWD, Bishop 
of Plock to the Diocesan Clergy, December 3 1 ,  1 907. 
34. " Statystyka sekty mariawitow,"  Miesi�cznik Pasterski Plocki, no. 10  ( 1 906) : 282-283.  
35 .  " Spoleczna dzialalnosc Matki Marii Franciszki," Mariawita 6, 3 ( 1962): 29-3 1. 
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parishes. Shortly thereafter, in a letter to the diocesan clergy, Archbishop 
Popiel warned against participation in the Mariavite assemblies, which, he 
argued, had violated church discipline and had departed from the principles 
of Catholic theology.36 Meanwhile, the Mariavites strove hard behind the 
backs of the Polish episcopate for formal recognition of their movement 
in Rome, and in August 1 903, Pius X granted a special audience to 
Kozlowska and seventeen accompanying priests. The Polish bishops, nev­
ertheless, quickly regained the pope ' s  ear through intensive lobbying. In 
August 1 904, a year after his audience with Kozlowska, Pius rejected her 
visions and dissolved the Assembly of Mariavite Chaplains, leaving the 
fate of the Mariavite Sisters in the hands of the Polish episcopate.37 For­
malized by a November 1 904 decree of the Holy Inquisition, the papal 
decision also banned any further contacts between Kozlowska and her ad­
herents among the clergy. 
The following January the Mariavites issued a formal declaration of 
submission to the sentences of the Inquisition. Despite the submission to 
Rome, however, the subordination of the Mariavites to episcopal authority 
at home proved only superficial. Instead they redoubled their pastoral ac­
tivity, spreading further the censored Mariavite cults in predominantly 
mixed rural-urban parishes. They also began to criticize the "depraved" 
lifestyles of the non-Mariavite clergy openly from the pulpit, propagating 
among parishioners a new model of the priesthood. As a result, the epis­
copate in January 1 906 suspended the Mariavite priests in their functions, 
and both sides once again turned to the Vatican. There, the Polish bishops 
continued to enjoy the upper hand. On April 5, 1 906, Pius X issued an 
encyclical against the Mariavites, giving them fifteen days to unite with 
the church and demanding their submission to interviews with their bish­
ops .  When Father Jan Michal Kowalski, in the name of six Mariavite 
priests in Plock diocese, rejected these demands, the first schism in Polish 
Catholicism since the Reformation became a fact, formalized by the In­
quisition' s  official sentence of excommunication on December 5, 1 906.38 
Meanwhile, the revolution had brought laymen into the quarrel between 
the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the rebellious Mariavite priests . Denied 
a hearing in Rome, the Mariavites turned for support directly to the pop­
ulation, resorting frequently to the slogans of class struggle popularized by 
the revolution. For its part, the church also sought to mobilize public opin-
36. Krawczak, "Rewolucja a Zycie spoleczno-religijne," p. 14 .  
37. Ibid., p. 15 .  The Assembly of Mariavite Sisters was dissolved in Plock diocese but 
allowed to continue a tenuous existence elsewhere. 
38. ADK AK OA-2/9. 
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ion through pastoral letters to the faithful, agitation from the pulpit, and a 
series of vicious attacks on the Mariavite "heresy" in the Catholic press .39 
With inflamed passions leading to a search for more radical solutions on 
both sides, Catholic loyalists and Mariavites engaged in a struggle for the 
control of churches, chapels, shrines, and cemeteries which at times as­
sumed the form of fratricidal warfare. The most violent incident occurred 
in the Warsaw suburb of Leszno, where in April 1 906 fighting between 
Mariavites and their Catholic opponents for control of the parish church 
left eight dead. The Russian authorities finally intervened at the end of 
1906 to contain the religious strife and bloodletting.40 The Mariavites 
achieved legal recognition by the tsarist government in exchange for the 
restoration of disputed places of worship to Roman Catholic jurisdiction. 
For its part the autocracy gained a potential weapon to use as leverage 
against the church in the postrevolutionary period. 
Revolution and Catholic Reform 
The Mariavite controversy and schism, however costly to the church, 
was not entirely detrimental, for it forced a reexamination of clerical 
practices, lifestyles, and ethical behavior. In particular, it led to a recon­
sideration of the "devotionalist" direction of theological training in the 
seminaries, which advocates of reform held partially responsible for the 
Mariavite deviation.41 It also focused attention on the generation gap and 
on a lack of communication between older and younger members of the 
clergy. Similarly, the successes of the mass political movements during the 
revolution pressured the church to rethink its position on national and so­
cial issues and to build new organizational bridges to the popular classes. 
Ironically, the revolution, while confronting the Polish church with one of 
the most profound crises in its history, also created opportunities for the 
church to emerge from that crisis. 
Most significantly, the revolution loosened some of the more stringent 
state controls on the Catholic Church and Catholic religious practices. The 
39. See Ks. Br. 0., "Wichrzenia herezyi 'mankietnikow, ' ' ' Przegl�d Katolicki, no. 9 
(March I ,  1 906) : 1 25-1 27; as well as "Pseudomarjawici, ich poc�tek i odst�pstwo od 
Kosciola," Miesifcznik Pasterski Plocki, no. 1 ( 1 906) : 1 8-32 .  
40. Already, by  the end of  February 1 906, the Warsaw governor-general had issued a cir­
cular to provincial and police authorities, instructing them to remain neutral in the religious 
quarrels of the population but firmly act to prevent and eliminate incidents of violence; see 
APW ZOW 1 938.  
41 .  Ks.  M. Szkopowski, "Czarny mankiet, " Wiadorrwsci Pasterskie I ,  IO  ( 1 905) :  6 1 3-6 1 9. 
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most important development affecting religion during the revolution, the 
Edict of Religious Toleration issued by the tsar in April 1 905, eased a 
number of the restrictions against the church which had accumulated since 
the January Insurrection of 1 863.  Designed to retain the neutrality of non­
Orthodox Christian churches, if not their loyalty, during the Russian gov­
ernment's  struggle against revolutionary forces throughout the empire, the 
edict specifically conceded to the Catholic Church in Poland some much­
needed breathing room. Separate statutes involving the construction of 
places of worship in ethnically mixed areas, clerical appointments and 
transfers, religious processions, missionary activity, the formation of relig­
ious brotherhoods, and the travel of clergy outside their parishes were 
liberalized. Legal limits were also placed on punitive action the state could 
take against individual priests, excluding them, for example, from hard 
labor camps and Siberian exile .42 
The principal provisions of the edict, however, rescinded earlier meas­
ures of russification. In this regard, state recognition of the right of Ortho­
dox subjects to convert to another Christian denomination allowed the 
long-persecuted Uniates, residing mainly in the ethnically Byelorussian and 
Ukrainian counties of the Kingdom's  eastern provinces, to join the Roman 
Catholic Church. As previously mentioned, the edict also restored the ex­
clusive right of Catholic clergy to provide Polish-language religious in­
struction in the public schools.43 Although this latter concession could 
hardly satisfy the national aspirations of a society striving for Polish as the 
language of instruction of all subjects, it went a long way toward meeting 
the church' s  own more-limited agenda. 
Besides the Edict of Toleration with its specific concessions, other de­
velopments during the revolution were beneficial to the Catholic Church. 
The relaxation of press laws and state censorship enabled the church to 
expand its publications dramatically and to discuss previously prohibited 
topics, including social and national issues. Further concessions on edu­
cation, eventually permitting the formation of private schools with Polish 
as the language of instruction for most subjects, vastly improved the 
church' s chances to influence the direction of youth. And finally, the Oc­
tober Manifesto, with its provisions on freedom of assembly and associa­
tion, allowed the church to sponsor the formation of new organizational 
entities to reach Catholics whose needs could no longer be accommodated 
solely by traditional institutions and practices. 
42. "Zniesienie ograniczen religijnych," PrzeglQd Katolicki, no. 17, supplement (April 27, 
1 905). 
43. Ibid., no. I S, supplement (May 4, 1 905). 
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Meanwhile, events and an aroused public opinion pressured the church 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the revolution. As the 
palpable unpopularity of its loyalist policies clearly demonstrated, the 
church could no longer afford to ignore the national and self-governing 
aspirations of Polish society, especially as those aspirations were frequently 
expressed in patriotic demonstrations and popular protests at Catholic 
places of worship.44 Once the Edict of Toleration allowed the church 
greater maneuverability in its relationship with the Russian state, the 
church did begin to rethink its position and gradually, but ever so carefully, 
to identify itself with selected national causes. Although this change came 
about only after the October Manifesto, the shift in policy from calculated 
loyalism to cautious support of "national work" did produce some im­
mediate benefits. For example, the episcopate ' s  quiet abandonment of its 
opposition to the school strikes and boycott, replaced by public calls and 
private lobbying for Polish language concessions, helped ensure for the 
church an important voice in the subsequent debate over a future private 
Polish school system. Similarly, the church recovered some of its lost 
ground in the countryside as the clergy began to involve itself in larger 
numbers in gmina action.45 But the most important consequence of the 
church' s  shift in strategy came after the imposition of martial law through­
out the Kingdom in December 1 905, when a growing number of Poles, 
again denied the opportunity for legal and unrestricted political activity, 
turned to the church as a means of expressing their national identity. In 
1906, the first full year of martial law, the number of pilgrims to the ancient 
shrine of the Black Madonna in Cz�stochowa jumped fourfold in compar­
ison with the previous year (from 262,04 1 pilgrims in 1905 to 1 ,064,232 
pilgrims in 1 906) .46 
Although partial accommodation to the national aspirations of society 
enabled the church to offer a more viable alternative to the program of the 
National Democrats, the crisis of the church in industrial centers as well 
as the challenge of socialism could be alleviated only by the adoption of 
a countervailing social evangelism. Given the nature of the times and the 
44. Demonstrators often demanded crosses, church emblems, and banners from the clergy 
as well as the participation of priests in patriotic processions; see ADK AK OA-21 I 2 , Cir­
cular of the General Consistory of the Warsaw Archdiocese to the Clergy, November 15 ,  
1905 . 
45 . E.g., some clergy in Piotrkow Province, supported by the bishop of Kujawy-Kalisz, 
Stanislaw Zdzitowiecki, "illegally" began to record civil documents in Polish as an act of 
solidarity with the gmina movement; see APL KGP 1 565. 
46. APL KGP 1 566, Cz�stochowa Chief of Police to the Piotrkow Governor, October I I  
(24), 1 906. 
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institution, the only available model came in the form recommended by 
Catholic social teachings in western Europe. This meant, above all, the 
popularization and realization of the social encyclicals of Leo XIII. 
A group of moderate reformers, also drawn primarily from the younger 
ranks of the Polish clergy, emerged during the revolution to assume such 
a mission. Predicating their efforts on the support of the episcopate (in 
contrast to Wyslouch and the Mariavites), these reformers, or " social 
workers" (spolecznicy) as they called themselves, sought to use the con­
cessions granted to the church by the tsarist government for the broad 
implementation of Christian Democracy on Western (particularly French, 
Belgian, and German) models and experience. Closer to home, they drew 
practical lessons from the social and political activism of the Catholic 
clergy in Prussian Poland, who through their involvement in institutions 
of "organic work" had fully maintained for the church a position of na­
tional leadership.47 Grouped around the monthly periodical Wiadomosci 
Pasterskie (Pastoral News) and led by Marian Fulman and Bronislaw Mar­
janski among others, the clerical reformers in the Kingdom also favored 
wide-ranging changes in the curricula of theological seminaries, in the 
personnel and recruitment policies of the hierarchy, and in the financial 
practice of " building the material church. '  '48 
To promote their ideas as well as the discussion of national and social 
issues, the reformers became vocal advocates of frequent conferences of 
the clergy at all levels. As an intended model, the reformers organized a 
nationwide congress of the clergy which convened in Warsaw on Decem­
ber 1 2, 1 905 . Despite the absence of the episcopate ' s  expressed approval, 
the congress was attended by 4 1 7  clerics .  Here, at least a part of the clergy 
put itself on public record in support of ambitious political reform, calling 
for "the widest possible administrative and legislative autonomy [for the 
Kingdom of Poland], with a separate parliament in Warsaw elected on the 
basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. '  '49 In the same vein, 
the congress also backed popular demands for the elimination of capital 
punishment and a general amnesty for political prisoners. In keeping with 
the slogan " With the Polish people-the Polish priest, " the congress jus­
tified its resolutions with the argument that the obligations of the clergy 
were not merely pastoral and religious but also those of general citizenship. 
47. See Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews, pp. 1 1 8-1 58, as well as Richard Blanke, Prus­
sian Poland in the German Empire, 1871-1900 (Boulder, 1 98 1 ), pp. 22-26, 8 1 .  
48. Ks. A .  Szymat1ski, " 0  pracy spolecznej ,"  Wiadomosci Pasterskie I , 3 ( 1 905): 1 53-
176; Marian Fulman, "Nasza praca spoleczna na dobie," ibid. , I ,  6 ( 1 905): 389-395. 
49. "Uchwaly I-go krajowego zjazdu duchowieilstwa w Warszawie," Wiadomosci Paster­
skie I ,  1 2  ( 1 905): 806-8 1 1 .  
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Above all, the reformers sought to build new organizational bridges to 
Polish Catholics with the aims of familiarizing the clergy with the living, 
working, and "religious-moral" conditions of the common people and of 
improving those conditions through a combination of direct social action 
and missionary work. The most successful Catholic social initiative of the 
revolutionary era was the Association of Christian Workers (Stowarzysz­
enie Robotnikow ChrzeScijanskich-SRCh), founded by Father Marceli 
Godlewski at the end of 1 905 . The SRCh fought adult illiteracy, created 
mutual-assistance funds, provided job-placement service as well as free 
medical care and legal advice, established savings and loan institutions, 
and formed cooperatives among its working-class members. To raise the 
moral-religious level of its membership, the SRCh not only promoted par­
ticipation in religious processions and traditional Catholic brotherhoods but 
also organized clubs, theaters, choirs, orchestras, excursions, and other 
"morally uplifting" activities.50 
As a result of the firm belief of Godlewski and other clerical "patrons" 
of the association that industrial-labor relations should be based on coop­
eration rather than confrontation, the SRCh refrained from developing a 
trade union organization. Nevertheless, it did seek to mediate disputes be­
tween labor and management while calling upon the state to create courts 
of arbitration. Such ideas gained currency among a growing number of 
industrial workers, especially once the strike movement failed to achieve 
the desired results in 1 906 and 1 907. Within a couple of years of its found­
ing, the association counted 22,207 members organized in seventy-nine 
circles, placing it third among workers '  organizations behind the PPS and 
SDKPiL but slightly ahead of the National Workers' Union (NZR) spon­
sored by the Endecja.5 1 
After 1908, the SRCh experienced a decline (though not nearly as dra­
matic as that which afflicted the socialist parties) as the euphoria and hopes 
of the revolutionary years gave way to general disillusionment with all 
organized activity and a tendency among workers to retreat to the shelter 
of private lives. In the meantime, other promising social initiatives pro­
moted by the reformers, such as a projected Christian association of farm 
workers modeled after a similar organization in Prussian Poland, were 
never realized.52 Indeed, just as their efforts were beginning to bear fruit 
50. APW ZOW 667, Statutes of the Association of Christian Workers in Warsaw Province, 
December 8 (2 1 ), 1 906. 
5 1 .  W6ycicki, ChrZeScijanski ruch robotniczy w Polsce, p. 97. 
52 .  Marian Fuiman, " Stowarzyszenie robotnik6w roJnych," Wiadomosci Pasterskie 2 ,  1 2  
( 1 906): 729-735. 
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among the population, the reformers ran into obstacles that proved insur­
mountable. 
Understandably, the Russian government, recalling the role of the church 
in the January Insurrection of 1 863, did not look kindly on Catholic social 
activity and the clergy' s  involvement in mass organizations. It therefore 
held up the legal registration of the SRCh until the end of 1 906, meanwhile 
placing many of its "priest-patrons" under the surveillance of the secret 
police. Godlewski himself was repeatedly harassed in subsequent years, 
and Fathers Jan Gralewski and Jozef Kownacki, both strong proponents of 
Catholic social work in Warsaw, were confined by order of the Warsaw 
governor-general to a Carmelite monastery in Plock Province. Marceli Ry­
niewicz, vicar of Holy Trinity parish in Warsaw, was deprived of the right 
to teach religion in private schools because of his involvement in a Polish 
teachers ' union. More frequently, the Russian authorities simply refused to 
confirm appointments and transfers, as in the case of Piotr Wojtkowski of 
St. Anthony' s  parish in Warsaw when he used a state subsidy to provide 
food and lodging for the children of political prisoners.53 A more serious 
blow to the reformers came in January 1 906 with the suspension of the 
progressive Catholic periodical Dzwonek Cz�stochowski (The Cz�stochowa 
Bell) for violation of martial law press codes, which forced its talented 
editor and eloquent spokesman for social Catholicism, Father Jozef Adam­
czyk, to flee the country.54 
Despite state persecution and harassment, the reformers might have per­
severed had they enjoyed the solid support of the hierarchy. The attitude 
of the Polish episcopate toward Catholic social action remained, however, 
ambivalent at best. Bishop Stanislaw Zdzitowiecki of Kujawy-Kalisz was 
the only consequential advocate of reformist causes, exercising his author­
ity to sponsor initiatives such as the publication of Wiadomosci Pasterskie, 
with its pronounced social profile. 55 Tomasz Kulinski, bishop of Kielce, 
sought to familiarize his diocesan clergy with Catholic social teachings and 
expressed support for society 's  "just demands" in pastoral letters before 
his death in early 1 907, but he otherwise wavered in his commitment to 
the cause of reform, frequently retreating to a position more in line with 
that of the rest of the episcopate.56 The episcopal majority, for its part, paid 
53. APW ZOW 1 6 1 7, 1 629, 1 680, 1 80 1 ,  and 1 878. 
54. APL KGP 1 589, Cz�stochowa Chief of Police to the Piotrkow Governor, December 29, 
1 905 (January I I ,  1 906). 
55. Roman Dzwonkowski, Listy spolecme biskup6w polskich (Paris, 1 974), pp. 1 45,  1 62 .  
56 .  The bishop of  Kielce was also a prime mover behind the organization of  four-day 
"social courses" for the clergy, which were held in Warsaw in the summer of 1 907; see 
ADK AK OA-2/9. 
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lip service to the principles embodied in papal encyclicals while refusing 
to take the steps necessary to promote their realization beyond the for­
mation of the Commission for Social Work in October 1 905 . Reform of 
the seminaries, including the introduction of social studies in their curric­
ula, did not occur until 1 908 and then on a much more limited scale than 
envisioned by the reformers.57 Meanwhile, construction of churches in ur­
ban parishes increased only marginally as available funds continued to be 
channeled into " building the material church. '  '58 The shortage of personnel 
in working-class parishes, and particularly of young, energetic priests, re­
mained acute. This prompted Bronislaw Marjaitski to complain bitterly 
about the episcopate ' s  indifference to the challenges confronting the 
church' s  mission in factory centers, "which is why they continue to send 
to such places the usual old, sick, backward, and incompetent parish 
priests. ' '59 
The episcopate also disapproved of the reformers ' political tendencies, 
particularly their ties to the National Democrats.60 The assistance of the 
Endecja in the organization of the Warsaw congress of the clergy in De­
cember 1905, for example, was enough to compromise the gathering in the 
eyes of the episcopate .61 As the hierarchy's  polemical war against the Na­
tional Democratic ideological postulates and education policies gained mo­
mentum in 1906, the reformers found themselves in a most unenviable 
position. Those reformers who participated in the myriad organizations 
sponsored by the Endecja  were publicly criticized and called upon to resign 
from whatever functions they held.62 Meanwhile, Wiadomosci Pasterskie 
felt compelled to join, though with considerably less enthusiasm, in the 
chorus of Catholic press attacks against the nationalist movement.63 
Contrary to their expectations, the reformers were also unable to draw 
effectively on the moral support of the Holy See in their efforts to imple-
57. Woycicki, Chrzeicijanski ruch robotniczy w Polsce, pp 144-145.  
58 .  Fulman, "Wieikomiejskie i fabryczne parafie," p. 77.  
59. Ks.  Bronislaw Maryanski, " Sprawa robotnicza," Wiadomosci Pasterskie 2,  I I  ( 1 906) : 
64 1---{j50. 
60. These ties can be traced to the involvement of several dozen priests in the Collegium 
Secretum, a circle of clergymen organized under nationalist auspices at the turn of the 
century, which stressed cooperation with the lay intelligentsia in national, social, and edu­
cational work; see Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy, pp. 55-56. 
6 1 .  E.g., Bishop Wnukowski of Plock scolded reformers for "participating in nationalist 
meetings well outside their parishes and diocese" ;  see ADP PWD, Bishop of Plock to the 
Diocesan Clergy, December 23, 1 905 . 
62. Ibid., February I ,  1 907; Ks. dr. WI. Namiotko, "Polska Macierz Szkolna," Przegl�d 
Katolicki, no. 1 0  (March 7, 1 907) :  149-153 .  
63 .  See, e.g. , the moderate tone of  "Stronnictwo narodowe-demokratyczne a Kosciol," Wia­
domosci Pasterskie 3, 6 ( 1 907): 377-38 1 .  
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ment the principles of Rerum Novarum. The papacy of Pius X, Leo XIII ' s  
successor, was one of  general retrenchment and emphasis on  traditional 
doctrine that effectively blunted the edge of earlier " progressive " encyc­
licals. In this respect, the reformers were dealt a major blow by the pope' s  
December 3 ,  1 905, letter to the Polish bishops denouncing "anarchist un­
ions" and "the extreme nationalist party" for pushing the Polish popula­
tion to "barbaric, criminal activity. "  To counteract such behavior among 
the population, Pius called upon the Polish church to stand for law and 
order as well as the integrity of the Russian state.64 Although Pius contin­
ued to recommend the clergy' s  involvement in "Catholic social action, " 
his interpretation of extrapastoral social and political activity lacked clear 
instructions for putting the doctrines of Christian Democracy into practice. 
The reformers were disappointed to discover that the Vatican itself was 
still profoundly conservative, especially once Pius made his first pro­
nouncements against social "modernism" in 1 9 1 0. 
Lack of support from their bishops and the Vatican naturally left the 
reformers vulnerable to an assault from their older and more conservative 
colleagues. Known variously as " super-Catholics" or "churchmen" (kos­
cielnicy) by their opponents, these conservatives remained generally un­
impressed by the "social gospel" of Leo XIII. Grouped around the weekly 
periodical PrzeglfJd Katolicki (Catholic Review), they intended to use the 
concessions granted by the tsarist government for the pursuit of more tra­
ditional goals. They believed, for instance, that the problem of incorporat­
ing the Uniates from the eastern provinces should take precedence over 
the needs of urban parishioners in personnel assignments and financial 
decisions.65 To deal with the religious needs of industrial workers, the 
conservatives preferred to rely on traditional missionary activity carried 
out by teams of Redemptionist and Franciscan monks brought in from 
Austrian Poland with the temporary blessing of the Russian government. 
Not surprisingly, the conservatives deemed initiatives such as the As­
sociation of Christian Workers " too radicaL " Instead, they threw their 
complete support behind the organization of parishioners in an all­
embracing Catholic Union which, according to its statutes (and in contrast 
to the SRCh), was directly subordinate to the authority of the bishops. 
Designed to merge all existing Catholic organizations, thereby providing 
the church with a more viable political base in its competition with the 
modern mass movements, the Catholic Union instead became a tool of the 
64. PrzeglQd Katolicki, nos. 1-2 (January I I , 1 906) : 1-3, nos. 3-4 (January 25, 1 906) : 25-
28, and nos. 5-6 (February 8, 1 906): 49-5 1 .  
65. Ks. Antoni Szaniawski, "Pilna potrzeba," ibid., no. 20 (May 1 8 , 1 905): 297-298. 
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conservatives in their struggle with the reformers. The Association of 
Christian Workers indeed became the principal target of attacks by leaders 
of the Catholic Union, who did not hesitate to accuse Father Godlewski 
and his collaborators of " modernism. " 66 
The conservatives also equated the idea of frequent conferences of the 
clergy with " modernism, " while continuing to regard the episcopal chan­
cellory as the only reliable source of knowledge and information. They 
believed, moreover, that politics should be left entirely in the hands of the 
episcopate. Political activity of individual clergymen, especially in mass 
organizations, was considered degrading to the clerical profession. Such 
positions were naturally very much in line with the opinion of the episcopal 
majority. 
Unfortunately for the reformers, conservative positions were also in line 
with views held by the majority of the lower clergy. In the spring of 1906 
the chancellory of the bishop of Kielce circulated questionnaires among 
the parish clergy in an attempt to poll clerical opinion in the diocese on 
some of the key political and social issues confronting the church. Though 
this experiment was not repeated elsewhere in the Kingdom of Poland, the 
written responses from both rural and urban areas of Kielce diocese (which 
included the D�browa Basin industrial region) provide a revealing sample 
of contemporary clerical attitudes.67 The following questions, in particular, 
drew long essay-type responses : How should a chaplain respond to anti­
clerical agitation? Should the clergy promote reading among parishioners 
and of what kinds of literature? Should chaplains participate in secular 
social, educational, and religious organizations, in recreational associations 
and sporting clubs, and especially, 'in political parties? And most important, 
should involvement in extrapastoral activities require in all cases the prior 
permission of the bishop? 
Significantly, the answers indicate a limited familiarity with the encyc­
licals of Leo XIII and Catholic social teachings in the West, which are 
referred to in fewer than 25 percent of the responses studied (though one 
can imagine what that percentage might have been before the revolution). 
This minority tended to approve participation in secular organizations as 
another means of reaching parishioners, particularly the lower classes and 
youth groups. According to Franciszek Staszkiewicz of Ksi�nice Wielkie 
parish, such participation was necessary " in order to measure the pulse of 
66. Woycicki, Chrzeicijanski ruch robotniczy w Polsce, pp. 1 52-154. 
67. The responses were sent to the Consistory of Kielce diocese and are contained in the 
collection ADK KD OD-2/ I .  Unfortunately, data on the age and social background of the 
respondents are not available. 
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social life and to counteract social ills . "  Father Jozef Zalewski of 
Suloszowa parish agreed, adding that " in the struggle of life and death for 
the Faith, a pastor must act among the people, he must go to the people­
to the workers, to the poor; he must seek out ways to help them, to make 
their lives less difficult. "  Citing Roman Catholic practices in western Eu­
rope, one respondent argued that clerical involvement in secular organi­
zations did not require the permission of the bishop, as it was already 
justified by earlier papal appeals to the clergy. 
At the same time, these priests called for the active engagement of the 
clergy in the fight against illiteracy through the establishment of libraries 
and reading rooms at the parish level, and they favored clerical involve­
ment in the publication of a diocesan daily newspaper. They also consid­
ered that the best way to fight anticlerical propaganda and agitation was 
through exemplary behavior, modest living, and conscientious performance 
of pastoral duties, rejecting the use of the pulpit, altar, confessional, and 
other "holy places" for "counteragitation. " Most significantly, although 
they agreed that the church as an institution should stand above partisan 
politics, they believed that priests as individuals and citizens should be 
permitted to exercise their political rights and participate in political parties. 
The majority of respondents however, argued that the spiritual mission 
of the clergy ruled out involvement of its members in partisan politics. 
According to Stanislaw Zarnojski of Olesnica parish, membership in a po­
litical party was ' 'beneath the dignity" of a chaplain, who ' 'must be every­
thing for everyone. "  Father T. Dybowski of Bydlin parish went even 
further, condemning the involvement of clergymen in politics as " harmful 
for both the church and the country. "  General opposition to clerical par­
ticipation in political activities, however, did not exclude the use of the 
pulpit to fight the church' s  real and imagined enemies nor that of the 
confessional for the "private instruction" of parishioners. "Political agi­
tation in defense of the rights of the church,"  according to Father Dy­
bowski, "does not contradict the teachings of the church nor the dignity 
of the clergy. " 
Most respondents were indifferent to participation in nonpolitical secular 
organizations and could not see how a priest' s  involvement in such activ­
ities served the aims of the church. Wawrzyniec Nowakowski of Pacanow 
parish thought the only safe arena for " social activity" of the clergy was 
the conservative Catholic Union. Others maintained that the clergy had no 
time at all for activity outside the church. The priority given to traditional 
pastoral duties was expressed most succinctly by Father M. Wilamowski 
of Mierzwin parish: "Participation in associations, trade unions, coopera­
tives, and sporting clubs should be left in the hands of laymen. Let the 
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chaplain take care of the altar, pulpit, and confessionaL " Above all, the 
majority of respondents stressed the absolute necessity of "unity with 
the bishop, "  which effectively translated into a willingness to abdicate all 
initiative-political, social, and religious-to episcopal authority. 
In the end, the contest between the reformers and the conservatives in 
the Polish clergy was unequal, symbolized by the voluntary folding of 
Wiadomosci Pasterskie at the end of 1 907 because of general lack of sup­
port and interest in its further publication. With the decline of the revo­
lution and the pressures generated by it, the hierarchy backed away from 
its initial and cautious endorsement of Western-style Catholic social action, 
thus killing any possibility of introducing the more far-reaching changes 
in traditional practices called for by the advocates of reform. Conservative 
retrenchment in the Vatican of Pius X, indeed throughout European Ca­
tholicism in the years before World War I, could not but strengthen the 
hand of Catholic traditionalists in the Kingdom. The subsequent offensive 
against "modernism" in Poland, designed to silence radical critics like 
Izydor Wyslouch, was bound to have a sobering effect on the more mod­
erate proponents of change as well. And finally, the general age and social 
profile of the clergy, coupled with its indifference to anything outside the 
performance of routine pastoral duties, denied reformers the broad support 
necessary to overcome the hesitation and tentative policies of the episco­
pate. In the final analysis, the conservatives '  victory over the reformers 
represented the loss of significant opportunities created by the revolution 
for the church to expand its mission in neglected areas and to tap an 
undeniably deep reservoir of popular religiosity. Having survived the crisis 
of the emergency years of the revolution, the church in Russian Poland 
was inclined to retreat into its ancient shell and return to its traditional 
methods of saving souls. 
C H A P  T E R E 1 G H T 
T H E I M P A C T  O F  
M A R T I A L  L A W  
During the first ten months of 1 905, the government responded to the 
various manifestations of upheaval in the Kingdom of Poland with both 
concessions and measures of repression. The carrot-and-stick approach, 
however, was the result not of a carefully considered policy but of incon­
sistent attitudes within the government about how best to deal with the 
crisis in the Polish provinces. Generally, the central government in St. 
Petersburg inclined toward compromise in the linguistic, cultural, and re­
ligious spheres, a tendency that, if realized in full, could have satisfied the 
national aspirations of most politically conscious Poles. The provincial bu­
reaucracy in the Kingdom, however, generally opposed such concessions 
and fought a rearguard action against them. Through their control over the 
flow of information to St. Petersburg, the provincial authorities sought to 
present a compelling case for repressive measures, especially as they ap­
plied to the political expression of Polish national identity. Their lobbying 
efforts were not without effect, especially among key officials in the Min­
istry of Internal Affairs, who then turned to the whimsical and vacillating 
Nicholas II for the appropriate edict. 
The inability of the government to resolve upon a firm course of action, 
reflected in the alternating currents of compromise and crackdown, exac­
erbated tensions in the Kingdom. St. Petersburg's  concessions of religious 
toleration and bilingualism in education and local administration raised 
expectations for more fundamental change, whereas the emergency powers 
granted the provincial bureaucracy proved sufficient only to embitter ever­
increasing numbers . In early November, during the ten days immediately 
after the October Manifesto, the government appeared to be left with but 
two choices, both of them extreme. The first was to crown the earlier 
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concessions with a manifesto similar to that of November 4 to the Finns, 
restoring statutory political autonomy to the Polish provinces. The second 
was to proclaim a " state of war," or martial law, throughout the Kingdom 
of Poland and to suppress, once and for all, the movement for Polish home 
rule. The decision, reached on November 10, to impose martial law, had 
calamitous repercussions. As it turned out, it killed the last opportunity for 
a peaceful "Russian" solution to the proverbial Polish question. Instead, 
Russian rule in the Kingdom thereafter rested irrevocably on military oc­
cupation. 
The " Victory " of the Provincial Bureaucracy 
The imposition of martial law resulted, in large part, from the attitudes 
of those who reported to St. Petersburg, that is, those important members 
of the administrative and police apparatus responsible for maintaining Rus­
sian government in the Kingdom. These bureaucratic attitudes, in turn, 
helped shape the way in which events in Poland were reported. A particular 
spin was thus put on the flow of information received by St. Petersburg, 
which because of the regularity of that flow, could not but influence central 
officials, such as Russia' s  first prime minister, Sergei Witte, who otherwise 
tended to favor conciliatory gestures toward the Poles. In short, bureau­
cratic reporting from the Kingdom, rather than a supposedly uncompro­
mising central government in St. Petersburg, created the principal obstacle 
to the possibility of an autonomous Kingdom emerging from the Revolu­
tion of 1 905 . 
To get at the mentality of these provincial officials, it is necessary to 
recall briefly the dual function of the Russian administrative and police 
apparatus in the Kingdom as it evolved after the 1 863 insurrection. On the 
one hand, that apparatus governed the Kingdom with the help of an army 
of occupation; that is, it implemented and maintained the law, ensured 
order and security, supervised the development of industry and commerce, 
kept the social peace, and systematically provided the central ministerial 
agencies with summary reports based on information received from its 
lower-ranking officials. In the absence of Poles, who had been purged and 
then blocked from administrative appointments of any significance, the 
provincial Russian bureaucracy effectively became the Kingdom's  ruling 
class. On the other hand, however, the bureaucracy in Russian Poland 
became the principal agency in charge of implementing the official state 
policy of russification. Placed in the front lines of the struggle against 
Polish language, culture, and religion, the provincial bureaucrats became 
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zealots for the cause of russification, eventually exceeding the expectations 
of St. Petersburg in this regard. More than once, a relatively moderate 
central government would force their temporary retreat. Nevertheless, anti­
Polish attitudes hardened and stereotypes became fixed among these pro­
vincial officials-attitudes and stereotypes that were to figure prominently 
in their reporting during the Revolution of 1 905 . 
To the typical 1 905-era Russian bureaucrat in the Kingdom, the principal 
enemies were the noble landowner, the Catholic priest, and the urban-based 
intellectual, all representatives of those social groups that, some forty years 
earlier, had provided political and moral leadership for the January Insur­
rection. Not surprisingly, as a new ruling class, the provincial bureaucracy 
felt continually threatened by the displaced native elite. In reporting Polish 
attitudes toward the Russo-Japanese War, for example, local officials con­
centrated almost exclusively on monitoring the behavior of landowners, 
clergy, and intelligentsia. When unmistakable signs of discontent appeared 
from below, responsibility for it was readily assigned to one of the afore­
mentioned groupS. l  By extension, the bureaucracy saw little danger coming 
from the "mass nation" in its own right, especially from the Polish peas­
antry, whose eternal gratitude for favorable terms of emancipation was 
taken for granted. 
Throughout most of 1 905 , the course of events and the policies of the 
central government placed the ruling bureaucracy in the Kingdom on the 
defensive. Although St. Petersburg never got around to an official renun­
ciation of russification, it did much to dismantle existing policy and thereby 
undermine the position of its agents in the Kingdom. The Edict of Relig­
ious Toleration, conceived as early as 1 903 and promised at the end of 
1904, was finally issued the following April. By removing restrictions on 
public religious manifestations, the movement of clergy, and especially the 
conversion of former Uniates to Roman Catholicism, the Edict of Tolera­
tion undercut russification. In the eyes of the provincial bureaucracy, how­
ever, religious toleration played into the hands of the traditional enemy, 
the Polish Catholic priest. In an effort to force St. Petersburg to modify 
the edict, provincial governors readily identified the Catholic clergy as 
leaders of the national and separatist movements in Poland. Meanwhile, 
bureaucratic harassment of the clergy was stepped up, despite the edict. 
Provincial officials demanded from central authorities the transfer of trou­
blesome priests, sought to use their limited emergency powers to restrict 
the clergy's  newly attained freedom of movement, insisted on the use of 
I .  These reports, compiled for each of the ten Polish provinces, are located in AGAD 
KGGW 2308. 
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Russian in all official church correspondence, and threatened to close 
places of worship that permitted the singing of the forbidden national Po­
lish hymn, "Boze cos Polsk�" (God Preserve Poland) . Beyond increasing 
the red tape for the legal conversion of Uniates to the Roman rite, however, 
the central government stayed the course of toleration. 
Worse still, from the vantage point of the provincial bureaucracy, was the 
decision of the Committee of Ministers of June 1 9, 1 905, which further un­
dercut earlier russification measures. The popular movement against the rus­
sified school system, accompanied by the demands of gmina assemblies for 
expanded use of the native language, convinced the central government to 
offer the Poles limited, yet significant, concessions . The principle of bilin­
gualism was introduced in public elementary and secondary schools, in 
gmina administration, and in the commissariats of peasant affairs. Discrimi­
nation in state approval of land purchases based on religion or nationality 
was also terminated. Meanwhile, the Council of State agreed to consider the 
question of introducing, in the Polish provinces, institutions of rural and mu­
nicipal self-government as well as independent justices of the peace.2 
Once again, central government policy ran contrary to the interests of 
the Russian bureaucracy in the Kingdom. Earlier, that bureaucracy had 
tried to stem the movement against the schools, which it blamed on the 
Polish intelligentsia, through closings and mass expulsions of students. To 
undermine the gmina action movement in the countryside and its perceived 
leading "agitators" from the noble landowning class, some Russian offi­
cials had even resorted to informing the peasants that the end result of 
their "illegal action" would be the restoration of serfdom. All of this had 
little impact either in the Kingdom or in St. Petersburg. Rather than retreat 
from their language demands, the Poles subsequently enlarged them. On 
October 14, the central government responded with legislation permitting 
the establishment of private schools with Polish as the language of instruc­
tion for nearly all subjects, thus providing the legal basis for what would 
become the Polska Macierz Szkolna (Polish Motherland Schools) and other 
independent educational initiatives.3 
While fighting the concessions to the Polish national movement and its 
perceived representatives among the Polish elite, the bureaucracy in the 
Kingdom continued to court its supposed "friends" among the lower 
2. The decision of the Committee of Ministers of June 6 ( 1 9), 1 905, as confirmed by the 
tsar, is found in AGAD KGGW 262 1 .  
3 .  On the concessions of October 14, see Edmund Staszyilski, Polityka o.fwiatowa caratu 
w Kr6lestwie Polskim: Od powstania styczniowego do I wojny swiatowej (Warsaw, 1 968), 
pp. no-l 7 1 .  
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classes. Peasants and industrial workers, it reasoned, were basically apo­
litical and would remain aloof from the revolutionary and national move­
ments if their economic grievances were addressed. Hence, during the 
January-February general strike and throughout the spring of 1 905, the 
governors of Piotrk6w, Warsaw, Radom, and Lublin provinces actively 
sought to mediate industrial labor disputes, to the point of pressuring em­
ployers to make concessions. In the countryside, although provincial au­
thorities remained convinced that agrarian strikes and mass trespassing 
incidents would not have occurred without "outside agitation," many of 
them expressed sympathy for the demands of the rural poor. In Lublin 
Province, local authorities were particularly slow to intervene in agrarian 
disputes and moved only after complaints of their " inactivity" reached St. 
Petersburg.4 In neighboring Siedlce Province, by contrast, officials moved 
quickly enough, but in response to the alarming prospect that landowners 
and farmhands would reach agreement without their participation. 
When the behavior of the lower classes belied the provincial bureaucra­
cy' s  belief in the continuing efficacy of a policy of divide and rule, how­
ever, appeals to St. Petersburg for emergency powers became exceedingly 
commonplace. The Warsaw superintendent of police was calling for the 
imposition of martial law, literally "a state of war," already by the end of 
February, even though the industrial general strike had run its course. In 
his mind, the "national movement" embodied in the school strikes posed 
a far greater threat to Russian rule than the discontent of industrial work­
ers.5 The best that he and the rest of the provincial authorities received 
from St. Petersburg was agreement to proclaim a " state of intensified se­
curity," the lowest level of emergency rule. "Intensified security" was 
proclaimed in Warsaw and Piotrk6w provinces at the end of January; in 
Kalisz, Radom, and Siedlce provinces on February 4; and in the rest of 
the Kingdom by the end of February. 
" Intensified security" increased the powers of the provincial authorities, 
but more on paper than in actuality. On the basis of Article 15 of the 
statutes providing for this form of emergency rule, provincial governors 
4. AGAD KGGW 25 13 ,  Minister of Internal Affairs to the WGG, March 2 1  (April 3), 1 905; 
Stanislaw Kalabinski, ed., Carat i klasy posiadaj(!ce w walce z rewolucj(! 1905-1907 w 
Kr61estwie Polskim: Materiaiy archiwalne (Warsaw, 1 956), pp. 88-89. In response to St. 
Petersburg, rather than the Polish landowners, the Lublin governor finally issued a procla­
mation announcing that cases involving attacks on private property and employers of farm 
labor would be turned over to military courts. In reality, however, those arrested in connec­
tion with the agrarian strikes either received short jail terms or were placed under temporary 
police surveillance. 
5. AGAD KGGW 2489, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the WGG, February 1 5  (28), 
1 905. 
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and superintendents of police were empowered by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, through the Warsaw governor-general ' s  office, to issue "binding 
decisions" and to sentence and fine, without reference to the courts, those 
who violated their decrees. As the most progressive features of the Russian 
legal reforms of the I 870S had never extended to the Kingdom in the first 
place, the power of administrative sentencing itself meant very little in the 
Polish context. Moreover, the maximum sentence that could be imposed 
under Article 1 5  was three months in jail and/or a five-hundred-ruble fine. 
Only those deemed guilty of "terrorist" acts, that is, outright physical 
assault against the state and its representatives or against private individuals 
and their property, could be transferred to military courts for sentencing. 
Theoretically, this meant that under " intensified security," the wearing of 
a traditional Polish national emblem during a religious procession and the 
illegal sale and possession of weapons and explosives could result in the 
same maximum jail sentence or fine.6 Consequently, the very arbitrariness 
of "intensified security" aggravated popular discontent instead of pacify­
ing it, whereas the later concessions of the central government of April 
and June seemed to condone many of the acts of civil disobedience pun­
ishable under its statutes. 
At the same time, the central government proved reluctant to grant the 
provincial bureaucracy in Poland greater emergency powers, not those pro­
vided by the statutes regulating "a state of extraordinary security," let 
alone those embodied in "a state of war. " To be sure, martial law was 
proclaimed in L6dZ and L6dZ County on June 24, but even then as a 
belated response to a very real breakdown of law and order. Martial law 
provided the then-Warsaw governor-general Lt. Gen. Konstantin Maksi­
movich (who had replaced Mikhail Chertkov three months earlier) sweep­
ing authority, which he immediately delegated to Gen. Nicholas 
Shuttleworth, the commander of those army units that had suppressed the 
local insurgency.? Shuttleworth' s  "rule" in L6dZ was far from draconian, 
however, and extended little beyond the enforcement of a strict curfew, a 
ban on demonstrations and other public gatherings, and a hunt for revo­
lutionaries and terrorists. Although martial law led to an immediate decline 
in strike activity in L6dZ as troops were posted in the factories, it did not 
prevent a revival of the strike movement in the fall .  
6. Cf., e.g. ,  APW ZOW 1 778, Directives of the Warsaw Governor-General of March 18  
(3 1 ), 1 905, with AGAD KGGW 2577, Circular of  the WGG to  the Provincial Governors of 
June 30, 1 905 . 
7. Pawel Korzec, ed., ZrOdla do dziej6w rewolucji 1905-1907 w okr�gu 16dzkim, vol. I ,  pt. 
2 (Warsaw, 1 957), pp. 244-246. 
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Martial law was also introduced in Warsaw on August 23 , 1 905 , in 
response to the increasingly large protest demonstrations and strikes or­
ganized by the socialist parties against the Bulygin duma, the consultative 
assembly announced by imperial decree four days earlier. Again, however, 
martial law had only a local resonance. Requests by the Siedlce and Kalisz 
governors to extend martial law to their provinces were rejected as " un­
justified" by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.s More to their liking, how­
ever, was the ministry' s  critical appointment on August 28 of George 
Skalon as Warsaw governor-general. 
Skalon was hardly a stranger to the Polish provinces. The descendent of 
a French noble family, long russified by generations of service to the Rus­
sian crown, Skalon first served in the Kingdom as a special affairs officer 
to Governor-General Iosif Gurko in the early 1 890s, during the most in­
tense period of the campaign against Polish language, religion, and culture. 
After typical service transfers into and out of posts in the Kingdom, he 
returned to Warsaw at the end of May 1 905 as deputy to Governor-General 
Maksimovich. Known as a proponent of "the strong arm," Skalon' s  re­
placement of the ineffective Maksimovich three months later became the 
first important step in the ultimate resort to exclusively repressive measures 
of rule. Skalon would remain in the office of Warsaw governor-general 
until his natural death in February 1 9 14, having survived several earlier 
attempts on his life.9 
Although Skalon' s  appointment came too late to influence the decision 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to deny the Kalisz and Siedlce gover­
nors ' requests to impose martial law in their jurisdictions, the new Warsaw 
governor-general proved more successful in defeating a planned concession 
that would have permitted Polish as the language of instruction for all 
subjects in officially permitted private schools. 1 O  Otherwise, Skalon' s  first 
month in office proved relatively calm. By the end of September, he was 
sufficiently confident to recommend for the ministry' s  consideration the 
eventual lifting of martial law in L6dZ and L6dZ County and its replace-
8. AGAD KGGW 2507, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, August 1 3  (26), 1 905, and 2584, 
Minister of Internal Affairs to the WGG, August 19 (September I), 1 905. 
9 .  Halina Kiepurska, Warszawa w rewolucji 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 974), pp. 303-304. The 
most serious and nearly successful attempt was undertaken by the PPS on August 1 8 , 1 906, 
when a bombing of Skalon' s  carriage left the Warsaw governor-general with a mild con­
cussion; see Adam Prochnik, Studia z dziej6w polskiego ruchu robotniczego (Warsaw, 1 958), 
pp. 450-492 .  
10 .  Zygmunt Lukawski, "Rosyjskie ugrupowanie polityczne wobec sprawy autonomii Kro­
lestwa Polskiego w okresie 1 905-19 17 ,"  Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego: 
Prace Historyczne 9 ( 1 962): 1 5 1 .  
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ment with a state of intensified security. 1 1  Skalon' s confidence, no doubt, 
was bolstered by a dramatic increase in troop strength in eight of the 
Kingdom's  ten provinces since June. 1 2  
The Kingdom's  tenuous and superficial tranquillity was soon disrupted 
by the October general strike, less than two months into Skalon' s  tenure 
in office. The resulting Imperial Manifesto of October 30 then sparked an 
extraordinary chain of events in the Kingdom. Although Warsaw itself 
technically remained under a " state of war," censorship effectively evap­
orated the next day, and the first of several large-scale demonstrations in 
support of the Kingdom's  political autonomy proceeded through the streets 
of the Polish capital. On November I ,  the Catholic Church expressed its 
gratitude for the October Manifesto with the singing of " Te Deum Lau­
damus" and prayers for the House of Romanov in the country' s  major 
cathedrals. On November 2, a large crowd responded to the appeal of the 
socialist parties to demand the release of political prisoners in front of the 
Warsaw magistrate ' s  office on Theater Square. Cossack attempts to dis­
perse the demonstrators resulted in rioting and many fatalities, prompting 
Skalon to plead with Sergei Witte, the recently appointed chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, to maintain a state of intensified security in the entire 
Kingdom and martial law in the Warsaw and L6dZ regions. 13 Nevertheless, 
the next day the tsar granted a general amnesty that led to the release of 
more than a thousand persons in Warsaw alone. This was followed on 
November 4 by the largest of the Warsaw demonstrations, a peaceful pro­
cession of as many as one hundred thousand organized by the National 
Democrats and headed by cross-bearing priests. This demonstration, in 
tum, provided a model for dozens of mass processions held in provincial 
capitals and district towns on November 5, which began with expressions 
of gratitude to the tsar in Catholic churches and ended with the illumination 
of candles in the windows of Polish, as well as Jewish, homes. 
Particularly after the tsar's manifesto to the Finns of November 4, ru­
mors of impending autonomy permeated the political air of the Kingdom. 
The demonstrations of November 5 were accompanied by the resolutions 
of factory crews and peasant assemblies calling for Polish home rule. The 
popular movement for autonomy was capped by the dispatch of a dele­
gation of Polish dignitaries, organized by the National Democrats and led 
by Roman Dmowski, to meet with Count Witte. As the Polish delegation 
set off for St. Petersburg, the bureaucracy in the Kingdom, headed by the 
I I . Korzec, Zrodla do dziej6w rewolucji I (2): 38 1-382.  
1 2 . Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajfJce, pp. 273-279. 
13. Ibid., pp. 298-299. 
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Political demonstration III Warsaw, November 1 905. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 
22957) 
determined Skalon, labored even harder for a military solution to the Polish 
question. On November 6, despite the relatively peaceful nature of events 
since the October Manifesto, Skalon on his own initiative ordered the pro­
vincial governors to disperse all street demonstrations with armed force . 1 4 
It remained, however, to convince St. Petersburg that the restoration of 
order in the Kingdom depended not on further concessions but on the 
immediate application of repressive measures. " Three years at my post 
have convinced me, "  the Kalisz governor Novosiltsev reported to an agree­
able Skalon, " that the Poles, by virtue of their character, can never be 
satisfied and must be ruled by a consistently strong hand. " 1 5  
A s  high as Polish expectations for autonomy ran, fears among the provin­
cial bureaucracy that the imperial government might actually concede auton­
omy ran even higher. In his telegram to Witte of November 2, Skalon 
reported that "extremist parties" were behind the demand for political au-
14 ·  Ibid., p. 30 1 .  
I S .  AGAD KGGW 2507, Kalisz Governor to the WGG, October 29 (November I I ) , 1 905 . 
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Artist ' s  depiction of the Theater Square Massacre in Warsaw, November I , 1 905 . 
(Muzeum Niepodleglosci 43297) 
tonomy voiced in the Warsaw demonstrations-this in an attempt to justify 
the retention of the various forms of emergency rule already in place. For the 
next week, Skalon bombarded st. Petersburg with his agents ' reports of ab­
solute chaos in the Kingdom. Throughout the country, according to the spe­
cial deputy to the Warsaw governor-general for police affairs, local 
government authority was collapsing as a result of the "paralysis" of the 
regular police and insufficient troop strength. 1 6  In Piotrk6w Province, the 
population of Cz�stochowa reportedly was "arming itself to the teeth with 
Austrian weapons " in secret preparation for an armed uprising, while the 
D�browa Basin had fallen to "socialist rule. " 17 "Complete anarchy" was 
said to embrace the Pulawy region of Lublin Province. 1 8 Meanwhile, the 
1 6. AGAD KGGW 25 1 2  and 2525, Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, October 1 9  (No­
vember I )  and October 28 (November 1 0), 1 905, respectively. 
I 7 .  AGAD KGGW 2498, Telegram of the Provisional Governor-General of L6dz and L6dZ 
County to the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military Region, October 29 (November I I ), 
1 905, and 2499, Commander of the Cz�stochowa Garrison to the Chief of the Okhrana of 
Piotrk6w Province, October 23 (November 5), 1 905; Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajgce, 
pp. 307-308. 
1 8 .  APL KGL 1 905 :250, Telegram of the Chief of Nowa-Aleksandria County to the Lublin 
Governor, October 2 1  (November 3), 1 905 ; AGAD KGGW 25 1 5, Report of the SDPA to 
the WGG, October 28 (November 1 0), 1 905.  
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eight thousand inhabitants of ZelechOw in Gawrolin County of Siedlce Prov­
ince had become "completely terrorized" by the activity of the " socialist 
party. " 19 
This steady stream of exaggerated reports of anarchy, terrorism, the 
breakdown of civil administration and police authority, and above all, prep­
arations for a general uprising finally made an impact in the Russian cap­
ital, particularly in the Ministry of Internal Affairs . It was here that Skalon 
won the critical support necessary for a crackdown. While preparing his 
ground by sounding alarms within the ministry, Skalon simultaneously 
called on General Voronin, chief of staff of the Warsaw Military Region, 
to present him with a detailed plan for the defense of the "Vistulaland" 
in the event of an armed uprising-in effect, a blueprint for martial law.20 
On November 8, before receiving Voronin' s  report, Skalon sent an urgent 
wire to D. F. Trepov, head of the Department of Police within the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, arguing that martial law was "the only way out"­
that is, the only way to avoid an imminent insurrection.2 1 Skalon' s  case 
for a " state of war" and "strong repressive measures" easily won over 
Trepov and Minister P. N. Durnovo, who then secured the tsar' s approval 
on November 10. Thus, before Dmowski and the Polish delegation ever 
had an opportunity to present to Witte their case for autonomy as the best 
means of preserving political stability in the Kingdom, the decision to 
impose martial law had already been made. 
From False to Real Alarms 
Skalon' s  purpose in imposing martial law was not to forestall an uprising 
but to defeat Polish efforts to obtain political autonomy. Three weeks later, 
after the much-invoked justification of a general uprising failed to mate­
rialize, martial law was lifted. The intended damage to the cause of Polish 
autonomy had been accomplished. The imposition of martial law, however, 
had created such bitterness among the general population that the earlier, 
highly exaggerated prophecies of anarchy and revolt now became self­
fulfilling. The gmina assembly of Sielce (Plonsk County, Warsaw Prov­
ince) best expressed popular attitudes when it claimed that the provincial 
bureaucracy was responsible for all subsequent disorders in the country 
19 .  AGAD KGGW 2527, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, October 23 (November 5), 
1 905 · 
20. Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce. pp. 305, 3 1 0-3 1 1 .  
2 1 .  Ibid., pp. 302-303 . 
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The delegation to Count Witte. Political cartoon, November 1 905. (Muzeum Nie­
podleglosci 35873) 
because it had failed to implement reforms in the spirit of the October 
Manifesto.22 
The same provincial officials who had demanded strong repressive mea­
sures in early November now questioned whether martial law had brought 
about the expected results. In Warsaw Province, the crackdown on the 
22 .  AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to WGG, December 29, 1 905 (January 1 I ,  
1 906). 
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gmina action movement and its leaders exacerbated existing tensions. In 
mid-December, assembly meetings in all gminy of Sochaczew County 
passed a uniform set of resolutions that amounted to a declaration of in­
dependence from the ruling bureaucracy.23 Gmina assemblies resolved, 
among other things, to forbid the presence of the police at their meetings, 
and many members of the rural Land Guard were persuaded by individual 
threats against their lives and unrestrained crowd violence to leave the 
Kingdom altogether. Incapable of carrying out their responsibilities unless 
accompanied by military patrols, those members of the Land Guard in 
Lowicz County who had not abandoned their posts remained confined to 
their homes, revolvers in hand, in anticipation of assassins or a mob siege.24 
Authorities in Kalisz Province, too, were disappointed with the results 
of martial law , which they clearly had expected to pacify the popular move­
ment, especially in the countryside. Although major eruptions of violence 
were avoided, the provisional military governor-general requested the re­
moval of "priest-agitators" from parishes where gminy continued to be 
particularly recalcitrant in fulfilling their obligations to the state.25 Whereas 
martial law failed to change the mood of the population in Kalisz Province, 
it transformed the "abnormal relationship" between the population and 
local officials in Kielce Province to one of "open hatred," according to 
its governor. As in Warsaw Province, the exceedingly vulnerable rural 
police became the principal target of popular anger, "even on their quarters 
at night. "26 
In LOrnZa Province, where in many counties the ranks of the Land Guard 
had been reduced by nearly half, the lifting of martial law at the end of 
November was accompanied by Polish patriotic demonstrations in towns, 
villages, and settlements that had not participated in the earlier celebrations 
sparked by the October Manifesto. This time, however, there were no ex­
pressions of gratitude to the tsar for the new freedoms. The subsequent 
radicalization of gmina action in the province and, especially, of the move­
ment against the state schools were sufficient to convince police officials 
of the existence of plans for an uprising, despite the contrary views of the 
LOrnZa governor.27 
In Lublin the imposition of martial law was answered with a one-day 
general strike on November 1 3  and the forced suspension of instruction in 
23 .  AGAD KGGW 2505, Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 17 (30), 1 905. 
24.  AGAD KGGW 2505, Warsaw Governor to the WGG, December I I  (24), 1 905. 
25 .  AGAD KGGW 2507, Provisional Governor-General of Kalisz Province to the WGG, 
November I I  (24), 1 905 . 
26. AGAD KGGW 2509, Kielce Governor to the WGG, November 7 (20), 1 905 . 
27. AGAD KGGW 25 1 2 ,  Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December IO (23), 1 905. 
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  M A R T I A L  L A W  2 7 3 
all city schools. All proclamations announcing martial law were tom down. 
Although socialist efforts to call a second general strike on November 1 6  
failed, patrols o f  police and troops were constantly harassed by snipers. 
Outside the provincial capital, vigilantism experienced a sharp upsurge in 
Lublin, Krasnystaw, and Lubartow counties.28 In Plock Province, martial 
law met with little active resistance, but its lifting at the end of November 
was accompanied by a peasant tax revolt and other, bolder forms of gmina 
action. Gmina administrators and court officials refused any further use of 
the Russian language in the performance of their duties, leading to mass 
dismissals and arrests.29 
A succession of "binding decrees" issued by the provisional military 
governor-general of Radom Province indicates the growing severity of the 
crisis in that region. These proclamations to the population began by listing 
bans and punishments for such matters as possession of antigovernment 
publications, the failure to close gates and entrances to buildings at the 
appropriate hour, and the wearing of school uniforms by expelled students. 
Within days, however, the "binding decrees" turned to the possession and 
use of explosive devises and handguns as well as the defense of telegraph 
lines, railroad track and bridges, and other state property. Consequently, 
the inhabitants of Radom Province, an early center of terrorist activity, 
were among the first to be assigned collective responsibility for the state ' s  
material losses " regardless of the circumstances. ' ' 30 State efforts to  collect 
the subsequent fines levied on the population, however, met with resis­
tance. Residents of Bialobrzegi in Opatow County, fined nineteen hundred 
rubles for refusing to defend telegraph lines in their community, submitted 
only when confronted by half a company of Cossacks. Moreover, the use 
of Cossacks to collect not only fines but also taxes from the rural popu­
lation left many towns in the province without adequate troopsY 
In Siedlce Province, where the national movement had long been ac­
companied by a religious movement among the Roman Catholic and Uni-
28 .  AGAD KGGW 25 1 5 ,  Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, November 10 (23) and 1 6  
(29), 1 905 ; Provisional Governor-General o f  Lublin Province to the WGG, November 9 (22) 
and November 15 (28), 1 905 ; and Lublin Governor to the WGG, December 4 ( 1 7), 1 905. 
29. AGAD KGGW 25 1 7, Provisional Governor-General of Plock Province to the WGG, 
November I I  (24) and December I I  (24), 1 905 ; Reports of the SDPA to the WGG, No­
vember 22 (December 5) and December 16 (29), 1 905; and Senior President of the Warsaw 
District Court to the WGG, December 1 6  (29), 1 905 . 
30. AGAD KGGW 2520, Proclamations of the Provisional Governor-General of Radom 
Province of November I ( 14), November 2 ( 1 5), November 4 ( 1 7), November 6 ( 1 9), and 
November 1 3  (26), 1 905 . 
3 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2520, Provisional Governor-General of Radom Province to the WGG, 
November 9 (22) and 1 2  (25), 1 905; Kalabiitski, Car.at i klasy posiadaj(!ce, p. 388. 
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ate population against the official Russian Orthodox ChUfCh, the imposition 
of martial law and its ill-timed lifting led to a dramatic upsurge in ethno­
religious tensions, especially in the eastern counties of the Chelm region. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Edict of Religious Toleration, missionary 
work, nationalist propaganda and voluntary mass conversions had already 
resulted in the departure of 68 percent of the province' s  East Slavic pop­
ulation from Orthodoxy in the spring and summer. Now, in the last months 
of 1905, the remaining Orthodox minority became subjected to coercion 
and terror from a Catholic majority increasingly bent on eliminating Or­
thodoxy from the region altogether. Gmina assemblies, dominated by Ro­
man Catholics and Uniates, arbitrarily disenfranchised their Orthodox 
neighbors by making membership in the Catholic Church a prerequisite for 
holding local elective office. As a result, many mayors, plenipotentiaries, 
and village elders converted to retain their posts. When the authorities 
refused to confirm the converted officials in their positions and installed 
Orthodox candidates in their place, the latter became targets and casualties 
of popular violence. Meanwhile, the agricultural employers of the region, 
almost uniformly Polish and Roman Catholic, openly discriminated against 
Orthodox farm workers in hiring, wage payments, and the granting of 
pasturing rights. And where employers failed to discriminate, crowds of 
Catholic villagers frequently blocked Orthodox laborers from working on 
nearby estates .  By December the Orthodox minority in Sied1ce Province 
was said to be "in a state of near panic" as a result of rumors of " im­
pending pogroms" against them.32 
If civil administration was breaking down throughout the Kingdom, in 
the Lithuanian counties of Suwalki Province it collapsed altogether. From 
early November to mid-December 1 905, provincial authorities recorded no 
fewer than seventy-five armed attacks, including several cases of arson, on 
local administrative offices, courts, primary schools, vodka retail outlets, 
and headquarters of the Land Guard.33 In Wylkowyszki County, all twenty­
four members of the rural police had to be transferred to the county seat 
for their personal safety, and troop strength was deemed sufficient only in 
the towns. In the abandoned countryside, gmina assemblies openly declared 
their independence from state taxation and threatened death to police and 
gendarmes who dared to appear at their meetings. Everywhere Russian 
32 .  AGAD KGGW 2527, Siedlce Governor to the WGG, November 24 (December 7), 1 9°5 ; 
see also Robert Blobaum, "Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife: The Struggle between 
Catholics and Orthodox Christians in the Chehn Region of Russian Poland, 1 904-1906, " 
Polish Review 35, 2 ( 1 990) : 1 20-123 .  
33 .  AGAD KGGW 345 , Summary Reports of  the Suwalki Governor' s  Office for November 
and December 1 905. 
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signs and portraits of the imperial family were vandalized and destroyed 
by Lithuanian armed bands, who also carried out acts of expropriation 
against preponderantly Polish landowners and parish priests.34 On Decem­
ber 1 5,  after dozens of "disorders" over a five-day period, Skalon 
requested permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to reimpose 
martial law in Wladyslawow, Wylkowyszki, Kawalaria, and Mariampol 
counties, which had fallen victim to a "complete anarchy" fanned by the 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party.35 Two days later, the tsar approved 
the restoration of military rule in these counties inhabited by a majority of 
Lithuanians, whose "days of freedom" proved even more short-lived than 
for the tsar's other subjects in Russian Poland. 
In retrospect, the renewed resort to a "state of war" in Suwalki Province 
on December 1 7  served as a mere prelude to the reimposition of martial 
law throughout the Kingdom of Poland. Within four days, all ten provinces 
were returned to military rule while Skalon lobbied St. Petersburg for even 
greater emergency powers . Shocked by the near collapse of state authority 
which accompanied the first experience with martial law, both in its pre­
cipitous imposition and its equally precipitous lifting, Skalon and the mil­
itary governors took to their task with far greater seriousness of purpose 
the second time around. If, in its first enactment, martial law had been 
called upon to defeat the movement for Polish autonomy, it now faced the 
even more formidable challenge of restoring basic law and order. And 
while the first, mild dose of martial law had managed to kill the prospects 
for a self-governing Kingdom in the course of three weeks, it would take 
several years of sweeping repressive measures to restore the confidence of 
provincial authorities and to permit a return to civilian administration. 
The Rule of the Provisional Governors-General 
The period of military rule, which lasted in varying degrees until 1 909, 
extends beyond the strict chronological confines of this book. Even with 
the extension of a restored civilian administration to all ten provinces in 
the middle of that year, parts of the Kingdom still remained under "civil­
ian" forms of emergency rule in 19 14, when the outbreak of the Great 
War created a new and far different challenge to the maintenance of Rus­
sian power in the Kingdom. Nevertheless, because the goals of martial law 
34. AGAD KGGW 2524, Suwalki Governor to the County Chiefs, December 3 ( 1 6), 1 905, 
and Report of the SDPA to the WGG, December 5 ( 1 8), 1 905 . 
35 .  Kalabiitski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, pp. 378-38 1 .  
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were largely accomplished by 1 907, a discussion of the salient features of 
military rule is in order. 
As in November, the reimposition of martial law resulted in the transfer 
of all civil and military authority in the provinces to ten "provisional" 
military governors-general .36 Martial law vested these military governors, 
usually district commanders, with sweeping administrative, police, and ju­
dicial powers exercised under the scrutiny of the Warsaw governor-general 
in his dual capacity as commander of the Warsaw Military Region. 
Although the provisional governors-general delegated certain of their re­
sponsibilities to the civilian provincial governors " in the aim of restoring 
order as quickly as possible, "  there were few cases of competing and 
conflicting jurisdictions.3? On their own initiative, the provisional military 
governors could issue binding decrees and, in the event of their violation, 
administer maximum sentences of three months in jail and fines of three 
thousand rubles without referring to the courts or, for that matter, to the 
Warsaw governor-general. 
These "normal" repressive measures were supplemented by the nearly 
dictatorial powers entrusted to the Warsaw governor-general, particularly 
through his exercise of Articles 1 2 and 1 9  of the emergency statutes af­
fecting territories under a " state of war. " Under Article 1 9, in cases in­
volving armed opposition to the authorities, attacks on police, military, and 
public officials, premeditated armed assaults on private property, and the 
looting, robbery, and theft of public property, the Warsaw governor-general 
could deprive citizens of all rights and transfer their cases to the military 
courts. Upon a guilty verdict from the latter, the Kingdom' s  chief military 
and civilian official was then empowered to impose the death sentence. 
Article 1 2  permitted the Warsaw governor-general to dispense with the 
military courts and impose capital punishment without any trial so as to 
respond quickly to political murder, attempted assassinations and their 
preparation, and all activity "aimed at terrorizing the authorities and the 
population. ' '38 
36. Later subdivisions were created in Radom and Piotrkow provinces in the course of 1 906, 
leading to the appointment of two additional provisional govemors-general. 
37. One such instance involved the submission of police protocols of evidence in criminal 
cases to the judicial authorities, which was still required by martial law statutes and upheld 
by the Warsaw governor-general; see AGAD KGGW 2585, WGG to the Provisional 
Governors-General, February 7 (20), 1 906. 
38. For Skalon' s  own understanding of Articles 12 and 1 9, see AGAD KGGW 2584, Cir­
cular of the WGG to the Provisional Governors-General, November 7 (20), 1 905, and 2585, 
WGG to the Provisional Governor-General of Opatow, Ilia, KOIlskie, and Sandomierz Coun­
ties in Radom Province, January 1 ( 14), 1 906. 
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From the beginning, Skalon sought to limit the restrictions that St. Pe­
tersburg, through the person of Prime Minister Witte, might place on the 
exercise of his extraordinary powers, while never tiring of reminding the 
provisional governors-general of his exclusive prerogatives. With the reim­
position of martial law on December 22, Skalon' s  right to exercise Article 
1 9  was initially confined by the exclusion of six instances otherwise spec­
ified by statute.39 This limitation, together with early reports from the prov­
inces that the "normal" repressive measures imposed by the provisional 
governors-general were having little immediate effect, prompted Skalon to 
lobby the Ministry of Internal Affairs for "strong repressive measures" to 
accompany martial law. Lifting the restrictions on his exercise of Article 
1 9  and the liberal resort to Article 1 2 ,  according to the Warsaw governor­
general, was "the only way to restore internal order. "40 Such arguments 
convinced Minister P. N. Durnovo, who on January 1 2 ,  1 906, informed 
Skalon of his "guaranteed support" for "all severe and decisive meas­
ures" to restore order in the Kingdom.41 
Having received Durnovo' s telegram, Skalon proceeded on the same day 
to order the execution of the Piekalski brothers, workers of the Saturn 
Mining Company, held in connection with the murder of a member of the 
Land Guard, and of Jan Markowski, for the killing of the Lublin station­
master.42 Three days later, thirteen anarchist-communists from the Inter­
national group were executed by firing squad in Warsaw. Before the month 
was out, twenty-four persons, mainly anarchists, had been sentenced to 
death by administrative fiat.43 
For Count Witte, who had already sought to restrain the arbitrary ex­
ercise of the prerogatives granted Skalon by the martial law statutes, the 
executions in Poland constituted an abuse of power. Fearful that Skalon' s  
actions would turn moderate Russian opinion against his government and 
undermine the fledgling constitutional experiment, Witte successfully out­
flanked Durnovo in convincing the tsar on February 1 9  to suspend the 
Warsaw governor-general ' s  application of Article 1 2  and to restore the 
earlier restrictions on his exercise of Article 19 .44 These restraints on Ska-
39. AGAD KOOW 2585, Circular of the WOO to the Provincial Governors, December 8 
(2 1 ), 1 905 . 
40. Kalabinski, Carat i klasy posiadajqce, pp. 399-401 .  
4 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2585, Minister of Internal Affairs to the WGG, December 30 (January 
1 2), 1 906. 
42. Kalabmski, Carat i klasy posiadaj�ce, pp. 42 1 ,  423. 
43 . Herman Rappaport, ed. ,  Anarchizm i anarchiici na ziemiach polskich do 1914 roku 
(Warsaw, 1 98 1 ), pp. 24-25, 27-28 .  
44. Ibid., p .  30. 
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George Skalon, Warsaw Governor-General from August 1 905 to February 1 9 1 4. 
(Muzeum Niepodleglosci 3597 1 )  
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lon, however, proved short-lived. With Witte ' s  fall from grace several 
weeks later, followed by the ascendancy of Peter Stolypin in the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and then as head of the government, Skalon had little 
trouble in restoring his prerogatives. Thereupon, the Warsaw governor­
general ' s  right to resort to Article 1 2  was loudly proclaimed as a public 
warning but exercised only once more, in September 1 907, when eight 
socialists were executed for the murder of a L6dZ industrialist. 
Skalon's  subsequent self-restraint in his use of Article 1 2  is explained, 
in part, by the introduction in Poland of the field courts-martial, legal 
justification for which was provided by Article 87 in Stolypin' s  revision 
of the empire ' s  Fundamental Laws after the dissolution of the Second 
Duma. For Skalon's  purpose in the Kingdom, this legal mechanism com­
bined the semblance of due process with the means to respond quickly to 
crimes against the state. Accordingly, in all localities under martial law, 
civilians accused of a crime who otherwise would have been tried by a 
regular military court under Article 1 9  could be turned over to a provisional 
"field" court, established on an ad hoc basis and made up of a chairman 
and four officers. The accused were to be tried within twenty-four hours 
of their arrest, with sentences passed no later than forty-eight hours after 
the court had convened. The proceedings were to be entirely secret, and 
the sentence, once submitted to and approved by the commander of the 
military region (in the Kingdom's  case, the Warsaw governor-general), was 
to be executed within twenty-four hours of its pronouncement. Needless 
to say, procedures and the administration of punishment became quick and 
simplified, meeting the requirements of both summary justice and the rights 
of the accused to a " triaL " The field courts were therefore made to order 
for Skalon, and ideal blending of Articles 1 2  and 19 ,  which shielded him 
from accusations of arbitrary action while maintaining the full range of his 
emergency powers . 
To argue that the field courts were extremely active in Russian Poland 
would be an understatement. The interwar socialist and historian Adam 
Pr6chnik studied the 347 cases and 1 , 1 68 accused persons tried by the field 
courts in the Kingdom in 1 908, the year for which he found the most 
complete documentation. Unfortunately for the contemporary historian, the 
data retrieved by Pr6chnik, embracing the courts ' verdicts and sentences 
in 76 percent of the cases, are no longer extant. Nevertheless, of the 885 
individual verdicts and sentences examined by Pr6chnik, 391 resulted in 
the death sentence. Of these, 1 7 1  were subsequently commuted by the 
Warsaw governor-general to life sentences in hard-labor prisons. We are 
therefore left with a minimum of 1 20 executions (there may have been as 
many as 150) by verdict of the field courts in Russian Poland in 1 908 
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alone, which amounted to slightly less than 1 1 percent (and perhaps as 
much as 14 percent) of all such executions in the entire Russian Empire 
between 1906 and 1 9 14.45 
Although the loudly proclaimed purpose of the field courts was " to fight 
terror with terror, " only 40 percent of the cases examined by Prochnik 
involved accusations of subversive political activity (terrorist actions, 
armed expropriations, political assassinations). By party affiliation, of those 
accused of political crimes against the state, 1 67 belonged of the PPS,  10 1 
to the SDKPiL, and 63 to anarchist organizations of various hues. They 
were joined, in descending order, by 22 Bundists, 1 3  Zionists, and one 
member of the National Workers' Union. The majority of those brought 
before the field courts, however, were accused of violent, but nonpolitical, 
criminal offenses. Here, Prochnik' s  data confirm the dramatic upsurge in 
the activity of criminal gangs at the end of the revolution discussed in 
Chapter 6 .  
Although the activity of the field courts and the application of the " Sto­
lypin necktie " in Russian Poland appear in bold relief against the backdrop 
of the empire as a whole, their effectiveness against the state ' s  political 
enemies-and violent criminal bands, for that matter-ultimately de­
pended on the success of the " normal" repressive measures of the 
provisional governors-general in restoring order among the general popu­
lation. In the first weeks of reimposed martial law at the end of 1905 and 
the beginning of 1 906, these measures only served to encourage popular 
rebellion in large parts of the Kingdom, especially in Suwalki, Radom, 
Kielce, and Siedlce provinces, which in tum caused the excitable Warsaw 
governor-general to lose patience quickly. Over the long term, however it 
was the punitive action of the provisional governors-general, rather than 
the extraordinary powers demanded by Skalon, that restored Russian state 
authority in the Kingdom. 
Foremost among the concerns of the martial law governors was the 
illegal possession, sale, and purchase of firearms. Weapons smuggling had 
already reached epidemic proportions in the first months of 1 905 when the 
first steps were taken to control their further proliferation by banning all 
sales of firearms and ammunition.46 Subsequent confiscations of illegally 
possessed or sold firearms during the course of 1 905-in Lublin Province 
45. Pr6chnik, Studia z dziej6w polskiego ruchu robotniczego, pp. 527-556. The total of 
1 , 102 executions for the empire as a whole for the duration of the field courts is taken from 
Alfred Levin, The Second Duma: A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian 
Constitutional Experiment, 2d ed. (Hamden, Conn., 1 966), p. 26 1 .  
46. APW ZOW 1078, Directive of the WGG of March 1 8  (3 1) , 1 905 . 
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alone there were more than four hundred documented cases47-had little 
real impact. When, at the end of December, the provisional governor­
general of Siedlce Province reported that "almost the entire population" 
of the town of Ryki in Gawrolin County was armed, he was hardly ex­
aggerating.48 His counterparts could and did make similar claims, whether 
for the northern counties of Kielce Province, whose inhabitants were said 
to provide arms to terrorist bands; the peasants of Janow County in Lublin 
Province who provided arms to militias to protect their villages from the 
rumored, impending attacks of "Black Hundreds" ;  or factory workers in 
Radom, where two battalions conducted mass searches for illegal weap­
ons.49 
Disarming the general population thus became the first priority of the 
martial law governors. Of the 1 65 cases that came before the provisional 
governor-general of Piotrkow Province for administrative sentencing be­
tween April 1 2  and May 1 2 ,  1 906, more than one-third (57) involved illegal 
possession of firearms, explosive devices, and other weapons. The sen­
tences for illegal weapons possession in the most urban and industrialized 
of the Polish provinces during this period nearly doubled those in the next­
highest of the thirteen categories of martial law violations-participation 
in illegal meetings (30). The remaining categories included strike agitation 
(20), possession of illegal publications ( 1 8), disruption of trade and com­
merce (9), illegal solicitation (8), distribution and posting of illegal pub­
lications (8), illegal street sales of newspapers (5), resisting authorities (3), 
anti-duma agitation (3), participation in street demonstrations (2), tearing 
down government publications ( I ) , and gmina agitation ( 1 ).50 
Illegal weapons possession, however, was an even greater problem in 
rural areas. Between January 1 0  and March 1 9, 1 906, the provisional 
governor-general of Kielce Province handed down 204 administrative sen­
tences for various martial law infractions. Of these, 140 cases could be 
adequately documented, and nearly half of them (65) involved the illegal 
carrying and possession of weapons, mainly firearms. Moreover, of the 73 
47.  APL KGL 1 905 : 1 2 1 .  
48. AGAD KGGW 2527, Provisional Governor-General o f  Siedlce Province to the WGG, 
December 15 (28), 1 905 . 
49. AGAD KGGW 2509, Provisional Governor-General of Kielce Province to the WGG, 
December 20, 1 905 (January 2, 1 906); 25 15 ,  Provisional Governor-General of Lublin Prov­
ince to the WGG, December 24, 1 905 (January 6, 1 906); and 252 1 ,  Telegram of the Pro­
visional Governor-General of Radom Province to the WGG, December 29, 1 905 (January 
I I ,  1 906). 
50. APL TGGP 4, Administrative Sentences of the Provisional Governor-General of Piotr­
k6w Province, March 30 (April 1 2) to April 30 (May 1 2), 1 905 . 
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Street arrests in Warsaw, 1 906. (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 35887) 
sentences between February 20 and March 1 9, 42 (nearly 60 percent) con­
cerned weapons charges.5 1 
But the main purpose of the military governors was not so much the 
punishment of those arrested as the reduction of the number of weapons 
in circulation and the prevention of their falling into the hands of the 
fighting organizations of the political parties. An examination of twenty­
four sentences by the Kielce provisional governor-general for weapons 
violations between March 8 and March 2 1 ,  1 906, reveals unexpectedly 
light punishments, far removed from the maximums of three months in jail 
and fines of three thousand rubles permitted by martial law statutes .  Only 
twice were persons sentenced to more than a couple of weeks in jail, and 
the highest fine imposed was twenty-five rubles .52 Yet for a peasant whose 
illegal possession of a hunting rifle had led to arrest, several days in jail 
during spring planting, coupled with a fine of ten rubles, could and did 
have a significant economic impact. Already by early summer, the specter 
5 1 .  APK TGGK 2 I ,  22I, 22II, 23 ,  23A, and 74. 
52 .  APK TGGK 23A. 
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of an armed population sustaining terrorist bands had been put to rest 
through effective measures of confiscation, interdiction, and deterrence. 
Viewed from below, the principal goal of martial law was to drive a 
wedge between the general population and the opposition political move­
ments. The imperial Russian version of divide-and-rule, as it applied to the 
Polish provinces, rested on the principle of collective responsibility. In the 
first place, the extraordinary expenditures necessitated by military rule were 
covered by special levies imposed on the towns and gminy. Although re­
liable data are available only for Lublin Province, such assessments for the 
first two months of 1 906 amounted to more than two thousand rubles. 
Although the average levy of thirty-five rubles per gmina does not sound 
like a large sum, when extended over the duration of martial law, it con­
stituted a major drain on already strapped community budgets. Within a 
couple of months, the treasuries of several gminy could no longer contrib­
ute their "fair share" to martial law government in Lublin Province, so 
Skalon simply imposed higher charges on the townS.53 
One reason community resources were so strained was that the popu­
lation was also made financially liable for all damage to state and private 
property. This principle, applied only occasionally in November 1905 , 
mainly in Radom Province, now applied to the entire Kingdom. Such li­
ability could vary widely with the losses suffered: from the 1 ,89 1 rubles 
levied retroactively on the town of Bialobrzegi in Radom Province for 
damages resulting from "rioting and looting" on November 1 2  and 1 3 , 
1 905, to the less than 1 5  rubles demanded from the villagers of Czartyszew 
in Kielce Province as their share of responsibility for the robbery of the 
Lopyszno gmina treasury.54 Actual collection, regardless of the sums in­
volved, frequently required the use of military force. In Suwalki Province, 
where Lithuanian gminy were particularly recalcitrant in paying taxes, let 
alone fines, authorities warned in early January 1 906 that all resistance 
would be treated as insurgency, with arrested persons to be tried by courts­
martial . Nevertheless, the chief of Mariampol County, although accompa­
nied by dragoons, managed to collect a mere five rubles in his entire 
jurisdiction. Jn Wylkowyszki County, authorities managed to collect two 
hundred rubles, but only when they went for the economic jugular by 
sequestering peasant livestock-and even then, the local population boy­
cotted state attempts to auction the sequestered property. After January 20, 
the martial law authorities in Suwalki Province were forced to resort to 
53.  APL KGL 1 905 :25412 and 1906: 1 36. 
54. AGAD KGGW 2520, Radom Governor to the WGG, February 22  (March 7), 1 906; 
APK TGGK 7, Kielce Governor to the Chief of Kielce County, October I I  (24), 1 906. 
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additional punitive measures, including flogging, to collect taxes and 
fines.55 
It proved equally difficult for the authorities to convince communities 
to cooperate actively with the authorities in defending state property. When 
the inhabitants of Pruszk:ow in Warsaw County were assigned responsibil­
ity for the security of a state vodka outlet, the village assembly " illegally" 
resolved to close it down.56 In Lublin County, gmina assemblies were sim­
ilarly uncooperative, and this despite a good deal of official arm-twisting 
of the sort successful in neighboring Lubartow and Bilgoraj counties. Here, 
the local population "continually" refused to provide "volunteers" for 
" security units" of night watchmen at gmina administration offices, to 
finance jail maintenance, or to hire new guards.57 
Eventually, however, the principle of collective responsibility succeeded 
in its main goal of eroding the social base that had provided support to the 
state ' s  revolutionary political opponents, especially in the countryside. Ac­
cordingly, once a semblance of order had been restored among rural in­
habitants, the state demonstrated a more flexible, even charitable, attitude 
in dealing with the villages.  Already in early April 1 906, the military gov­
ernor of Piotrkow Province, on the advice of his civilian counterpart, re­
scinded a fine of 642 rubles levied on the gmina of Popien.58 Sentences 
were suspended against persons arrested earlier for gmina action agitation 
in those areas where " the use of the state language has been restored and 
the mood of the population pacified. " 59 Similarly, gmina officials exiled 
for proclaiming their solidarity with the gmina action movement were al­
lowed to return to their places of residence. Peasants, arrested for various 
martial law infractions, were released to return to spring field work. Fines 
and sentences, especially for minor violations of martial law, were sub­
stantially reduced, by Skalon' s  order, beginning in February 1 906. Martial 
law excesses and the abuse of power now came under the highest scrutiny, 
as in the ' case of the gmina of Skarbiewo in Warsaw Province, which had 
been subjected to successive three-thousand-ruble fines as well as requi­
sitioning and where the protests of the gmina assembly eventually led to 
55.  AGAD KGGW 2524, Provisional Governor-General of Suwalki Province to the WGG, 
December 20, 1 905 (January 2, 1 906), and Suwalki Governor to the WGG, December 3 1 ,  
1 905 (January 1 3 ,  1 906). 
56. APW WGZZ 1 724, Chief of the Gendarmes in Warsaw, Nowominsk, and Radzymin 
Counties to the Chief of the Warsaw Provincial Gendarmes, March 9 (22), 1 906. 
57. APL KGL 1 906:47i, Chief of Bilgoraj County to the Lublin Governor, June 28 (July 
I I ), 1 906, and Chief of Lublin County to the Lublin Governor, June 1 7  (30), 1 906. 
58. APL TGGP 3, Provisional Governor-General of Piotrkow Province to the Chief of Brze­
ziny County, March 1 9  (April I) ,  1 906. 
59. AGAD KGGW 25 1 7, Memorandum of the Director of the Chancellory of the WGG, 
April 12 (25), 1 906. 
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the dismissal of the chief of Plonsk County.60 By the end of November, 
repressive measures of rural tax and fine collection came to an official 
end.61 
While the government attempted by such means to neutralize the rural 
population, it also moved to beef up the police, whose weakness in both 
numbers and morale had played a major part in the near collapse of state 
authority at the end of 1 905 . During the course of 1 906, the number of 
police functionaries more than doubled, from approximately 4,700 at the 
beginning of the year to nearly 10,000 by early 1 907.62 In Lublin Province, 
where complete data are available, the Land Guard was increased from 
388 members at the beginning of 1 905 to 557 members in December 1 906, 
leaving it still short of the projected rural police force of 660. Nevertheless, 
the composition of the police according to nationality did not change, as 
"Roman Catholics" (i .e . ,  Poles) continued to make up less than 10 percent 
of the Land Guard. The preponderantly "Orthodox" Land Guard remained 
an alien force.63 
By the summer of 1 906, if not earlier, the state had clearly restored 
order among the population at large. The countryside had been effectively 
pacified, and in urban-industrial areas the strike movement had subsided 
dramatically. Armed bands continued to wage a campaign of political ter­
ror, but with obviously diminishing effects and with less and less popular 
support, as the authorities themselves acknowledged when Skalon lifted 
the ban on the sale and possession of firearms by "law-abiding" citizens 
in the late spring.64 The state had won its "war," and many of the desid­
erata for the proclamation, or, more accurately, the reimposition, of martial 
law in December 1 905 had been satisfied. Why, then, did the "state of 
war" remain in effect, indeed, for another three years? 
This question assumes added poignancy when it is realized that Skalon 
himself broached the question with his subordinates as early as March 
1906. The compilation of the responses of the provisional govemors-
60. AGAD KGGW 2609, Minister of Internal Affairs to the WGG, January 28 (February 
I I ), 1 906; Provisional Governor-General of Warsaw Province to the WGG, February 8 (2 1 )  
and March I I  (24), 1 906; Warsaw Governor to the WGG, March 7 (20), 1 906; WGG to 
the Warsaw Governor, March 5 ( 1 8), 1 906; and Protocol of the Gmina Assembly of Skar­
biewo, March 1 0, 1 906 (N.S.) .  
6 1 .  AGAD KGGW 2585, Circulars of the WGG to the Provisional Governors-General, 
January 23 (February 5), 1 906, and November 1 6  (29), 1 906. 
62. Jerzy Paj�, Organizacje bojowe partii politycznych w Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1904-1911  
(Warsaw, 1 985), pp. 1 22-1 23 .  
63 .  APL KGL 1 905 :64 and 1 906:94. 
64. APL KGL 1 906: 17 ,  Lublin Governor to the County Chiefs and the Lublin Chief of 
Police, May I I  (24), 1 906; Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, Czwarte powstanie czy 
pierwsza rewolucja: Lata 1905-1907 na ziemiach polskich, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1976), p. 402 .  
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general by Skalon' s  chancellory reveals a near unanimity of opinion op­
posed to an early lifting of martial law. Only the military governor of Plock 
Province favorably considered the possibility. In stark contrast, the Piotr­
kow provisional governor-general was "decisively against" a return to 
civilian rule, which was also considered "completely impossible" by his 
counterpart in Warsaw Province. Such adamancy is understandable, given 
the relative instability that still afflicted the Kingdom' s  two most urbanized 
and industrialized provinces. But the military governors of the remaining 
and predominantly rural provinces also argued for postponement: until after 
the elections to the First Duma (the LOrnZa, Kalisz, and Kielce provisional 
governors-general), or until after the actual convening of the Duma (the 
Suwalki provisional governor-general), or until after the completion of 
spring field work (the Lublin provisional governor-general).65 The prevail­
ing opinion that the time was not right, that the lifting of martial law would 
be " premature, "  requires brief explanation. 
Fear of terrorism undoubtedly contributed to the extreme caution of the 
martial law officials, especially in March 1 906, when the activity of armed 
bands was peaking. Slightly more than a year later, however, when most 
of these bands had been liquidated, there would be no renewed discussion 
of the possibility of returning to civilian rule. More significant was the 
bitter experience of lifting martial law after a mere three weeks in Novem­
ber 1905, which had helped bring on the popular revolutionary upsurge, 
especially in the countryside, and an unprecedented destabilization of Rus­
sian authority in the Polish provinces. Fearful of repeating that mistake, 
the Warsaw governor-general and his subordinates now erred on the far 
side of caution, even though the situation had changed in fundamental ways 
since the previous December. This overreaction, induced by the alarm of 
recent memory, paralyzed any proclivity within Skalon' s  administration to 
think in bolder political terms, whether in March 1906 or after the various 
scenarios outlined by the military governors as the year wore on. This 
political paralysis, most unfortunately, would freeze the Kingdom in a 
" state of war" long after any conceivable justification for its continuation. 
When the country was finally freed from the rigors of military rule several 
years later, many of the gains from the revolutionary era had been lost. 
Lost, but not necessarily irretrievable . Beyond denying the Kingdom 
statutory political autonomy, martial law in subsequent years did much to 
arrest, if not reverse, the development of civil society. That society, which 
65. Kalabiitski, Carat i klasy posiadajQce, pp. 456--461 .  
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had emerged in piecemeal fashion at the end of the �ineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth, perhaps had been brought to premature 
blossom by the revolution. Like a warm, early, but also stormy spring, the 
revolution fostered the sudden cropping out of a multitude of associations, 
societies, and organizations, many of them with roots in the underground, 
while it transformed others already legally and publicly in existence. These 
bodies, intermediate between state and society, whether in the form of 
political parties, trade unions, professional associations, cooperatives, cul­
tural and educational organizations, or communal assemblies, were 
strained, sometimes violently, by a too-rapid growth and by the pressures 
of popular participation, in unprecedented numbers, by many whose only 
experience had been that of subjects, and not that of citizens. Ambiguous 
and uncertain state policies,  alternating between forced acquiescence and 
repression throughout 1 905, further destabilized conditions under which 
both the notion and the phenomenon of citizenship struggled to express 
and consolidate themselves. 
Independence, whether in the form of territorial political autonomy or a 
separate state existence, was not necessarily a precondition for the further 
and healthy development of civil society in Russian Poland. Far more in­
dispensable were legal guarantees and recognition of intermediate, auton­
omous, and public institutions and organizations, regardless of the state or 
governing structure providing them. In this sense, the March 1 906 " pro­
visional" laws on unions and associations were the best available means 
for the nurturing and consolidation, under the stabilizing conditions of ex­
tended experience, of the fragile flowers of civil society in Russian Poland 
which had taken various forms, as well as many deformities, during the 
revolution. 
Yet despite the existence of the March laws, together with other, earlier 
state concessions affecting religious toleration, rural self-government, pub­
lic and private educational institutions, and proportional political represen­
tation of the Polish provinces in the Russian State Duma, martial law in 
the Kingdom, as a result of its long duration, effectively undermined the 
very conditions made possible by these concessions for the further, peace­
ful, and stable development of civil society. This is where martial law, 
which by 1 907 could no longer be justified by its original intentions of 
restoring order in Russian Poland, caused real social damage. The subse­
quent and prolonged night frost of military rule, lifted only in stages be­
tween 1909 and the outbreak of the Great War, became the extended 
experience, rather than that promised in the October Manifesto and the 
March laws, under which the remaining offshoots of civil society in Rus­
sian Poland now struggled to survive. 
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Many did not make it. Two political parties, the PPS-Proletariat and the 
Polish People ' s  Union, were eliminated by 1 907 . The main parties consti­
tuting the socialist movement-the two factions of the PPS, the SDKPiL, 
and the Bund-although they survived the aftermath of the revolution, 
were crippled by mass arrests, declining memberships, and further frag­
mentation. The nationalist movement, despite its now-thorough rejection 
of revolutionary means, fared little better in the political climate created 
by martial law, especially after Stolypin' s  constitutional revisions denied 
the population of Russian Poland proportional representation in the State 
Duma. Even the Association of Christian Workers, which never claimed 
the status of a political party, as well as its competitor, the conservative 
Catholic Union, suffered under the intense scrutiny, restrictions, and ha­
rassment of the state authorities. Revolutionary or not, these organizations 
were repressed simply because they engaged, or were perceived to engage, 
in politics, an autonomous activity that the still-autocratic Russian state 
was not altogether willing to concede to the tsar 's  subjects in Poland, even 
at the local level. Hence, zemstvo-style assemblies and elected municipal 
councils would never be extended to Russian Poland. Although legally 
recognized political parties would continue to exist, together with those 
that retreated to the underground, they were rendered largely incapable of 
acting politically. 
Political parties and organizations were not the only institutions of civil 
society that struggled to survive martial law. Trade unions and professional 
associations, despite their disavowal of party ties as required by the March 
laws, shared the fate of the mass political organizations. As a consequence 
of their political inspiration and, more significantly, of their potential as 
bases for recruitment into the political parties, Skalon' s  martial law gov­
ernment between 1 907 and 19 10  not only rendered the process of regis­
tering new unions and associations virtually impossible but closed down 
even more whose statutes had earlier been approved, including twenty­
three in L6dZ alone.66 For similar reasons, many of the promising inde­
pendent educational and cultural initiatives and organizations discussed in 
Chapter 5, including the Polska Macierz Szkolna, the University for AIr, 
�d the Swiatlo circles,  were all suppressed. The periodical press, which 
had mushroomed toward the end of the revolution after the lifting of pre­
ventive censorship, too, was never permitted to realize its potential to act 
as a civic forum for the exchange of opinion on important political and 
66. Ignacy Orzechowski and Aleksander Kochanski, Zarys dziej6w ruchu zawodowego w 
Kr6lestwie Polskim, 1905-1918 (Warsaw, 1 964), pp. 1 56--1 82 ;  Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, 
LOdi w latach rewolucji 1905-1907 (L6dZ, 1 975), p. 345 . 
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  M A R T I A L  L A W  
social issues. Already in 1 906, forty-one periodicals of wide-ranging di­
versity were closed down in Warsaw.67 Even the seemingly innocuous co­
operative movement under the aegis of the Association of Christian 
Workers encountered a most uncooperative state. Of the 1 60 cooperative 
stores created in L6dZ under its sponsorship, not a single one had survived 
by 1 9 10.68 
Still, state repression of the would-be institutions of civil society was 
not indiscriminate. Ironically, some even grew and developed. Foremost 
among these were the gmina assemblies. Despite the political activization 
of the communes during the revolution and disregarding all evidence to 
the contrary, the state continued to view the peasantry as essentially apo­
litical, if not a base of social support for imperial rule. Convinced both by 
their own attribution of the gmina action movement to outside agitation 
and of the efficacy of concessions to bilingualism in rural self-government 
and primary education, state officials pursued policies in the Polish coun­
tryside that alternated between lenience and negligence. After the 
restoration of order in rural areas, some repressive measures were sus­
pended, and peasants arrested on martial law violations were released. 
Then, having established by those measures that rural self-government and 
primary schools would adhere to the recently established rules of bilin­
gualism, the state essentially turned its back on the gminy, which enabled 
communal institutions to carve out areas for real local self-government. 
For example, the gminy displayed considerable initiative in expanding the 
network of elementary schools in the countryside, especially in the last two 
years before the outbreak of World War I, and, even more significantly, 
in the absence of any tangible financial assistance from the state. 
A second example, again drawn from the countryside but also from pro­
vincial towns, is the uninterrupted growth of the volunteer firemen' s  move­
ment. The associations of volunteer firemen had not been inactive during 
the revolution. One need only recall the peaceful proc\!ssions and demon­
strations of November and December 1 905, accompanied by the "orches­
tras" of volunteer firemen intoning "Boze cos Polsk�" and from whose 
ranks came the marshalls who, far more than the despised rural police, 
maintained public order. Despite the role of volunteer firemen as civic and, 
therefore, political leaders in their local communities, including their par­
ticipation in gmina action, their associations were also of irreplaceable 
67. Halina Kiepurska, Inteligencja zawodowa Warszawy, 1905-1907 (Warsaw, 1 967), p. 
338 .  
68. Wladyslaw Lech Karwacki, Zwi�zki zawodowe i stowarszyszenia pracodawcow w Lodzi. 
(L6dZ, 1 972), pp. 372-389. 
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"Freedom of the Press , "  Political cartoon from I 906, (Muzeum Niepodleglosci 
37°79) 
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social and economic utility. Although the state remained skeptical of the 
volunteer firemen, its unwillingness or inability to commit its own re­
sources to fighting fires outside the major urban areas left it little choice 
but to tolerate the proliferation of the associations. Thus between 1900 and 
1 9 1  I ,  the number of volunteer firemen' s  organizations increased from 128  
to 452,  and ultimately to 557 associations on the eve of  the Great War.69 
Because other independent and autonomous initiatives in the country­
side, including agricultural circles and rural cooperatives, similarly pros­
pered, the balance sheet for civil society does not look nearly as bleak, 
especially in the light of the fact that the majority of the population of 
Russian Poland continued to live and work in rural areas. Yet even in the 
major urban and industrial centers, though institutions important for the 
development of civil society may have been emasculated, they were never 
completely uprooted and destroyed. Even at the height of Skalon' s  repres­
sive military rule, political parties, trade unions, associations, and inde­
pendent publications continued to exist, sometimes beyond the legal 
margins, but · also within them. Once martial law was lifted, and despite 
the continuation of lesser forms of emergency rule, these urban-based in­
stitutions of civil society displayed a remarkable capacity for revival and 
expansion between 1 9 1 1 and 1 9 1 4. 
How, then, does one weigh the ill fortunes of a political party, incapac­
itated by the arrest of its leaders in the summer of 1907, against the si­
multaneous legal registration of an organization like the Society for the 
Advancement of Equal Rights of Polish Women or the appearance of a 
volunteer firemen' s  association in a few locality? Even a partial answer 
will require extensive social research and creative analytic approaches to 
the postrevolutionary period in Russian Poland. Yet given the preoccupa­
tion of the historiographic literature with narrowly defined political out­
comes, there is some satisfaction in raising the question. 
69. J6zef Ryszard Szaflik, Dzieje ochotniczych straiy poiamych (Warsaw, 1 985), pp. 1 78-
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